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research methodology, the con trib utors focus on the different religious, polit ical 
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comparative explanation of veiling regimes. 
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Framing and regulating the veil 
An introduction 
Sieglinde Rosenberger and Birgit Sauer 
Context and aims of the book 
Since the 2000s, veiling practices, that is the covering of women’s hair and the 
covering of face and body, have been heavily discussed all over Europe. Origin­
ally, the controversies started with the enforcement of a headscarf ban in Turkey 
in the 1990s, followed by a law that forbids the wearing of ‘conspicuous reli­
gious signs’ in schools in France in 2004. As a highly vis ible symbol of religious 
and cultural dif fer ence displayed by Muslim women, the Islamic headscarf has 
been the subject not only of disputes and claims, but also subjected to new legis­
la tion and court de cisions at national and Euro pean levels. However, compared 
to the occurrence of fierce pub lic con tentions over the various meanings of the 
headscarf, it is surprising that policy makers in only a few nation states decided 
on restrictive headscarf regulations. Most notably France, some German federal 
states and Turkey introduced pro hibitive regulations, while other coun tries such 
as Austria, Denmark, Greece, the Neth er lands and the United Kingdom have 
stuck to non- regulation practices or even confirmed expli citly accommodating 
rules. Also, pro hibitive regulations are limited to specific social sites, mainly 
state institutions, and to specific groups of covered women, e.g. pupils, teachers 
or pub lic ser vants. Thus, the in tens ity and the positions towards the veil 
expressed in pub lic debates via the media differ from pol icy de cisions and 
legislation. 
However, in the previous years, the debates over Islamic body covering have 
changed: no longer is the headscarf the pri mary object of conflicts, but the so-
called burqa, the full face- and body- covering moved to the fore.1 Calls to ban 
the full face and body covering arose in the Neth er lands, in Ger many and 
Austria, in Switzerland, Italy and the UK. In 2010, pro hibitive regulations on the 
full body covering came into force in France and Belgium. In con sidera tion of 
these de velopments, it seems as if the politicization of the full veil has super­
seded the headscarf, in par ticu lar in coun tries with a lib eral, accommodative tra­
dition towards the wearing of the Islamic headscarf, as for instance the 
Neth er lands and the UK. 
All chapters in this volume strive for a sys tematic comparison of headscarf 















2  S. Rosenberger and B. Sauer 
meanings and regulation of Muslim headscarves. Moreover, the book intends to 
explain one common feature of all headscarf debates, namely the use of gen­
dered frames and/or the ref er ence to gender equality. The theor et ical and empiri­
cal research results presented in this book draw on the findings of the VEIL 
pro ject, funded in the sixth Euro pean research framework of the Euro pean Com­
mission from 2006 to 2009. The VEIL pro ject was a collaborative study which 
investigated diverging and converging pol icy approaches towards headscarves in 
eight Euro pean coun tries in a cross- national comparative method. Countries 
included in the VEIL pro ject were Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Ger many, 
the Neth er lands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In addition to the national 
per spect ives, the Euro pean level was included in the analysis. 
The selection of coun tries was inspired by a three fold typology of pol icy
approaches to the headscarf issue discussed in the liter at ure – restrictive legis­
la tion, accommodating rules and non- regulated practices (see Skjeie 2007;
Joppke 2009). Moreover, the coun try cases discussed in this book vary in
their his tor ically estab lished approaches to immigration as well as in their tra­
ditions of gender and anti- discrimination pol icies and are characterized by
different institutionalized types of state–church relations. Turkey is a very
inter esting case in terms of headscarf struggles, differing significantly from
the other seven coun tries. A coun try with a Muslim popu la tion and secular
consti tu tional prin ciples, Turkey has gained a lot of attention in Western
Euro pean soci eties, also with respect to its restrictive headscarf pol icies. A
chapter on Bulgaria is included in this volume; Bulgaria is an example of a
former state- socialist coun try with an autochthonous Muslim minor ity, which
has faced several headscarf conflicts in the last few years. Hence, this coun try
example illus trates some dif fer ences from established demo cra cies and EU
member states. 
In the last years, empirical research on how Euro pean coun tries accommodate 
religious and cultural diversity in gen eral and, in par ticu lar how the headscarf 
issue is regulated has been conducted (e.g. Fetzer and Soper 2005; Bader 2007; 
Klausen 2005; Scott 2007). To a large extent, this research is based on national 
case studies such as Altinordu (2004), Amiraux (2007), Berghahn (2004), Mush­
aben (2004, 2008) and Amir- Moazami (2005) on headscarf pol icies in Ger many, 
Göle (1997) and Saktanber (2002) for Turkey and Scott (2007), Bowen (2007) 
and Poulter (1997) for France. Moreover, a number of two- or three- country 
comparisons aim at explaining dif fer ences and simil ar ities in regulations, like 
Amir- Moazami (2007) and Joppke (2007, 2009) comparing France, Ger many 
and UK, Saharso (2006) comparing the Neth er lands with Ger many, and Skjeie’s 
(2007) comparison of Nordic coun tries. Also, a special issue of the journal 
Social Politics contains several coun try studies, some of them based on the VEIL 
pro ject (Social Politics 2008).
 The comparative liter at ure on the headscarf issue distinguishes three models 
of headscarf regulations across Europe (Skjeie 2007: 130): First, the pro hibitive 
approach advocating bans on all forms of Muslim body covering in pub lic insti­
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only to certain kinds of body covering such as full- face veils. Third, the non- 
restrictive, tolerant model where the wearing of head and body covering is not 
restricted (see also Joppke 2009). 
Against this research background, the VEIL pro ject refined the existing typol­
ogy of headscarf regimes in Europe. The typology in this volume distinguishes 
accommodating and pro hibitive regulations and cases of ‘non- regulation’. The 
authors in this volume argue that clustering coun tries along gen eral statements 
would not grasp reality adequately: the pic ture is much more complex than a 
three fold typology can cover. With regards to sites of regulation (e.g. state insti­
tutions or private business), to instruments of regulation (e.g. laws, decrees or 
court de cisions) and to types of religious attire, a much more soph istic ated vari­
ation is in place. In some coun tries, at some polit ical levels (regional or national), 
specific modes of regulation are estab lished for specific social sites and domains 
with pro hibitive con sequences (e.g. courts, schools and universities). In other 
coun tries non- restrictive pro posi tions are at work for all domains. Beside this, 
some legis la tion could be quali fied as tolerant: in other coun tries no regulation at 
all exists with regard to the wearing of the Islamic headscarf. Also, we have to 
distinguish different groups of women affected by a regulation (such as pupils, 
teachers or pub lic servants). 
The puzz ling question at the beginning of the research for this book was how 
to understand and explain the different pub lic debates and regulations on the 
headscarf issue across Euro pean coun tries. Hence, the two core aims of this book 
are to explain dif fer ences and simil ar ities first in the meanings negotiated in 
pol icy debates over veiling with regard to frames, values and prin ciples. The 
second aim is to ana lyse and explain pol icy outcomes and modes of regulations 
in comparative per spect ive (pro hibitive, accommodative or non- regulated). 
Therefore, the book’s analytic focus has two levels, first the framing of pol icy 
debates and conflicts over different practices and the meanings of veiling and, 
second, the regulations in different national settings pertaining to head coverings 
of Muslim women in the pub lic sphere, par ticu larly in pub lic institutions like 
schools, universities and the courts. 
What is meant by the term veiling in this book? As debates about Muslim 
head and body covering are loaded with different meanings we want to clarify 
the different terms that are referred to in polit ical and aca demic debates. In gen­
eral, the authors of this book use the generic term ‘veil’ to refer to hijab, burqa, 
jilbab, niqab and chador. If a specific form of body covering is referred to in the 
chapters the appropriate term will be specified. Muslim female body covering 
differs regionally and has different indi vidual styles. The headscarf (hijab in 
Arabic, foulard in France) is worn in various ways: the scarf can cover only the 
hair (and ears) and can be tied either loosely and covering the neck, or be 
wrapped at the back in a knot. Some women wear the headscarf in the ‘tur ban’ 
style that is tightly wrapped around the face and loosely covers the hair, ears and 
shoulders, often in combination with loose blouses and robes. A burqa is a robe 
worn by Afghani women that covers the body from head to toe, including the 
face and eyes, the latter being covered with a mesh. Jilbab is a robe covering the 
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body, including a veil that leaves the face vis ible but covers the rest of the head 
and body. Niqab is a black robe, which covers the body from head to toe, with a 
fitting veil that covers part of the face but leaves the eyes open. It is also called 
chador (among Paki stani, Iranian and Afghani people) or carşaf (among Turks).
 Another clarification of terms is im port ant. The authors of this volume use the 
term Muslim women to de scribe the subjects of the pol icy debate. The term 
refers to indi viduals who due to their national origin, an ces try or conversion to 
Islam define themselves as Muslims or are labelled Muslims by debaters. This 
comprises a hetero geneous group of women with different ethnic, racial, linguis­
tic, national, sexual and socio- economic backgrounds, not all of them practising 
their faith or even adhering to the five pillars of Islam. Some authors in the book 
use the denominators ‘secular lib eral’ Muslim women to differentiate them from 
‘veiled’ or ‘devout’ women to denote their standing in the discourse. 
Critical discursive institutionalism: methodology of the book 
The chapters of the book do not only have a strong common focus on first the 
framing of headscarf debates and second on regulations, they are also based on a 
common methodology which can be labelled ‘crit ical discursive institutionalism’ 
(see Schmidt 2008; Sauer 2009, 2010). This approach consists of two core ele­
ments: first, a frame ana lysis of pol icy docu ments related to headscarf debates 
and, second, a comparison of national pol icy de cisions based on a variety of 
explan at ory factors which de scribe the institutional setting of pol icy making on 
the issue of Muslim headscarves such as cit izen ship and integration regimes, 
state–church relations, gender equality and anti- discrimination regimes. This 
institutional matrix is informed by social science theories on institutionalism, 
resource mobil iza tion, discursive pol icy ana lysis and gender theory. The two 
methodo logical elements – frames and institutional settings – have the strength 
to explain dif fer ences and simil ar ities in presenting the headscarf issue in 
national pol icy debates as well as to con trib ute to the understanding of national 
regulations. 
Frames and frame analysis 
The symbolic- interpretive constructs (consisting of, for example, shared beliefs, 
images and symbols) that people use to make sense of their envir on ment are 
called ‘frames’ (Snow and Benford 1992; Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998). The 
study of the role of ideas in pub lic pol icies maintains that frames play a constitu­
tive role in pol icy formation as well as in pol icy solutions (Bacchi 1999; Schmidt 
2008; Lombardo et al. 2009; Sauer 2010). A frame is defined as ‘in ter pretative 
schemata that signifies and condenses the “world out there” by select ively punc­
tuating and encoding objects, situ ations, events, ex peri ences, and sequences of 
action in one’s present or past envir on ment’ (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). 
Frames are ‘or gan ized ideas’, which provide some ‘coher ence to a designated set 
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certain pol icy situ ations; they connect a pol icy position to a wider set of ideas 
and ideo lo gies. Moreover, frames do not only in ter pret pol icy prob lems, but also 
create pol icy prob lems (diagnostic frames) as well as pol icy solutions (prognos­
tic frames) (Zald 1996). Considering reality as a socially constructed phenome­
non also implies that know ledge of and par ticu lar accounts of ‘the truth’ are 
situated and always shaped by a specific his tor ical, cultural and polit ical con text 
(Hajer and Versteeg 2005). People always shape a pro posi tion in a way that is 
directly linked to par ticu lar ‘polit ical and cultural con texts, and to polit ical and 
cultural histories and ideo lo gies’ (Verloo 2005: 17).
 A careful ana lysis of these pro cesses aims to understand the ways in which 
societal issues are repres ented in the polit ical domain, which par ticu lar under­
standing gains dominance at some point and why, and which understandings are 
discredited. The headscarf issue is thus conceptualized and repres ented differ­
ently by various actors who compete with each other over the meaning of the 
conflict and who offer different solutions to solve it. Hence, headscarf debates 
are polit ical conflicts in which power plays an im port ant role in influ en cing 
which repres enta tions gain standing and which ones disappear. 
In the VEIL pro ject, the par ticu lar definition of the headscarf prob lem (dia­
gnosis) and the proposed solution to the prob lem (prognosis), as well as the 
argumentation and structure of norms have been translated into an analytic 
framework that consists of a coding scheme with a set of ‘sensitizing questions’ 
on each element (Verloo and Lombardo 2007). This ‘analytic matrix’ of the 
frame ana lysis included questions about who gets a voice or who has a standing
in a pol icy docu ment in order to identi fy who is involved in the construction of a 
frame and who sup ports this frame. The matrix further inquired about gender 
relations constructed in the docu ment as well as norms discussed in the head-
scarf debates. The mater ial of the frame ana lysis applied in Chapters 1 to 4 of 
this book was composed by pol icy docu ments used and produced in headscarf 
debates in the eight coun tries and the EU from 1989 to 2007.2 Policy docu ments 
are defined as written docu ments dealing with veiling of all actors involved in 
pub lic headscarf debates. Analysed docu ments origin ate from the fol low ing 
actors or institutions: aca demic journals, churches and religious groups, courts, 
employers, media/journ al ists, Muslim groups and women’s groups, groups of 
other minor it ies, par lia ments and legis lat ive bodies, state bur eau cra cies, polit ical 
par ties, pub lic intellectuals, schools and universities. The mater ial also included 
some inter views with rel ev ant pol icy actors. In each coun try under investigation, 
a min imum of 20 and a max imum of 40 docu ments were ana lysed in- depth. The 
sampling of the docu ments was guided by a manual determining that the selected 
docu ments have to be grouped around pol icy de cisions and pol icy incidents in 
the coun try from 1989 to 2007. Preferably, all actors and sites of headscarf 
debates should have been repres ented in the selected docu ments. The Appendix 
contains a detailed list of the pol icy docu ments on which the chapters are empiri­
cally based (see Appendix 1). 
The framing strat egies of actors and institutions in the eight coun tries and the 
EU were solidified by de veloping 11 major frames from the mater ial: these 
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major frames were divided into 32 subframes (for a list of all frames and sub-
frames see Appendix 2). Finally, the frames were compared cross- nationally in 
regards to the use, nego ti ation and construction of gender images (Chapter 1), 
the significance of secularism/laïcité in arguments pro and contra veiling 
(Chapter 2), the construction of identity, rights and belonging (Chapter 3), the 
discursive formation or non- formation of a Euro pean value- oriented identity 
(Chapter 4) and the major frames used by Muslim actors’ defence of veiling 
(Chapter 10). 
Institutional settings 
The second methodo logical dimension of the VEIL pro ject, the concept of insti­
tutional settings, aims at gaining know ledge concerning the reasons and purposes 
behind the variety in governing the headscarf in Euro pean demo cra cies – pro­
hibitive and accommodating rules, and non- regulation. The notion of ‘institu­
tional setting’ applied in Chapters 7 to 9 of this book covers in par ticu lar the 
cit izen ship regime and im mig rant integration pol icies, state–church relationship, 
gender equality and anti- discrimination regimes (see also Saharso 2007; Fetzer 
and Soper 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005). In the fol low ing we briefly de scribe 
these institutional settings. 
Citizenship regimes and integration policies 
Political and sociological theories on cit izen ship and immigration often as sume 
that specific cit izen ship models determine patterns of polit ical contestation over 
issues relating to immigration and integration, including conflicts about im mig­
rants’ religious identities (Joppke 2010; Fetzer and Soper 2005). This liter at ure 
focuses mainly on rules for access to cit izen ship and the extent to which coun­
tries are willing to recog nize religious and cultural diversity within their polity 
(e.g. Koopmans and Statham 2000). In gen eral, three cit izen ship models are pre­
sented: the civic- assimilationist or repub lican model, the ethno- cultural model 
and the multicultural model (Saharso 2007: 516f.; also Joppke 2009). In the 
civic- assimilationist model the nation state is seen as a com mun ity of cit izens 
sharing common values and prin ciples. This model is gen erally open to include 
migrants as cit izens and provides easy access to cit izen ship (ius soli), but does 
not recog nize cultural and religious group dif fer ences (this is, for instance, the 
case in France). The ethno- cultural model is based on descent (ius sanguinis) 
rather than on consent to common values (such as in Austria and Ger many). 
Finally, the multicultural model promotes cultural and religious diversity with 
rel at ively easy access to cit izen ship and re cog ni tion of cultural dif fer ences (like 
in the Neth er lands and the UK). 
However, it is im port ant to note that the polit ical con tro versy re gard ing the 
headscarf does not neces sar ily cor res pond with the approaches conceptualized in 
the body of rel ev ant liter at ure (see Koopmans et al. 2005). Calling for the pub lic 
re cog ni tion of a religious identity does not fit into the regu lar and gen erally 
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expected pattern of migrants’ polit ical claims made in France for instance. Sim­
ilarly, in Austria, facing an exclusionary ethno- cultural model where complex 
bar riers for im mig rants to become cit izens are in practice and Chris tian cultural 
monism is hege monic, one would not expect the accommodation of the Islamic 
headscarf. Yet, Austria is one of the very few coun tries where the conflict over 
the Islamic headscarf is virtually ab sent and a fairly inclusive pol icy towards 
Islam, despite Austria’s right- wing populist par ties, exists. These observations 
suggest that, at least with regards to a thorough sci ent ific ana lysis of the Islamic 
headscarf, the theor et ical model of cit izen ship regimes and integration pol icies 
must be broadened and revised. In accordance with other authors (e.g. Fetzer and 
Soper 2005; Joppke 2010), this book suggests additional explaining factors such 
as state–church relations, the re cog ni tion of religious com munit ies, gender and 
anti- discrimination pol icies as well as the framing of discourses. 
State–church relations and recognition of religious communities 
Relations between state and religious com munit ies are an im port ant factor for 
understanding the conflicts over and the regulations of Muslim veiling practices. 
A comparative study by Fetzer and Soper (2005: 7) emphas izes ‘the de velopment 
of pub lic pol icy on Muslim religious rights is mediated . . . by the different insti­
tutional church–state patterns’. In Europe, three state–church relation models can 
be distinguished: a ‘separation’ or laic model (like in France or Turkey), a ‘coop­
erative model’ (like Austria, Ger many and the Neth er lands) and a ‘state–church 
model’ (like England, Scotland and Denmark) (Brocker et al. 2003: 14). In laic 
sys tems, state institutions have to be free of all religious practices and symbols 
and religious education is not taught at pub lic schools. States with a ‘coopera­
tive’ understanding of neutrality do work together with religious com munit ies. 
Here, the state has to be equally distant from the recog nized churches, and reli­
gious education may be taught in schools – like in Austria and Ger many. Also, 
the display of the Chris tian cross in pub lic buildings is not con sidered a contra­
dic tion to state neutrality. Countries that pre scribe to the state–church model do 
not claim neutrality towards religious denominations; most of them have his tor­
ically de veloped specific forms of relationships between the state and the domi­
nant church. With respect to the headscarf, Sabine Berghahn (in this book) 
argues that laic states tend to ban all religious symbols, including headscarves, 
from the pub lic realm, while coun tries with a state church tradition or with 
strong ties between – mainly Chris tian – churches and state institutions respond 
more inclusively towards the wearing of Muslim headscarves and other forms of 
bodily covering. 
Thus, the argument of state–church relations explains dif fer ences in the re cog­
ni tion of claims made by Muslim com munit ies, espe cially with regard to toler­
ance towards the wearing of headscarves and other forms of veiling. However, 
while in Ger many strong ties between the Chris tian churches and state institutions 
exist, eight out of 16 federal states have banned the wearing of a headscarf. 
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cooperative sys tem of state–church relations, sim ilar to Ger many, Austria neither 
bans veiling nor does a fierce pub lic debate about Muslim headscarves in state
institutions exist. To explain the dif fer ences between these two coun tries another 
vari able has been con sidered: the official re cog ni tion of the Muslim com mun ity. 
Again different from Ger many, Austria’s inclusive practice of religious plur al ism
is based on the legal re cog ni tion of Islam as a religion and the approval of the
Islamic Religious Community in Austria as the official representative body of 
Muslims living in Austria (Mourão Permoser and Rosenberger 2009). 
Gender equality and anti- discrimination policies 
Another factor which may shed light on the accommodation of religious diver­
sity and headscarf practices is the tradition of gender equality and anti-
discrimination legis la tion and pol icies and their authority over state institutions. 
In the liter at ure it is argued that coun tries with strong equality orientation are 
less inclined to ban the headscarf and other forms of veiling because such pro­
hibitive meas ures are viewed as an infringement on Muslim women’s rights to 
parti cip ate in the pub lic realm (McGoldrick 2006; Skjeie 2007). Conflicts over 
veiling in Britain and the Neth er lands at the end of the 1990s show that anti- 
discrimination and gender equality commissions indeed framed the headscarf 
and other forms of bodily covering as an equal oppor tun ity issue and hence sup­
ported Muslim women’s right to wear these forms of garment. However, Austria 
is again an exception. Although anti- discrimination and gender equality have 
always been of less im port ance in the coun try’s value order and women’s pol icy 
enforcement is rather weak, Austria has a rather tolerant approach to the accom­
modation of the Muslim headscarf. 
Although debates and pol icies on Muslim head covering focus on gender 
equality and the oppression of women (Chapter 1), and issues of migration and 
integration are negotiated in headscarf debates in most of the coun tries, these 
arguments do not explain dif fer ences or simil ar ities in regulation in the eight 
coun tries of the study. The research results in Chapters 5 to 10 show that head-
scarf bans, accommodative pol icies and non- regulation pol itics cannot be 
explained by the given anti- discrimination or gender equality ma chineries. They 
only play rel at ively mar ginal roles both in debates and legis la tion for or against 
head- and body- covering regulation. 
The VEIL pro ject concludes that it is also the polit ical culture and national 
belief systems of norms and frames that account for cross- national dif fer ences in 
the structure and extent of the debate on headscarves as well as in the forms of 
polit ical regulations of female Muslim attire. For instance, in Denmark it is the 
highly valued indi vidual rights, in Austria it is the inclusive state–church rela­
tionship, in France and in Turkey it is the prin ciple of secularism, which impact 
on framing and regulating the headscarf. The VEIL pro ject results indicate that it 
is a tiny set of factors that explain the vari ations of regulation, namely that the 
his tor ically estab lished relation between religion and state and norm ative tradi­
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Organization of the book and overview of the chapters 
All book chapters, except the chapter on Bulgaria (Chapter 6), follow a compara­
tive per spect ive on the different religious, polit ical and cultural framing of the
veiling issue across Euro pean coun tries and on the explanation of different veiling 
regimes. Subsequently, the book has two main parts: Part I places the focus on 
frames and framing strat egies and identifies (conflicting) uni ver sal rights, moral
values and lib eral prin ciples embedded in the headscarf debates on the national 
and Euro pean levels. Part II contains research results on different outcomes of 
regulation and legis la tion of the issue of veiling and aims at con trib ut ing to 
explain the dif fer ences and simil ar ities in these regulations and legislation. 
Rikke Andreassen and Doutje Lettinga (Chapter 1) ana lyse how arguments of 
gender and gender equality are used in Euro pean debates about Muslim women’s 
head and body coverings. It is obvious that many actors in headscarf debates use 
arguments of gender and gender equality. The chapter sheds light on how gender 
is framed and negotiated in these debates, and it ana lyses how gender and gender 
equality play into constructions of nationality and national identities. The 
debates about headscarves are not simply about Muslim women’s clothing or 
im mig rant integration, rather the debates con trib ute actively to construct certain 
gendered national nar rat ives. This chapter emphas izes the links between head-
scarf debates, gender and nationality in order to show how these cat egor ies inter­
sect and influence each other. 
The second chapter by Eirini Avramopoulou, Gül Çorbacıoğlu and Maria 
Eleonora Sanna presents an overview of the con ditions that mediate the polit ical 
and ideo logical nego ti ations over veiling practices by focusing on the concept of 
secularism. The authors propose to use ‘secularism’ as a ‘hub- concept’ which 
helps to read, relate and represent the pre val ent – or ab sent – frames in each 
coun try while focusing on the hege monic discourses on the ‘secular’ and the 
‘religious’ which cut across con texts of different cultural, polit ical and legal 
values, norms and regulations. The aim of the chapter is to detect the par ticu lar 
discursive instances of nego ti ations over veiling practices in order to ex plore the 
antagonistic relation between ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ – an antagonism 
sup ported and mediated by social and polit ical actors of different affiliations. 
Nora Gresch, Petra Rostock and Sevgi Kılıç ask for the role of frames in con­
structing borders of belonging (Chapter 3). The chapter argues that in debates 
and regulations concerning head and body covering of Muslim women, nation 
states create specific nar rat ives of belonging by defining habitual practices that 
cit izens need to comply with or need to embody to be con sidered a full member 
of a par ticu lar national com mun ity and to be granted full cit izen ship rights. In 
the debates of the eight coun tries, specific argumentative patterns are used to 
ad voc ate for or against Muslim body covering: an exclusive para digm of belong­
ing ad voc ates for restrictive meas ures. Actors who argue against legal restric­
tions use an inclusive para digm of belonging. 
The last chapter of Part I by İlker Ataç, Sieglinde Rosenberger and Birgit 
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headscarf debates. Assuming that norms and beliefs are discursively constructed 
and negotiated in headscarf pol icies, the authors take both the Euro pean and 
national levels into account. The major concern of the chapter is to investigate 
whether these debates con trib ute to Euro peanization or, respectively, to the 
emergence of a Euro pean sphere of common norms and values. The idea of a 
Euro pean sphere of shared values is understood as an ‘empty signifier’, i.e. not 
as a given set of norms and values but as a deliberative and multifaceted pro cess 
of nego ti ation. Differentiating between a ver tical and a horizontal dimension of 
Euro peanization, the chapter argues that both horizontal as well as ver tical Euro­
peanization show only minor salience. Instead, the authors detect pol icy frames 
that underline a nationalization of religious and cultural values in Europe. 
The second part of the book is ded ic ated to the modes and actors of national 
regulations as well as to the limits of claim- making for restrictive regulations 
from a comparative per spect ive. Although Euro pean coun tries are based on the 
traditions of lib eral demo cracy and funda mental human rights, including 
freedom of religious expressions and gender equality, dif fer ences in institutional 
settings have translated into a multifaceted spectrum of approaches to headscarf 
pol icies. The chapters follow the differ enti ation in three major clusters of regula­
tion (accommodative, pro hibitive and non- regulation) and look for explanations 
as to why sim ilar and/or different modes of regulations for specific social sites 
and groups of covered women have been adopted in different Euro pean 
countries. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the regulations, of the occurrence of con­
flict cases and of the most im port ant court judgements concerning the Muslim 
headscarf and veiling in the eight states of comparison by Sabine Berghahn. The 
chapter identifies the most influ en tial factors for the headscarf regulations. What 
is im port ant for the explanation of the legal treatment of female head and body 
covering are not only national peculiarities such as state–church relations, his tor­
ical obli ga tions and the (non-)exist ence of anti- discrimination aware ness and 
institutions on the national level. Moreover, Euro pean norms and judgements 
and the national transposition and in ter pretation of these norms impact veiling 
policies. 
Chapter 6 by Kristen Ghodsee ana lyses the regulation concerning Bulgarian 
schools. As one of the Euro pean Union’s two newest member states, Bulgaria is 
actu ally the EU coun try with the largest Muslim minor ity, estim ated between 13 
and 15 per cent in a coun try of 7.9 million. In 2006, several complaints re gard ing 
Muslim girls wearing a headscarf at pub lic schools were filed with the Bulgarian 
Commission for Protection from Discrimination, the national body in charge of 
adjudicating human rights violations. This chapter discusses the two key cases 
that came before the Commission in 2006 and 2007, the circumstances leading to 
these cases and the arguments made both for and against religious symbols in 
schools. Methodologically, the chapter is based on a detailed discourse ana lysis 
of the texts of new Muslim maga zines targeted towards young Slavic Muslims. It
is shown that the language of these de cisions expli citly relies on language and 
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the headscarf in Bulgaria, while still leaving plenty of ambiguity for individual
headmasters to circumvent the ban if they wish. This reflects Bulgaria’s uneasy 
position vis- à-vis its Muslim minor ity, as well as intra- Muslim rivalries between 
the ethnic Turkish popu la tion and Bulgarian- speaking Muslims.
 Next, Leila Hadj- Abdou, Sieglinde Rosenberger, Sawitri Saharso and Birte 
Siim explain accommodative pol icies in coun tries with populist anti- immigrant 
mobil iza tion (Chapter 7). Denmark, the Neth er lands and Austria are coun tries 
where expli cit regulations exist that enable veiling in various pub lic domains, 
such as pub lic schools, the civil ser vice and the par lia ment. At the same time, all 
three coun tries are known for their right- wing and populist politicians speaking 
out against migration and Islam. This chapter tackles this apparent paradox by 
disentangling the pro cess of trans forma tion from non- regulating to adopting pol­
icies that regulate the veil in a tolerant way. By scrutinizing and comparing the 
polit ical con ditions under which Austria, Denmark and the Neth er lands have 
passed different decrees of toleration, and relating these to his tor ically specific 
national con texts and populist ‘symbolic’ tactics, it shows how and why accom­
modative rules in regard to veiling have been estab lished. Yet, because this com­
parison is led by con textual specificity over time, it pays attention to the 
changing polit ical con text that has put pressure on accommodative pol icies 
re gard ing different realms and forms of covering. The chapter stresses the poten­
tial of the national polit ical oppor tun ity structures to facilitate accommodative 
regulations despite heavy populist challenges. 
Prohibitive regulations concerning Muslim headscarves in France, Turkey 
and Ger many are ana lysed in Chapter 8 by Sabine Berghahn, Gül Çorbacıoğlu, 
Petra Rostock and Maria Eleonora Sanna. While France and Turkey are rather 
sim ilar in restricting the headgear of pupils, the case of Ger many is different: 
here, no restrictions for pupils and students are in effect, while in some parts of 
the coun try pro hibitions for teachers in pub lic schools to wear headscarves, and 
partly for other civil ser vants, were estab lished. On initial observation, the 
French and Turkish regulations seem to be in accordance with their state–church 
regimes of laïcité and secularism, while the German regulations obviously con­
tradict the coun try’s prin ciple of an open and comprehensive state neutrality. 
Though for different reasons, all three coun tries are currently undergoing a 
period of trans ition, Muslims as migrants have become the ‘other’ par excellence 
as both the French and the German soci ety face their multi- religious and multi­
cultural reality. In Turkey, in contrast, Islam is the religion of the majority of the 
popu la tion. Here, debates about the headscarf ban reflect the ongoing highly 
controversial struggle mainly between secular Kemalist and Islamic forces over 
the consti tu tion of Turkey as a modern state. 
Chapter 9 by Rikke Andreassen, Eirini Avramopoulou, Nora Gresch, Sevgi 
Kılıç and Birgit Sauer ana lyses those Euro pean coun tries that do not have all 
en com passing national regulations, either pro hibitive or tolerant, re gard ing 
Muslim women’s head and body coverings. Instead, Austria, Denmark, Greece 
and the UK have gen eral anti- discrimination regulations that secure the rights to 
religious freedom and are hence labelled as tolerant. However, the chapter 
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detects pol icies of ‘non- regulation’ in some – but not all – sites of soci ety. Thus, 
non- regulation pol icies might at first glance seem like an inclusive approach 
towards the Muslim veil. This chapter, how ever, shows that the four coun tries 
studied have passed several decentralized regulation rules or case- to-case 
approaches, which might actu ally result in excluding veiled women. The chapter 
illus trates how these practices of non- regulation function as a tool to maintain 
the status quo of a mono- cultural coun try in some situ ations rather than a tool to 
become an inclusive multicultural country. 
The next chapter by Leila Hadj- Abdou and Linda Woodhead (Chapter 10) 
has a slightly different focus: it stresses the role of women’s civil soci ety organ­
iza tions in the pol icy debates comparing the United Kingdom and Austria. The 
authors are inter ested in the degree to which, and in which ways, Muslim minor-
it ies have entered the pub lic domain in respect to the issue of the veil. Are they 
vis ible at all in disputes? Are they vis ible in col lect ive and or gan ized forms, or 
as indi vidual voices? What are their demands and what are the strat egies to push 
through their demands? After addressing these questions, the chapter ex plores 
which factors restrain or enhance the pos sib il ity of Muslim minor it ies taking part 
in pub lic disputes, and how oppor tun ity structures in the two coun tries shape the 
strat egies employed. An under lying inter est is whether the fact that this is an 
issue concerning not merely a minor ity (Muslims), but a minor ity within a 
minor ity (Muslim women) makes a difference. 
The book concludes with some gen eral reflections on the role of lib eral values 
and norms within the Euro pean Union by Sawitri Saharso. Saharso claims that 
lib eral values allow far more room for al tern ative in ter pretation than is reflected 
in current pub lic debates on headscarves. Due to that, the debates on Muslim 
women’s body covering risk running into a rather ‘illib eral lib eralism’. Instead, 
the arrival of new cultures in Europe should be seen as an oppor tun ity to ques­
tion current Euro pean in ter pretations of the lib eral tradition and to combine well 
with the desire to de velop common Euro pean values. 
Notes 
1 Public debates use the term burqa for garment covering the face and the body in order 
to allude to women in Afghanistan although the targeted women in Euro pean coun tries 
are wearing a niqab. See description of different garments in this chapter. 
2 The ana lysis of pol icy docu ments starts in 1989 due to the fact that this year was 
marked by the first debate on Islamic headscarves in France. The time frame of the 
ana lysis ends in 2007 due to prac tical reasons – this was the year when the VEIL pro­
ject started. 
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1 Veiled debates 
Gender and gender equality in 
European national narratives 
Rikke Andreassen and Doutje Lettinga 
Introduction 
This chapter sheds light on how gender is framed and negotiated in Euro pean 
debates on Muslim women’s head and body coverings, and ana lyses how gender 
and sexuality play into constructions of nationality and national identities. The 
chapter dem on strates that a wide variety of actors in all coun tries debates the 
headscarf and veil from a women’s rights per spect ive. Veiling is persistently 
framed as being a threat to uni ver sal values and prin ciples of gender equality, 
auto nomy, emancipation, secularism and tolerance. Our comparative ana lysis 
shows that these uni ver sal values are not only par ticu lar national in ter pretations 
and institutionalized applica tions thereof (Parekh 1992) but are even contested 
within the nation itself. By illustrating how cat egor ies of gender, race, eth ni city, 
religion and nationality intersect and influence one another within this frame, 
this chapter ana lyses how the headscarf and veil debate con trib utes to the exclu­
sion of veiled Muslim women in certain national imaginaries (Anderson 1991). 
Furthermore, con sidering the conflicting views observed between fem in ists on 
the issue, the chapter also argues that the debates more over reflect a struggle 
over who gets to define the values and strat egies of fem in ism in a multicultural 
Europe. 
This chapter is structured into three parts. The first illus trates how actors,
espe cially fem in ists and politicians, in the eight coun tries ana lysed use argu­
ments of gender and gender equality in their debates. In all coun tries, a pre val­
ent view in the debates on potentially banning Muslim women from wearing
veils is that covering is oppressive of women and a threat to gender equality.
This chapter scrutinizes examples of this frame, which we labelled the ‘vic­
timization frame’. It de scribes the simil ar ities in these Euro pean debates with
regard to norms and values expressed in this frame and the discourse co ali tions
of actors employing it (Hajer 1993). The second part of the chapter gives
insight into national par ticu larities within this frame. Debates, after all, do not
emerge in a vacuum, but are shaped by par ticu lar national his tor ical, cultural
and polit ical con texts (Hajer and Versteeg 2005; Bacchi 2005). This chapter
shows how polit ical actors in each coun try construct their specific national
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of this chapter reflects upon counter- arguments which contest the nationalized
discourse of Muslim women in need of liberation by the white (Chris tian)
majority. Here the chapter falls back on the conclusion that norm ative prin­
ciples of gender equality and emancipation play a vital role in national con­
structions but that no agreement exists on the meaning of these terms, nor
about the strat egies they entail. The chapter concludes that the debate on
veiling should be seen as an ongoing deliberation about the con ditions of
inclusion in and exclusion from the national com mun ity in which gender and
sexuality play a vital role (Yuval- Davis 1997; Lutz et al. 1995). It also con­
cludes that the debate represents an ongoing discussion among fem in ists about
the con tent and strat egies of their polit ical pro ject. The chapter underscores
that the nationalizing of gender equality – by inscribing gender equality as an
in teg rated part of a hege monic national culture that is being threatened by the
culturally ‘other’ – results in exclusionary and racialized understandings of
gender equality and of the national community. 
Gender and gender equality: common framing in all 
countries 
Victimization and liberation from religion 
In the Euro pean debates that we studied for the VEIL pro ject, the most common 
frame observed was that Muslim girls and women are oppressed by their com­
mun ity, culture and religion and in need of liberation. This vic timization frame 
appeared in all coun tries’ docu ments, although it was not very salient in the 
British and Greek debates. However, estab lishing the strength of this frame in 
relation to the country- specific pol icy debates and regu latory regimes goes 
beyond the scope and possib il ities of our chapter. As we will illus trate, the frame 
was taken up by various politicians to argue in favour of a ban that curtails girls’ 
and women’s right to cover (in various domains). It is inter esting to note that 
fem in ists themselves have been ambivalent about the desirabil ity of a ban to 
tackle Muslim women’s oppression. Moreover, various fem in ists contested the 
idea that the headscarf represents gender oppression and offered al tern ative 
in ter pretations of gender equality and autonomy. 
One of the prin cipal arguments presented in the vic timization frame is that
headscarves and veils conflict with the idea of gender equality, as these cover­
ings are gender- specific types of clothing, and hence in their very nature mark
a hier archy between men and women. Veiling is seen as a structural prob lem
of Islam (or in religion al to gether), because the Qur’an pre scribes this practice
of gender differ enti ation. Another argument is that donning the headscarf and
veil is a result of the in ternalization of gender discriminatory norms and that
women can only become truly free and equal if they contest the oppressive
nature of their religious culture by breaking with it. In the Neth er lands, Ger­
many, France and Denmark, various Second Wave fem in ists opposed the prac­
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and who were hesitant, if not opposed, to strat egies of emancipation that
remained within the framework of Islam. 
In the Neth er lands, the former editor- in-chief of the leading fem in ist maga­
zine Opzij, Cisca Dresselhuys, used this vic timization frame when she argued 
against the headscarf on International Women’s Day on 8 March 2001. Dressel­
huys stated that she would refuse to hire editors who wore headscarves because 
this practice contradicts fem in ist ideals of equality. In her editorial in Opzij she 
explained her prin cipled stance as follows: 
The headscarf symbolizes a par ticu lar way of thinking about women being 
inferior to men. And this is exactly something that fem in ism has tried to 
contest. This started many years ago with the struggle against the biblical 
thought that women should not have any place in pub lic life, have executive 
positions, have voting rights, wear male clothes, or – yes, all the time that 
hair! – cut their hair short rather than wearing hats. . . . Now when we have 
finally overcome this battle [i.e. against the Chris tian Church], it would be 
unaccept able for me to accept sim ilar funda mentalist, female oppressing 
doctrines. It would feel as jus tifying and submitting to an error. 
(NL3) 
Dresselhuys questions the persistent claim that Muslim women don the headscarf
of their own personal choice. And even if they were, she con siders it anti- feminist
if women voluntarily submit to gender- unequal norms that sustain the pat ri archal
order. She compares the choice to wear the headscarf to the claim of women in the
1970s who maintained they were housewives out of free choice, even though no
other al tern atives existed at the time. In a sim ilar vein to those who voluntarily
submit to social roles of women as mothers and caretakers, veiled women would
legitimize pat ri archal ideas of women as virgins whose sexuality needs to be cur­
tailed for men. Hence, the wearing of the headscarf is, according to Dresselhuys,
not only a form of sex discrimination but also dangerous for women’s rights by
condoning sexist ideas. Opzij has therefore frequently criticized the Dutch Com­
mission of Equal Treatment, which has en dorsed the right to cover in various
domains for reasons of non- discrimination and freedom of religion.1 Yet, Dressel­
huys was against a ban on headscarves, as it would deprive vulner able Muslim
women and girls of their chances to education and eco nomic independence. 
Similar vic timization framing can be found among fem in ists in other coun­
tries. In Denmark, a larger debate about headscarves emerged when a Danish 
Muslim woman wearing a hijab, Asmaa Abdol- Hamid, was appointed as a TV 
hostess at the pub lic ser vice station DR (Danmarks Radio; Denmark Broadcast­
ing Corporation) in 2006. The hiring of Abdol- Hamid was met by an outcry 
from the fem in ist organ iza tion Women for Freedom, who demanded that DR 
should fire Abdol- Hamid. In their press release of 2 April 2006 they wrote: 
Asmaa Abdol- Hamid is known as an Islamic fanatic and a sup porter of 
Sharia . . . DR is a pub lic ser vice station, and it is im port ant that TV- hostesses 
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are ob ject ive and do not become a space [sic] where fanatic attitudes can be 
expressed and honored. Attitudes that are a ser ious threat against women’s 
rights. 
(DK19) 
Similar to the views of former editor- in-chief Dresselhuys of Opzij maga zine, 
the organ iza tion Women for Freedom expressed a dislike for Islam and head-
scarves – in ter preting the latter as being solely oppressive of women because it 
views headscarves as a gen eral threat to all women and their gender equality. 
Also in the United Kingdom, some feminists questioned that free choice 
within Islam (or any religious structure) is pos sible. In an open letter published 
in the British news paper, the Guardian, in 2005, journ al ist Catherine Bennett 
criticized the wife of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Cherie Booth, 
for defending a schoolgirl’s right to veil. The female pupil, Shabina Begun, 
was forbidden to wear the jilbab as a sub sti tute for her school uniform. Similar 
to Dresselhuys, Bennett locates the prob lem in religion by comparing Islam 
to Cath olicism and argues that veiling is imposed upon young girls by men 
who in ter pret the Qur’an in the ‘medi eval style – that their wives, sisters, and 
daughters should be viewed only in their entirety by the men they belong 
to’ (UK7). Bennett finds pro- headscarf fem in ists hypocrites who apply different 
stand ards to Muslim girls than to their own daughters, whom they would not 
like to see wearing the headscarf. She therefore argues that fem in ists should sup­
port Muslim girls’ struggle for liberation like any other girl. The gov ern ment 
should not indulge itself with religion as it currently does in Britain (UK7). 
Bennett combines her claim against the headscarf with a critique of the British 
Anglo- Saxon state church, which also exists in Denmark. Dresselhuys, too, criti­
cized Dutch traditions of institutionalized religious plur al ism as being bad for 
women. Her claim to dismantle the remnants of Dutch pillarized multicultural­
ism found much sup port by lib eral secular intellectuals such as law professors 
Afshin Ellian (NL15), Sylvian Ephimenco (NL16), Paul Scheffer and Herman 
Phillipse. In this frame, religion is clearly seen as the source of pat ri archy and 
lib eral secularism as the solution to tackle it, although Muslim men become the 
new culprits in a form of oppression that seems par ticu lar to Islam and Muslim 
culture. 
Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to gender equality 
The call to liberate Muslim girls grew louder when the headscarf was linked to 
the rise of a funda mentalist Islamism. Typical for the German, Turkish and 
French debate was the claim that the headscarf was not only a symbol of a pat ri­
archal religious culture, but also of a dangerous polit ical Islam. Not only family 
or com mun ity members exert pressure on the girls but also rad ical funda­
mentalists, who recruit them for their polit ical ideo logy. If the state would not 
draw bound ar ies to religious claims of re cog ni tion like the headscarf or veil, so- 
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into Europe. Hence, not only the rights of Muslim women and girls are threat­
ened but those of the whole society. 
Interestingly, par ticu larly secular Muslim fem in ists warned of the accommo­
dation of the headscarf as a form of pseudo- tolerance that jeopardized Muslim 
girls’ rights to freedom and equality. In all coun tries we observed alli ances 
between them and Second Wave fem in ist protagonists defending national 
achievements of women’s rights against multiculturalism or religious plur al ism, 
as that would give leeway to Islamic funda mentalism. In Ger many, for instance, 
Alice Schwarzer of the fem in ist maga zine Emma argued together with German 
women of Turkish origin like Necla Kelek (G29) and Ekin Deligöz (G31) that 
people defending a teacher’s right to cover are cultural relativists that leave 
vulner able girls to their oppressive com munit ies. In 2003 Schwarzer argued in 
the weekly Der Spiegel that the headscarf is a polit ical symbol used by Islamists, 
who are gradually trying to introduce Sharia law into Ger many (G2). Three years 
later, in an inter view in the German news paper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
she compares the headscarf to the yellow star that Jews were forced to wear 
during the Nazi regime, to indicate that Muslim women can be con sidered 
second rate cit izens who are forced to cover by Islamist funda mentalists (G28). 
In France, sim ilar claims were made by fem in ists such as Elisabeth Badinter, 
Gisèle Halimi and Anne Zelenski along with women like Fadela Amara of the 
organ iza tion Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores, Nor Submissives) (Ezekiel 
2006); and in the Neth er lands by women like Seçil Arda (NL10), Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali (NL6) and Nahed Selim (NL13) along with Cisca Dresselhuys.2 
The ser ious ness of this threat was often emphas ized by ref er ences to Muslim 
coun tries or Islamic theocracies where women’s rights are violated. Islam is con­
sequently repres ented as an oppressive religious culture, detached from the par­
ticu lar national, polit ical and cultural con text where it is practised. Seçil Arda, a 
Dutch fem in ist of Turkish origin, argues in a column in Volkskrant news paper in 
2001 for instance: ‘Fundamentalists in coun tries like Iran, Egypt, Afghanistan, 
Turkey, and various Arabic states use liquida tion, intimidation, and threats 
against fem in ists in order to ban their thoughts’ (NL10). 
Originating from coun tries with a Muslim majority, women like Arda often 
were given voice in the debate to speak out against gender in equal ity and funda­
mentalism in Islam. The media producers and politicians who invited them to 
pol icy debates apparently reasoned they knew best what Islam entails for 
women. While this allowed them to put the (precarious) position of minor ity 
women on the polit ical agenda, the fact that these women were repres ented as 
the ‘authentic’ Muslim voice also silenced other veiled women whose claims 
were seen as stemming from a false consciousness and Islamist manipulation. In 
the final part of this chapter, we will address those other Muslim women’s voices 
who claimed their own right to speak. Moreover, by emphasizing the danger of a 
funda mentalist and pat ri archal Islam encroaching upon a Europe marked by 
values of gender equality, pat ri archy increasingly turned into a cultural prob lem 
of the ‘other’. This not only rendered in vis ible the continuing gender in equal ity 
and sexism in Euro pean soci eties or the discrimination and social eco nomic 
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mar ginalization that intersect with im mig rant women’s emancipation, it also fed 
a nationalist discourse that counterposed a backward and dangerous Islam vis- à-
vis an enlightened, egal it arian and modern Europe. The next section will illus­
trate how this enabled anti- immigrant politicians to co- opt and monopolize the 
fem in ist agenda for their own interests. 
Instrumentalizing the feminist agenda 
Not only fem in ists but also politicians use the vic timization frame in congruence 
with Islam as a threat frame to plead for a ban on headscarves. Some clearly 
link their claims against veiling with demands for cultural assimilation or even 
expulsion. In Austria, for instance, Richard Heis, the leader of the rightwing
nationalist party FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; Freedom Party of 
Austria) in Innsbruck, Tyrol, launched a motion to pro hibit headscarves in pub lic 
schools in 2006. He quotes the above-mentioned Necla Kelek in his argument 
that the headscarf is a polit ical symbol of rad ical Islam and that a ban would 
therefore help Muslim girls against unwanted pressure to cover. Furthermore, he 
argues that headscarves are a sign of dis integ ration because they conflict with 
Western values. According to him, teachers with headscarves are incorrect role 
models for im mig rant chil dren and unable to pass Western values on to these 
chil dren, and hence hinder their integration into Austrian soci ety. He sup ports 
his argument with a national claim by saying that ‘real Tyroleans’ do not want 
headscarves (A18). 
This use of fem in ist gender equality arguments for assimilative and anti- 
immigrant agendas can also be observed in Denmark. Peter Skaarup, Member of 
Parliament (MP) for the populist and right- wing Danish People’s Party, has for 
instance argued: 
According to Danish norms it is discriminatory to veil. The fact that women 
must hide their sexuality, cover their hair, that is, in a Danish con text, an 
expression of a devalu ation of the woman . . . and that is what we have 
fought against with our struggle for gender equality, and therefore the veil is 
a prob lem for our soci ety. . . . The right thing is therefore to ban the head-
scarf and live accordingly to our customs here in Denmark.3 
Politicians from the Danish People’s Party put forward a bill in 2004 to pro hibit 
headscarves and veils in pub lic working places such as educational institutes, 
hos pitals, libraries and pub lic transportation by framing them as incom pat ible 
with the Danish culture (DK1). It was said that such a ban would help Muslim 
girls and women who want to integrate, i.e. assimilate, into Danish soci ety. This 
bill was not passed, as the majority of par lia ment argued it would go against the 
Danish consti tu tion’s freedom of religion that is equally applic able to all reli­
gious com munit ies (DK5, DK9). 
Also in the Neth er lands, gender equality functioned in the discourse of the 
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burqas in the Neth er lands on 10 Novem ber 2005.4 Wilders referred to multicul­
turalism as ‘apartheid’ because it would allow ‘medi eval practices’ like full 
facial cover age.5 Other (lib eral) right- wing politicians also framed burqas as 
conflicting with Dutch values, as they were in ter preted as being oppressive of 
women, and ‘the Neth er lands is a coun try of freedom and equality’.6 Women 
were used to illus trate a pub lic order and integration prob lem. Various par ties 
argued in the sub sequent parlia ment ary debates that a ban increased the integra­
tion of Muslim women in Dutch soci ety, because it would break their isolation 
and enable face to face communication that was required for parti cipa tion. More­
over, a ban was deemed legitimate because the visibility of burqa-wearing 
women endangered pub lic safety and caused feelings of in secur ity and fear 
among other cit izens (Lettinga 2009; van Ooijen 2008). Like Denmark, the ban 
on the burqa was not yet institutionalized in the Neth er lands because it contra­
vened human rights of non- discrimination and freedom of religion. In 2008, the 
gov ern ment announced a very moderate change of law that aims to ban all types 
of face covers in the realm of education. 
In both the Dutch and the Danish debates, the (male) majority’s cultural prac­
tices of organ izing gender were viewed as nat ural and as a right to be protected 
against Muslims. In Denmark, women’s sexual liberation is often associated 
with women’s rights to be topless on beaches and in advertisements and to parti­
cip ate in the por no graphy industry (Andreassen 2005: 186). By representing 
head and body coverings as symbols of female oppression, the national under­
standing of women’s liberation therefore seems connected to their bodily expo­
sure of skin (Andreassen 2007). While fem in ist critiques of the sexualization of 
female bodies are dis regarded, Muslims are positioned as a threat to fem in ist 
achievements of (bodily) self- determination and equality, which are repres ented 
as uni ver sal norms that every one should follow. In the Neth er lands, sexual toler­
ance functions as a broker for cultural and religious tolerance in the same way as 
fem in ism. In 2006, the Neth er lands introduced immigration cri teria by imposing 
integration tests that included compulsory viewing of a film of Dutch culture 
featuring a topless sunbathing woman and gay men kissing. Immigrants from 
non- Western coun tries need to pass the test in their home coun tries in order to be 
eli gible for Dutch cit izen ship. Also in the headscarf debates, Dutch right- wing 
politicians presented the growing number of (rad ical) Muslims of their soci eties 
as a threat to the equal rights of homosexuals in their respective coun tries.7 In 
both coun tries therefore, politicians who have previously not been in favour of 
sexual minor it ies’ or women’s rights – or at least have never parti cip ated in their 
struggle for re cog ni tion – are now arguing in favour of the same minor it ies’ 
rights. Feminists who tried to put Muslim women’s equality and self-
determination on the agenda saw their fem in ist claims being hijacked by con ser­
vat ive and populist right- wing politicians who used it as a vehicle to curtail 
immigration and to exclude (non- liberal) Muslim minor it ies from the national 
com mun ity (Butler 2008). 
The next part of the chapter elaborates on the finding that gender and sexual­
ity function as a cultural group marker for modern Western cultures in national 
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pol icy discourses. We do not argue that all politicians in these coun tries were 
merely using the fem in ist agenda for other aims (although some clearly were). 
They may have been convinced that a ban would con trib ute to the equality and 
freedom of veiled Muslim girls, as this frame began to shape their reality. 
Instead, we aim to show how in all coun tries’ debates a polit ical com mun ity was 
constructed whose members should share uni ver sal values of gender equality. 
Yet, the com munit ies that were constructed remained nationally par ticu lar, illus­
trating continuing dif fer ences in the role of the state in protecting women’s 
equality, in managing (religious) plur al ism and in incorporating cit izens into the 
polit ical community. 
National particularities in the debate 
Celebration of secularist nations 
In France, a ban on all ‘ostens ible’ symbols of religion in pub lic schools was 
implemented in 2004. The purpose was, among others, to protect Muslim girls 
against Islamic rad icals spreading their discriminatory ideo logy in the French 
suburbs.8 Only by offering a neutral space at school, where vis ible religious 
symbols were banned, could the state guarantee girls’ freedom and equality. The 
so- called Stasi Commission had advised the implementation of this law.9 One of 
the Commission’s members, the French scholar Patrick Weil, explains why he 
thinks such a law is neces sary in an art icle published in Esprit in 2005: ‘Wearing 
the scarf or imposing it upon others has become an issue not of indi vidual 
freedom but of a national strat egy of funda mentalist groups using pub lic schools 
as their battleground’ (FR15). The Stasi report connects headscarf debates to 
practices of forced marriages, and states: ‘The basic rights of women are scorned 
now adays on a daily basis in our coun try. Such a situ ation is unaccept able. . . . 
Paradoxically, the headscarf offers the protection to some girls which should 
actu ally be guaranteed by the state’.10 
Although the Stasi Commission recog nized that some women may veil vol­
untarily, their choice was outweighed by the necessity to protect others from 
com mun ity force. French secularism, laïcité, was suggested as the framework to 
realize the liberation and emancipation of Muslim girls. In its report, the Com­
mission emphas ized its aim to de velop a concept of secularism that cor res ponded 
to the present- day pluralistic soci ety and distanced itself from a ‘combative’ sec­
ularism that opposed religion, yet it eventually concluded that headscarves and 
other vis ible symbols of religious dif fer ence should be privatized in the pub lic 
realm of education. Particularly the headscarf should not be accommodated in 
secular pub lic schools because it is used by Islamists to transmit values that con­
flict with the Repub lican pro ject of equality, solid arity and lib erty. Relegating 
religious expressions to the private realm was seen as the solution to protect 
shared values of equality against private com mun ity practices and traditions that 
endangered the freedom of par ticu lar young Muslim girls. Girls refusing to 
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to preserve and proselytize their religious identity at the expense of other pupils’ 
freedoms. This identity pol itics was seen as the cause of social frag menta tion 
and discrimination (i.e. of Jewish pupils with skullcaps). 
French fem in ists recog nized that for certain young girls the headscarf may 
symbolize their submission to gender- oppressive practices in their family or 
com mun ity. They deliberated whether a ban constituted the appropriate solution 
to address the lacking emancipation and freedom of some Muslim girls. Some 
women sup ported the gov ern ment’s ban by signing a peti tion in Elle maga zine 
in which they emphas ized the necessity of a strictly secular Repub lican school to 
avoid the intrusion of religious identity claims that would par ticu larly burden the 
freedom and equality of Muslim girls (FR3).11 The fem in ist organ iza tion CNDF 
(Collectif National des Droits des Femmes; National Women’s Rights Collect­
ive), on the other hand, signed a counter peti tion to oppose the ban (FR5).12 Even 
though the CNDF claimed that the headscarf stigmatizes the female body, it con­
sidered a ban an inappropriate solution to address the prob lem that religious 
funda mentalists misuse such a symbol to control women’s sexuality. Similar to 
the Stasi Commission, the organ iza tion presented laïcité as the solution for com­
bating sexism and gender discrimination, albeit one that allowed for the accom­
modation of the headscarf in schools. For unlike the Commission, the CNDF 
still believed in the eman cip atory power of the secular repub lican schools that 
would help girls gain the capa city of auto nomy and eventually unveil them­
selves. The CNDF thus also portrays Muslim girls as vic tims in need of state 
help in order to become secular, free, rational subjects. In both frames, Muslims 
can only be free and equal cit izens if Islam secularizes and assimilates to a 
repub lican framework of secular modernity. 
Celebration of (secularized) Christian nations 
In the German and Austrian debate, polit ical actors have sim ilarly framed Muslim
women’s head and body coverings as conflicting with national values of gender
equality and as symbols of dis integ ration. In the German federal con text, headscarf
debates and regulations are decentralized to the level of the separate provinces
(Bundesländer), leading to different (re-)conceptualizations of the nation (Berghahn
2008). In the southern and southwestern states, dominant arguments have been that
teachers cannot veil because Muslim headscarves conflict with Western (Chris tian)
values that shape Ger many’s demo cracy. In the words of the then Minister of Edu­
cation in Baden- Württemberg in 2004, Annette Schavan, representing the Christian
Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union; CDU): 
The headscarf constitutes, as a polit ical symbol, a part of a female oppres­
sive his tory. It can symbolize an in ter pretation of Political Islamism, which 
conflicts with the prin ciple of equality between men and women. In that 
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Schavan further argues that civil ser vants, e.g. teachers, should not wear such 
female oppressive symbols because with those symbols they are advocating the 
wrong kind of role model, par ticu larly to young Muslim girls who want to inte­
grate into the German soci ety. Hence, wearing a headscarf is in Ger many – like 
in France – framed as a sign of separatism and dis integ ration; identified in 
German as Parallelgesellschaften, parallel societies. 
Unlike the French Stasi Commission, many actors in the German debate do
not propose strict secularism as a solution to the prob lem and often differenti­
ate their model from the French laïcité. In parlia ment ary discussions in the
Federal state of Baden- Württemberg on banning headscarves for pub lic
school teachers, the CDU (G1f ), the Social Democratic Party SPD (Sozial­
demokratische Partei Deutschlands) (G1c) and the con ser vat ive pat riotic
party The Repub licans (Die Republikaner; REP) (G1a) have all argued that
religious symbols in themselves do not conflict with the German consti tu tion
because Ger many has an open, inclusive practice of neutrality. They all refer
to, and hence reify, a German his tory of religious governance in which the
state has closely cooperated with the churches, in par ticu lar in the areas of
social wel fare and education (Koenig 2005; Amir- Moazami 2007). Privatiz­
ing all religious symbols within the educational realm would therefore con­
flict with this institutionalized his tory, as well as with the idea of a nation that
gives space to German values and religions. But according to their framing,
the headscarf symbolizes more than religion, as it is seen as also carrying a
polit ical message. Ulrich Maurer from the SPD emphas ized in the 2004
debate why the SPD voted in favour of a ban: ‘Other than the headscarf, the
Chris tian cross belongs to our Western culture, to our traditions and symbol­
izes here brotherly love, tolerance and maintenance of funda mental human
values’.13 
By viewing and presenting Chris tian symbols as polit ically neutral and
com pat ible with consti tu tionally embedded values of Ger many, it is pos sible
to plead for a partial ban on only headscarves in the federal state of Baden-
Württemberg. Islam can be successfully constructed as representing non-
German values, whereas Chris tian and Jewish symbols are seen as part of a
German his tory that teachers may express. Only politicians from the Green
Party pointed at the hypocrisy of pleading for open neutrality while banning
certain religious expressions; but their al tern ative law proposal, to maintain a
case by case approach, did not find any sup port. As a result, tradi tion ally
dressed nuns, i.e. with head cover age, can teach in Baden- Württemberg while
covered Muslim teachers cannot. Four other provinces have also implemented
partial bans for teachers: Bavaria, North Rhine Westphalia, Saarland and Hesse
(the law in the latter province also expli citly forbids headscarves in pub lic ser­
vice). Three other states (Berlin, Bremen and Lower Saxony) have banned all
religious symbols for teachers and some other pub lic functions (Rostock and
Berghahn 2008). 
Also in Ger many and Austria, fem in ists were divided on the issue. As we have
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fem in ists were in favour of a ban on the headscarf for teachers. Even though they
never ad voc ated a partial ban that would discriminate between cit izens of different
faiths, they reasoned that only a strict separation between state and religion would
enable young (Muslim) girls to be ‘really’ free, equal and modern. Other fem in ists
objected to a ban. Former (fem in ist) commissioners on integration for the federal
gov ern ment of Ger many (Marieluise Beck, Barbara John and Rita Süssmuth) have
argued, for instance, that gender oppression can only be targeted by including
Muslim women in the labour market. Instead of advocating a ban that blames indi­
viduals with headscarves for the funda mentalism, fem in ists should sup port them in
their struggle against funda mentalism (G12). Also the Austrian Sandra Frauen­
berger, who is serving as Viennese city councillor for women representing the
Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Öster reichs; SPÖ), argues against a
pro hibition of headscarves as that would hinder Muslim women’s integration into
the Austrian mainstream soci ety. According to Frauenberger, pro hibiting head-
scarves would make the women return to their con ser vat ive Muslim fam il ies.
Instead, the girls and women should be active parti cip ants in the school sys tem and
workforce; as she argues ‘We have to keep them in our soci ety’ (A28). In their
framing of the prob lem, these fem in ists clearly identi fy a different solution to the
prob lem from a ban. But by presenting the majority soci ety as inclusionary and
liberatory, they seem to overlook the (institutionalized) discrimination and xeno­
phobia that con tinue to function as obs tacles in the struggle for parti cipa tion of
minor ity women. 
Social cohesion and gender in the debate on face veils 
In the United Kingdom, the framing of gender equality in the veil debates has 
also been connected to women’s parti cipa tion in soci ety. But the debate in 
Britain is in many ways different from other Euro pean coun tries’ debates, as it 
solely focuses on full facial covering, i.e. niqabs. Hijabs are not debated in 
Britain but toler ated without discussion as an indi vidual right to freedom and 
part of the multicultural soci ety. The claim that the headscarf conflicts with 
national or uni ver sal values of gender equality and that a secular pub lic space is 
needed to liberate Muslim women was much less salient in Britain than in the 
other coun tries’ debates. Instead, it is argued that the current soft secularism, i.e. 
status quo of an estab lished state church, and British traditions of human rights 
and demo cracy will secure women’s rights and parti cipa tion in soci ety (UK2, 
UK6, UK9, UK12).14 
In Britain, the debate about niqabs has been closely connected to a fear of 
Islam as a funda mentalist religion or a polit ical ideo logy. Similar to the other 
coun tries’ debates on headscarves, arguments are made that Muslim women are 
forced to veil by male ‘funda mentalists’ and ‘pat ri archs’ (UK6, UK7). In a sim­
ilar vein, veils are linked to debates about integration; Muslim women were 
blamed for wearing clothes that are perceived as ‘other’ and thus as signalling 
segregation from mainstream soci ety. The British Labour Party politician and 
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Britain in 2006: ‘wearing the full veil was bound to make better, pos it ive rela­
tions between the two com munit ies more difficult. It [the niqab] was such a vis­
ible statement of separation and of dif fer ence’ (UK1).15 
The sim ilar ity between the British debate on the veil and the con tin ental 
debates on the headscarf (or niqab in the Neth er lands) is the under lying as sump­
tion that only a com mun ity that shares the same values and adheres to the same 
prin ciples and norms can remain nationally cohesive and egal it arian. In all 
debates, covered women become the representatives and symbols of a Muslim 
com mun ity that is con sidered different and separate from the national com mun­
ity. In these national constructions, veiled Muslim women become symbols of – 
and are held respons ible for – ‘their’ com mun ity’s potential actions and beliefs 
or for forging social cohesion between ‘their’ and other com munit ies. This is an 
illustration of how women become bearers of their com mun ity’s (attributed) 
identity and respons ible for change (Volpp 2001; Yuval- Davis 1997; Warring 
1998). Veiled Muslim women do not simply symbolize the Islamic, potentially 
funda mentalist, segregating commun ity; they also mark the physical separation 
between the two com munit ies, i.e. between the Muslim com mun ity and the 
British/Dutch/French/German/Danish com mun ity (Lutz et al. 1995: 91; Yuval-
Davis et al. 2005: 527). We have seen how several politicians, fem in ists and other 
actors have demanded that women remove their headscarves or veils in order to 
integrate, i.e. assimilate into the white, Chris tian, national culture, and to become
modern and emancipated. This suggests that (Muslim) women who do not veil
are in teg rated and presumed to have em braced the national (white, secularized 
Chris tian) emancipated culture (e.g. G1b, G1c, G19, FR8, A8, A19). In these
debates, women thus become phys ical markers between the two cultures, which 
are constructed as each other’s oppos ite in a hierarchical manner, hence making it 
im pos sible to be an in teg rated part of both simul tan eously. This integration into 
Euro pean national soci eties is therefore not simply a question of shared values 
and norms; it is also a phys ical integration. Muslim women become, with their 
bodies, phys ical symbols of the success or failure of that integration. 
Struggles of feminism 
Feminism as a floating signifier 
As illus trated, prin ciples and norms of gender equality, auto nomy and sexual lib­
eration were tied to the vic timization frame en dorsed by various fem in ists in 
Ger many, France, Denmark and the Neth er lands. Here the argument was that 
headscarves were symbols of oppression that conflicted with uni ver sal norms of 
gender equality that all national cit izens had to share. In this last part of the 
chapter we want to return to the fem in ist discussion by elaborating upon the 
frames of these and other fem in ists, equally concerned about those prin ciples 
and norms, who have contested this claim. They have pointed out how such uni­
ver sal prin ciples cannot be in ter preted unambiguously and emphas ized the mul­
tiplicity of fem in ist strat egies to reach gender equity. 
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Many fem in ists pointed out that headscarves have mul tiple meanings and 
cannot be reduced to a symbol of oppression. They emphas ized that women may 
wear the headscarf for very varied reasons, which can only be understood in 
relation to the woman in question. In this light, the Austrian- Turkish fem in ist 
Dilek Cinar argues that a pro hibition would be counterproductive, because a pro­
hibition would imply a simplistic in ter pretation of headscarves by equating them 
with religious funda mentalism. A pro hibition would stigmatize headscarves and 
thereby all covered women, dis re gard ing the women’s indi vidual mo tiva tions to 
cover (A39). Also the Danish fem in ist organ iza tion the Feminist Forum has 
argued that headscarves and veils must be in ter preted as multifaceted practices 
that cannot simply be reduced to female oppression (DK20). After the Danish 
organ iza tion Women for Freedom had demanded that Danish pub lic ser vice TV 
(DR) could not hire a woman with a headscarf (DK19), i.e. the hiring of Asmaa 
Abdol- Hamid in 2006, the Feminist Forum sent out a press release in which they 
sup ported DR’s hiring of Abdol- Hamid. They wrote: ‘The Feminist Forum con­
gratulates DR for their hiring of Asmaa Abdol- Hamid as hostess for the debate 
program Adam & Asmaa. With this hiring DR parti cip ates in strengthening both 
gender and ethnic equality in Denmark’ (DK20). Without endorsing the idea that 
Muslim women who cover are oppressed, the Feminist Forum proposes parti­
cipa tion and inclusion of Muslim women as the most appropriate fem in ist strat­
egy to reach equality. 
The prin ciple of gender equality was in ter preted differently by fem in ists who 
framed not the headscarf but the ban as a form of gender discrimination. Several 
fem in ists pointed out that a ban on headscarves would disproportionately harm 
the rights of Muslim women and lead to discrimination on grounds of gender, 
which fem in ists cannot en dorse (A24, A26). Also the prin ciple of auto nomy was 
used to both argue against and in favour of veiling. We have seen how in the 
vic timization frame the headscarf was viewed as a symbol of limited (sexual) 
freedom; Cisca Dresselhuys argues for instance: 
Because fem in ism has always been – and still is – to enable women who 
want to make different choices, I now want to sup port Muslim women who 
would like to but do not yet dare to remove their symbol of oppression, their 
headscarf. 
(NL3) 
The Dutch fem in ist scholars Sawitri Saharso and Baukje Prins criticized her 
stance to refuse women with headscarves as editors as a form of ‘intolerant sim­
ilar ity fem in ism’ (NL4). In an open letter to a daily news paper in 2001, they 
called for re cog ni tion of women’s free choice, including choices that are gen­
erally disliked by Opzij fem in ists such as the will to veil. Women may want to 
retain ties with their religion or culture while emancipating, and sub sequently 
even change pat ri archal traditions by practising different gender roles than are 
expected. In the framing of Saharso and Prins, donning the headscarf can thus 
also be seen as the result of women’s autonomic choices that are located within 
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religious and cultural frameworks, as well as a pos sible form of ‘accommodative 
protest’ (MacLeod 1992). Instead of only sup porting women whose emancipa­
tion is achieved through the adoption of secular lib eral values and a rejection of 
Islam, they opt for the re cog ni tion of mul tiple strat egies of emancipation. 
These examples illus trate the great diversity among Euro pean (Muslim) 
women and fem in ists in their definitions of and views on emancipation and fem­
in ism, par ticu larly on women’s agency and their capa city or desire to gain auto­
nomy within cultural and religious structures (Friedman 2003; Mackenzie and 
Stoljar 2000; Deveaux 2005, 2007; Mahmood 2001). The debates about head-
scarves and veils therefore illus trate how fem in ism is a floating signifier with no 
specific meaning ascribed to it (Laclau 1990). The meanings of fem in ism – as 
well as gender equality and the in ter pretation of headscarves and veils – are con­
stantly changing and shifting depending on who uses the terms and in which 
national, cultural and social con texts they are used. It is im port ant to con sider 
how this lack of a fixed meaning influences the debates. A symbol – fem in ism – 
whose meaning differs from con text to con text will always be accompanied by 
antagonisms between different discourses trying to ascribe hege monic meaning 
to the symbol; i.e. different fem in ists are constantly trying to make their version 
of fem in ism and their in ter pretation of headscarves appear as the hege monic dis­
course (Laclau 1993; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The result is a debate that seems 
inconsistent: both fem in ist camps arguing in favour of and against a ban have 
used arguments of gender equality and labelled themselves fem in ists. This does 
not mean that they neces sar ily have much in common or share the same values. 
They all argue in favour of women’s rights but they neither agree on what this 
implies nor on how to get these rights. Another result is that the debates are not 
simply about headscarves and gender equality but also about gaining hege monic 
sup port for one’s ascribed meaning to the symbol and getting one’s version of 
fem in ism accepted as the common version. 
Who speaks for whom? 
This draws our attention to the prob lem of repres enta tion. Instead of viewing 
their terms and strat egies as partial and situated, several actors tried to push for 
their in ter pretations and strat egies of fem in ism among power holders; unfortu­
nately, sometimes by discrediting and silencing other women’s voices. Some 
fem in ists (whether they appropriate this label or not) have accused other fem in­
ists of speaking on behalf of Muslim women. They have claimed their own voice 
in the debate.16 One example is the French activist of Algerian descent Houria 
Bouteldja (FR27). She is a member of the movement Les Indigènes de la Répub­
lique composed of French cit izens who define themselves as descendants of 
slavery, col on iza tion and immigration. In a fem in ist aca demic journal from 
2004, she claims that the French initiative to ban headscarves only serves to 
maintain a symbolic order that dehu man izes cit izens of colour and practising 
Muslims, which, according to her, delineates a co lo nial mentality of superi or ity. 
Bouteldja makes an ana logy to the French so- called ‘civilization mission’ in 
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col on ized Algeria in the early twentieth century, when white French also tried to 
encourage Muslim women to remove headscarves in the name of their emanci­
pation. She is par ticu larly scep tical of secular Muslim women who have argued 
in favour of a ban in order to liberate young girls, such as the organ iza tion Ni 
Putes Ni Soumises (NPNS). According to Bouteldja, such women collaborate 
with the col on izers by denouncing their fellow coun try people as backward and 
uncivilized if they con tinue to cover (FR27). 
Women like Bouteldja point out that (fem in ist) discourses are strongly linked 
to existing social practices and related power positions, which cannot be reduced 
to sexual dif fer ence alone. Although her claim of re cog ni tion is weakened by her 
own denial of NPNS’ fem in ist per spect ives, she draws our attention to the 
im port ant insight that there is no privileged fem in ist position that gives some the 
right to speak in the name of others. This should not lead to a moral relativism 
that denies the pos sib il ity of judging practices across religious cultures, because 
that would mean a ‘fetishizing of cultural attributes and claims’ by employing an 
essentialist and static understanding of religious culture (Yuval Davis et al. 
2005: 529). As women are differently positioned according to class, sexuality, 
religion, race, eth ni city and age, their dif fer ence cannot be reduced to culture 
and religion alone. This re cog ni tion means that women not only speak from dif­
ferent locations (even ‘within’ the same culture) but may also hold different 
aims, strat egies and goals of gender and women’s emancipation (Phillips 1999, 
2007). Women’s emancipation in con tempor ary Europe must be understood in 
an intersectional per spect ive, where religious practices, like head and body cov­
erings, are viewed in relation to repres enta tion, workforce parti cipa tion, post- 
colonialism and discrimination, and where other cat egor ies of in equal it ies like 
class and sexuality are also taken into account. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illus trated how gender and gender equality have played a 
central role in recent Euro pean debates on headscarves and veils. There are many 
simil ar ities between the debates in different coun tries. One sim ilar ity is that in 
all coun tries politicians and fem in ists have drawn upon the vic timization frame 
when discussing headscarves and veiling, and have portrayed veiled Muslim 
women as oppressed by either a misogynous culture or Islamic funda mentalists. 
Another im port ant sim ilar ity is that these actors de scribe Muslim women’s 
oppression as an opposi tion to their national coun try’s state of gender equality as 
well as a threat to this gender equality. This was blended with integration argu­
ments, where the (male) majority’s ethics and norms of gender equality and 
freedom were presented as uni ver sal values that Muslims do not (yet) possess. In 
other words, all coun tries are, in the framing of their national actors, presented 
as the embodiment of gender equality, with unveiling becoming markers of 
national belonging. 
The construction of gender equality as a uni ver sal value that Muslim women 
do not possess leads to a reconfiguration of gender equality as a marker of 
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cultural bound ar ies. By analysing how national actors drew upon very different 
understandings of ab stract uni ver sal prin ciples and values to plead against 
veiling, this chapter has shown how different bound ar ies of the nation were 
drawn. These could to a large extent be related to the nationally and his tor ically 
par ticu lar traditions of secularism and nation building. Nonetheless, these bound­
ar ies were also strongly contested within coun tries by actors attributing different 
meanings to sim ilar prin ciples. The debates are thus not simply about head-
scarves and veils. They can be con sidered as an arena where different construc­
tions of the nation are made in the con text of changing demographic patterns in 
Europe. 
The chapter has further argued that headscarf debates are struggles about how 
to define fem in ism, which likewise contains unequal power relations. Muslim 
women and their headscarves become a platform from which fem in ists, and 
others, can debate fem in ism. The frame of vic timization that portrays Muslim 
women – in opposi tion to the majority – as not having gender equality, racializes 
and nationalizes gender equality and serves to retain hege monic practices of 
fem in ism. This denies the complex, con textualized and nuanced understandings 
of gender equality and auto nomy that constitute fem in ist struggles in con tempor­
ary Europe. More in par ticu lar, it deprives Muslim women of the chance to 
combine their faith with emancipation. Moreover, this framing plays into nation­
alist and other funda mentalist discourses that normalize and juxta pose certain 
ethics, practices and norms as ‘Islamic’ and ‘Western’, which helps to ‘freeze’ 
both minor ity and majority cultures in hierarchal orders. In a Western Euro pean 
con text, this may negat ively impact Muslim women’s struggles for emancipation 
by forcing them into an either/or choice between a national white com mun ity – 
where they are not fully included – and a diaspora com mun ity – where a critique 
of unequal gender structures might be seen as a betrayal of the group (Ghorashi 
2006). In order to increase collaborative fem in ist efforts that are neces sary to 
challenge pat ri archy across cultures, different fem in ist voices ‘within’ such cul­
tures must be recog nized and sup ported rather than discredited. This requires a 
crit ical self- reflection of one’s own (his tor ically, socially, religiously and cultur­
ally) specific fem in ist pro ject and a greater sensitivity for women’s agency 
within moral frameworks that are not neces sar ily shared. 
Notes
 1 Opzij editor Jolande Withuis has argued for instance: ‘The Commission prioritizes 
religion all the time, discriminates dissidents and hinders integration’ (‘Handjeklap 
met seksisme’, Opzij, 1 Janu ary 2007). According to Withuis, Dutch pillarized 
multiculturalism is a ‘sneaky racism’ that has allowed ‘a Holland full of headscarves, 
veils and yet even chadors, where homosexual teachers have to hide their way of life 
and their loves and where doctors waste time and know ledge healing hymens’ 
(‘Liberaal?’ Opzij, 1 Febru ary 2003). Since 2008 Opzij has a new chief editor, Mar­
griet van der Linden, who is clearly more receptive for Muslim women’s different 
views and strat egies of emancipation. She hired a columnist who wears a headscarf 
herself. 
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various (female) politicians, intellectuals and journ al ists argue that Islamists are trying 
to overthrow the secular state, with the con sequence that all women’s equal rights 
would be endangered (TR3, TR6, TR12, TR17). This illus trates the diffusion of this 
frame across national borders as a result of migration and the increasing trans-
nationalization of cit izen ship (Soysal 2000).
 3 P1 Morgen (radio programme), 23 May 2006, DR. 
4 NL, TK 29 754, no. 41 (2005–2006): this pol icy docu ment concerns the motion of 
Geert Wilders to ban the burqa in the Neth er lands. TK refers to ‘Tweede Kamer’ or 
‘Second Chamber’, the Dutch par lia ment. These docu ments were collected from the 
online database of the Dutch par lia ment: www.parlando.nl (accessed 9 March 2010). 
5 NL, TK 15 (19 Octo ber 2005) and NL, TK 29 754, no. 53: this pol icy docu ment con­
cerns a Dutch debate between parlia ment ary commissions on education, integration 
and do mestic affairs about rad icalization, in which Wilders launches his motion to 
ban the burqa in the Netherlands. 
6 Bert Bakker (of the D66, Democraten 66, Liberal Democrat Party) in NL, TK 29 203, 
no. 9 (29 March 2004): 7. 
7 Joost Eerdmans of the LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn; List Pim Fortuyn) argued in a debate 
on banning religious symbols in certain pub lic functions by referring to Dutch 
achievements of gay rights: 
My fraction is worried about the growing Islamization of the Dutch soci ety. A few 
of its funda mental values are being threatened: the equal treatment of men and 
women, the equal treatment of homosexuals and heterosexuals and last, but cer­
tainly not least, the separation between church and state, something we will 
discuss today. 
(NL, TK 59, 17 March 2004) 
8 The law was entitled Loi encadrant, en applica tion du principe de laïcité, le port de 
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges 
et lycées pub lics. A great majority in the national par lia ment voted on 10 Febru ary 
2004 in favour of the law, both from left- and right- wing par ties (494 to 36, with 31 
abstentions). On 3 March 2004 the Senate adopted the law, with 276 voting in favour 
and 20 against. It was pro mul gated on 21 March and entered into force the sub sequent 
school year (McGoldrick 2006). 
9 The Stasi Commission was set up by the then President Jacques Chirac to reflect upon 
the applica tion of French secularism (laïcité) in its present- day multicultural soci ety. 
It was officially called ‘The committee of reflection on the applica tion of the prin ciple 
of secularity in the Repub lic’ (Commission de réflexion sur l’applica tion du principe 
de laïcité dans la République), headed by Bernard Stasi. Before it launched its report 
on 5 Decem ber, President Chirac had already announced that he would implement a 
law to regulate religious symbols out of the school. 
10 	Commission de réflexion sur l’applica tion du principe de laïcité dans la République
(2003) Rapport au President (Paris, 11 Decem ber 2003): 47. From here: Stasi report. 
All translations are ours. 
11 Among the peti tioners were the fem in ist philo sopher Elisabeth Badinter and promi­
nent French women like Isabelle Adjani, Michelle Perrot, Francoise Héritier. 
12 The CNDF regroups various women’s movements and trade unions and par ties on the 
left, such as the MLF (Mouvement de Libération des Femmes) and its pillar organ iza­
tion MFPF (Mouvement Francais pour le Planning Familial). 
13 Parliamentary debate about changing the school law: Plenarprotokoll 13–62 (4 Febru­
ary 2004): 4395. All translations are ours. Christoph Vetter of the German council of 
the Prot est ant Church (G8) and Cardinal Karl Lehmann of the German Bishop’s Con­
ference (G6, G7) both released a press statement in 2003 in which they doubted 
whether veiled women could represent the ‘German free demo crat order’ if they were 
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express their religion but at the same time pointed at the pos sible negat ive impact that 
a veiled teacher can have on young girls’ emancipation and integration in German 
society. 
14 There is no simple explanation for why the practice of headscarves does not cause
debate in Britain when it causes great debate on the Euro pean continent. One
reason might be that Britain has a strong tradition for or gan ized anti- discrimination.
The British Commission for Racial Equality (in 2009 transformed into the Equality
and Human Rights Commission) was estab lished by the so- called Race Relations
Act in 1976, and has since been active in directing pub lic attention towards dis­
crimination against migrants and descendents of colour. The British Commission
has gained a strong pub lic voice and plays a central role in pub lic debates about
discrimination. It does not represent all migrants and descendants, espe cially not
Muslim women. The commission is included here as an explan at ory factor throw­
ing light on the dif fer ence between debates in Britain and on the Euro pean conti­
nent. Another explan at ory factor might be that there seems to be a stronger
post- colonial aware ness in Britain than on the continent. This might account for
the stronger tolerance towards Muslim headscarves and for the less harsh tone in
the debates in Britain. Finally, the United Kingdom does not have a strict separa­
tion between the church and the state, as the Anglican Church is interwoven into
the British consti tu tion. The British debate about veils was not strongly connected
to questions of secularism, and there were no arguments claiming that secularism
is the way to secure gender equality. 
15 This clearly illus trates a dif fer ence between the Dutch and the British framing of the 
debate on face covers; whereas Jack Straw emphas ized the communication between 
two ‘com munit ies’ as a solution for social frag menta tion, Dutch politicians argued for 
the assimilation of (or tho dox) Muslims into the secularized lib eral com mun ity by 
demanding for a full ban on symbols like the niqab that segregated and isolated 
vulner able Muslim women and scared the majority population. 
16 Also Muslim women in favour of a ban have felt excluded from the debate. One 
example is the German of Turkish descent secular lib eral fem in ist Ülkü Schneider- 
Gürkan who has or gan ized a col lect ive in the Federal state of Hessen (G20). It strives 
for a separation between church and state and an unrestricted acceptance of the 
German consti tu tion. Together with other ‘demo cratically minded Muslims’, she pub­
lished a statement in the news paper Die Tageszeitung in 2004 to argue in favour of a 
ban on headscarves for teachers (G12). They criticized the letter of Marieluise Beck, 
Barbara John and Rita Süssmuth etc. for speaking in their name by calling for the 
accommodation of the headscarf for teachers in order to safeguard Muslim women’s 
emancipation (G12). 
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2 Thinking through secularism 
Debates on the Muslim veil in Europe 
Eirini Avramopoulou, Gül Çorbacıoğlu and 
Maria Eleonora Sanna 
Introduction 
Many scholars have emphas ized the significance of the concept of secularism in 
relation to con tempor ary Euro pean modernity (Connolly 1999; Ratzinger et al. 
2006; Taylor 2007; Levey and Modood 2009). It has been argued that secular­
ism came to be perceived as a polit ical doctrine emerging in modern nation 
states and that its applica tion was based on the separation between secular and 
religious institutions (Taylor 1998; Asad 2003; Mahmood 2006). However, as 
Asad (2003: 1) has poignantly argued in his criticism of Taylor’s (1998) em brace 
of secularism as constitutive of modern demo cratic states, there is more to it than 
this. He reminds us that ‘modern pro jects do not hang together as an in teg rated 
totality, but they account for distinctive sensibilities, aesthetics, moralities’ 
(2003: 14). And indeed it has become evid ent in debates on Muslim women’s 
attires, that secularism needs to be further scrutinized and re thought in its rela­
tion to the religious, and also in terms of the specific con tent with which it is 
infused when presented as constituting and regulating societal, cultural and polit­
ical embodiments (Asad 2003; Mahmood 2006: 323). 
Whereas the division between the religious and the secular is a pertinent one 
in the his tory of Chris tianity and, as such, is respons ible for both the ‘funda­
mental’ and ‘founda tional’ separation between the church and the state (Nancy 
2007: 7), debates on secularisms cannot escape controversies related to Chris­
tianity and Islam. As Anidjar notes, ‘Chris tianity invented the distinction 
between religious and secular and thus made religion. It made religion the prob­
lem – rather than itself ’ (2006: 62). These con tinu ous conflicts between (and 
among) Chris tianity and Islam over religion, which seem to have influenced his-
tor ically different Euro pean modernities, mirror secularism as part of his tor ical 
pro cesses and nar rat ives in which the polit ical powers mediate gendered cit izen­
ships and belongings. The concept of secularism offers a prism through which to 
ex plore various theor et ical and methodo logical questions emerging in relation to 
the veil debates across con texts within different state–religion regimes. Further­
more, as will be explained in this chapter, secularism is not only a theor et ical 
conceptualization; it is also, and even more, a polit ical term adopted and stra­
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con tinu ally reconfigured; and, furthermore, it allows for a comparative per spect­
ive that is attentive to its discursive heterogeneity. 
This chapter aims at juxta posing discourses on Muslim veiling practices in 
coun tries with diverse histories, cultural and polit ical envir on ments and legal 
regulations. By building three clusters of national case studies, with each cluster 
representing a different configuration of state–religion relations, we pursue a 
comparative approach that attempts to shed light on the understandings and 
in ter pretations, claims and demands sur round ing Muslim women’s head and/or 
body coverings. The three groups are (a) Austria, Ger many and the Neth er lands 
fol low ing a neutral model, (b) France and Turkey representing a laic model and 
(c) the UK, Greece and Denmark illustrating the ways in which a dominant reli­
gion affects aspects of state conduct (Berghahn 2007). By employing secularism 
as a hub concept we raise two main questions. First, how do the discursive argu­
ments employed for or against the veil reflect the different appeals to secularism 
across different con texts? Second, in which cases of controversies over veiled 
women and by which actors do in ter pretations of secularism reconfigure its 
signification? 
The interconnectedness of different forms of secularism and debates about 
veiling practices points to the heart of recent aca demic ana lyses of the relation 
between the religious and the secular within modern nation states.1 The aim of 
our cross- comparison is to engage with these con tempor ary dialogues and there­
fore not to perceive the Muslim veil just as a prob lem produced in Europe. On 
the contrary, we pursue an approach to the debates on religious attires within 
par ticu lar geopolit ical regions as the result of a prob lematization as defined in 
Foucauldian terms. In Foucault’s words, 
prob lematization doesn’t mean the repres enta tion of a pre- existing object, 
nor the cre ation by discourse of an object that doesn’t exist. It is the totality 
of discursive or non discursive practices that introduces something into the 
play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought. 
(Foucault 1988: 257) 
In methodo logical terms, we aim at analysing the embedded power dy namics as 
unravelled through pub lic debates while we approach them as instances of dis­
cursive regimes that cannot be regarded as distinct from practices (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001: 107). 
Debates on veiling practices and on secularisms are interconnected and on 
many occasions they crisscross national borders. The ana lysis of our mater ial 
indicates that while in some cases it is the manner in which secularism is 
debated, understood and implemented which sets the con ditions or the semantics 
of par ticu lar veil debates, in other situ ations it is because of the fact that Muslim 
headscarves ignite discussions of a par ticu lar type that perceptions and claims 
over secularism come to be shaped and/or redefined. And since secularism 
becomes a notion that is constantly reconfigured, depending on its con textual 
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mentioned that discourses on secularism as appearing in one national con text 
have already been mediated by rel ev ant discourses in different geographies. For 
example, discussions fol low ing the French restrictive legis la tion provoked 
various heated debates in all other Euro pean coun tries and affected the con­
ditions of legal pro hibitions in Turkey (cf. Göle 2006; Bowen 2007). 
The coun tries of each cluster are cross- compared by focusing on pub lic 
debates ana lysed through selected pol icy docu ments, emerging as ‘para digmatic’ 
(Flyvbjerg 2001: 80). In the first part of the chapter, we examine texts from 
Austria, the Neth er lands and Ger many, coun tries in which a modality of state 
neutrality has been em blem atic of regulating the incorporation of the Islamic 
alterity in soci ety. The appeal to ecumenism in Austria, discussions over multi­
culturalism in the Neth er lands and over plur al ism in Ger many reiterate the con­
flicting in ter pretations of secularism as interrelated with the antagonistic 
positioning in the debate. Moreover, these discussions reformulate the terms 
under which the parti cipa tion of Muslims in Euro pean soci ety is negotiated 
between integration and assimilation while reframing the expressions of national 
identity. In the second part of the chapter, dialogical connections between laïcité
in France and Kemalism in Turkey are drawn in order to shed light on the his tor­
ical and polit ical significations of secularism in coun tries in which a strict sepa­
ration between state and religion has been implemented. In the last part of the 
chapter, cases and par ticu lar actors from the UK, Greece and Denmark, coun­
tries with a close relation between church and state, reveal either a par ticu lar 
resistance towards secularism which is perceived as a threat to cultural unity and 
national identity by representatives of the church (cf. UK, Greece), or a certain 
necessity to secularize Islam in order to follow the coun try’s needs, for instance 
its economy. 
Cluster I: culturalist approaches towards veiling in ‘neutral’ 
countries 
Austria, Ger many and the Neth er lands represent a neutral configuration of state– 
religion relations (Berghahn 2007). Arguments employed by different actors in 
each national debate emerge as em blem atic of pro cesses that reconceptualize sec­
ularism and resignify the mul tiple appeals to both the impartiality of the state and 
the prin ciple of gender equality. Hence, these debates challenge national identity 
im agery, anti- discriminatory approaches to cit izen ship and multicultural policies. 
Our research question is thus formulated as follows: first, how do redefini­
tions of the con tent of secularism interconnected with debates on Muslim 
women’s attires question the terms under which national self- identifications are 
(re)configured? Second, how do these redefinitions and consecutive (re)configu­
rations question the con ditions and modalities for Muslim women’s social parti­
cipa tion in coun tries where unrestrictive or partially unrestrictive regulations 
(Austria and the Neth er lands) have been adopted, and in coun tries (such as Ger­
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When, in 2003, the provincial leader of the extreme right Freedom Party of
Austria (FPÖ) in Tyrol claimed a change of legis la tion for pro hibiting the head-
scarf in schools (A22), the Islamic Religious Community in Austria (IRCA) 
reacted by reaffirming that the wearing of the headscarf is both an inner religious 
mat ter of an institutionalized religious com mun ity and an indi vidual right (A4). 
The FPÖ waged a media cam paign arguing against the headscarf in the name of 
gender equality; women’s emancipation, depicted as a value of Chris tian moder­
nity disdained by Islam, was referred to in order to argue that Muslims were 
incom pat ible with Austrian soci ety (cf. A18, A19, A20, A21). In this con text, 
the IRCA argued that the re cog ni tion of Islam, guaranteed by law, is a feature of 
national identity and is com pat ible with the Chris tian tradition of tolerance. In a 
sim ilar vein, the former pres id ent of the Austrian par lia ment (member of the 
con ser vat ive ÖVP; cf. A15) referred to lib erality as an ‘old national tradition’ 
thanks to which Austria is able to em brace religious multiplicity in soci ety. In 
the pro- veiling media battlefield, Chris tian churches also advanced the idea of 
freedom of religion as a national tradition while stressing tolerance as under lying 
secularism. The pres id ent of the Ecumenical Council (A2) and members of the 
Cath olic Church (A3) conceive secularism as an ecumenical attitude towards all 
religions built on the Chris tian values of tolerance and acceptance. On these 
bases, the headscarf can be toler ated in the pub lic sphere in the name of state 
neutrality. According to the Ecumenical Council, limiting the right to wear the 
headscarf would open the way to other lim ita tions of the expression of religious 
freedom that would dangerously reduce the visibility of religion in Austrian 
soci ety. Rainer Bauböck (A35), one of the leading Austrian researchers on cit­
izen ship, and Jürgen Wallner (A33), a judicial expert voice in the debate on 
Muslim women’s attires, express clearly the way in which an ecumenical in ter­
pretation of secularism can be associated with a lib eral conception. According to 
their ana lysis, open neutrality towards different and often conflicting religious 
beliefs, ideas and traditions as well as symbols and practices, implies thinking 
about religion as a part of soci ety. Hence they criticize laïcité (Bauberot 2000) 
as an ideo logical prin ciple dis re gard ing indi vidual religious or philosophical 
convictions which are ‘intrinsically part of human beings who are the ones con­
stituting the polit ical sover eignty of the state’ (A33). In disapproving of laïcité
as state ideo logy, the notion of secularism, oscillating between ecumenism and 
lib erality, becomes a polit ical term able to sup port the separation between 
churches and the state not in the name of an ideo logical division between reli­
gion and soci ety, but in the name of the visibility of religious freedom (Balibar 
2004a). Stressing the Austrian tradition of religious tolerance on the one hand, 
the argumentation of the pres id ent of the Ecumenical Council seems, on the 
other hand, to reduce the headscarf to a ‘cultural mark’. By avoiding any ref er­
ences to its religious symbolism, Chris tianity is being presented as a modern
religion, able to enforce the prin ciple of tolerance, and Islam as a purely ‘cul­
tural’ religion (Anidjar 2006: 59). In the same way, members of the Social
Democrats (SPÖ), such as the Viennese city councillor for women and integra­
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ÖVP (A30), state that the institutionalization of religious diversity is an im port-
ant polit ical instrument to encourage the parti cipa tion of veiled women in soci­
ety, and to improve their social cit izen ship. This statement, while sensitive to 
veiled women’s integration, is never the less ambiguously rephrased by a cultur­
alist discourse opposing our Austria by right- wing politicians (cf. A28, A30) – a 
supposedly open, already secular and egal it arian soci ety – to cultural minor it ies, 
implicitly conceived as backwards and targeted as being the only people respons­
ible for gender inequalities. 
The dominant and polit ically transversal argument – that the visibility of reli­
gious freedom is a feature of national identity – is justified by a discourse on tol­
erance as the prin ciple infusing Austrian secularism. This discursive instance 
depicting Austria as being tradi tion ally open to diversity produces a culturalist
defence of the indi vidual right to wear the Islamic headscarf. In this con text, the 
parti cipa tion of veiled women in soci ety as well as their cit izen ship are 
approached ‘paternalistically’ (Abu- Lughod 2002): Muslim women, veiled or 
not, and men, in spite of the formal re cog ni tion of Islam, are socially in teg rated 
as cultural aliens in the name of the Austrian self- defined degree of tolerance 
and acceptance. 
In the fol low ing we will compare this argument raised in the Austrian debate 
with the pre val ent arguments framing the Dutch debate on the veil where dis­
putes on multicultural integration pol icies are embedded in a secular model of 
‘pillarization’ (see Chapter 7). In the Neth er lands, the pub lic and polit ical debate 
on the necessity to restrict religious freedom, a consti tu tional right, in the name 
of state impartiality and gender equality, also began in schools by questioning 
the wearing of veils by teachers and students. It then con tinued in discussions on 
the wearing of both headscarves and full body/face coverings in courts and in 
places of pub lic ser vice. Since 2008, Islamic veiling practices have been forbid­
den in certain judiciary and police functions. In spite of these specific pro­
hibitions, equal treatment of all religions has been implemented in 
accommodation pol icies sup ported by the case- by-case advice of the Dutch 
Commission of Equal treatment (NL1). Similarly, several anti- discrimination 
offices (NL7, NL18), NGOs (NL22) and politicians of different affili ations (from 
the left- wing to Liberals) have put forward the rights argument while referring to 
the idea of multiculturalism as being part of Dutch secularism. According to 
these actors, veiling practices are both an indi vidual right and a sign of the role 
religion plays in soci ety. Following the his tor ical segmentation of Dutch soci ety 
along confessional lines, state–religion relations have been shaped into a model 
encouraging churches and religious com munit ies’ corporations. This model, 
based on a Chris tian tradition fostering the active function of religion in soci ety, 
succeeded in defining Dutch pub lic space as a space of religious diversity (Let­
tinga and Saharso 2009). In this con text, Ayaan Hirsi Ali (NL6), an em blem atic 
Muslim laic fem in ist voice, as well as members of the Liberal party, laic fem in­
ists (cf. NL3, NL4, NL9, NL10, NL12), members of socialist, social demo cratic, 
lib eral and populist par ties, called for bans on full body/face coverings in the 
pub lic sphere. They shared the argumentation that the face veil is the very 
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symbol of women’s oppression in Islam. Hence it must be banned in order to 
respect a strict separation between lib eral institutions and religion, which is the 
polit ical tool able to promote and safeguard gender equality. Only a few Dutch 
fem in ists reacted against this argumentation in the name of the ideal of a multi­
cultural soci ety (NL4, NL17, NL19, NL21). While reigniting the debate about 
whether multicultural pol icies should be con sidered appropriate tools to handle 
prob lems of dif fer ence and equality or whether they lead to cultural relativism 
(cf. Okin 1999; Phillips 2007), these fem in ist voices reacted against Ali’s claim 
by arguing that veiling practices should be con sidered com pat ible with the idea 
of women’s self- determination (NL17, NL21). In this per spect ive, wearing of 
headscarves could be in ter preted as a symbol of religious conviction, of an auto­
nom ous choice, and as an identity marker providing a sense of empowerment 
(NL17, NL19). Thus its institutionalization as both an indi vidual and religious 
right could improve veiled women’s parti cipa tion in soci ety and sup port the 
implementation of anti- discriminatory integration pol icies (Prins and Saharso 
2008). Moreover, according to these voices, the secular character of the Dutch 
state, based on the ideal of a multicultural soci ety in which religion is vis ible and 
dynamic, should guarantee the de velopment of mul tiple fem in ist strategies. 
Focusing on the dissonances over which the notion of secularism could feed a 
model of state neutrality able to integrate Islam in the national religious dyna­
mism and Islamic female alterity in the national body politic, the Dutch debate 
mirrors German discussions on veiling practices as reflecting German dilemmas 
around the consti tu tional prin ciples both of religious freedom and of gender 
equality. In Ger many, the polit ical debate on the necessity to regulate Muslim 
women’s attire (G1, G19) reveals a shift in how the con tent of secularism is 
in ter preted, a shift from a polit ical doctrine guaranteeing the consti tu tional prin­
ciple of equality and embodying the ideal of plur al ism to a norm of state neutral­
ity in the name of which Islamic practices can be sanc tioned and veiled women 
excluded. The case of Fereshta Ludin, who took legal action against the refusal 
of the province of Baden- Württemberg to employ her as a veiled teacher (G5, 
G26), illus trates the ways in which a traditional pluralistic image of national 
identity can be redefined (Berghahn 2007). The Federal Constitutional Court’s 
(FCC) de cision to trans fer the competence to regulate teachers’ veiling from the 
national to the province level (ibid.: 28) reconfigures the limits of polit ical neu­
trality. Moreover, the controversies related to the FCC’s de cision resignified the 
con tent of secularism while disclosing the interrelation between its definition 
and the different in ter pretations of and instrumental appeals to the prin ciple of 
gender equality. 
Since the FCC’s judgement in 2003, eight German provinces have adopted 
school acts banning teachers’ headscarves, and five of them have passed clauses 
in favour of Christian- occidental symbols. Cardinal Lehmann (G6, G7, G21), 
expressing the official position of the Cath olic Church, the Chris tian Democrats 
(G19, G22, G27b), and the de cisions of the Federal Administrative Court (G26) 
and of the Bavarian Constitutional Court (G32), expli citly privilege Chris tian reli­
gious symbols. They have argued that only the visibility of Islam is threatening 
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state impartiality, while Chris tian symbols do not. This in ter pretation arises from 
a framework according to which Chris tianity is con sidered an in teg ral part of 
both German culture and a sys tem of values including women’s emancipation. 
These same actors, in ter preting state impartiality as the product of a supposed 
secularization of Chris tian traditions (Joppke 2007), also agree with German 
fem in ist groups (G15, G28, G29). Like Dutch fem in ists, German fem in ists in ter­
pret the headscarf as both a sign of cultural separation – and hence as a threat to 
the ideal of plur al ism – and as the symbol of the Islamic pat ri archy violating the 
consti tu tional prin ciple of gender equality. In this con text, Ludin’s claim to the 
consti tu tional right of self- determination and to equal access to pub lic ser vice 
for every German (G3) reformulates gender equality: how can the Western 
(Chris tian) model of women’s emancipation go along with veiled women’s 
agency (Butler 1990) in a plural soci ety? This reformu la tion challenges German 
views on the ways in which ‘a ser ious appreciation of dif fer ences among 
women’ (Abu- Lughod 2002: 783) should be de veloped in order to trigger a 
demo cratic debate between subjects about the con ditions and modalities of 
implementing anti- discriminatory pol icies which embody both the ideal of plur­
al ism and the prin ciple of gender equality. 
The social concerns and polit ical impasses of culturalist approaches coping 
with dif fer ences among women are clarified by comparing a certain Austrian 
ecumenical lib eralism with the German conflicts related to Ludin’s claim, as 
well as with the Dutch controversies on the meaning and role of multicultural­
ism. Our cross- comparison thus sheds light on the dif ficult ies of dealing with 
dif fer ences among women when women are culturally recog nized as the ‘prod­
ucts of different histories, the expressions of different circumstances, and the 
manifestations of differently structured desires’ (ibid.) rather than understood as 
the product of the plurality of women’s polit ical stances and positions (Varikas 
2006). 
Debates about the secular formulated in the language of Chris tian ecumenism 
in Austria and of Chris tian pillarization in the Neth er lands for sup porting the 
right to freedom of religious expression, as well as a discourse on the secular as 
a Chris tian inheritance jus tifying the pro hibition of Islamic symbols in Ger many, 
refer to an aporetic idea of tolerance: tolerance as the privilege of the hege monic 
religion to tolerate the others and, therefore, ‘to minorize’ them (Mariet 1991), 
thereby foreclosing the pos sib il ity of an open demo cratic debate on the meanings 
and requirements of secularism. 
Cluster II: the veil between the citizen and the state 
France and Turkey have both implemented a ‘laic model’ strictly separating state 
and religion (Berghahn 2007). In France, Muslims are a minor ity whereas in 
Turkey they constitute the majority of the popu la tion. While both states define 
themselves as secular in a very strict sense, dif fer ences in the consti tu tion of the 
popu la tion, his tory, culture and traditions of gender relations lead to discrepan­
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However, in both coun tries, the headscarf is debated within the framework of 
do mestic pol itics and ref er ences to modernity. In France, the visibility of Muslim 
headscarves is largely perceived as a prob lem caused by the failure to integrate 
Muslim im mig rants. The headscarf is stigmatized as a threat to the secular order 
and to national identity. In the Turkish debate, the visibility of the headscarf is 
perceived as a polit ical sign of a funda mental opposi tion to the his tor ical prin­
ciples of the state. We will argue that, despite the dif fer ences, veiled women as 
submissive threats to secular sys tems are at the core of the debate in both coun­
tries. In France and Turkey, veiled women are singled out as ‘the subject’ who 
fails to integrate into a secular state sys tem as a modern citizen. 
Laïcité, a consti tu tional prin ciple of the French Repub lic (cf. the French 
consti tu tion of 1958), has been appealed to in both pub lic and polit ical debates 
on Muslim female attire since 1989, when three covered students were expelled 
from a high school. In 2004, after the Stasi Commission’s report on laïcité,2 a 
law was passed which pro hibited students from wearing headscarves in pub lic 
schools. In France, the juridical inscription of the prin ciple of laïcité goes back 
to 1905 when the strict separation between churches and the state was codified 
in law (Bauberot 2000). The law of 9 Decem ber 1905 aimed at removing the 
influence of the Cath olic Church from schools and at ensuring state control over 
the educational sys tem. The law created a ‘homo gen eous’ pub lic space, sup­
posed to represent the symbolic sover eignty of the French secular and therefore 
modern nation (Balibar 2004a: 154). The implementation coincided with the 
stronger unification of regional identities that composed the territory of the 
French state ‘under a secular state nar rat ive of indi vidual auto nomy within a uni­
ver sal nation of free and equal cit izens’ (Gökarıksel and Mitchell 2005: 153). 
The notion of a free and equal cit izen in a modern secular nation was to be inher­
ent in French national identity, and it was expected to be in ternalized by im mig­
rants. Being a Muslim is not openly declared as an obs tacle to integration, but 
rather Islamic attire and values are put forward as reasons for their failure to 
assimilate. 
According to Jane Freedman (2004), it is difficult to understand the im port­
ance of the headscarf issue in French soci ety without taking into account the 
im port ance of secularism for French national identity and the ways in which 
immigration, espe cially from the former colonies, has led to questioning it. 
According to those who oppose the display of Muslim headscarves in the pub lic 
sphere, such as a large spectrum of politicians, of gov ern ment officials and of 
mainstream fem in ists, the headscarf stands for a denial of French culture and 
represents a polit ical attack against French secularism (FR8, FR11, FR21). The 
strat egy transforms the ‘Islamic headscarf practice’ into a ‘communitarian’ 
claim, an indi vidual practice into a specific com munal claim (FR19). Régis 
Debray, a philo sopher and former adviser on foreign affairs to François Mitter­
rand’s gov ern ments, argues that the prin ciple of laïcité is endangered through 
this communitarianism. Therefore, the headscarf is seen as a sort of peculiarity 
which the French laïcité should not allow (FR8). In turn, Freedman (2004: 6) 
argues that the way in which the headscarf affair is played out must be placed in 
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an inter na tional con text of post- colonial relations in which the fear of the spread 
of Islamic funda mentalism has created ten sion within French soci ety, with 
im mig rants of Islamic origin at risk of being stereo typed as funda mentalists or 
terrorists. This is why the headscarf should, according to Françoise Lorcerie, be 
con sidered a ‘neo- colonial prob lem’ (FR22). Laïcite seeks to overcome ethnic
identities and cultural belongings so as to create equality through sameness, 
which entails a strict exclusion of all signs of religious dif fer ence from the pub lic 
sphere. 
Muslims in France make up a diverse popu la tion with different national and 
ethnic origins and differing levels of religious ob serv ance. Nonetheless, Muslims 
are reduced to their culture, stigmatized as essentially oppressive and unequal, 
and hence the headscarf is largely referred to as the very symbol of hierarchical 
gender relations presumed to be essentially inherent to Islam (ibid.: 8). However, 
the headscarf may also be seen as the symbol of ‘a reinforced gendered dichot­
omy between “liberated” Western women and their “oppressed” Muslim sisters’ 
(ibid.: 7). French repub lican fem in ists and secularists have both voiced this view. 
They both demand that Western women should be con sidered models for non- 
Western women with regards to gender equality, and that the headscarf should 
be banned from pub lic schools to protect women and soci ety (FR3, FR9, FR11, 
FR12, FR14, FR15). An example of this claim is the peti tion initiated in 2003 by 
the editor- in-chief of the French women’s maga zine Elle (FR3). According to 
the signatories (67 French women aca demics, activists and artists), the headscarf 
stands for Muslim women’s submission and for the denial of Western fem in ism, 
as well as being a threat to Western women at large. The sociologist Yolène 
Dilas- Rocherieux claims that the headscarf reveals a deeper prob lem related to 
male control over female bodies (FR14). According to her, denying the submis­
sion of veiled women in Islam and arguing that they are free to choose to wear 
the headscarf leads educated veiled women to become models for the younger 
generation. These arguments against the headscarf show a lack of re cog ni tion of 
Muslim women’s agency and their construction as submissive. The para digmatic 
discourses against the headscarf thus underline the ‘communitarian’ aspect of 
the Muslim female attire, depicted as imposed on women by certain Muslim 
groups. In a sim ilar vein, Peter Weil, a former member of the Stasi Commission, 
argues that the wearing of the headscarf, rather than being an expression of reli­
gious identity, has to be identified with a strat egy of funda mentalist groups who 
are using pub lic schools as their battleground (FR15). His in ter pretation excludes 
the pos sib il ity of questioning what is at stake in religious abuse on women’s 
bodies and sexualities. Instead it identifies women’s oppression as being specifi­
cally inherent to Islam. Arguments over ‘gender equality versus the submission 
of women’ single out Islam as a collection of anti- modern practices opposed to 
Western values of gender equality. In the eyes of the com ment ators mentioned 
above, Western values in gen eral and the value of gender equality in par ticu lar 
are repres ented by the French prin ciple of laïcité and embedded in French 
national identity. Arguments according to which French national identity is 
under attack reiterate the idea that the secular state is under threat. As a result, 
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the mainstream discourses opposing Muslim headscarves are putting forward the 
defence of French national identity by claiming to keep the pub lic sphere free 
from any religious symbols and connotations, putting veiled women at the core 
of their arguments and at the same time stripping them of their agency. 
In Turkey, sim ilar to the French con text, veiled women and their supposed 
submission within the framework of Islam are referred to in disputes on secular­
ism. Secularism, which became the most im port ant pillar of the Repub lic of 
Turkey since its founda tion in 1923, took the form of laïcité sim ilar to the prin­
ciple applied in France. It is based on the official disestab lishment of religion 
from state as well as on the consti tu tional control of religious affairs by the state 
(cf. Berkes 1978; Mardin 1983). During the founda tion of the Repub lic, state 
elites aimed to relegate religion to the private sphere and clear the pub lic sphere 
of any in dica tion of religious belonging in order to achieve secularization. 
Reforms, implemented during this period, have aimed at estab lishing Turkey as 
a rational secularized soci ety in which equal relations between men and women 
hold an im port ant place. Nonetheless, a complete secularization has not been 
achieved in Turkey, either in the social or the polit ical sphere, although it has 
been effected in the legis lat ive domain. Keyman argues that 
the state’s top- down act of creating a secular national identity by initiating 
strict polit ical and institutional regu latory mech an isms on religious com­
munit ies has always been challenged by Islam and its power ful symbolic 
and cultural role in the consti tu tion of societal relations and social identity 
formations of Turkish people. 
(2007: 216) 
This espe cially became evid ent after 1980, with the rise of polit ical Islam in pol­
itics, eco nomy and culture. Since then, increasing visibility of headscarves in the 
pub lic has been in ter preted as the symbol of the rise of polit ical Islam con sidered 
as threatening the secular founda tions of the state. 
Women’s status has become an im port ant indic ator of Turkey’s moderniza­
tion in the eyes of the state elites, and has thus been the object of many reforms. 
Women, as Deniz Kandiyoti (1988, 1989) argues, have become ‘symbolic 
pawns’ for the state, as well as ‘comrades- in-arms’ for the nation to achieve sec­
ularization and modernization. The headscarf prob lem is a major com pon ent in 
the debates re gard ing the relations between gender, religion and secularization in 
Turkey. A modern, educated, enlightened woman – in bin ary opposi tion to the 
veiled woman – has been idealized since the founda tion of the Repub lic as how 
a Turkish woman should be. The headscarf has been ‘cast as a par ticu larly vis­
ible manifestation of a non- secular, “expressive” polit ical subject position that 
violates the state’s stra tegic construction and global repres enta tion of a “con­
fined” Islam’ (Gökarıksel and Mitchell 2005: 153). There were no regulations 
banning the veil in the pub lic sphere until the 1980s. With the rise of polit ical 
Islam and the symbolic value of the headscarf, restrictions were placed on the 
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fol low ing the Constitutional Court’s de cision in 1989 stating that the headscarf 
is a symbol that threatens the unshakeable pillar of secularism. 
A major argument used by the op pon ents of the headscarf is that it causes 
women’s submission. Although secularism is not mentioned directly, the gender 
aspect, or the idealization of relations between men and women in these argu­
ments, usually points to the achievement of a secular sys tem, which Turkish 
soci ety must not lose. Veiled women are portrayed as being used by Islamists3 
and politicians with Islamist tendencies for their polit ical aim to overcome the 
secular sys tem. Secularist women’s groups and journ al ists, who are mostly male, 
call for Islamist politicians to stop using women for their par ticu lar polit ical aims 
and veiled women to wake up and cease to be submissive (TR6, TR7, TR10). 
İlhan Selçuk, a journ al ist known for his strict Kemalist views, argues that the 
headscarf is a repres enta tion of male dominance and pat ri archy inherent in soci­
ety and signals the secondary position attributed to women. The headscarf pre­
vents women from liberating themselves and demanding their rights that are 
indicated in the Civil Code, which were made pos sible through the seculariza­
tion of soci ety (TR15). Another journ al ist who is widely known for his strict 
opposi tion to the headscarf and Islamist polit ical par ties in gen eral, Emin 
Çölaşan argues that the headscarf is a uniform, a symbol of enmity against state 
as well as a backward practice (TR6). 
The perception of veiled women as ‘symbolic pawns’ in Islamists’ hands cor­
res ponds with how the state elites and con tempor ary Kemalists view modern, 
secular women as the symbolic carriers of the secular sys tem. In the early years 
of the Turkish Repub lic, oppor tun ities for women were broadened by the found­
ing fathers, who required a new pub lic visibility for the female cit izen they 
envisaged in the name of nation building and the protection of secularism. 
Women had to appear within the framework the state bur eau cratic elites put 
forward if they wanted to parti cip ate in the pub lic sphere and enjoy the newly 
gained rights and oppor tun ities. This framework of gender repres enta tion is still 
alive among present day secularist polit ical groups and journ al ists (TR8). 
Not only are veiled women seen as the symbolic carriers of polit ical Islam in 
Turkey and hence as a threat to the secular sys tem, they are also perceived as a 
threat to the idealized images of men and women and their relations. These 
gender images that are pic tured as ‘modern’ take on a drawback, according to 
the arguments against the headscarf. The attire dem on strates segregated gender 
relations or gan ized within the framework of Islamic moral rules, which is the 
oppos ite of the equal gender relations implemented under the secular sys tem 
(Göle 1996). However, not only journ al ists but also Kemalist women frame the 
headscarf issue not as a gender issue or issue of freedom, but most funda­
mentally as an ‘opposi tion to the polit ical sys tem’, as argued by the chairwomen 
of the women’s branch of the secularist Repub lican People’s Party (TR7). 
In France and Turkey, laïcité is a polit ical instrument for constructing a 
modern and egal it arian nation, in which equality between men and women is 
used as a meas ure of the degree of modernity, and to ad voc ate the unity of the 
state. Hence Islamic symbols are seen as being not only antagonistic to laïcité
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but also to national unity. Secularism legitimizes both the official disestab­
lishment of religion from the state and a detachment of the pub lic sphere from 
religious belongings, in which ‘modern’ cit izens can parti cip ate. The headscarf 
as a religious symbol has no place in the secularized pub lic sphere according to 
these stances in both coun tries. It is presented as a symbol against secular order, 
a tool of women’s oppression and, though for different reasons in the two coun­
tries, against national unity. 
Cluster III: resisting secularism, secularizing Muslimness 
In this part of the chapter we concentrate on pub lic debates over female Muslim 
attires in Greece, the UK and Denmark, coun tries fol low ing a ‘church of state’ 
model (Berghahn 2007). It is im port ant to address the fol low ing question: how 
does the con tent of a ‘church of state’ model the veil debate and reconfigure the 
con tent of secularism? Statements made by religious leaders in Greece and in the 
UK are taken as a starting point for the ana lysis because declarations in which a 
resistance towards secularism is argued by eminent actors cannot be con sidered 
as contingent; on the contrary, they constitute discourses as part of a social 
semantics affecting pub lic opinions and societal embodiments (Norval 2006: 
231). In a sim ilar vein, the Danish pub lic debates over claims for ‘the seculariza­
tion’ of the market sphere and the insistence on the perception of veiling as an 
indi vidual right instead of a religious one, shed light on discursive utterances of 
veiling as a commodity interweaving modern ‘secular’ aesthetics and embodi­
ments (Navaro- Yashin 2002: 82–5; Henkel and Sunier 2009: 475). 
In 2004, the Greek Orthodox Archbishop Christodoulos took a personal 
stance against the French headscarf ban by declaring: 
If I want to send my child to school dressed up as an evzon [author’s note: 
tsolias, traditional Greek national male costume of fighters for national inde­
pend ence], who is going to prevent me from doing so? I can do whatever I 
like. 
(GR10) 
While privileging the use of religious symbols and by advocating against the 
idea of a secular and multicultural Europe, voices representative of Orthodox 
Chris tian af fili ations in Greece have deployed a ‘rights language’ in defence of 
freedom of religious expression in order to effect ively safeguard a religious and 
national homo gen eity, a Greek ethnocentric self- perception as religiously and 
nationally coherent (GR10, GR16). The Greek Orthodox Church, perceiving 
itself as a religious- national-state entity, has sys tematically acted as if its main 
task was to preserve and enhance the glorified ideo logical construction of 
identi fying authentic and pat riotic Greekness as Orthodox Chris tian and thus 
retain the privileges attributed to it by the state. Antonis Manitakis has emphas­
ized that the Orthodox Church does not seem par ticu larly inter ested in the actual 
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pat riotic morale (2000: 132). Therefore, the Archbishop’s deployment of a lib­
eral rhet oric in sup port of ‘religious freedom’ should be questioned while taking 
into con sidera tion that the Orthodox Chris tian Church, which has been granted 
by the state the authority to deal with the claims of religious minor it ies, has 
failed to satisfy even the long- standing demand by the Muslim im mig rants’ asso­
ci ations to have a mosque built in Athens (Avramopoulou and Athanasiou 2007: 
15). 
In the UK, in the con text of strong legal pro vi sions in favour of anti- 
discrimination meas ures, the claim for ‘religious freedom’ made by the Arch­
bishop of Canterbury (UK18) reflects a different agenda. His claims must be 
understood in the con text of a con tro versy sparked by Jack Straw, the former 
British foreign sec ret ary claiming that the niqab is a barrier to communication 
(UK20). In 2006, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who represents the inter na tional 
Anglican com mun ity, defended Muslim attires while ‘warning politicians not to 
interfere with people’s right to wear vis ible symbols of their faith’ (UK18). By 
asking the British gov ern ment not to act as a ‘licensing authority’ mediating a 
workable pub lic morality through people’s attires, the Archbishop argued that 
‘the ideal of a soci ety where no vis ible pub lic signs of religion would be seen . . . 
is a polit ically dangerous one’ (ibid.). Furthermore, he commented that ‘moving 
toward a secular soci ety in Chris tian Britain – where the Queen is the head of 
the Church of England and religion still features in pub lic institutions – would 
be more rad ical than can be ima gined’ (ibid.). Thus, Chris tianity is understood 
as an in teg ral part of a so- called ‘Britishness’; the British state and people’s 
culture are seen as embedded in Chris tian religious symbolism and familiarized 
with religious ethos (ibid.). His vigor ous denunciation of a future secular soci ety 
animates an in ter pretation of secularism within the framework of a strict division 
between state and churches, an incipient scen ario, which would threaten the 
norms of British soci ety and institutions (ibid.). 
While the two statements of religious leaders in Greece and the UK differ, 
they show a striking point of convergence. In both cases, the occasion of debates 
on veiling ignites an eminent necessity for declarations of resistance towards a 
certain kind of ‘secularism’ which is being in ter preted as a pro cess distinct from 
each coun try’s his tor ical, cultural and religious nation state formation. Thus, in 
both debates secularism is seen as an ‘other’, as a threat to the ‘national self-
identification’. Moreover, by defending the right of freedom to religious expres­
sion, they stra tegically entrench the symbolic geopolit ical bound ar ies of the 
homeland so as to secure the closely interrelated state–church affiliation. 
When the protection of eco nomic inter ests is the focus, correlations can be 
drawn from the way in which veiling has emerged as an issue of contestation in 
Denmark where a sim ilar institutional configuration of a strong church–state 
relation occurs. An im port ant polit ical debate took place in par lia ment in 2004 
when the Danish People’s Party, a populist right- wing party, submitted a pro­
posal to ban veils in pub lic working places (DK1). The party representatives 
argued that headscarves must be pro hibited as they are ‘foreign’ symbols 
which negate the meaning of demo cracy, tradition and values as understood and 
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accommodated within ‘Danishness’. Hence they sup ported the need to imple­
ment centralized state regulations against religious symbols in the pub lic sphere 
(DK4, DK5). A certain in ter pretation of secularism as neutral is cun ningly put 
forward while it is argued that pub lic neutrality is being necessitated in relation 
to polit ical and religious symbols. At the same time, ‘freedom of religion’ is 
defended as a right only if the expressed religious affili ations could be com pat­
ible with a certain understanding of ‘Danishness’ which does not appear to be 
com pat ible with Muslim traditions (DK1, DK4, DK5). 
However, no other polit ical party favoured such pro hibition. They argued that 
this would contravene the Law against Discriminatory Behaviour on the Labour 
Market and the Law of Ethnic Equal Treatment, as well as pos sibly violate the 
consti tu tion and the Euro pean Convention of Human Rights (cf. Andreassen and 
Siim 2007: 40). Interestingly enough, though, the main reason for condemning a 
state inter ven tion in the case of veiling practices was that ‘freedom of religion’ 
should be decided, dealt with and in ter preted as an indi vidual right and mat ter, 
as exemplified by the Liberal Party’s spokesperson (DK2). Similar controversies 
emerged when attempts to regulate the wearing of Muslim attires in the market 
sphere led to legal court cases while stimulating a heated discussion on whether 
veiling should be taken as an indi vidual right, i.e. ‘choice’, or as a religious right, 
i.e. ‘obli ga tion’.4 Employer representatives argued that it is their right to decide 
on dress codes and that there should be no centralized legis la tion determining 
these mat ters (DK10, DK11, DK12, DK13). In par ticu lar, one of the court 
de cisions formulated the dilemma as to whether the rights of the indi vidual (to 
wear a veil) should be protected against the rights of the private com panies (to 
formulate a dress code) and whether a dress regulation which would ban the 
Muslim veil should be con sidered as discriminating (DK11). 
Under such legal nego ti ations, the claim for institutionalizing ‘neutrality’ in 
the market sphere cun ningly foregrounds an in ter pretation of secularism which 
appears inimical not towards religion as such, but towards Islam in par ticu lar. As 
Balibar has argued, ‘many cultures are deemed to be too “religious” to become 
accept able in the pic ture’ (2004b: 225). For those who need to define the aes­
thetic terms under which a cit izen could be included as an employee in the 
labour market, it appears that it is always Islam and in par ticu lar the female 
Muslim attires that mark the limits of the accept able ‘religious female cit izen’. 
Thus, religion is being stra tegically in ter preted through a secularized understand­
ing of faith in which piety and polity do not neces sar ily contradict each other if 
only the holy scripts would be open to indi vidual in ter pretations, if only religion 
(and in par ticu lar Islam) could be apprehended in terms of indi vidual choice or 
cultural pref er ence, if only women would not ‘choose’ to veil. By perceiving 
integration in terms of personal choice or by emphasizing Muslim women’s ‘free 
choice’ to preferably comply with the rules of the polity, the relation between 
gender and religion would remain safely unprob lematized and the cherished 
values of the market and the rights of corporations would not be challenged. 
Secularism in this case is select ively applied so as to make Muslim women 
conform to the lib eral market eco nomy and aesthetics. 
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While in the UK the limits of securing demo cracy and the limits of national 
cit izen ship are being determined through the use of niqab and the rem edy is to 
unveil the face of fully veiled Muslim women, in Denmark it is simply the use of 
a headscarf that appears to challenge the limits of tolerance towards female reli­
gious alterity. In Greece it is merely identi fying as a Muslim, not even the use of 
head or body coverings, which challenges national identity. In 2006, the candi­
dacy of Asmaa Abdol- Hamid (a woman who became the first Danish veiled TV 
hostess) for a seat in par lia ment with the Red- Green Alliance created feelings of 
an incipient ‘mistrust’. Although she openly declared that she is a fem in ist who 
does not sup port the death pen alty and opposes religious extremism, in the 
pub lic imaginary she con tinued to be perceived as a symbol of religious rad­
icalization and funda mentalism (Andreassen 2008). During the same year, two 
Muslim women of Turkish origin, Özlem Sara Cekic (a Socialist Party candi­
date) and Yildiz Akdogan (a candidate of the Social Democrats), managed to be 
elected to par lia ment. Their dif fer ence from Abdol- Hamid is that neither Cekic 
nor Akdogan wear the veil and thus were em braced by the pub lic. In 2006, in 
Greece, the candidacy of Gül Beyaz Karahasan, who was the first woman from 
the Muslim Turkish- speaking minor ity popu la tion of Western Thrace to be nom­
inated as a candidate with the social- democratic PASOK party, triggered sim­
ilarly suspicious sentiments. Although she made expli cit declarations against 
veiling practices, being herself a non- veiled woman, both her ‘Muslimness’ and 
her ‘Turkishness’ gen er ated polemics and alarmist questioning of her ‘genu ine 
national consciousness’ (GR11).
 These par ticu lar discursive instances of contestation towards the parti cipa tion 
of the female Muslim ‘other’ within each coun try’s polit ical field signifies how 
flex ible the notion secularism can be when it is being stra tegically used to build 
new walls of exclusion. In the aforementioned case studies, which examine the 
different terms under which the ‘Muslim female other’ can be included in the 
national imaginary of coun tries with strong state–church af fili ation, so as to 
disarm the supposed threat to the national homo gen eity, no common ground can 
be reached. Within the ongoing discourse on secularizing Islam in order to make 
it more ‘safe for demo cracy’ (Mahmood 2006), Henkel and Sunier emphas ize 
that despite the increasing adaptation of (veiled) Muslim women to the inter na­
tional youth culture, they can still be perceived in soci ety as ‘anomalous and aes­
thetically confusing’ (2009: 475). The different reconfigurations of secularism 
faced with the need to understand and include the religious female alterity chal­
lenges the limits of a ‘Chris tian but still “secular”, con ser vat ive but still “lib­
eral”, oppressive but still “tolerant” ’ imagination (Athanasiou 2006: 115). 
By way of conclusion 
In this chapter we have focused on three clusters of national case studies with 
the aim of con sidering ‘para digmatic’ pub lic discourses on Muslim veiling prac­
tices. By using secularism as a hub concept, our approach allows perceptions 
and in ter pretations of Muslim women’s head and body coverings to come under 
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scrutiny. Through this research the comparison between the divergent conceptu­
alizations and in ter pretations of secularism, as emerging in different social and 
polit ical actors’ claims, has opened the way for a crit ical inquiry into the mul­
tiple and ambivalent approaches to Muslim veiling attire within Euro pean lib eral 
demo cra cies. At the same time, as the manifold understandings, claims and 
demands over Muslim women’s head and body coverings appear in each con­
text, the notion of secularism is constantly reconfigured through different strat­
egies of denomination. Our ana lysis has shown the interwoven relationship 
between debates on Muslim veiling practices and certain reconfigurations of 
secularism.
 Additionally, reflecting through the kaleidoscopic interconnectedness of the 
religious and the secular, our research has tried to shed light on what is at stake 
each time polit ical and pub lic debates on Muslim veiling practices recall dis­
courses on national gendered cit izen ship and belonging, not only across but also 
within Euro pean coun tries. Gender equality, women’s emancipation and auto­
nomy as well as indi vidual and religious rights appear thus as challenged, 
defended but also instrumentalized in the debate. 
Notes 
1 For a recent debate on the limits of the relations between the religious and the secular, 
see the debate between Mahmood (2008a, 2008b) and Gourgouris (2008a, 2008b). 
Moreover, for a thought- provoking debate on the gendered, cultural and national 
aspects of veiling practices in Euro pean secular con texts, see Henkel and Sunier 
(2009). 
2 In 2003, President Jacques Chirac commissioned a group whose role was to reflect on 
religious signs in schools. The Inde pend ent Commission of Reflection on the applica­
tion of the prin ciple of laïcité in the Repub lic began to work on mul tiple issues and 
re com mendations, such as fighting labour discrimination or recognizing state holidays 
for Jews and Muslims. In fact, only the headscarf issue was taken for imme diate legis­
la tion. The Commission finally ad voc ated for a pro hibitionist law on conspicuous reli­
gious signs at school and in pub lic administrations. 
3 The term ‘Islamist’ is used to de scribe the use of Islam as a source of polit ical activ­
ism, rather than only practising it as a daily religious non- political ritual. 
4 In par ticu lar, there have been four cases in which employers have refused to hire 
women with hijab. The labour unions took these employers to court. 
References 
Abu- Lughod, L. (2002) ‘Do Muslim women really need saving? Anthropological reflec­
tions on cultural relativism and its others’, Amer ican Anthropologist, 104 (3): 783–90. 
Andreassen, R. (2008) ‘Constructions of veiled Muslim women in the news media’s inter­
section of eth ni city/race, gender, sexuality and nationality’, paper presented at the 
ESSCR Conference, University of Lisbon. 
Andreassen, R. and Siim, B. (2007) ‘Country report: Denmark’, unpublished paper, 
January. 
Anidjar, G. (2006) ‘Secularism’, Critical Inquiry, 33 (1): 52–77. 
Asad, T. (2003) Formations of the Secular: Chris tianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
     
    
Thinking through secularism  53  
Athanasiou, A. (2006) ‘Οι Λόγοι της  “Μαντίλας”: Φύλο, Σεξουαλικότητα, Έθνος και η
μεταφορά της “Άλλης Γυναίκας” ’, Βήμα Κοινωνικών Επιστημών, 44: 91–115. 
Avramopoulou, E. and Athanasiou, A. (2007) ‘Country report: Greece’, unpublished 
paper. 
Balibar, E. (2004a) ‘Dissonances dans la laïcité’, Mouvements, 33–34: 148–61. 
Balibar, E. (2004b) We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, 
Prince ton, NJ, and Oxford: Prince ton University Press. 
Bauberot, J. (2000) Histoire de la laïcité en France, Paris: Que Sais- je? 
Berghahn, S. (2007) ‘Judicial expertise on current regulations and explanations for varie­
ties in regulations and in the framing of Euro pean headscarf debates’, legal aspects 
report prepared for the Euro pean research pro ject VEIL, typescript, deliver able no. 17. 
Berkes, N. (1978) Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, Istanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları. 
Bowen, J.R. (2007) Why the French don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State and Public 
Space, Prince ton, NJ, and Oxford: Prince ton University Press. 
Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble, London and New York: Routledge. 
Connolly, W.E. (1999) Why I am Not a Secularist, Minneapolis, MN, and London: Uni­
versity of Minnesota Press. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it 
can Succeed Again, Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1988) Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 
1977–1984, London: Routledge. 
Freedman, J. (2004) ‘Secularism as a barrier to integration? The French dilemma’, Inter­
national Migration, 42 (3): 5–27. 
Göle, N. (1996) Forbidden Modern, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Göle, N. (2006) ‘Islam resetting the Euro pean agenda?’ Public Culture, 18 (1): 11–14. 
Gökarıksel, B. and Mitchell, K. (2005) ‘Veiling, secularism and the neolib eral subject: 
National nar rat ives and supra national desires in Turkey and France’, Global Networks, 
5 (2): 147–65. 
Gourgouris, S. (2008a) ‘Detran scend entalizing the secular’, Public Culture, 20 (3): 
437–45. 
Gourgouris, S. (2008b) ‘Antisecularist failures: A counterresponse to Saba Mahmood’, 
Public Culture, 20 (3): 453–9. 
Henkel, H. and Sunier, T. (2009) ‘Debate section: Are Muslim women in Europe threat­
ening the secular pub lic sphere?’ Social Anthropology, 17 (4): 471–9. 
Joppke, C. (2007) ‘State neutrality and Islamic headscarf laws in France and Ger many’, 
Theory and Society, 36 (4): 313–42. 
Kandiyoti, D. (1988) ‘Slave girls, temptresses and comrades: Images of women in the 
Turkish novel’, Gender Issues, 8 (1): 35–50. 
Kandiyoti, D. (1989) ‘Women and the Turkish state: Political actors or symbolic pawns?’ 
in N. Yuval- Davis and F. Anthias (eds) Woman- Nation-State, London: Macmillan: 
126–49. 
Keyman, E. (2007) ‘Modernity, secularism and Islam: The case of Turkey’, Theory 
Culture Society, 24 (2): 215–34. 
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, London and New York: Verso. 
Lettinga, D. and Saharso, S. (2009) ‘Débats sur le “voile Musulman” en France et aux 
Pays Bas’, Migrations Société, 21 (122): 237–76. 
Levey, G.B. and Modood, T. (2009) Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, 
Cam bridge and New York: Cam bridge University Press. 
          
54 E. Avramopoulou et al. 
Mahmood, S. (2006) ‘Secularism, hermeneutics, and empire: The pol itics of Islamic ref­
ormation’, Public Culture, 18 (2): 323–47. 
Mahmood, S. (2008a) ‘Is critique secular? A symposium at UC Berkeley’, Public 
Culture, 20 (3): 447–52. 
Mahmood, S. (2008b) ‘Secular imperatives’, Public Culture, 20 (3): 461–5. 
Manitakis, A. (2000) Η Σχέση της Εκκλησίας με το Κράτος-Έθνος: Στη Σκιά των
Ταυτοτήτων, Athens: Nefeli. 
Mardin, Ş. (1983) ‘Religion and pol itics in modern Turkey’, in A. Kazancılgil and E.
Özdubun (eds) Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State, London: C. Hurst and Company. 
Mariet, G. (1991) ‘Origines philosophiques de l’idée de la tolerance dans la pensée occi­
dentale modern’, in G. Mariet (ed.) Le maitre et la multitude, Paris: editions du Félin. 
Nancy, J.-L. (2007) ‘Church, state, resistance’, Journal of Law and Society, 34 (1): 3–13. 
Navaro- Yashin, Y. (2002) Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey, 
Prince ton, NJ, and Oxford: Prince ton University Press. 
Norval, A. (2006) ‘Democratic identification: A Wittgensteinian approach’, Political 
Theory, 34 (2): 229–55. 
Okin, S.M. (1999) Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Univer­
sity Press. 
Phillips, A. (2007) Multiculturalism without Culture, Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University 
Press. 
Prins, B. and Saharso, S. (2008) ‘In the spotlight: A blessing and a curse for im mig rant 
women in the Neth er lands’, Ethnicities, 8 (3): 365–84. 
Ratzinger, J., Habermas, J. and Schuller, F. (2006) Dialectics of Secularization: On 
Reason and Religion, San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press. 
Taylor, C. (1998) ‘Modes of secularism’, in R. Bhargava (ed.) Secularism and its Critics, 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 31–53. 
Taylor, C. (2007) A Secular Age, Cam bridge, MA, and London: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Varikas, E. (2006) Penser le sexe et le genre, Paris: Puf. 
 
 
3 Negotiating belonging 
Or how a differentiated citizenship is 
legitimized in European headscarf 
debates1 
Nora Gresch, Petra Rostock and Sevgi Kılıç 
The headscarf debates: delineating the contours of a 
European phenomenon 
The pas sion ate and fierce debates about the wearing of Muslim body covering 
and espe cially the increasing legal restrictions thereof in various pub lic sites of 
Euro pean coun tries are perceived as puzz ling by many ob ser vers and com ment­
ators of current Euro pean pol itics: all the states that have introduced restrictive 
regulations adhere to the concept of lib eral demo cracy. Thus, these states con­
ceive of themselves as being based on the rule of law with its premise to ensure 
that all cit izens have the equal right to express their personal beliefs which 
prominently includes the right to freedom of religious expression. This concept 
thus stresses that the lib eral demo cratic state must guarantee a neutral pub lic 
space or sphere that can be accessed and engaged with by all members of the 
state. Intrinsically linked to this concept is the obli ga tion of the state to treat all 
people equally inde pend ent of their sex, cultural origins, phys ical abil it ies or 
religious convictions by ensuring equal oppor tun ities and the protection of their 
indi vidual choices (Saharso 2007).2 But if lib eral demo cratic states are obliged 
to provide equal oppor tun ities for all their cit izens, how then is it pos sible to 
legitimize restrictive regulations concerning religious attire, thereby not only 
depriving Muslim women of equal oppor tun ities by limiting their choices to 
realize their visions of a ‘good life’ (Ekardt 2009: 303ff.), but effect ively creat­
ing a differentiated citizenship? 
In debates and regulations about Muslim body covering, the meanings of 
major prin ciples of lib eral demo cracy are not only renegotiated but col lect ive 
national identities reconstructed. By means of analysing how the actors within 
the headscarf debates argue for or against wearing the headscarf within the most 
contested frames of the headscarf debate in six coun tries of our sample (Austria, 
Denmark, France, Ger many, Neth er lands, United Kingdom),3 it is our argument 
that, in the debates and regulations concerning head and body coverings of 
Muslim women in the pub lic sphere, nation states create specific nar rat ives of 
belonging by defining habitual practices that the respective cit izens need to 
comply to or need to embody to be con sidered a full member of a par ticu lar 
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of the formal cit izen ship status. In the fol low ing, we will show that by aligning 
specific arguments with meanings that relate to Western or national asso ci ations 
of belonging, Muslims are constructed as the ‘other’ to modern Euro pean demo­
cra cies and the bound ar ies of ‘belonging’ are renegotiated within the con text of 
the headscarf debates (Dietze 2004). 
To sub stanti ate this argument we would like to indicate in this chapter that it 
is how specific argumentative patterns are used to ad voc ate for or against 
Muslim body covering that construct and employ two different para digms4 of 
gendered, cultural and religious belonging to a nation state. Actors arguing 
within the ‘exclusive’ para digm of belonging ad voc ate for restrictive meas ures 
and for institutionalizing specific habitual practices that need to be embodied to 
be con sidered a full cit izen and thus implementing a specific norm of appropriate 
beha vi our of cit izens. In contrast, the actors who argue against legal restrictions 
of Muslim body covering and within the ‘inclusive’ para digm of belonging 
emphas ize the legal status of Muslims in the par ticu lar states and hold Euro pean 
lib eral demo cra cies to their promise to guarantee all cit izens the equal right to 
freedom of religious expression. 
The de velopment of our argument is based on a structural ana lysis
approach (Diaz- Bone 2006) of frame- elements5 used by the actors in the
headscarf debates of all coun tries of the sample. The methodology of a struc­
tural ana lysis suggests sys tematized successive steps for investigating the
structure of know ledge of a given area of inter est and is based on the
methodo logical outline concerning discourse ana lysis given by Foucault
(ibid.). Thus, for our ana lysis, we, first, de veloped a working definition of the
frame- elements from a social science per spect ive that defined the frame-
elements in relation to the con text of their use. Second, we sys tematized the
frame- elements referred to in each of the selected policy docu ments of the
VEIL pro ject6 in accordance with the frames to which they were aligned and
in accordance with the actors who use them. Having sys tematized the frame-
elements in such a way we, third, focused on the questions of whether specific 
frame- elements are linked to specific frames, how these frame- elements refer
to the position on the headscarf and if the actors refer to par ticu lar frame-
elements in a specific way. We could thus, fourth, identi fy the predominantly
used frame- elements within a specific frame and determine if these frame-
elements and frames can be related to a restrictive or permissive position on
the headscarf of a respective coun try. Fifth, as a result of this step we could
identi fy ‘cit izen ship/integration’, ‘gender/emancipation’ and ‘rights/religion’
as the three frames in which frame- elements figured prominently as justifica­
tions for or against specific veiling regulations. For the final and sixth step,
we focused our ana lysis on how belonging was negotiated within the argu­
mentation for or against the headscarf. Thus, we could identi fy six argumen­
tative patterns – ‘the headscarf as a sign of being different’ or ‘freedom of
choice; women as auto nom ous subjects’ (gender/emancipation frame), ‘the
headscarf as a polit ical symbol or violation of national prin ciples’ or
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headscarf as sign of separation; non- integration’ or ‘integration through
rights and/or the re cog ni tion of dif fer ence’ (cit izen ship/integration frame) –
that can be respectively aligned with the two aforementioned para digms of
gendered, cultural and religious belonging to a nation state. 
In the fol low ing parts of our chapter, we first set the theor et ical con text of our 
ana lysis by discussing how the pol itics of belonging, cit izen ship and national 
identity are interrelated. Subsequently, we empirically outline how the frame-
elements are employed to argue for or against the veiling of Muslim women 
within the frames of ‘cit izen ship/integration’, ‘gender/emancipation’ and ‘rights/ 
religion’. By identi fying the respective pro and contra argumentative patterns for 
each of the three frames, we relate the employment of these patterns to the nego­
ti ation of cit izen ship and belonging. Our chapter is completed by showing how 
the three contested frames of ‘cit izen ship/integration’, ‘gender/emancipation’ 
and ‘rights/religion’ are interrelated through the use of the argumentative pat­
terns, which crucially shape the pro cess of delineating the bound ar ies of the 
respective national imaginaries. 
The constitutive tensions of citizenship: belonging 
We might come closer to answering the question of how it is pos sible that lib eral 
demo cratic states introduce restrictive regulations concerning religious attire and 
thereby limit the right to religious freedom only for par ticu lar members of a 
nation state by taking into con sidera tion what has been only mar ginally dis­
cussed in the con text of Euro pean headscarf debates so far: how restrictive regu­
lations might be explained in the con text of being or becoming members of a 
nation state as well as being recog nized as such (an exception is Rostock and 
Berghahn 2008). 
A nation, in Anderson’s famous definition, is ‘an ima gined polit ical com mun­
ity – and ima gined as both inherently limited and sover eign’ (Anderson 1991: 
6). The nation is perceived of as a ‘com mun ity, because, re gard less of the actual 
in equal ity and ex ploita tion that may prevail in each, the nation is always con­
ceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (ibid.: 7), pointing to the crucial prin­
ciples of equality and connectedness of the people of a specific polit ical 
com mun ity. It is thought of as limited, with enclosing bound ar ies and never ‘all- 
inclusive’, but with cri teria of who is included and who is excluded. The nation 
is more over ima gined as sover eign because the nation state de veloped and was 
fought for in demarcation to the ‘divinely- ordained, hierarchical dynastic’ 
regimes (ibid.: 7) with a sover eign state as the guarantor and manifestation of 
freedom. 
The de velopment of the institutions of con tempor ary Western lib eral states 
has thus been deeply en tangled with the mentioned charac ter istics of a nation, 
which employs the idea of an ima gined com mun ity with distinct cri teria for 
belonging. Following Nira Yuval- Davis, the social practices of negotiating and 
delineating these cri teria of who belongs to a specific nation state and who does 
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Although Yuval- Davis stresses the conceptual dif fer ence between cit izen ship 
and belonging, belonging crucially relates to the dimensions of cit izen ship. The 
rights and obli ga tions that come with being a cit izen of a specific nation state 
‘are about meeting the cri teria of inclusion and there is differential inclusion and 
exclusion of so- called cit izens along the lines of gender, eth ni city, class, age and 
so on’ (Anthias 2006: 22; emphasis added). It is exactly this blurred, fluid social 
realm where the practices of boundary drawing de velop into ‘cri teria of belong­
ing’ and are manifested in rules and regulations that construct dif fer ences that 
can grow into hierarchies (ibid.: 22). 
Moreover, if we follow the conceptualization of cit izen ship that is outlined by 
Rainer Bauböck (1999), cit izen ship is not only about the legal status of being a 
full member (mem ber ship) of a demo cratic polit ical com mun ity that entitles 
every cit izen to the enjoyment of a bundle of rights which define the relation 
between the indi viduals and par ticu lar nation states.7 Citizenship also needs to 
be lived and exercised: 
Imagining oneself as a member of a polit ical com mun ity will have to be 
sup ported by practices of ‘good cit izen ship’ ranging from narrowly polit ical 
beha vi our such as participating in elections to the ordinary virtues of civility 
in every day life . . . a certain level of habitual cit izen ship practices will be 
neces sary in order to sup port the imagination of a shared polit ical com mun­
ity and to empower indi viduals through the sys tem of legal rights. 
(Bauböck 1999: 3) 
Furthermore, we would like to add that certain rights are only granted if a certain 
level of habitual cit izen ship practices is embodied in order to constitute or realize 
the imagination and construction of a shared and exclusionary polit ical 
community. 
In contrast to conceptualizations of cit izen ship, pol itics of belonging emphas­
izes the ex peri ences and practices of ‘identification’ with a polit ical com mun ity 
on the one hand and an ‘emotional dimension’ which is attached to these ex peri­
ences and practices on the other hand (Yuval- Davis 2007: 563f.; Anthias 2006: 
21f.). The dimension of identification focuses on the practices and ex peri ences 
of how people con sider and identi fy themselves as well as others. The pol itics of 
belonging thus delineates how members of racial or ethnic collectivities that are 
con sidered as ‘other’ are often not perceived as belonging to the national com­
mun ity even though they are formally full members of the par ticu lar polit ical 
com mun ity due to their cit izen ship (Yuval- Davis 2007: 563). The second crucial 
dimension for the pol itics of belonging relates to Anderson’s aspect of the com­
mun ity of a nation and en com passes the emotional attachment to the collectivi­
ties people feel they belong to (ibid.: 564). 
For the ana lysis of con tempor ary pol itics of belonging it is crucial to focus on 
the interrelatedness of and the dy namics between the three mentioned dimen­
sions of cit izen ship – mem ber ship, rights and practices – the pol itics of belong­
ing and the renego ti ation of the national identity, i.e. the ima gined com mun ity. 
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This interrelatedness of the dimensions of the pol itics of belonging, cit izen ship 
and national identity can be traced by analysing how specific arguments are used 
in the headscarf debates and how, within this pro cess, the bound ar ies of cit izen­
ship and belonging are reconfigured and with it the national imaginary. 
In the fol low ing we will show how the two contested para digms of belonging 
mater ialize within the six identified argumentative patterns of the most contested 
frames of our sample to extrapolate the meanings of the arguments that create 
the con ditions of implementing regulations. 
Contested paradigms of belonging 
Citizenship/integration 
The first contested frame that exemplifies how belonging is negotiated within 
Euro pean headscarf debates is the frame of ‘cit izen ship/integration’. As a central 
dif fer ence between cit izen ship and belonging is the question of identification of 
the self and espe cially of ‘the other’; it is certainly this notion of belonging that 
is contested within the two argumentative patterns of ‘the headscarf as a sign of 
separation/non- integration’ and ‘integration through rights and/or the re cog ni tion 
of dif fer ence’ that were identified in the ‘integration’ frame.
 The first argumentative pattern – ‘the headscarf as a sign of separation/non-
integration’ – reflects the attitude that in order to parti cip ate, migrants have the 
obli ga tion to integrate first. ‘Integration’ would require some conformity to 
certain crucial norms and values of a respective demo cracy such as gender 
equality, freedom and tolerance. 
This argumentative pattern is strongly articulated in the German headscarf 
debate where mainly members of the two large people’s par ties (G1b, G1c, G19) 
as well as Alice Schwarzer, one of Ger many’s most famous fem in ists (G2), view 
the headscarf as hindering integration or even as a polit ical sign of lacking inte­
gration and of separation and exclusion. In this in ter pretation the headscarf dem­
on strates its foreignness to the social beha vi our of Germans and hence 
symbolizes non- belonging to German soci ety. Accordingly, to pro hibit 
headscarf- wearing teachers from school is seen as an appropriate meas ure to 
facilitate integration.
 In France, the pro hibition of the headscarf in schools is defended using a sim­
ilar argumentation as in Ger many; with a nationally specific focus that ties the 
French prin ciple of laïcité to issues of belonging and integration: here state bur­
eau cracy argues that wearing the headscarf is threatening the French repub lican 
identity as Euro pean, modern, emancipated and secular (FR11) as well as 
infringing on equality and is espe cially used by pub lic intellectuals. Therefore, 
pub lic intellectuals construct the headscarf as not com pat ible with Western 
norms and values (FR8), or even as an Islamic ‘attack’ against French repub lican 
values. Muslim women’s use of body coverings is viewed as being a distinguish­
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While both the German and the French debate focus on the pro hibition of 
headscarves, in the United Kingdom the headscarf was not an issue for the 
longest time. However, as the debate has unfolded, par ticu larly since 2001, it is 
mostly in the British media, for example the Guardian, that the face veil, or 
niqab, but sometimes also veiling in gen eral is discussed as a mark of separation 
and as hindering integration (UK8, UK12, UK15, UK17). Moreover, veiling is 
seen as contra dict ory to ‘British’ values such as freedom, demo cracy and 
liberalism. 
Interestingly, this argumentative pattern is only seldom used in the Neth er­
lands and Austria: in the Neth er lands ref er ence to ‘integration’ is only made in 
relation to a gen eral ban of burqas in the pub lic space as a means to fight 
growing Islamic funda mentalism. Only one party member (NL11) and one 
pub lic intellectual, Sylvain Ephimenco (NL16) in ter pret ‘integration’ as a prere­
quis ite to parti cipa tion, requiring some conformity to dominant norms of beha vi-
our such as gender equality or face visibility in communication in order to 
maintain a tolerant and equal cit izen ship within the bound ar ies of multicultural­
ism. And in Austria, despite an ethno- cultural definition of cit izen ship sim ilar to 
Ger many, it is only a right- wing party (A21) that uses ‘integration’ to argue for 
Muslim women’s obli ga tion to unveil. Within this frame it is argued that head-
scarves are a dangerous sign of dis integ ration, parallel soci eties and of Islamist 
funda mentalists because they symbolize Islam as a polit ical ideo logy, which 
would conflict with Western values. 
In contrast to the first argumentative pattern the actors of the second argu­
mentative pattern relating to ‘integration’ mostly emphas ize im mig rants’ rights 
as cit izens and connect ‘integration’ to socio- economic discriminations that 
(Muslim) im mig rants face. Moreover, Muslims are defined as belonging to the 
nation state com mun ity and thus having the right to re cog ni tion of their religious 
practices. Therefore, the second argumentative pattern can be called ‘integration 
through rights and/or the re cog ni tion of dif fer ence’. Interestingly, this figure of 
argumentation is not of relev ance in the UK. The explanation for the absence of 
this pattern of argumentation could be that debates on Muslim women’s body 
coverings in which the right to cover is not questioned have only arisen recently. 
Hence, there is no need to claim re cog ni tion of dif fer ence as this re cog ni tion is 
already provided. 
France is tradi tion ally characterized as a coun try with an assimilationist cit­
izen ship model, relegating cultural and religious beliefs to the private sphere and 
rejecting distinctions on the basis of eth ni city, class and religion. Here, the argu­
mentative pattern has a focus on the re cog ni tion of dif fer ences and is articulated 
by aca demics like Françoise Gaspard and Fahrad Khosrokhavar (FR1), and 
(Muslim) women’s groups (FR6) who point out that the headscarf does not 
hinder integration but enables Muslim women to be both French and Muslim 
citizens.
 In the Neth er lands, tradi tion ally characterized as a coun try with a multicul­
tural cit izen ship model, it is women’s groups (NL4, NL21) and a Muslim 
women’s group (NL19) that call for the re cog ni tion of different strat egies of 
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emancipation and integration with regard to the headscarf and/or all other female 
Islamic clothing. While Dutch soci ety is criticized for stigmatizing and discrimi­
nating against Muslim women, the claims for re cog ni tion of dif fer ence are not 
connected to the Dutch multiculturalist cit izen ship model.
 In the Austrian case, it is churches (A3, A4, A6), media (A10), Muslim 
groups (A14), other minor it ies (A16), par ties (A26) as well as pub lic intellec­
tuals which, referring to ‘integration’, prob lematize restrictions on or the 
pro hibition of veiling, emphasizing Muslims’ religious rights. While headscarf- 
wearing women are often marked as the cultural ‘other’ while neg lecting Muslim 
women’s social and eco nomic discriminations, ‘integration’ is also used by 
Muslim (women’s) groups (A6, A13), par ties (A26, A30) and women’s groups 
(A38, A40) to claim for the integration of Muslim women into the labour 
market. 
In contrast to the other coun tries, in the German debates it is only German 
Muslim groups (G10, G25) and other minor it ies (G18) that criticize the course 
of the headscarf debate for its assimilationist tendencies, with the majority soci­
ety defining how migrants should integrate and how they should practise their 
religion. Linked to this criticism is a rejection of any kind of pro hibition of reli­
gious symbols.
 Although Denmark moved from one of the most lib eral to one of the most 
restrictive migration regimes between 1982 and 2002 (Siim 2007: 495), which 
would give rise to the supposition that integration has been a topic of pub lic dis­
course, ‘integration’ was not at stake in the Danish headscarf debate in our body 
of analysis. 
Rights/religious freedom 
Even more so than in the case of ‘integration’, ‘religious freedom’ is defined in 
nationally par ticu lar ways. The right to religious freedom is closely linked to 
each coun try’s church–state regime and each coun try’s dealing with religious 
diversity.
 Within the first argumentative pattern which we called ‘religious freedom as 
indi vidual right’, religious freedom is asserted within all our cases by Muslim 
actors who are increasingly using the legal sys tem to sup port their cause and to 
claim – together with aca demics, intellectuals, some fem in ists and par ties – the 
correct exercise of the right to religious freedom as defined in the respective 
national consti tu tions. Hereby, the actors using this argumentative pattern 
emphas ize that Muslim women are members of the respective soci ety and con­
sequently have the same enti tle ment to religious freedom as all other cit izens. 
Yet this is done with varying in tens ity in the coun tries under comparison.
 In France, as the only laic state in our cross- country comparison, Islam is rel­
egated to the private sphere like all the other religions (Sanna et al. 2008). But in 
contrast to the prevailing rigid in ter pretation of laïcité and the supposedly equal 
treatment of the different religions through a laic approach, Muslim groups and 
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and anti- racists, anti- colonialist and anti- capitalist fem in ists (FR4, FR26, FR28) 
emphas ize the right of freedom of religious expression to compete with the exist­
ing ban on veiling in France as well as the current in ter pretation of laïcité. These 
actors point out that the French state’s in ter pretation of laïcité de facto results in 
the unequal treatment of different cit izens. In con sequence, they argue for a 
more inclusive form of state neutrality that treats all religions equally and 
includes all religions in the pub lic realm instead of reaffirming the hege monic 
imaginary of the unity and indivisibility of the French nation. It is emphas ized 
that being recog nized as a Muslim and being able to practise one’s religion pub­
licly does not conflict with being a French cit izen. Thus, the mentioned hege­
monic imaginary of the French nation and its cit izens through relegating religion 
into the private sphere is challenged. 
Religious freedom is also used in Ger many to challenge the existing pro­
hibitions of teachers’ headscarves. As in France, it is mainly Muslim groups and 
Muslim women’s groups (G9, G10, G23, G24, G25) and pub lic intellectuals like 
Birgit Rommelspacher (G4) and former consti tu tional court judge Ernst- 
Wolfgang Böckenförde (G16) who argue that pro hibiting the headscarf limits 
the indi vidual right to religious freedom of the teacher and prevents a free choice 
of a ‘good life’. Instead, a pro hibition of the teacher’s headscarf unduly privi­
leges the negat ive religious freedom of pupils and parents not to be subjected to 
practices of a belief they do not share over the pos it ive religious freedom of the 
teacher. Criticizing both the pro hibitive and the strictly secular headscarf regula­
tions, it is argued that German state neutrality is not enforced correctly because 
religions are either banned from the pub lic sphere which is against Ger many’s 
‘open’ understanding of neutrality or because religions are treated unequally. As 
state ser vants – and thus already German cit izens – Muslim women confidently 
claim their belonging to the German nation state by fighting for their right to 
religious freedom. 
Austria can be con sidered one of the extreme oppos ites of the German and 
French cases not just because of the coun try’s ‘pluralistically inclusive’ church– 
state regime and, in par ticu lar, the legal re cog ni tion of Islam preclude the pro­
hibition of the headscarf because this would result in the pro hibition of all 
religious symbols (Gresch et al. 2008). Also, the majority of Austrian actors that 
refer to religious freedom, argue in favour of the headscarf and against any 
restrictions: mainly churches (A2, A3), Muslim groups and Muslim women’s 
groups (A4, A5, A6, A12, A14) relate to the right of religious freedom by 
arguing that the headscarf is protected as a religious symbol or expression of 
person al ity (right to privacy).8 Much emphasis is put on the fact that Islam has 
been a recog nized religion in Austria since 1912, which gives the Austrian 
Muslim religious com mun ity legal auto nomy in in ternal affairs and provides 
Muslims with state protection to freely and pub licly exercise their religion. 
The position of Muslims in the Neth er lands is sim ilar to the Austrian case. 
Not surprisingly, the argumentative patterns of both coun tries re semble one 
another. The Dutch his tory of ‘pillarization’ (verzuiling) has largely influenced 
the de velopment of a secular sys tem in which religion may play a pub lic role 
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while the state is obliged to treat all com munit ies in the same way and safe­
guards a large organ iza tional freedom and inde pend ence of all religious bodies 
(Lettinga and Saharso 2008). Arguing in favour of accommodating the headscarf 
in the pub lic realm, Muslim groups and Muslim women’s groups (NL16, NL17, 
NL19), other NGOs (NL7, NL18), state bur eau cracy (NL13, NL23) and 
women’s groups (NL4, NL21) argue that wearing the headscarf is protected by 
the right to religious freedom embodied in Article 6 of the Dutch consti tu tion 
and that Muslims have the same right as non- Muslim col lect ives to express their 
faith. A nationally specific argumentation is used re gard ing the face veil. 
Amongst others, Muslim groups and Muslim women’s groups (NL16, NL17, 
NL19), and women’s groups (NL4, NL21) insist that wearing a face veil is a 
right of women to adhere to their religion that the lib eral demo cratic state needs 
to protect, also and even if this would signal gender in equal ity. Since the Dutch 
state does not interfere with the religious life of adherents themselves, it would 
be a form of state paternalism to liberate a woman from a self- chosen ideo logy 
against her will because she does not in ter pret her veil as in equal ity. Here, Dutch 
Muslims’ cit izen ship is implicitly employed to enforce the lib eral demo cratic 
state’s obli ga tion to treat all cit izens equally and protect their choices of a ‘good 
life’. 
In contrast to the other coun tries, equality of religion is not granted by the 
Danish consti tu tion: Denmark has an estab lished church, the Danish National 
Evangelical Lutheran Church named ‘the Peoples’ Church’ (Folkekirken) and is 
by its consti tu tion defined as a Prot est ant Lutheran coun try. Therefore, while the 
consti tu tion grants freedom of religion, the hier archy of religions is not ques tion­
able (Andreassen et al. 2008). Yet surprisingly, religious freedom does not play 
an im port ant role in the Danish debates nor has the status of religious com munit­
ies been central to legal conflicts about veiling. These conflicts have rather been 
centred on employment in areas of retail and media (ibid.). Moreover, if reli­
gious freedom is used to argue against a pro hibition of the headscarf it is not 
framed as a mat ter of indi vidual rights. Instead, par ties (DK7, DK8, DK9) and 
Muslim groups and Muslim women’s groups (DK22) state that while a headscarf 
might be oppressive, a ban of headscarves would be equally oppressive. Religion 
should be a private mat ter and a single person’s religious belief should be 
respected. 
As is the case in Denmark, the United Kingdom has an estab lished state reli­
gion that enjoys signific ant privileges. In contrast to the Danish case, where the 
equality of different religions is not an issue, the Church of England’s signific ant 
privileges serve as a stand ard against which other religious com munit ies can – 
on the basis of fairness – claim equality (Kılıç 2008). In the British debates, 
churches (UK18), Muslim groups (UK14), media (UK5), par ties (UK20) as well 
as aca demic journals (UK11) use the ref er ence to religious freedom to stress that 
Britain is not a secular state but a coun try where people have religious rights and 
can practise their faith without interference from the state in any way they like. 
Particular emphasis is placed on liberalism as a key com pon ent of British values 
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viewing the niqab, jilbab and hijab as expressions of religious faith women 
should be free to express. By using British Liberalism as the ref er ence point 
from which to argue for the religious freedom of British Muslims, it is taken for 
granted that Muslims do belong to the British nation state. 
At the same time that Muslims in Europe are increasingly claiming their 
rights to religious freedom, the secular lib eral Western demo cra cies under study 
are constantly defining the bound ar ies of what is con sidered as religious in the 
debates on veiling. These nego ti ations are reflected in the second argumentative 
pattern of the ‘rights/religion’ frames called ‘the headscarf as a polit ical symbol 
or violation of national prin ciples’: within this argumentative pattern, the reli­
gious freedom of Muslim women can be restricted by either arguing that the 
headscarf is not a religious but a polit ical symbol and therefore not protected by 
the right to religious freedom and/or by arguing that it violates certain national 
values or prin ciples like the negat ive religious freedom of others. In combination 
with other values such as gender equality and state neutrality, the prin ciple of 
religious freedom or neutrality is used to argue for a pro hibition of the 
headscarf. 
Supporting the prevailing position in France, that the wearing of religious 
signs in schools is a communitarian danger which desta bil izes the French 
national identity and social cohesion (Cadot et al. 2007), this argumentative 
pattern is strongly articulated by aca demics (FR10, FR15, FR20, FR22), pub lic 
intellectuals and experts (FR8, FR15), journ al ists (FR18, FR21, FR23) and state 
bur eau cracy (FR11). According to this position, wearing a headscarf is not an 
indi vidual religious right but a national strat egy of funda mentalist groups using 
pub lic schools as their battleground. By constructing the headscarf as a polit ical 
symbol that discriminates veiled women and targets the French Repub lican prin­
ciple of laïcité, a strict separation of state and church is favoured and thought to 
foster women’s rights and protect the soci ety against funda mentalism. Thereby, 
certain habitual cit izen ship practices are estab lished in order to neutralize any 
religious expression and thus reaffirm the unity and the indivisibility of the 
French nation and its cit izens while implicitly denying Muslims who refuse to be 
religiously neutralized the right to belong to the French nation state. 
While the argumentative patterns of the ‘religious freedom as an indi vidual 
right’ in France and Ger many converge, the arguments employed for limiting 
Muslims’ religious rights are rather hetero geneous in Ger many. A number of 
actors such as courts (G5, G30) and par ties (G1e, G14, G17, G22) argue that a 
teacher’s religious right can be restricted in order to protect the state’s neutrality 
in school while all religions have to be treated equally. In contrast to this argu­
ment, churches (G6, G7, G8, G21), women’s groups (G2, G20) and par lia ment/ 
legis la tion, i.e. party representatives (G1a, G1b, G1c, G1f, G19, G27b) argue 
that the headscarf is not a religious practice but a symbol for the unequal treat­
ment of men and women, violating the consti tu tional prin ciple of equal treat­
ment of men and women. Furthermore, it is argued that even if the headscarf 
were subject to the indi vidual right to religious freedom, the negat ive religious 
freedom of non- Muslim pupils must be privileged because students cannot avoid 
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teachers with headscarves due to the compulsory school attendance and Muslim 
female pupils have to be protected from headscarf- wearing teachers in order not 
to be forced to wear a headscarf too. This strongly articulated argumentative 
pattern furthermore employs a justification – though not used by all the actors 
mentioned – of the unequal treatment of Christian- occidental symbols, like the 
nun’s habit and wearing a cross as neck lace, and the Islamic headscarf by 
drawing a direct connection between the enlightenment and Chris tian values, 
arguing that ‘Chris tian’ refers to values detached from its religious con tent but 
which are based on Ger many’s Christian- occidental tradition as embodied in the 
consti tu tions of Ger many and specific federal states (cf. also Berghahn and 
Rostock 2007, 2008). Due to this argumentation, belonging to the German nation 
state as well as German cit izen ship are intrinsically tied to a Christian- occidental 
her it age. Thereby, Muslims are not only constructed as culturally and religiously 
different, but as the ‘other’, excluded from the German national imaginary.
 In Denmark, this argumentative pattern is used only mar ginally and again 
articulates a very peculiar Danish rhet oric. Women’s groups (DK14) and par ties 
(DK1, DK4) implicitly argue that Muslim women’s veiling is in conflict with the 
Judeo- Christian tradition dominant in Denmark. Islam is viewed as intolerant, 
undemo cratic and incom pat ible with the modern Danish agenda of gender equal­
ity. Therefore, the right to religious freedom can be restricted for Muslims not to 
practise their religion in a pub lic space or in a way which is offending to the 
ordinary Danish cit izen. Thus, cit izen ship and belonging are prim arily defined as 
Judeo- Christian. 
Due to the aforementioned institutional settings of religious plur al ism, only 
few actors in Austria and the Neth er lands and none in the UK argue for pro­
hibitive veiling regulations with ref er ence to religious freedom: in Austria, only 
party members (A22, A27, A32) want to restrict Muslim women’s religious 
freedom because it clashes with values of Austrian soci ety, mainly the equality 
of men and women. In contrast, it is state neutrality that is cited by Muslim 
groups and women’s groups (NL12), NGOs (NL20) and pub lic intellectuals 
(NL2) in the Neth er lands as a ref er ence for pro hibiting headscarves of teachers 
in pub lic schools and/or for court clerks: if the state wants to protect the equality 
and (religious) freedom of all cit izens re gard less of their different backgrounds, 
it should not be affiliated with any religious creed. 
Although, with the exception of Denmark, all the states of our cross- country 
comparison claim to treat all religions equally, it is with ref er ence to a ‘coun try’s 
identity and its values’ that the right to freedom of religious expression is 
restricted and the exercise of religious practices regulated. Those actors who 
refer to religious freedom in order to argue in favour of legal restrictions on the 
headscarf adhere to an exclusive para digm of belonging. By defining what kind 
of religious practices are protected by the right to religious freedom, specific cri­
teria are estab lished which need to be met to be con sidered a ‘good cit izen’. 
Thus, the respons ib ility for belonging is given to the indi vidual who can only 
belong if she (in our case) complies to these cri teria by refraining from her 
choice of a ‘good life’. Only the actors who use religious freedom to argue 
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against legal restrictions of the headscarf reflect an inclusive understanding of 
belonging which is open to different forms of religion. 
Gender equality 
Focusing on the topography of the frame- elements within the gender/emancipa­
tion frame, one argumentative pattern en com passes the elements ‘freedom of 
choice, thought or religion’, ‘self- definition’ or ‘self- determination’ as well as 
‘women’s auto nomy’ or ‘women’s agency’, which we call ‘headscarf as freedom 
of choice/women as auto nom ous subjects’. The other one relates the elements 
‘being modern, lib eral, demo cratic, and secular/neutral’ with Muslim women as 
‘oppressed, vic timized, and sexualized’ for defining the ‘headscarf as a sign of 
being different’.
 In the Austrian headscarf debate, the elements of the first argumentative 
pattern are mainly the ‘right to self- determination of women’ as well as ‘freedom 
of choice of religious expression’ and the im port ance of full ‘parti cipa tion and 
inclusion of Muslim women’ in relation to arguments that centre around gender. 
They are expressed by actors of the Islamic Religious Community, members of 
the Green and the Social Democratic Party, the speaker of the Green party’s 
women’s organ iza tion (Monika Vana), the Minister of Women’s Affairs (Doris 
Bures) at the time and the Viennese councillor for integration and women’s 
issues (Sandra Frauenberger), women’s groups and experts (A5, A12, A26, A28, 
A30, A36, A38, A39, A40). Those actors stress the various personal mo tiva tions 
of why and how women choose to wear the headscarf.
 For the Neth er lands, espe cially actors related to Muslim and women’s groups 
like the Werkgroep Ontsluiert, refer to ‘freedom of choice’ in conjunction with 
‘women’s auto nom ous choice’ (NL4, NL19, NL21) to veil,9 ‘inclusion/parti cipa­
tion of Muslim women’ (NL4, NL17, NL19, NL21) and the claim for ‘more
openness and understanding of Dutch soci ety’ (NL4, NL19, NL21), that is also 
articulated by the actor of the Religious Group (NL17), Haci Karacaer, the dir­
ector of the Turkish mosque- organization Millî Görüş. The headscarf is more over 
seen as an ‘identity marker’ and source of ‘empowerment’ (NL19, NL21, NL24).
 Also in Denmark, actors of the media, like the Feministisk forum, women’s 
groups and Muslim women’s groups, like Sherin Khankan, member of Critical 
Muslims emphas ize Muslim women’s right to ‘freedom of religion and self- 
definition’ (DK17, DK20), referred to as ‘Danish values’ (DK21), ‘auto nomy’ 
(DK22) and the headscarf as a sign of ‘identity and belonging’ as well as ‘liber­
ating’ (DK22). The im port ance to ac know ledge the different living con ditions 
and the plurality of Muslim women’s lives is seen as a crucial task, espe cially 
for the media (DK20) and some Danish fem in ists (DK17, DK21).
 Regarding the UK, only indi vidual Muslims (UK2, UK10) refer to ‘freedom 
of choice’ in conjunction with gender equality and ‘self- determination’ and 
‘women’s rights’. Important to con sider concerning this argumentative pattern is 
that the actors allude to the ‘veil’, not differentiating between the niqab, hijab or 
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‘values and norms of Western soci ety’ which would lead to the perception of 
women as sexual commodities (UK10) and to the pat ri archal structures of 
Western as well as Islamic soci eties because the veil is viewed as a mark of sep­
aration prim arily by the male elites and it makes British men feel ‘uncomforta­
ble’ (UK2).
 In the French headscarf debate, the elements within the argumentative pattern 
of ‘freedom of choice and religious expression’ are associated with ‘human 
rights’ (FR25, FR26, FR28) as used by experts and aca demics, ‘self- 
determination’ (FR6) and the claims to end discrimination against veiled women 
(FR4, FR5, FR16, FR23) by calling for an intersectional post- colonial per spect­
ive of gender, race, sexuality and nationality while debating the wearing of the 
veil (FR1, FR4, FR25, FR26, FR28). The mentioned values here were prim arily 
used by actors from Women’s groups, like the Collectif National pour les Droits 
des Femmes (CNDF ) (FR5, FR26), Muslim representatives, like Malika Hamidi-
Hosseinpour who co ordinates the Euro pean Muslim Network, a research group 
on Islamic cultures in Europe (FR6), pub lic intellectuals (FR28), the aca demic 
con text (FR1, FR25) and state bur eau cracy, the Haute Autorité de Lutte contre 
les Discriminations et pour l’Egalité (HALDE) (FR16). 
The asso ci ation of ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘self- determination’ with the right 
to not being discriminated against (G23, G3) is also made in Ger many. Here 
again, prim arily actors related to Muslim women’s groups emphas ize ‘free 
choice’ (G10), ‘women’s own respons ib ility’ (G24), and ‘self- determination’ 
(G23). Besides Muslim women’s groups (G24, G25), only pub lic intellectuals 
(G4), a representative from the Green Party (G27d) and people related to 
women’s groups (G12) stress that a headscarf ban would ‘hinder integration’ and 
espe cially exclude Muslim women from ‘equal access’ to the labour market. 
The other argumentative pattern de scribes the major soci ety as modern, 
demo cratic, lib eral, secular and neutral as well as gender equal while Muslim 
women are depicted as oppressed, vic timized and sexualized by the Muslim 
com mun ity and espe cially male rel at ives. Having estab lished this in ter pretation 
of the situ ation of Muslim women in lib eral demo cra cies, Muslim women are 
seen as not being able to make ‘free choices’. Thus, we called this argumentative 
pattern ‘headscarf as a sign of being different’.
 For the Austrian con text, prim arily the representatives of the FPÖ (A19, A22) 
as well as the former Minister of the Interior, Liese Prokop from the ÖVP (A32), 
link gender equality with ‘Austrian values’ and neutrality: 
Public institutions have to be philosophically and religiously neutral. . . . The 
headscarf is also a declaration of belief in the Islamic legal conception 
which has abso lutely nothing in common with our view re gard ing religious 
freedom or the equality between man and woman. 
(A22) 
Salient for Austria is also the linkage of ‘gender equality’ with the ‘uni ver sality 
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and the media (A8, A11), stressing that wearing the headscarf excludes Muslim 
women from a self- determined parti cipa tion in the world and forces them into 
dependency from men (A11) which contradicts equal treatment.
 In the Dutch headscarf debate, the self- perception of Dutch soci ety as liber­
ated, modern and gender equal (NL6, NL13, NL26, NL15, NL16) is linked with 
descriptions of Western women as liberated (NL3), Islam as oppressive and pat­
ri archal (NL3, NL6, NL10, NL13, NL15, NL16) as well as a threat to Western 
values like secularism (NL10, NL13, NL15, NL16) which would require to be 
‘far less tolerant towards the oppressive charac ter istics of the Islamic com mun­
ity’ (NL10, NL13, NL15). These value asso ci ations are pursued by actors of 
Muslim and women’s groups (NL6, NL10, NL13), pub lic intellectuals (NL15, 
NL16), the Social Democratic Party (NL26) and Cisca Dresselhuys, chief- editor 
of leading Dutch fem in ist maga zine Opzij (NL3).
 Within the British headscarf debate, the freedom of religion and religious tol­
erance is framed as a British norm or value, but wearing a veil10 is perceived as 
‘oppressive to women’ (UK1, UK6, UK7, UK17) or as hindering ‘women’s 
parti cipa tion and integration’ in soci ety (UK4, UK13, UK17) which is why it 
should be pos sible to restrict the wearing of the veil case by case, repres ented by 
actors from schools, the media, the Labour party and an indi vidual Muslim.
 For Denmark, the meaning of ‘gender equality’ and ‘personal freedom’ are 
framed as ‘Danish values’ that are seen as incom pat ible with ‘traditional Muslim 
values’ (DK5) and ‘in equal ity’ attributed to the pat ri archal structure of Muslim 
soci eties (DK4): ‘For the sake of the Danish soci ety we must send the signal that 
we do not accept that women’s personal freedom is being violated in Denmark’ 
(DK5). Danish fem in ist voices share the mentioned opinions by spokespersons 
of the Danish people (DK4) and the Conservative party (DK5) by also stressing 
the ‘pat ri archal structure of Muslim com munit ies’, which is oppressive for 
Muslim women (DK14, DK15, DK16). Thus, the Danish women’s movement is 
viewed as having ‘betrayed Muslim women by not sup porting them against sub­
ordination’ (DK14) and the uni ver sality of ‘women’s rights’ is emphas ized by 
actors from women’s groups (DK15, DK16, DK19).
 Regarding the French debate, this argumentative pattern is pre val ent and refers
prim arily to the headscarf as a sign of denial of ‘Western equality, sexual norms
and fem in ism’ as well as ‘Western demo cratic values’ (FR3, FR9, FR12), ad voc­
ated for by experts (FR9, FR12, FR14, FR15), state bur eau cracy (FR13) and repre­
sentatives of the media (FR3). The claim for ‘equality’ between men and women
is here associated with the prin ciple of ‘laïcité’ and ‘demo cratic values’ (FR9,
FR13, FR14, FR15). Moreover, it is ‘Muslim men’ (FR12, FR13), or the ‘pat ri­
archal structure of Muslim com munit ies’ (FR15) that are framed as the ‘cause’ of
the prob lem and the ones who exert control over ‘female bodies’ (FR14) by for
example Patrick Weil (FR15), senior researcher fellow at the National Centre for
Scientific Research who was a member of the Stasi Commission and Yolène Dilas-
Rocherieux (FR14), Associate Professor in Sociology (University Paris X). 
This argumentative pattern is also of strong relev ance for Ger many, and it is 
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G22), Chris tian Democrats (G1f, G19, G27b), the Greens (G1d), the Repub­
licans (G1a) – as well as of the churches (Prot est ant and Cath olic) who stress 
that the headscarf is a symbol for the ‘unequal treatment of men and women’ 
that stands in opposi tion to the German ‘consti tu tional prin ciple of gender equal­
ity’ (G8, G9, G19). The pro hibition of the headscarf is thus not perceived as 
‘discrimination’ because a ban would aim at the ‘securing of state neutrality’ 
(G22). Moreover, wearing the headscarf is seen as a result of ‘social pressure’ 
which would ‘discriminate’ Muslim women (G22, G1f, G1a) and deprive them 
of their ‘equal rights’, ‘self- determination’ and ‘full parti cipa tion’ in soci ety. 
This line of argumentation is sup ported by the pub lic intellectuals Alice 
Schwarzer (G28) and Necla Kelek (G29). 
In regard to our question of how the two contested para digms of belonging 
mater ialize within the most contested frames in the ana lysed headscarf debates, 
the proponents of restricting wearing the headscarf within the ‘gender/emancipa­
tion frame’ refer to gender equality as a prin ciple of con tempor ary lib eral demo­
cra cies and define it as a central trait of demo cracy like being modern, 
demo cratic, liberated and sometimes secular. Thus, they sup port and reconstruct 
a specific norm so that equality means nothing more than living up to and com­
plying with this norm while simul tan eously defining those who do not as 
‘different’. 
To belong or not to belong – a principled question 
Looking now at all three most contested frames within the headscarf debates, we 
would like to suggest that it is through the specific argumentative configuration 
of the de scribed frame- elements that the bound ar ies with regards to who belongs 
to a nation and who does not are redrawn or renegotiated with specific con­
sequences re gard ing the practice of ‘cit izen ship’ and the related enjoyment of 
full rights or who is defined and recog nized as ‘full’ cit izen. Our ana lysis showed 
that all of the six argumentative patterns within the three frames can be assigned 
to two different para digms of belonging, one adhering to an inclusive under­
standing of belonging and the other one to an exclusive one. Both para digms 
employ different cri teria for being recog nized as full members of a polit ical 
community. 
The actors of the headscarf debates who ad voc ate for restrictions on wearing 
the headscarf employ the argumentative patterns of ‘the headscarf as sign of 
being different’ (gender/emancipation), ‘the headscarf as a polit ical symbol or 
violation of national prin ciples’ (rights/religion) and ‘the headscarf as sign of 
separation/non- integration’ (cit izen ship/integration). Interestingly, within these 
three argumentative patterns, the ref er ences to the respective national are crucial. 
In this con text, espe cially the two argumentative patterns which refer to gender/ 
emancipation and rights/religion build a co ali tion, thereby simul tan eously 
drawing the bound ar ies of the nation; by equating ‘wearing a headscarf ’ with 
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The redrawing of the imaginary national bound ar ies becomes espe cially 
obvious in France and Ger many. Considering the 1989 de cision of the Court 
d’Etat, wearing a headscarf in school was not in ter preted as an infringement of 
the prin ciple of laïcité (Gökariksel and Mitchell 2005: 154), but in the wake of 
the enrolling headscarf debate, wearing the headscarf is now seen as undermin­
ing the core values of French identity. Similarly, the German Federal Adminis­
trative Court in its reasoning referred to the ‘Christian- occidental tradition’ of 
Ger many expli citly including specific religions in the national imaginary 
im agery while excluding others (G26). 
Moreover, by employing the par ticu lar argumentative patterns, the respective 
actors not only draw the line of who belongs to the national com mun ity and who 
does not, but simul tan eously define what kind of practices need to be expressed 
as well as embodied to be eli gible to belong and to be con sidered a ‘good’ cit­
izen. Thus the proponents of restricting the wearing of the headscarf estab lish a 
norm or specific cri teria which need to be met, thereby placing respons ib ility for 
belonging on the indi vidual who can only belong if she (in our case) complies to 
these cri teria and embodies the ‘good’ citizen. 
Within the second – inclusive – para digm of belonging, the actors ad voc ate 
against legal restrictions re gard ing wearing the headscarf by using the argumen­
tative patterns of ‘the headscarf as freedom of choice/women as auto nom ous 
subjects’ (gender/emancipation), ‘religious freedom as indi vidual right’ (rights/ 
religion) and ‘integration through rights and/or the re cog ni tion of dif fer ence’
(cit izen ship/integration). In contrast to the proponents of a headscarf ban, these 
actors stress that headscarf- wearing women are already full members of the 
national com mun ity and thus entitled to the same rights and same oppor tun ities 
as women who wear different religious clothes or no religious attire at all. More­
over, the actors using this para digm of belonging stress that women wearing the 
headscarf already belong to the nation state which first has to ensure the con­
ditions of equal oppor tun ities so that indi viduals have the oppor tun ity to sup port 
and con trib ute to shared polit ical life in a mode that fosters and enables indi­
vidual agency on the basis of equal re cog ni tion and manifesting itself by full 
inclusion in a polit ical, social and judicial body (Somers 2008: 25). 
Interestingly, the proponents arguing for legal restrictions and employing the 
exclusive para digm of belonging usually de- emphasize or neg lect the pos it ive 
indi vidual rights of Muslim women while referring strongly to the national 
imaginary thereby redrawing or reconfirming it. In contrast, the ad voc ates 
arguing for no restrictions and employing the inclusive para digm of belonging 
stress the legal status and rights of the indi vidual members of a nation state, but 
do only seldom – for example in France – employ, re- articulate and re- envision 
the national imaginary as a nar rat ive of sparkling plurality. Due to these findings 
we would like to suggest that the two para digms of belonging we identified in 
Euro pean headscarf debates can be in ter preted as employing two competing 
understandings of belonging to the nation state: the proponents of legal restric­
tions envision social cohesion and religious homo gen eity of the (ima gined) 
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espe cially Muslims, as the ‘other’, have to comply with. The majority of op pon­
ents to legal restrictions re gard ing the headscarf view the nation state prim arily 
as a sover eign with the main obli ga tion to grant freedom to its cit izens. Citizen­
ship is therefore mainly understood as a legal status while defining and empha­
sizing the protection of indi vidual rights as mat ters that the state should treat as 
indi vidual concerns. Thus, this para digm puts its focus on the indi vidual situ­
ation or pref er ence that could also be seen as sup portive of different af fili ations 
of a cit izen, but does not articulate suggestions concerning how solid arity and 
belonging to a com mun ity could be envisioned. 
Thus, our ana lysis showed that the construction of nar rat ives of belonging 
within the headscarf debates is again related to women’s bodies by referring to 
and engendering national identities: Euro pean coun tries that have introduced 
restrictive regulations deny access to certain rights and oppor tun ities to 
Muslim women who opt to wear par ticu lar forms of Islamic apparel, which 
creates differentiated modes of cit izen ship. Thus, the ana lysed pol itics of belong­
ing are setting the stage for introducing norm ative regulations that strengthen 
the bound ar ies into hierarchies, building, allying and intensifying specific 
power relations between cit izens. Although our ana lysis showed growing lever­
age of the exclusionary para digm of belonging, the inclusive para digm of 
belonging questioned the hege monic imaginations of the respective national 
com munit ies, thereby revealing the contingent character of the articulated nar rat­
ives. What becomes vis ible through our ana lysis is that the ten sion and the inter­
play between the nation and the state is currently reconfigured, and in between 
many oppor tun ities to define and envision inclusive meanings of belonging 
exist. 
Notes 
1 We would like to thank Anne Phillips and Mieke Verloo for their inspirational com­
ments on earl ier versions of this chapter. 
2 Cf. Kymlicka 2007 for an excellent description concerning the mentioned concept and 
major prin ciples of polit ical lib eral theory in relation to the prin ciples of multicultur­
alist theory (Kymlicka 2007: 25ff.). 
3 Greece and Turkey are not con sidered in our ana lysis because the ‘headscarf issue’ is 
not discussed and framed as an immigration related topic in both coun tries which 
relates crucially to the respective pol itics of belonging in a coun try. Although, of 
course, there are many ‘not migrated’ Muslim women wearing head and body cover­
ings in the six remaining coun tries, we focus on the argumentations found in the ana­
lysed pol icy docu ments which relate the discussions about wearing head and body 
coverings to questions of immigration, integration and belonging.
 4 We use the term ‘para digm’ in its broad methodo logical sense, which could be 
de scribed as the main theme with which a specific prob lem or situ ation is ana lysed 
(cf. Klima 1994: 485). 
5 The term ‘frame- element’ will be used here to refer to the meaning- giving com pon­
ents of the ana lysed argumentative patterns. During the pro cess of the research, the 
research teams referred to these meaning- giving com pon ents as ‘values’, but for guar­
anteeing unambiguous ref er ences to the terms we used in our structural ana lysis of the 
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6 Please see the introduction for a detailed description of the method of a gender sensi­
tive frame- analysis of the VEIL project. 
7 The mentioned bundle of rights usually denotes T.H. Marshall’s differ enti ation 
between civil, polit ical and social rights within studies of cit izen ship (Marshall 1950; 
Mackert and Müller 2007: 10ff.). 
8 Other actors are employers/workplaces (A7), other minor it ies (A16), par lia ment/legis­
la tion (A15), par ties (A24, A25), pub lic intellectuals (A35) and state bur eau cracy 
(A37). 
9 Please note that for the Neth er lands the arguments here refer to the full veil as well as 
to the headscarf. 
10 Please con sider that for the UK all contra veiling arguments refer to the full veil. 
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4 Discursive Europeanization? 
Negotiating Europe in headscarf 
debates 
İlker Ataç, Sieglinde Rosenberger and Birgit Sauer
 
Why bother with Europe? Introduction1 
Basic values, consti tu tional prin ciples and rights, and cultural norms and prac­
tices build the core of controversial pub lic debates about Muslim headscarves. In 
Europe, rights and values such as equality of the sexes, indi vidual freedom of 
religion, neutrality of the state towards the religions and secularism, justice and 
tolerance as well as societal norms and aims such as plur al ism, social cohesion 
and integration are addressed by actors involved in the debates about Muslim 
head covering (Scott 2007; Gallala 2006; Joppke 2007). A wide range of values 
and norms are embedded in pub lic discussions in order to argue for or against 
the right to veil. Some ref er ences made in the debates of the eight coun tries2 we 
have ana lysed in ref er ence to ‘Euro pean’ norms and values, suggest that a set of 
common Euro pean values and norms exist. At the same time, some pol icy actors 
make expli cit ref er ence to ‘national’ values. Also, both cross- national and cross- 
actor vari ation of ref er ences to ‘Euro pean’ and ‘national’ values can be found in 
the ana lysed debates.3 
The starting point of this chapter is that values and norms are socially con­
structed. Policy actors refer to values and norms, which they have renegotiated 
in order to give meaning and legitimacy to their pol icy positions (Fischer 2003; 
Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). Accordingly, we treat ‘Euro pean values’ (Schim­
melfennig 2005) and ‘national values’ as ‘empty signifiers’: norms and values 
are never given, but their con tent is constructed in deliberative and multifaceted 
pro cesses of nego ti ation and referring. Within this methodo logical per spect ive, 
Euro pean as well as national values and norms are always in the making and 
always ‘à venir’ (Jacques Derrida). 
Taking into account the variety of values and norms referred to in headscarf 
debates and their contra dict ory use in favour of and against the right to veil in 
different national con texts as well as on Euro pean levels, this chapter deals with 
situating headscarf debates in struggles over shared values and norms in Euro­
pean coun tries. Hence, this ana lysis mainly examines whether controversies over 
Muslim headscarves build an arena where common Euro pean values are discur­
sively addressed, negotiated and adopted – both by actors in different nation 
states as well as by institutions and actors on the Euro pean Union level. The 
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chapter deliberates the role of concepts such as ‘Europe’, ‘Euro peanness’ or 
‘Euro pean values’ on the one hand, and the construction of ‘national’ values in 
framing strat egies of polit ical and social actors on the other. Does the framing of 
Muslim head covering con trib ute to the emergence of a Euro pean sphere of 
shared values and norms or does it foster a nationally fragmented landscape 
of norms and values in Europe (see also Koopmans and Erbe 2004: 97)? Does 
the Euro pean Union act as a ‘value entrepreneur’ (Gerhards et al. 2009: 517)? 
Moreover, does the framing of Muslim headscarves construct a set of exclusive 
national values and norms, which might be in ter preted as an indic ator for ‘re- 
nationalization’ (Koopmans and Erbe 2004: 97)? In other words, this chapter 
examines whether and to what extent values and norms which are de veloped and 
referred to in headscarf debates con trib ute to the pro cesses of what we coin the 
discursive dimension of Euro pean integration or ‘discursive Euro peanization’. 
While the Euro pean Union neither has a mandate for regulating religious issues 
nor has de veloped a pol icy of value integration – on the contrary, it has ‘strong 
resistance against . . . cultural homogenisation’ in the pro cess of constructing a 
Euro pean pub lic sphere (Koopmans and Erbe 2004: 98) – the chapter aims to 
shed light on implicit pro cesses of value integration. 
First, we elaborate on the ana lyt ical framework of ‘discursive Euro­
peanization’ in a ver tical and horizontal dimension. We then ex plore the ver tical 
pro cess of Euro peanization, namely top- down pro cesses (‘Euro peanization from 
above’) and bottom- up pro cesses (‘Euro peanization from below’). Vertical dis­
cursive Euro peanization will be ana lysed by the fol low ing dimensions: by the 
framing of the headscarf issue on the Euro pean level and the convergence of 
Euro pean and national value debates (‘from above’), and by ref er ences made to 
Euro pean debates and docu ments in national debates on Muslim headscarves 
(‘from below’). Third, we present the value structure of national headscarf 
debates and ana lyse their simil ar ities and dif fer ences in order to detect traces of 
horizontal Euro peanization (‘Euro peanization from within’) as well as cen tri­
fugal framing strat egies. Finally, we conclude our findings with ref er ence to pro­
cesses of discursive Euro peanization and/or national fragmentation. 
‘Discursive Europeanization:’ modelling the analysis of 
values and norms in headscarf debates 
‘Discursive Euro peanization’ refers to complex pro cesses of communication and 
nego ti ation between nation state actors and actors on the Euro pean level as well 
as between actors across nation states. In the polit ical science liter at ure on Euro­
pean integration, the concept of Euro peanization relates to ‘do mestic con­
sequences of the pro cess of Euro pean integration’ (Radaelli 2004: 2), namely the 
pro cesses of adaption of Euro pean member states to the polit ical framework of 
the Euro pean Union (Axt et al. 2007). This focus on the ver tical dimension, on 
Euro peanization as a top- down pro cess – ‘Euro peanization from above’ – aims 
at explaining do mestic change through the pro cess of Euro peanization often with 
a focus on convergence of pol icies in the EU. The transposition of EU norms 
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and the diffusion of norms into do mestic pol icies (see for instance Falkner and 
Treib 2008) build the centre of this line of research. 
In contrast to this body of liter at ure, this chapter rather approaches Euro­
peanization as ‘something to be explained’ and less as ‘something that explains’ 
(Radaelli 2004: 2). Radaelli suggests the fol low ing definition, which we would 
like to use as our starting point: 
Euro peanisation consists of pro cesses of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, pro ced ures, pol icy para­
digms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which 
are first defined and consolidated in the EU pol icy pro cess and then incorp­
or ated in the logic of do mestic (national and subnational) discourse, polit­
ical structures and pub lic policies. 
(ibid.: 3) 
Accordingly, Euro peanization does not cover a simple top- down pro cess nor a 
‘uni- directional reaction to “Europe” ’, it extends to interactive pro cesses, which 
provide con sider able oppor tun ities for creative usage of Europe (ibid.: 4; cf. 
Grossman 2006). Hence, ‘Euro peanisation covers both ver tical pro cesses (from 
the EU to do mestic pol itics) and horizontal dy namics’ (Radaelli 2004: 5). In a 
sim ilar vein, Koopmans and Erbe (2004) differentiate between two dimensions, 
the ‘ver tical Euro peanisation’ and the ‘horizontal Euro peanisation’. ‘Vertical 
Euro peanisation’ relates to ‘communicative linkages between the national and 
the Euro pean level’ consisting of two basic charac ter istics; first, a ‘bottom- up’ 
per spect ive, dubbed as ‘Euro peanisation from below’, in which national actors 
‘address Euro pean actors and/or make claims on Euro pean issues’ (Koopmans 
and Erbe 2004: 101). The bottom- up per spect ive starts with the inter action at the 
do mestic level and goes beyond the ‘reaction to Europe’ (Radaelli 2004: 4) and 
ana lyses discursive and communicative pro cesses within the different nation 
states (Schmidt and Radaelli 2005: 9). The second dimension of the ver tical 
pattern is a ‘top- down’ point of view, in which ‘Euro pean actors intervene in 
national pol icies and pub lic debates’ (Koopmans and Erbe 2004: 101), which 
might be labelled as ‘Euro peanization from above’. In contrast, ‘horizontal Euro­
peanisation’ consists of communicative linkages between different member 
states (Koopmans and Erbe 2004: 101), stressing convergence (or non-
convergence) of pub lic pol icies at national levels. 
Along with Koopmans and Erbe (2004), Radaelli (2004) and Giuliani (2003) 
we see Euro peanization twofold: as a pro cess of mutual adaption and co- 
evolution between do mestic and Euro pean levels, and as a convergence pro cess 
which takes place on the national levels. The notion of Euro peanization shifts 
the ‘attention to the inter actions between the national and EU level’ (Müller and 
Alecu de Flers 2009: 24) – and we would add between nation states. Hence, our 
term of Euro peanization attempts to move beyond the confusion between ‘up- 
loading’ and ‘down- loading’ (Börzel 2002) by focusing on parallel pro cesses of 
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interactive pro cess of change linking the national and EU levels’ (Müller and 
Alecu de Flers 2009: 12) – and, in addition, linking polit ical pro cesses to the 
idea of convergence in member states. 
Only recently has the study of frames, values, norms and discourses as under­
pinning pol itics of Euro peanization come to the agenda of polit ical science liter-
at ure (Radaelli and Schmidt 2005; Daviter 2007). Discourses are both ‘a set of 
ideas’ which ‘appeal to values’, and an ‘interactive pro cess of pol icy construc­
tion and communication’ (Schmidt 2002: 169f.). Discourses are more than 
‘cheap talk’ and ‘more than a mere accompaniment to pol icies’; they can ‘act as 
a causal influence’ on pol icies (ibid.: 173; Schmidt 2010). Itself grounded in a 
new form of institutionalist approach, the new ‘discursive institutionalism’ 
(Schmidt and Radaelli 2005: 2; Schmidt 2010) suggests that frames and 
belief sys tems are also to be viewed as rel ev ant features that carry respons ib ility 
in the pro cess of Euro peanization (Schmidt and Radaelli 2005: 2; White 
2004). Hence, Euro peanization is a multidir ec tional interactive pro cess which 
includes the ana lysis of the ways in which a prob lem is framed (Forest and 
Lombardo 2010: 4). Discourses and frames con trib ute to and can explain 
Euro peanization (Schmidt and Radaelli 2005: 2) as Euro peanization pro­
ceeds through ‘framing do mestic beliefs and expectations’ (Knill and Lehmkuhl 
2002: 259) Also, ‘Euro peanisation may be limited if it goes against the pref er­
ences of national actors who have another set of ideas’ (Radaelli and Schmidt 
2005: 195). 
Eder and Kantner (2000) conceive a common Euro pean ‘frame of ref er ence’ 
in do mestic debates as a benchmark for Euro peanization (after: Kleinen- von 
Königslöw et al. 2005). Also, taking up the concept of governance, Katzenstein 
and Byrnes (2006: 682) suggest that a successful pro cess of Euro peanization 
depends on shared values and belief sys tems which Euro pean cit izens can 
identi fy with and, thus, con trib ute to legitimatize Euro pean pol icy making. 
Besides the multidirected per spect ives of ver tical and horizontal Euro­
peanization, this chapter also focuses on the aspect of ‘discursive pol icies’. The­
oretically, discursive pol icies refer to expli cit and implicit pol icies of norm and 
value nego ti ation, communication, diffusion and adoption. Therefore, the notion 
of ‘discursive Euro peanization’ in this chapter stands for ‘Europe/Euro peanness’ 
as constructed through discourse, through frames as well as through values and 
norms (Hay and Rosamond 2002). ‘Discursive Euro peanization’ implies on the 
one hand that the EU may provide the ‘cognitive and norm ative “frame”, the 
terms of ref er ence’ (Radaelli 2004: 5). On the other hand, discursive Euro­
peanization is a pro cess ‘through which the EU gains its own auto nom ous 
meaning and self- validation within the logics, cognitive frames, and norms of 
beha vi our of do mestic actors’ (ibid.: 8). Hence, discursive Euro peanization is 
not only about com pliance of national actors with EU ‘scripts’ (Gerhards et al. 
2009: 517, 523) but also the ongoing pro cess of negotiating values and norms. 
The ver tical and horizontal dimension of Euro peanization is a pro cess of bench­
marking and comparison as well as cognitive reorientation, that is, the sim ilar 
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To sum up the modern liter at ure and move on to our ana lyt ical model: in this 
con tri bu tion we do not want to dem on strate whether Euro pean values are ‘really’ 
affecting do mestic debates about headscarves. Rather we want to address ‘dis­
cursive Euro peanization’ as pro cesses of renegotiating values and norms (see 
Figure 4.1). In this regard, the chapter conceptualizes ‘discursive Euro­
peanization’ as a complex framework of inter actions, first, among nation states 
and, second, between national and Euro pean levels. ‘Discursive Euro peanization’ 
will be conceptualized as a double- sided communication, nego ti ation and diffu­
sion of values and norms including a ver tical dimension, namely a top- down and 
bottom- up per spect ive (‘Euro peanization from above and from below’), and a 
horizontal dimension (‘Euro peanization from within’). 
In our framework, ver tical discursive Euro peanization relates to shared frames 
between the Euro pean level and nation state levels. As mentioned above, it can be
seen first as ‘discursive Euro peanization from above’, that is as a top- down pro­
cess of diffusion of values and norms from the Euro pean to the do mestic level, as 
an implementation of Euro pean Union frames in national con texts and as a value
convergence between EU and national levels. Vertical discursive Euro peanization 
from above is opera tionalized as a frame fit between the Euro pean and the differ­
ent national levels (a comparison of frames and values between the EU and the 
different national debates). Here we pose two questions: first, whether frames and 
values referred to on the Euro pean level diffuse into national debates; and second, 
whether there is a trend of convergence or divergence of norms and values 
expressed in national and Euro pean headscarf debates. The as sump tion is that dis­
cursive ver tical Euro peanization might lead to a convergence of the con tents of 
values and norms discussed in national debates about headscarves with con tents 
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Second, the ver tical dimension of discursive Euro peanization is conceptual­
ized as a bottom- up pro cess of frame ref er ence, as ‘discursive Euro peanization 
from below’. Appropriate indic ators for this pattern of discursive Euro­
peanization are direct quota tions of ‘Europe’, ‘Euro peanness’ and ‘Euro pean 
values’ and direct pos it ive ref er ences to Euro pean docu ments by national actors. 
Within our research these quota tions in national statements are con sidered as an 
indic ator for communicative pro cesses between do mestic and Euro pean levels, 
as well as for the adoption of Euro pean values by national actors. In our under­
standing, discursive Euro peanization takes place when the ‘EU becomes a cog­
nitive and norm ative frame’ (Radaelli 2004: 11), what Radaelli calls ‘ideational 
convergence’ (ibid.: 14). 
Horizontal discursive Euro peanization finds its expression in shared frames 
and values between nation states, without expli citly mentioning Europe or the 
Euro pean Union. With the horizontal dimension we assess pro cesses of value 
and norm nego ti ations in headscarf debates, which indicate the de velopment of 
shared values in cross- national arenas. Horizontal discursive Euro peanization 
(‘Euro peanization from within’) is opera tionalized on the one hand as frame 
convergence between different states as well as the use of sim ilar frames as ref­
er ence to framings and debates in other Euro pean coun tries. We will identi fy 
divergence and convergence of values and norms between nation states. It is 
as sumed that commonalities might con trib ute to a trans national framework 
exerting an impact on the debates on the Euro pean level and, eventually, lead to 
shared Euro pean values and the de velopment of a common set of Euro pean 
values and to a Euro pean value space (Schimmelfennig 2005). On the other 
hand, discursive elements that reinforce and strengthen the idea of national value 
sys tems based on homo gen eous cultural orders and practices might facilitate 
value frag menta tion and also nationally exclusive value sys tems (Mouritsen 
2006). 
Misfits:4 the lack of vertical Europeanization 
Our as sump tion is that the diffusion of frames and values referred to on the Euro­
pean level facilitate the convergence of national value sets discussed in headscarf 
debates with norms on the Euro pean level and by Euro pean actors. In order to 
locate the complex dy namics of the frames and values on the Euro pean level it is 
im port ant to be aware of the fol low ing three charac ter istics of the Euro pean level 
of headscarf debates. First, although Euro peanization creates new legal frame­
works, polit ical oppor tun ity structures and cultural repertoires for claims of reli­
gious re cog ni tion (Koenig 2007: 913), the EU has no direct regu latory 
competence re gard ing headscarves to harmonize rules and practices. However, 
different subunits of the Euro pean Commission follow closely the regulations 
concerning the headscarf in the nation states. For instance, the Euro pean Com­
mission’s expert reports and re com mendations point out that headscarf debates 
raise issues of different funda mental rights and legal prin ciples such as freedom
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Second, in two cases the jurisprudence of the Euro pean Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) (Dahlab v. Switzerland in 2001 and Şahin v. Turkey in 2005) sup ported
the restrictive approaches of the nation states, namely Switzerland and Turkey, and
claimed that there is no violation of freedom of thought under Convention Article
9. Our research indicates that these rulings led to a European- wide discussion of
values, espe cially of freedom of religion, gender equality and secularism. 
Third, besides the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the restrictive French regula­
tion from 2004 brought a new dynamic into the headscarf debates. The regula­
tion offered an arena for civil soci ety groups to or gan ize and articulate their 
ideas. For instance, Muslims actors or gan ized on the Euro pean level to de velop 
arguments against the French regulation and the ECtHR de cisions. Also, social 
sci ent ists, espe cially law theorists and fem in ists as well as pub lic intellectuals, 
argued in the cases of the ECtHR de cision and discussed the prob lematic out­
comes of the rulings for Euro pean soci eties. Our ana lysis shows that access to 
EU fora entails an oppor tun ity for these civil soci ety actors to place their 
demands and to articulate their ideas from a Euro pean per spect ive. Particularly 
the Euro pean Parliament (EP) builds an im port ant arena for various party actors. 
However, the far- right group in the EP produced a strong ‘Othering’-discourse 
in which Muslims were constructed as a religious group that conflicts with Euro­
pean culture and religion (EU3). 
Following these introductory remarks, we will ana lyse the pro cesses of ver­
tical discursive Euro peanization by first presenting the values discussed on the 
Euro pean level and then comparing frames and values constructed on the Euro­
pean level with those of the do mestic levels in order to ana lyse trends of conver­
gence or divergence. Third, we examine trends of ver tical Euro peanization ‘from 
below’ by scrutinizing direct quota tions of ‘Europe’, ‘Euro peanness’ and ‘Euro­
pean values’ and direct ref er ences to Euro pean docu ments by national actors. 
Values on the European level 
The judgements of the ECtHR and the French ban of religious symbols in 
schools con trib uted to a European- wide discussion of the Muslim headscarf. 
Euro pean pol icy docu ments refer to three value sets, to gender equality and 
freedom of religion as constitutive parts of lib eral indi vidual rights, and to secu­
larism. The fol low ing section ana lyses the two rulings of the ECtHR as well as 
the reactions to the rulings and to the French headscarf ban. 
Gender equality is used in headscarf debates to argue for and against a head-
scarf ban. On the Euro pean level the ECtHR refers to gender equality in its two 
de cisions in order to legitimize the headscarf bans in the two coun tries. In the 
case of Dahlab v. Switzerland the court de scribes the headscarf as a ‘power ful 
external symbol’ which is imposed on women by a precept laid down in the 
Qur’an (EU9). In the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, the court legitimizes the 
headscarf ban as a form of protection of the rights of women and of gender 
equality. Thus, the headscarf is constructed as a symbol for the submission of 
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The Grand Chamber’s (ECtHR) position on gender equality triggered a fierce 
debate about gender equality. Judge Tulkens claimed that a headscarf ban will 
not promote the equality between men and women. Moreover, she stressed that 
the headscarf has no single meaning but is worn for a variety of reasons (EU11). 
Similarly, Tore Lindholm criticizes the judgement as an example of illib eral and 
author it arian fem in ism because it fails to respect the ‘free’ de cision to wear reli­
gious attire. He concludes that barring access to pub lic education and pub lic 
employment for covered Muslim girls is against women’s rights and gender 
equality (EU12). Anastasia Vakulenko criticized that the headscarf was attrib­
uted a highly ab stract and essentialist meaning of a religious item extremely det­
rimental to gender equality (EU14). Also, Muslim actors argue with gender 
equality. In a media release, the Islamic Forum Europe (IFE) sees the judgement 
of the ECtHR as ‘a slap in the face for all educated women’ and as an ‘affront to 
a woman’s funda mental right to choose and expression’ (EU17).
 Regarding the freedom of religion and thought, Article 9 of the Euro pean Con­
vention of Human Rights (ECHR) constitutes an im port ant source of ref er ence for
different actors. Article 9 guarantees protection of a par ticu lar belief and of an
asso ci ation with a religion. However, the right to manifest is subject to restriction.
The ECtHR grounds its de cisions in the two headscarf cases on Article 9. But the
court emphas izes that in demo cratic soci eties with several coexisting religions, it
may be neces sary to put restrictions on the right of freedom of thought, conscience
and religion in order to re con cile the inter ests of various groups. From this per­
spect ive, the headscarf ban is legitimized for the protection of rights and freedom
of others, of pub lic safety and order (EU9, EU10). 
Several actors criticized the rulings stating that the headscarf alone does not 
infringe the rights and freedom of others and does not pre ju dice pub lic order 
(EU11). A prominent reaction to the French ban is the Written Declaration in the 
EP.5 This declaration states that indi vidual rights, namely religious freedom, are 
the most precious value in the Euro pean Union. Therefore, Euro pean gov ern­
ments are expected to allow the expression of indi vidual faith for religions and 
minor it ies within educational and state institutions (EU1). Muslim actors at the 
Euro pean level also refer to religious freedom. Arlene Rodrigues, a member of 
the Assembly for the Protection of Hijab (Pro- Hijab), sees the ban as an infringe­
ment of both the Euro pean and United Nations Conventions on Human Rights. 
She indicates that the ban will further stigmatize Muslims and make them feel 
vic timized and mar ginalized (EU18). 
Another prin ciple which legitimizes the headscarf ban is secularism. In its 
jurisprudence the ECtHR differentiates between ‘segments of soci ety who live 
under the secular and demo cratic elements’ and ‘extremist movements’ in 
Turkey. According to the court, the freedom to manifest one’s religion can be 
restricted in order to defend the prin ciple of secularism which is perceived as 
protection from extremist movements and as guarantor of demo cratic values. 
Hence, the ECtHR strengthens the specific national state–religion relationship 
emphasizing that nation states have a margin of appreciation to balance the reli­
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This concept of secularism is criticized for example by Judge Tulkens who 
blames the under lying ab stract conception of secularism. She reasons that the 
judgement does not address the applicant’s argument that she had no intention of 
calling the prin ciple of secularism into question. Moreover, she criticizes the dis­
cursive construction of the ‘Other’ by debating about ‘segments of soci ety who 
live under the secular and demo cratic elements versus extremist movements’. 
She claims that the wearing of the headscarf cannot be associated with funda­
mentalism but that it is vital to distinguish between those who wear the head-
scarf and ‘extremists’ who seek to impose the headscarf as they do other 
religious symbols (EU11). Tore Lindholm, too, criticizes the under lying concept 
of secularism. He questions the ECtHR’s abil ity to deal with the rights of reli­
gious minor it ies and nonconformists com pet ently and fairly, espe cially with 
Islam and Muslims, and criticizes that Muslims are seen as the ‘threatening 
Other’ (EU12). 
In the next section we will compare these framings with debates in the ana­
lysed nation states. 
Convergence of values? A comparison of European and national 
levels 
Actors on the Euro pean level refer to freedom of religion and the right to pub licly
manifest one’s religious ob serv ance as an essential human right grounded in the
ECHR, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU anti- discrimination direc­
tives. While this lib eral ref er ence is contested – as we have shown with the rulings
of the ECtHR – the Euro pean discursive field is, how ever, open and plural. Our
ana lysis shows that pol icy makers as well as representatives of Muslim groups
take a pos it ive ref er ence to Europe as a sphere of human rights. They call on Euro­
pean authorities to recog nize Muslims as cit izens with equal rights and duties
(EU18). At the same time, they call upon ‘Euro pean Muslims’ to actively take part
in Euro pean soci eties. From this per spect ive, Euro pean institutions and regulations
are seen to guarantee the protection of human rights (EU17). 
Voices raised against the headscarf ban address the Euro pean Commission 
and the EP to work out a solution on the Euro pean level and to offer an al tern­
ative to the restrictive approach pursued by the ECtHR and national gov ern­
ments. Approaching the headscarf issue from a minor ity per spect ive, a 
‘Euro pean model of integration’, which rests on respect for dif fer ences and 
respect for different religions, is constructed (EU4). Furthermore, the strand of 
Euro pean secularism is being criticized as illib eral because it discursively con­
structs a Euro pean ‘Us’ (pro gressive, lib eral and modern) and a ‘Them’ (reac­
tionary, funda mentalist and anti- modern) (EU16). 
However, actors such as representatives of the far- right par ties in the EP
are pleading for restrictive pol icies and in favour of a headscarf ban. In his
statement, the Austrian MP Mölzer asserts from a culturalist point of view
that Muslim migrants are incom pat ible with Euro pean culture and religion.
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attempt to impose Muslim culture on Euro pean coun tries. Moreover, the
Euro pean Union is made respons ible for failures in integration pol icies by
granting fin an cial sup port to im mig rants without demanding anything in
return (EU3).
 Turning to the national level, our findings show that national frames do not fit 
with the Euro pean level. While on the Euro pean level the headscarf discourse 
has a strong focus on basic rights such as freedom of religion, national headscarf 
debates hardly reflect these uni ver sal norms and rights promoted on the Euro­
pean level. In national docu ments only few ref er ences to indi vidual rights, such 
as religious freedom, gender equality and anti- discrimination, which are con­
sidered as sup portive of the inclusion of veiled women into pub lic life in Euro­
pean coun tries, can be detected. 
Furthermore, we found that debates on gender equality frame the latter as a 
cultural achievement of the indi vidual national soci eties but not as a uni ver sal 
rights. The sentiment is that this national achievement has to be protected against 
veiling on the grounds of tradition, religion and pol itics. In this con text, the 
national ‘Self ’ is attributed as being modern, emancipated and women friendly. 
Political par ties and intellectuals have adopted this frame in Denmark (DK9). In 
Ger many, a frame co ali tion of Chris tian Conservatives, Social Democrats and 
mainstream fem in ists portrays the covered woman as a vic tim, oppressed by her 
culture, whilst women from the majority soci ety are presented as emancipated 
(G1b, G1c, G1f, G28). In the Neth er lands (NL12) and in the UK (UK4), more­
over, Muslim men are viewed as more backward, pat ri archal and pre- modern 
than the male majority.
 Religious freedom is played out as the main prin ciple sup portive to the right 
of wearing the headscarf in pub lic institutions (this is par ticu larly the case in 
Austria and the Neth er lands: A5, A40, NL1, NL8) (Gresch et al. 2008). Reli­
gious freedom as a right enjoyed by all people re gard less of eth ni city and nation­
ality seems to almost be the only prin ciple that is stressed in favour of a tolerant 
(inclusionary) regulation of the headscarf. 
In addition to religious freedom as a basic right in lib eral demo cra cies,
voices in several coun tries emphas ize demo cracy in order to make a statement
for or against the wearing of the headscarf. The democracy- concept is framed
as follows: the given value sys tem is linked to lib eral demo cracy which is
characterized by indi vidual rights, religious rights and freedom (of choice).
Democracy is equated with an open and tolerant soci ety, a frame which is
par ticu larly strong in Denmark (DK5, DK7), the UK (UK9) and Ger many
(G10). However, this repres enta tion also includes a positioning against the
headscarf (as for instance in Ger many, G22). In the Neth er lands, the concept
of demo cracy is more over seen as a communicative act – which is hindered
by full body covering. Therefore, the burqa is framed as undemo cratic and
has to be forbidden (NL11). 
Compared to the traditional lib eral right of religious freedom, the ref er ence
to gender equality and anti- discrimination in these arguments is weak. Refer­
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equal treatment, the right to anti- discrimination or the indi vidual right of a
woman to choose her dress without any restrictions and express her (polit ical
or religious) identity. Thus, it is notable that the principle under the guise of
inclusion and parti cipa tion, which is highly valued in the Euro pean Union,
namely non- discrimination, plays only a minor role in national debates. It is
only Muslim organ iza tions, for instance in Ger many, which emphas ize that the
headscarf ban will foster group building and discrimination of minor ity groups
(G24, G25).
 In the first place, polit ical par ties in Denmark make statements consisting of 
ref er ences to indi vidual rights and are in favour of both a tolerant and restrictive 
regulation alike. On the one hand, it is said that Denmark would not accept that 
women do not have personal freedom (DK5). According to the Chris tian Demo­
cratic Party, banning the headscarf would go against freedom of religion and 
hence against demo cracy. The Chris tian Democratic Party states that religious 
garments should be accepted in an inclusive soci ety (DK9). On the other hand, 
the Danish People’s Party positioning itself against veiling argues that veiling 
does not count as com pat ible with Danish freedom rights (DK7). 
The reference of national actors to the European level: 
‘Europeanization from below?’ 
One result of our frame ana lysis is that hardly any national docu ments expli citly 
refer to Euro pean docu ments, Euro pean legal frameworks and Euro pean debates 
on values comprising religious freedom, anti- discrimination and integration. In 
the cases of the Neth er lands, Denmark and the UK, no ref er ences to the Euro­
pean realm of values, norms and (indi vidual) rights are made. This is slightly 
different in French and German pol icy debates where ref er ences to Euro pean 
docu ments and their enshrined values as a common denominator can be 
ex plored. In German pol icy debates the ECHR is mentioned (Article 9 Religious 
Freedom, Article 14 Prohibition of Gender Discrimination; G14, G22). These 
ref er ences to funda mental lib eral rights are accompanied by the interceding of 
de cisions of the ECTHR in the Swiss headscarf case (G14, G13, G18). Also in 
France ref er ence is made to Euro pean docu ments espe cially with the aim of 
opposing the headscarf ban. In contesting the ban as a discriminatory practice 
against covered women, com ment ators quote the Euro pean Convention on 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (§2, Article 9), but also the Euro­
pean Council Directive (2000) estab lishing a gen eral framework for equal treat­
ment in employment. 
All in all, only modest ref er ences to Europe or to a Euro pean value sys tem 
are present in national debates. This is espe cially true for coun tries where polit­
ical conflicts over headscarves are moderate, such as Austria and the Neth er­
lands. Only in coun tries with fierce debates – France and Ger many – do polit ical 
actors refer to the Euro pean Union level. Ultimately, the inter na tional level is 
referred to in fierce controversies in order to strengthen one’s own argument – 
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Some of the national docu ments refer to secularity depicted as a Euro pean 
value and to ‘Euro peanness’. In Greek debates, for instance, secularism is 
framed as Euro pean and as posing a threat to national cultural traditions. The 
idea of national pride and pat riotism is mobilized against the idea of a secular 
Euro pean uni versal ism. The EU is presented as a threat to the Greek church– 
state relation, which is seen as part of national traditions, a threat to (Greek) 
Chris tianity; therefore, the Orthodox Church demands freedom of religious prac­
tices (GR10). These voices, which are mainly pro- veiling, criticize Euro pean 
debates on headscarves with the argument that religion is being politicized 
(GR9).
 The French discourse differs completely, presenting the idea of ‘Euro­
peanness’ as a norm to which veiled women ought to adhere. The stra tegic invo­
cation of a liberal- secular logic of ‘Euro peanness’ as an idealized and norm ative 
value becomes quite evid ent in the discourses that expli citly deploy the domi­
nant conception of the repub lican prin ciple of laïcité in order to de velop the 
argument of the necessity of Muslim women’s emancipation and assimilation 
(FR8). 
Summing up the dimension of ‘ver tical discursive Euro peanization’, our find­
ings show that pro cesses of Euro peanization from above and from below are 
ambivalent and precarious. While the Euro pean level fosters indi vidual rights as 
uni ver sal rights, im port ant national actors do not refer to Euro pean debates but 
rather frame these lib eral rights as national values and, hence, not as parts of a 
Euro pean space of shared values. 
National fragmentation: the lack of ‘horizontal 
Europeanization’ 
On national levels our ana lysis shows that in almost all headscarf debates 
Muslims living and working in a given coun try are referred to as im mig rants 
rather than as cit izens. The construction of opposed values and norms serves to 
portray a common ‘Us’ (the cit izens) distinguished from a different (non- 
European and im mig rant), external ‘Other’ (see also Katzenstein and Byrnes 
2006: 680). The ‘Other’ is often presented not only as different, but also as being 
alien, backward or anti- modern (Scott 2007; Rosenberger and Sauer 2008). The 
mode to construct different cat egor ies of people and social groups runs – first of 
all – along majority soci eties and minor ity, namely migrant com munit ies (an 
exception is Turkey). Advocates of restrictions of the wearing of the headscarf 
perceive Muslims as ‘Others’, at least as non- Europeans. Even the headscarf 
con tro versy in France, most profoundly its parts which are sup portive of the out­
lawing of the veil, seems to be discursively or gan ized around an opposi tional 
scheme of France and its Muslims, the designed distinctions between tradition 
and modernity, religion and enlightenment, com mun ity and repub lic (FR8). 
In national headscarf debates the cat egor ization of distinct groups follows 
mainly four major discursive ‘demarcation’ lines – culture, gender, modernity and 
‘Westernness’, and fear and threats. As already mentioned, this cat egor ization is 
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linked to conflicting value sys tems. In the fol low ing we will present frames used 
in do mestic debates in order to point out the patterns of constructing the ‘Other’ 
in national headscarf debates. 
The cultural ‘Other’ 
Framing strat egies pointing to culture construct the ‘Other’ as belonging to a 
clear- cut different culture based on traditions, habits and values, which are per­
ceived as being incom pat ible with the culture of the majority soci ety. The 
‘Islamic culture’ as a marker for unwanted dif fer ences is par ticu larly de veloped 
in the Christian- conservative debate in Ger many where ‘Westernness’ is equated 
with Chris tianity and Chris tian values (G17), and in the right- wing-populist 
discourse in Austria (A20) and in Denmark. The populist Danish People’s 
Party demands a pol icy to ban the headscarf and highlights that the medi eval 
Muslim culture contradicts Danish culture based on demo cracy and indi vidual 
rights (DK4). 
The oppressed woman 
Arguments referring to gender equality are instrumental to build and strengthen 
bound ar ies between Islam and Europe, in order to give meaning to the separation 
of ‘Them’ from ‘Us’. In all coun tries investigated, polit ical actors are outspoken 
in presenting Islam as a backward and medi eval religion or tradition by referring 
to gender relations and/or the image of the oppressed women, for instance in the 
UK (UK7), Denmark (DK19), Austria (A20, A23), the Neth er lands (NL12, 
NL14). Even in the Greek debate where only few ref er ences are made to gender 
equality, covered women are seen as more backward compared both to majority 
women and to uncovered Turkish minor ity women (GR1). The predominant per­
ception under lying some commentaries is that a pro hibition of veiling works not 
only to protect national culture in its homo gen eously Euro pean modality, but 
also to liberate women and girls who are vic timized and oppressed by the archaic 
pat ri archal traditions of Islam (FR3). In the French anti- veiling discourses of the 
media, in fem in ist discourse and by pub lic intellectuals, experts and com ment­
ators, the conclusion is drawn that backward- portrayed veiled women should be 
assim il ated into the French, modern, secular mode of cit izen ship. Thus, banning 
the headscarf is meant to promote gender equality. 
Anti- modernity 
The backwardness of a culture is a very strong image associated with headscarf 
wearing women (FR13). Ahmed Aboutaleb, a Dutch- Moroccan politician, 
equates emancipation with Enlightenment. His line of argument is that im mig­
rants, having not yet reached the level of emancipation of Western and Dutch 
soci eties, are expected to adapt to this stand ard; he does admit, though, that time 
is needed to do so (NL12). Mass media and polit ical actors attempt to draw a 
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line between a backward, pat ri archal and oppressive polit ical ideo logy of Islam 
and an emancipative, pro gressive and enlightened notion of national or Euro pean 
modernity (DK7, A20). Within the conceptual framework of this purported 
polarity between ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’, ‘Islam’ is typ ic ally depicted as a religion 
and culture essentially positioned outside of and against modernity. Also in 
Turkey, the image of the headscarf as oppressive and backward is discursively 
constructed. Academics, journ al ists and politicians alike present the soci ety as 
divided into veiled and unveiled women leading to conflicting religious and 
secular sections (TR9). 
Loss of national unity 
One of the core elements in some national debates about headscarves, but very 
strongly in debates about face veils, is the fear of divisions, separation, frag­
menta tion and lack of social cohesion. In the UK, Denmark and Turkey (UK1, 
DK1, TR2) a ‘non- integration frame’ is pronounced and implies that a lack of 
social cohesion is dangerous for demo cratic soci eties, therefore indi viduals have 
the duty to integrate and to assimilate and not to claim their indi vidual rights – 
such as to wear a face veil. What the debate about the full body covering in the 
UK brings to the fore is that two separated com munit ies are in place: the Muslim 
com mun ity and the white British com mun ity (UK1, UK20). The latter is 
de scribed as a soci ety searching for dialogue and the Muslim com mun ity is pre­
sented as not wanting to com munic ate and hence not be part of the British soci­
ety (UK20). Muslim veiled women are presented as a group distinct from and 
alien to women of the ‘British soci ety’ (UK1, UK4). From a politician’s per­
spect ive (UK8), Muslims are constructed as vic tims due to their poor eco nomic 
and social status and mar ginalization within soci ety. It is argued that women 
who are hidden cannot be fully included into soci ety, or women who are fully 
covered are not able to be active parti cip ants in soci ety (UK13). 
Christian- democratic politicians in Ger many claim that the headscarf is a sign 
for group construction and cultural separation with disinteg rat ive effects. 
Annette Schavan, the then Minister for Culture of the federal state Baden-
Württemberg, who sup ported the law against headscarves at schools, claims that 
husbands and fathers force girls and women to wear the headscarf in order to 
distinguish themselves from the German soci ety (G1f ). Social demo crats are 
also afraid of in- group building by Muslim im mig rants and plead for integration 
and, thus, for avoiding signs that might promote isolation or separation like the 
headscarf (G1c). In the Neth er lands, the study organ iza tion on multicultural 
soci ety ‘Education’ is worried about young Muslims claiming religious identity 
and therefore excluding themselves from Dutch soci ety (NL22). In Turkey, the 
framing referring to separation and segregation is very sim ilar to the one in 
Western Europe. Here, veiled women are also portrayed as un- modern and 
blamed for segregation and in equal ity in the soci ety. It is the covered woman 
who is depicted as causing separation and splitting the soci ety into two sections 
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 In France, the proponents of the ban perceive the headscarf as an exceptional 
case, which legitimates lim ita tion to the expression of religious faith. The 2004 
law is presented as a neces sary ges ture of defence of the French repub lic and its 
indivis ible national unity. National unity, as a funda mental prin ciple of the 
repub lic, is presumed to be achieved and safeguarded through the rem edy of cul­
tural assimilation (Scott 2007). 
In sum, we point to gen eral debates on Islam and Muslim accommodation 
which often imply ‘accentuations of symbolic frontiers between Europe and 
Islam’ (Koenig 2007: 924) and question whether Islam, Muslim values and the 
visibility of Islamic symbols are seen as com pat ible with the prin ciples of lib eral 
demo cracy and enlightenment (Cesari 2004). In headscarf debates and in debates 
about full body covering as in the UK and the Neth er lands, the external covered 
‘Other’ em braces values, which are viewed not only as different from ‘ours’, but 
as incom pat ible with Western values or with Judaeo- Christian norms. In those 
discussions that ad voc ate for restrictions or even a ban of veiling, polit ical actors 
as sume culturally homo gen eous value sys tems that, in turn, contradict with reli­
gious and ethnic plur al ism. Very often right- wing populist par ties argue against 
headscarves by contrasting traditional Muslim values (spelled out as pat ri archy 
and gender in equal ity) with demo cratic values (personal freedom and gender 
equality). The latter are ascribed as substantive com pon ents of a given nation 
state or even of Europe (DK4). 
It is inter esting to note that contradicting value sys tems are grounded in very 
different situation- specific events and markers. In Ger many, for instance, it is a 
Chris tian founda tion linked to gender equality (G21); in Denmark it is demo­
cracy on which the coun try is based (DK4); in the Neth er lands it is gender 
equality (NL14); in France and Turkey it is secularism; in the UK it is openness 
and toleration which characterizes the British ‘white’ soci ety (UK20). The exam­
ples show that rather often polit ical actors and opinion leaders do not legitimize 
restrictions of veiling with a uni ver sal or ‘Euro pean’ set of values but with 
nation- specific value systems. 
Conclusions: discursive Europeanization or national 
fragmentation? 
In contrast to our ori ginal as sump tion that headscarf debates use ‘Euro pean 
values’ as an empty signifier in order to construct a common sphere of shared 
values, the empirical data show that in national headscarf debates the saliency of 
expli cit ref er ences to a Euro pean value sys tem, Euro pean norms and docu ments 
is fairly modest. We could not find convergence of values and norms referred to 
on the Euro pean level with those in the nation states in headscarf debates. On the 
contrary, actors in national arenas are inclined to refrain from setting the stage 
for a discursive Euro pean value space. Debates about Muslim head covering use 
frames which refer to values that are closely linked to cultural practices and 
norms archetyp ic ally ascribed to the respective nation state. The comparison of 
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might conclude that in veiling debates a new form of ‘neo- nationalism’ is emerg­
ing (Gingrich and Banks 2006), or at least a frag menta tion (see Figure 4.2). In 
the remainder of the chapter we will have a concluding look at our findings. 
Absence of Europe in national headscarf debates 
‘Euro peanization from above’ is the per spect ive of trickling down values 
stressed at the Euro pean level to do mestic levels and a convergence of Euro pean 
and do mestic debates. Our empirical findings do not indicate a discursive con­
vergence of basic rights and inclusive values discussed on the Euro pean level in 
national headscarf debates. On the contrary, national actors only select ively refer 
to debates in the Euro pean arena to strengthen value settings, which are framed 
as national traditions. With respect to ‘Euro peanization from below’, the find­
ings show that Europe is broadly ab sent in do mestic debates. National actors 
involved in headscarf debates over whelm ingly refrain from making ref er ences to 
values attributed to Europe or from quota tions of Euro pean docu ments. For 
instance, the Euro pean Union legal framework is only mar ginally referred to by 
people or groups who have a stand in headscarf debates on member state levels. 
On the contrary, social and polit ical actors in headscarf controversies construct 
values and norms which are closely linked to national features, institutional 
peculiarities and achievements. 
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Strengthening nationalistic values 
The second dimension to assess discursive Euro peanization en com passes the 
horizontal aspect. The indic ator used is whether values and norms addressed in 
headscarf debates in national polit ical spaces between the ana lysed coun tries 
converge. At first glance, on national levels some simil ar ities in formal patterns 
of values and norms addressed in pol icy docu ments and media texts can be 
detected. In several coun tries various polit ical and social actors stress values 
such as indi vidual rights of religious freedom and gender equality. Can this be 
labelled as the cre ation of a common set of values, in other words, a ‘discursive 
Euro peanization from within?’ At second glance, it turns out that almost all 
values and norms in do mestic debates are being presented as specific to a given 
nationhood. The frame ana lysis shows that simil ar ities exist; how ever, these do 
not con trib ute to a common set of shared ‘Euro pean values’ but rather to value 
sys tems presented as national self- understanding. 
Nonetheless, we could observe a specific form of convergence of values at 
the horizontal level: in par ticu lar, two mech an isms of value convergence on 
do mestic levels are in place which contradict potential pro cesses of ‘discursive 
Euro peanization’: first, the discursive articulation of uni ver sal rights as cultural 
achievements of a given nation and, second, values designed as nationally his­
toricized peculiarities. 
It is remark able to what extent culturally constructed norms, values and 
repres enta tions of the ima gined ‘Other’ are in place, while lib eral values based 
on uni ver sal rights access ible for all people are placed peripherally. Basic uni­
ver sal rights such as gender equality and the indi vidual right to religious freedom 
are largely ex ploited as ‘cultural rights’ linked to the tradition of a given nation 
state. In sum, debates on veiling turn out to be instrumental for redefining uni­
ver sal values and norms as nation specific. This ‘culturalization of values’ might 
lead to par ticu larization and nationalism (Mouritsen 2006). 
This chapter showed that on the national level debates about indi vidual and 
anti- discrimination rights are gradually transformed into an approach ded ic ated 
to cultural her it age: basic values like gender equality and religious freedom are 
not presented as com pon ents of uni ver sal rights but as values ascribed to a spe­
cific national culture. This is also the mech an ism of the exclusionary construc­
tion of groups viewed as the ‘Other’.6 In these deliberative pro cesses, patterns of 
beliefs and beha vi ours are deployed which constitute certain cat egor ies of people 
along religious and ethnic bound ar ies. Thus, headscarf pol icies are not only con­
tested, they become a tool to define the ‘lib eral Self ’ as opposed to the ‘Other’ 
and to renegotiate col lect ive identities on the do mestic level in an exclusionary 
way. 
Within the framework of ‘culturalization of values’, the argument that 
wearing the headscarf is a vis ible sign of the unwillingness of integration into 
settler soci eties takes a slightly different form. In this type of framing strat egy, 
the headscarf serves as a symbol for non- compliance with declared norms such 
as integration into a soci ety and modernity. Stressing unwillingness and 
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incompatibility of values and norms, the debate furthermore touches upon the 
self- evidence of social cohesion against threats imposed by the exist ence of dif­
ferent social and religious practices. Moreover, the topos of integration of 
im mig rants and social cohesion is not only highly rated within the pro claimed 
value order; these discursive elements enjoy almost the same valued position as 
funda mental prin ciples do. To a certain extent, we might conclude that in head-
scarf debates uni ver sal rights, equality and religious freedom are being sacrificed 
for the need of social cohesion and cultural integration of im mig rants into the 
majority soci ety. Besides the mere trend of trans forma tion of uni ver sal rights 
into cultural values, the social construction of diverse national peculiarities is a 
further signific ant pattern of nationalized discourse. 
Besides Turkey, France clearly faced the most heated controversies during 
the last decades. Studying the French case, Joan Scott observed the preser va tion 
of a mythical notion of ‘France’ as driving force in the affaire foulard (2007: 
173). Our study on the display of ‘Euro pean frames of ref er ences’ (Eder and 
Kanter 2000) gives strong in dica tions that in headscarf debates social meanings 
and values ascribed to nation states play a much greater role than Euro pean ones. 
On the contrary, in various debates nationalistic defined values are being rein­
forced. In addition, the idea that Europe is a space where inclusive stand ards of 
re cog ni tion of Muslim religious specificities could be translated into national 
pol icies appears as illusionary (Massignon 2007: 136). 
Notes 
1 We owe special thanks to Athena Athanasiou from the Greek team of the VEIL 
project. 
2 Besides the Euro pean level, that is the Euro pean Union institutions and the institutions 
of the ‘Council of Europe’, coun tries included in this investigation are Austria, 
Denmark, France, Ger many, Greece, the Neth er lands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
3 For this chapter we ana lysed pol icy docu ments by party politicians, by NGOs as well 
as media art icles which expli citly referred to ‘Europe’ and/or uni ver sal norms and 
which used values and norms by framing them as ‘national’. 
4 See for the issue of ‘goodness of fit’, Asensio (2008). 
5 In the Written Declaration the members of the EP call on Euro pean actors to sup port 
religious rights and freedoms in France and throughout the EU, including the right to 
wear the Muslim hijab, Sikh tur ban, Jewish skullcap and Chris tian cross in schools. 
6 Triandafyllidou (2001) shows the role of the ‘Other’ as a factor that shapes national 
sentiments, not only in activating feelings of belonging to a specific group but also in 
shaping them in a par ticu lar dir ec tion given that each nation seeks to differentiate itself 
from a specific ‘Other’. From this per spect ive she argues that ‘Others’ should be seen 
as part of the nation because they represent its negative. 
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5 Legal regulations 




A crucial element in dealing with the Muslim headscarf pertains to the legal reg­
ulations, that is, the norm ative setting by which polit ical and every day practice 
is strongly influenced – and also vice versa.2 Legal cultures and traditions vary 
across Europe. While legal sys tems in the common law tradition are mainly 
based on case law created by courts, legal sys tems rooted in civil law consist of 
codified laws adopted by par lia ments. Both legal sys tems are challenged by the 
question of whether religiously motiv ated symbols or clothes may be worn in 
pub lic institutions and/or by state em ployees exercising their professional func­
tions. However, how do regulations concerning the Muslim veil relate to the 
consti tu tional concept of state–church relations? Does this concept allow scope 
for religion to have an influence on polit ical outcomes in the different legal sys­
tems? Therefore this chapter examines whether cit izens are allowed to display 
their personal religious and spiritual affili ations pub licly or are required to keep 
these symbols of their identity out of the pub lic sphere. This leads to the main 
question: have the coun tries managed to strike a reason able balance between 
indi vidual human rights on the one hand and a commonly agreed regime of regu­
lations concerning col lect ive values for the pub lic sphere on the other hand?
 In the first instance, when we speak of ‘regulations’ we are referring to legal 
norms. These are legally binding ab stract rules and pro vi sions which enable 
de cisions to be taken sys tematically in specific cases of conflict. Important 
binding norms are usually contained in written laws in the sense of bills adopted 
by par lia ments. The more funda mental a norm, the more likely it is that this will 
be enshrined in the consti tu tion, if the coun try in question has a written consti tu­
tion; Britain, for example, does not. For France and Turkey, the consti tu tional 
prin ciple of laïcité or ‘secularism’ is the most rel ev ant norm structuring the 
sys tem of cit izens’ rights and duties (Amir- Moazami 2007: 47; Saktanber and 
Çorbacıoğlu 2008). 
In the absence of specific legal regulations in the form of bills adopted by 
par lia ment in these coun tries, the courts, par ticu larly consti tu tional or supreme 
administrative courts, have the role of in ter preting the consti tu tional prin ciple. 
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regulating by case law, the courts sometimes take the functions of a legis lat ive 
body, namely adjusting cri teria and creating ‘norms’ to resolve further cases of 
conflict by ‘precedent’ judgements. Furthermore, regulations may also be incor­
p or ated into decrees, adopted by executive state institutions. Norms created by 
gov ern ments, ministries and other state institutions must be based on a legal 
authorization in the form of a bill adopted by par lia ment. In addition to these 
decrees, there are sometimes in- house docu ments, administrative statements, 
instructions or directives giving legal in ter pretations in order to ‘regulate’ how 
state authorities should implement gen eral legal norms in a specific con text. 
These do not estab lish direct obli ga tions on cit izens, but may never the less have 
a de facto impact. In any case, state action encroaching upon cit izens’ funda­
mental rights must be based on binding norms – written or unwritten – and must 
be justified by compelling reasons based on the rights of others or pub lic or 
private inter ests as defined by the prevailing social and polit ical consensus in a 
par ticu lar coun try (Böckenförde 1999: 234; 2001; Sacksofsky 2009: 284). The 
aim of this chapter is to ana lyse which legal influences are at work in each coun­
try and to criticize them from a norm ative point of view. In this expli citly legal 
respect, the rel ev ant cri teria for a reason able mode of regulation include consti­
tu tional consistency and compatibility with indi vidual basic and human rights. 
The fol low ing section examines the legal situ ation in the coun tries of our ana­
lysis. First, the states applying a pro hibitive model of regulation are portrayed, 
followed by ‘tolerant’ models. Subsequently, the question whether and why 
there is a major correlation between the mode of regulation and the legal pattern 
of state–church relations is discussed. Before drawing conclusions we look at the 
legal influence coming from the Euro pean legal sphere repres ented by either the 
Euro pean Court of Justice (ECJ) or the Euro pean Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). 
Modes of regulating the Muslim headscarf 
In our sample of eight Euro pean states – Austria, Denmark, France, Ger many, 
Greece, the Neth er lands, Turkey and the United Kingdom – we find two ‘laic’ 
states (in the sense of a strictly secular separation of spheres), three ‘neutral’ 
states (where separation between the state and religious com munit ies is imple­
mented, but religious and other ‘private’ affili ations are allowed to be included 
into the pub lic sphere) and, finally, three coun tries with a (privileged) Chris tian 
state church (Berghahn 2007, 2008b). France and Turkey are ‘laic’ states, whilst
the neutral states are Austria, Ger many and the Neth er lands. The coun tries with a
state church are Denmark, Greece and the United Kingdom (England, Scotland). 
The ‘prohibitive model’: France, Turkey and some German federal 
states 
In France, the prin ciple of strict state neutrality applies to all pub lic ser vices 
(including teachers) as well as to courts. This strict form of neutrality is called 
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laïcité. It stems from the first art icle of the French consti tu tion affirming the sec­
ularity and indivisibility of the Repub lic and is formally stated in the 1905 Law 
on Separation between Church and State. Referring to this 1905 law, which 
demands laïcité in pub lic schools, the 2004 legis la tion (law of 15 March 2004) 
was adopted to strengthen the prin ciple of strict secularism and gender equality 
in order to combat violent and pat ri archal tendencies within Muslim com muni­
ties. The law pro hibits the display of any religious or polit ical symbols in pri­
mary and secondary schools but not in universities. Therefore, wearing a 
headscarf is forbidden for school pupils. Employees of the state and of pub lic 
institutions, including teachers, are also forbidden to show their private religious 
affili ations. Even though there is no legal pro hibition in the private sector labour 
market and despite a law transposing Euro pean Union anti- discrimination direc­
tives (espe cially 2000/78/EC) into national law, the prin ciple of laïcité and strict 
ideo logical ‘neutrality’ is tacitly applied by many employers to ban the Muslim 
headscarf in the private sector too (Sanna 2011).
 In Turkey, students and aca demics at pub lic or private universities are banned 
from wearing the headscarf on campus. Most of the court cases re gard ing the 
issue have emerged because of incidents in universities. In the past, several stu­
dents and a few faculty members were expelled from university and lost their 
lawsuits appealing against their expulsion. However, this does not only affect 
students; school pupils, teachers and aca demics working in the education sys tem 
(including universities), as well as women working in other state institutions and 
even in hos pitals are not allowed to wear any form of religiously motiv ated head 
covering pre scribed for women or any other religious symbols at all (Saktanber 
and Çorbacıoğlu 2008). The regulation concerning students refers to Article 17 
of the Regulation of the Council of Higher Education in combination with the 
in ter pretation by the Constitutional Court in 19893 stipulating that head cover­
ings worn by women contravene the prin ciple of secularism. In Janu ary 2008, 
the governing party AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; Justice and Development 
Party) tried to lift the headscarf ban and created a legal framework for this while 
amending the consti tu tion. However, on 5 June 2008 the Constitutional Court 
declared this reform unconsti tu tional as it again violated secularism as the 
central prin ciple of the Turkish Repub lic. If even the attempt to lift the (not for­
mally codified) ban on the headscarf for students in universities has failed, it is 
apparent that the legal pro hibitions for all state em ployees, court staff, members 
of par lia ment (MPs) and even for em ployees of pub lic hos pitals will remain in 
effect. Contrary to the situ ation in pub lic institutions, no formal law or regula­
tion restricts any kind of veiling in private enterprises in Turkey. However, many 
employers in the private sector prefer to hire unveiled women, espe cially for 
high profile jobs (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008).
 In Ger many half of the Bundesländer (federal states) (Berghahn 2009; 
Rostock and Berghahn 2009) have pro hibitive regulations. The pro cess of legis­
la tion was initiated by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) on 24 Septem ber 
2003,4 when the court handed down a ruling in the case of Fereshta Ludin, 
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Baden- Württemberg in 1998. The judgement consisted of a compromise con­
taining lib eral and restrictive elements. The court decided that teachers cannot 
gen erally be prevented from wearing religious clothes without a legal basis. The 
majority of judges attributed competence to restrict teachers’ religious clothing 
to the Land, referring to the fact that education and school pol icy fall within the 
ambit of distinct legis la tion passed by the federal states. As a con sequence, 
restrictive legis la tion has been adopted in the par lia ments of eight (of 16) 
Länder. Some of them adopted pro hibitions for civil ser vants outside the educa­
tional domain (in Berlin and Hesse). However, pupils and students all over Ger­
many are still free to wear the headscarf and no expli cit legal restriction of 
wearing the headscarf on the private labour market exists. 
Baden- Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine- Westphalia and the Saar­
land have introduced a ‘Christian- Occidental model’ of regulating the headscarf: 
the Education Bills adopted in each of these five Länder stipulate that teachers 
(in Hesse all pub lic ser vants; cf. Sacksofsky 2009) shall behave and dress 
according to the prin ciple of the state’s religious, polit ical and philosophical 
neutrality and shall not disturb the peace of school or infringe the ‘negat ive 
freedom from religion’ of pupils and parents.5 The wearing of religious clothes 
and symbols is expli citly covered by these rules, which were intentionally 
worded to pro hibit the Muslim headscarf. Exceptions are stated for Chris tian and 
occidental symbols – e.g. a nun’s habit and Jewish yarmulkes – in the formula 
that the ‘exhibition’ of ‘Christian- occidental’ ‘educational and cultural values or 
traditions’6 does not contravene the duty to maintain neutrality. In contrast to 
this model, Berlin, Bremen and Lower Saxony’s Education Bills apply a ‘secular 
model’, stipulating neutral beha vi our and outer ap pear ance without ref er ence to 
religious traditions of any kind. In these federal states teachers may not wear any 
form of vis ible religious or ideo logical symbols. 
It is im port ant to note that the authorities of the Bundesländer decide if and 
which symbols or clothes infringe on state neutrality or endanger peace in the 
school or the ‘negat ive freedom’ of pupils or parents. It does not mat ter at all 
what the person wearing a headscarf does or declares, nor how she behaves 
while teaching. It is claimed that ignoring these indi vidual aspects is justified by 
the duty to ban the ‘ab stract danger’ – irrespective of indi vidual aspects, 
although it remains unclear what an ‘ab stract danger’ is. While lawsuits of teach­
ers appealing against these sanc tions have failed so far, a number of courts have 
ruled that all religions must be treated equally. This means that not the headscarf 
nor the nun’s habit nor the Jewish yarmulke should be allowed for teachers. 
Thus courts rejected the ori ginal in ter pretation of the Christian- occidental 
clauses as exceptions from equal treatment (Berghahn 2009: 40; Sacksofsky 
2009: 289).7 
The remaining eight states without new regulations apply non- specific norms 
on requirements for teaching staff to indi vidual cases of teachers wearing a head-
scarf, if such cases arise. In these federal states teachers may wear the headscarf 
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The ‘tolerant model’ 
Austria has two expli citly tolerant regulations: a decree concerning the national 
school sys tem, and a col lect ive labour agreement on a local level in the health 
sector (concerning hos pitals in Vienna). For other domains, no specific regulation 
exists, but there is a practice of tolerating the headscarf. Although right- wing pop­
ulist politicians have tried to ignite a polit ical debate about headscarves, the legal
situ ation is clearly lib eral, as the Minister of Education issued a decree in 2004 
stipulating that pupils’ headscarves must be toler ated in order to guarantee the
consti tu tional right to religious freedom and free manifestation of faith. In Austria
this right is specifically covered by the 1912 ‘Muslim Law’ recognizing the
Muslim minor ity in the occupied territory of Bosnia- Herzegovina (in the con text 
of the Habsburg Empire). Later, con tempor ary religious com munit ies in Austria
were recog nized by bills adopted by par lia ment (Gresch et al. 2008; Gresch and 
Hadj- Abdou 2009). Thus, conflicts on the headscarf in the pub lic domain (mainly 
schools) have been resolved quickly by referring to the legal pro vi sions, which 
protect the right to veil on the grounds of respect for religious freedom. Austria, 
therefore, has one of the most tolerant regulations in Europe concerning expres­
sion of religious belief and its manifestation in the pub lic realm. So far, only one
pro hibitive practice has been legitimized by state authorities: a woman defendant
wearing the niqab was expelled from a (criminal) court. This de cision was con­
firmed by the Supreme Court, which in ter preted full covering as a polit ically and 
ideo logically motiv ated ges ture (and not as a religious practice).
 In Denmark, no law at the national level pro hibited the wearing of the head-
scarf, the niqab or any other religious symbol until the end of May 2009. 
However, there were and are some de- centralized regulations that restrict the 
wearing of headscarves: several shops of the chain Dansk Supermarked adopted 
regulations which prevent hiring em ployees with headscarves. Also, some high 
schools have pro hibited the burqa and the niqab, and some muni cipal ities refuse 
to give wel fare bene fits to fully covered women. In the meantime, the pub lic 
mood has grown more rad ical and since summer 2008 the Danish gov ern ment 
has prepared a bill regulating the display of religious (and polit ical) symbols by 
judges in courtrooms. The regulation does not apply to jury members or lay 
judges. The gov ern ment proposal to ban the use of the headscarf by pro hibiting 
all religious and polit ical symbols for judges was sup ported by the major polit­
ical par ties, but at the same time a number of indi vidual politicians from all 
polit ical par ties – except the far- right Danish People’s Party – opposed this ban 
on religious and polit ical symbols. In May 2009, how ever, the bill was adopted 
by par lia ment and came into effect in June 2009 (Siim 2009). 
Although Denmark has one expli citly pro hibitive regulation in courts the 
coun try shall not be labelled as ‘pro hibitive’ because this ban is a mere symbolic 
demarcation and so far no woman has been affected by this regulation. At 
present there are no judges in Denmark who wish to wear a headscarf in court. 
Greece has no gen eral law, administrative decree or other legis la tion regulat­
ing the wearing of headscarves or other religious symbols. Therefore, de cisions 
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on implementing specific regulations on pupils’ dress are usually left to the dis­
cre tion of headmasters of pub lic schools. In private schools the issue is regulated 
by ‘in ternal regulations of practice’. There are no rel ev ant legal regulations or 
even practices in Greek universities. Within the civil ser vice and the state- owned 
enterprises, the rel ev ant legis la tion in the code of practice for civil ser vants8 does 
not include any restrictions on the clothing of pub lic sector em ployees, apart 
from gen eral pro vi sions on ‘decent beha vi our’ (Article 27), the right to freedom 
of expression and the condemnation of any discrimination on the basis of reli­
gious or other beliefs (Articles 27 and 45). Despite the lib eral legal situ ation, we 
can as sume that religious minor ity groups which do not fit into the mainstream 
pattern are treated with more intimidation than the lib eral dynamic of non- 
regulation might suggest (Avramopoulou and Athanasiou 2011).
 In the Neth er lands women can claim the right to wear a headscarf in the 
private labour market, in pub lic education and in social wel fare ser vices. Indi­
viduals who perform certain functions in court and hold jobs in the police force 
requiring contact with the pub lic are excluded from this lib eral regulation 
(Saharso and Lettinga 2008). A clothing directive issued by the gov ern ment in 
20039 laid down cri teria stipulating when it is legitimate to impose restrictions 
on religiously or polit ically motiv ated clothing and symbols in the education sys­
tem. A 2004 pol icy docu ment10 concluded that religious symbols should be 
avoided in courts and for certain positions in the police force. In the past, the lib­
eral outcome of these largely permissive regulations was inspired by consulta­
tions in the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC), an auto nom ous body of nine 
experts that advises the gov ern ment and others on equality legis la tion, as well as 
by re com mendations from an ad vis ory committee on integration in 2004 (Com­
missie Blok). Thus, the gov ern ment con siders the headscarf in its directive on the 
education sys tem and in its pol icy statement as an expression of a Muslim 
woman’s religious belief and hence it is protected by the right to freedom of reli­
gion. Freedom of religion is a funda mental right in the Neth er lands, which can 
only be restricted if it can be shown that the aim pursued in restricting the exer­
cise of this right is legitimate, and that a ban meets the requirements of propor­
tionality and subsidiarity. The incompatibility of the headscarf with certain 
functions in the police force and all positions in the judiciary stipulates these 
exceptions from the overall lib eral rule (Saharso and Lettinga 2008; Lettinga and 
Saharso 2009). 
There is no regulation by parlia ment ary legal act in the United Kingdom
(UK). Conflicts over veiling in schools and courts are avoided, since pupils in 
most schools must wear school uniforms and judges in courts still wear wigs and 
are therefore not affected. If Muslim girls or women and other religious minor it­
ies wish to wear more comprehensive covering than the headscarf or if their 
clothing clashes with the school uniform rules, their wishes must be weighed 
against the functional imperatives of school life or court pro ced ures. In this case 
re com mendations from experts have been de veloped (Kılıç et al. 2008; Fehr 
2009).11 The main factor that explains Britain’s tolerant regime on veiling has its 
roots in his tor ical traditions and the relationship between church and state. 
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Although – or even because – there is a state church in parts of the coun try 
(England, Scotland), religious freedom is an essential underpinning of British 
soci ety and, in contrast to other Euro pean coun tries, this is not based on secular 
pro ced ures and ar range ments. However, Britain is an immigration coun try and 
has been a multicultural soci ety since the days of the British Empire. Individual 
rights are viewed as crucial, including the right to choose one’s style of dress. 
The auto nom ous re com mendations for schools and courts explain the prin ciples 
at stake, how to take them into con sidera tion and how to respect the various 
aspects of religious, cultural or gender dif fer ences. Nevertheless, some cases of 
conflict concerning veiling practices have arisen and there are media debates 
about full body veiling. In 2006, the former gov ern ment min is ter, Jack Straw, 
triggered a fierce discussion about cit izen ship and full body veiling in a news­
paper commentary about a fully covered lady consulting him in his office hours 
(Straw 2006). 
Since the terrorist attacks of Septem ber 2001 in the USA, major changes in 
discussions about the wearing of headscarves have taken place across Europe. 
Restrictive tendencies have emerged even in the coun tries of ‘tolerant’ types of 
regulation. The pol icy shift in Denmark, which to date is prim arily symbolic, 
and the Dutch reser va tions against the headscarf in the police and in courts have 
already been mentioned. Nevertheless, the Neth er lands remains an overall per­
missive and multicultural coun try, supposedly the most tolerant together with the 
UK. Analogously to the recent French legal initiative, mainstream Dutch par ties 
also felt encouraged in 2005 to press ahead with an initiative to pro hibit full 
body covering (the burqa or niqab) being worn on pub lic transport and in the 
streets. In the Neth er lands these attempts to ban full body covering, not just in 
pragmatic case by case practice but by an expli cit law, have failed several times 
because lib erally minded experts (Vermeulen et al. 2006) have argued that there 
are enough instruments to restrict indi viduals who pose a risk to pub lic safety 
(Saharso and Lettinga 2008; Loenen 2008). However, in 2009, the gov ern ment 
announced that it will prepare a bill to forbid any head or body covering that 
fully covers the face in both pub lic and private schools. Though Geert Wilders’ 
more rad ical proposal (to pro hibit burqas in all pub lic spaces) failed again and is 
still pending, the gov ern ment is meeting him halfway by devising a law on cloth­
ing that covers the face (Saharso and Lettinga 2008; Lettinga and Saharso 2009; 
Loenen 2008: 324). 
Hence, the coun tries clas si fied as ‘tolerant’ in our sample still follow the lib­
eral prin ciple with its permissive im plica tions in their overall practice. Behav­
iours and outfits which are not pro hibited and do not harm others are allowed by 
law, and the person in question must not be discriminated against. When cases 
of conflict occurred, how ever, and polit ical actors – espe cially from the far right 
– tried to estab lish a legal pro hibition on veiling, other polit ical or judicial forces 
have reacted, sometimes in a lib eral manner, but increasingly more restrictively. 
In some cases gov ern ment decrees, bills adopted by par lia ment and court 
de cisions regulate head or body covering in either a select ively restrictive or 
permissive fashion. Equal treatment or anti- discrimination institutions had a 
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moderating function espe cially in the Neth er lands and Britain (Squires 2007a), 
where they have a long and active tradition. Even in Denmark, where the ban on 
judges with headscarves was introduced in 2009, the right of an MP to wear a 
headscarf was confirmed in 2008 by the Presidium of the par lia ment (Siim 2007, 
2010a, 2010b; Siim and Skjeie 2008; Andreassen 2010). These results cor res­
pond with findings that the majority of Euro pean states adopted a permissive 
approach to regulation where and when headscarves may be worn, but at times 
take a select ive approach (overview: Berghahn 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Sauer 2009; 
Skjeie 2007; Coene and Longman 2008 on Belgium; Wyttenbach 2009 on Swit­
zerland). Almost everywhere, how ever, full body and face covering is not toler­
ated in the education sys tem and pub lic sector. The restrictive meas ures are 
based on functional reasons (face- to-face communication, safety) and have been 
handled on a case by case basis with no need for a specific law. 
Headscarf regulations and the influence of state–church 
relations 
How do these results fit into cat egor ies of state–church or state–religion regimes? 
Looking at the pattern of banning or tolerating the Muslim headscarf, it becomes 
clear that there is a strong connection between ‘laic’ states and the pro hibition of 
any religious clothing in pub lic institutions. However, the examples of Ger many 
and recently of Denmark, where pro hibitions of the strongest form – bills 
adopted by par lia ment – have come into force, show that legal pro hibitions, 
re gard less of the intentions and beha vi our of the indi vidual in question, are not 
exclusively a feature of states that have adopted a strict in ter pretation of secular­
ism. Neither Ger many nor Denmark belongs to the small group of ‘laic’ states. 
Apart from these two exceptions, no pro hibiting regulations estab lished by law 
are to be found in the coun tries of our sample with a neutral state attitude or a 
state- sanctioned church. That allows us to affirm that the prin ciple of religious 
plur al ism prevails in these coun tries even though there are tendencies towards 
restriction and pro hibition. At the very least, the majority of ‘non- laic’ states 
avoid curtailing the indi vidual right to religious freedom by introducing a ban. In 
the ‘neutral’ states and in coun tries with a privileged state church, it is im port ant 
to maintain a reason able balance between funda mental rights and col lect ive 
values and traditions. Contrary to the ‘laic’ states, the two other types of state– 
church regimes always risk being blamed for practising a hidden double stand ard 
by privileging their ‘own’ majority religion and discriminating against the faith 
of minor it ies. Therefore they tend to achieve a more pragmatic way of dealing 
with the prob lem. However, as we see in the cases of Ger many and Denmark, 
the wish to estab lish a clear demarcation (setting the German or Danish body 
politic apart from Muslim im mig rant com munit ies) is sometimes stronger than 
the call for legal rectitude and loy alty to uni ver sal prin ciples (Rostock and 
Berghahn 2008; Berghahn 2010). 
The different modes of state–church relations, of identi fying or not identi­
fying the state with religions/churches, are themselves the effects of his tor ical 
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pro cesses in Europe. They mirror the institutional con sequences drawn from the 
religious wars that flared up after the Lutheran Reformation, culminating in the 
Thirty Years War. The centuries after 1648 are characterized by the fact that a 
consensus on tran scend ental questions is im pos sible and therefore states must 
avoid conflicts among cit izens and states on these issues. In this ‘Westphalian’ 
in ter pretation of ‘modern’ statehood, coun tries mainly agreed to respect each 
other’s sover eignty and achieve in ternal societal peace by giving order and 
safety to their cit izens. Within state ter rit ories the governing powers first tried to 
achieve the ideal of religious homo gen eity to avoid or neutralize struggles over 
metaphys ical conflicts. Later, the prin ciple of pluralistic tolerance for different 
denominations, faiths and opinions was institutionalized; the indi vidual and col­
lect ive right to ‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, as enshrined in 
human rights conventions, gained acceptance, as did the right to manifest one’s 
faith. Nevertheless, France and Turkey, states that refounded themselves in spec­
tacular revolu tionary pro cesses, represent a more rad ical approach, the secularist 
solution, by creating a funda mental dichotomy between the pub lic and the 
private sphere. Manifestations of religious belief are thus limited to the private 
realm; reconciling the polit ical and indi vidual im plica tions of religious af fili­
ations is held to be undesir able. Both coun tries have estab lished a specific com­
bination of ‘laicism’ and repub licanism, with the under lying as sump tion that the 
spiritual influence of religion, faith and clerical power could be kept out of the 
polit ical and gov ern mental sys tem of the Republic. 
Under the premises of modern and lib eral legal conceptions of statehood and 
cit izen ship, how ever, the hege monic protection of the pub lic (= polit ical) sphere 
from private heterogeneity has become prob lematic, as funda mental human 
rights empower indi viduals and therefore limit the power of the state in restrict­
ing these indi vidual rights (about prin ciple ten sions cf. Motha 2007). The strict 
separation of the pub lic and the private sphere fails to provide sufficient justifi­
cation for a complete pro hibition of religious expression in the pub lic sphere; at 
least the prin ciple of proportionality must be taken into con sidera tion. This 
means that a regulation should not ignore the indi vidual mo tiva tions, intentions 
and self- interpretations of veiled persons, other wise the regulation is likely to be 
perceived as an infringement of the prin ciples of anti- discrimination and diver­
sity enshrined in EU law – with the emphasis on actual parti cipa tion in the 
labour markets and eco nom ies of Europe (Baer 2007; Squires 2007b). 
Hence we can conclude that the ‘laic’ model is not an adequate basis in 
de veloping an appropriate response to the existing multicultural and multi- 
religious diversity of Euro pean soci eties. The two other types of state–church 
regimes, espe cially the ‘neutral’ one, provide pragmatic con ditions for a reason­
able legal balance. However, these states have prob lems in adjusting to non- 
discriminatory legal management of religious plurality too, as dem on strated by 
the tendencies towards select ive restrictions and pro hibitions on the Muslim 
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Conflicting influences from European directives and case law 
As we have seen, the regulations in the coun tries of our sample are strongly influ­
enced by national legal traditions and the his tor ically handed down state–church 
relations, but in a globalized world and espe cially in Europe the states have to be
committed as well to external legal norms: those of the Euro pean Union and inter­
na tional human rights conventions. Therefore we can as sume that EU or Euro­
pean Community (EC) anti- discrimination law should have con sider able influence
in shaping legal regulations concerning the Muslim headscarf, as religious reasons 
are usually given for this clothing practice. Women who wear headscarves – and 
a number of Islamic religious authorities – used to agree on the in ter pretation that 
some verses of the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, require women to cover their 
hair, neck and ears. The question, how ever, of whether this is a religious duty or a
mere social demand deriving from the his tor ical time of the Prophet Muhammad, 
is contested. Within pluralistic legal sys tems, ‘religious duties’ of any kind have
to be treated with respect: if a reasonable number of indi viduals feel obliged to 
fulfil this duty it has to be regarded as part of their right to religious manifestation 
and ob serv ance, as long as the indi viduals in question do not harm others or 
endanger pub lic safety (Böckenförde 2009; Loenen 2006). Once again, an im port-
ant legal issue of human rights pol icies, in par ticu lar in EU pol icy, is that nobody 
shall be discriminated against because of his or her religion – including the exer­
cise of perceived religious duties. 
This legal stand ard is rel ev ant across the EU as stipulated by the directive 
2000/78/EC12 on the labour market. This directive forbids discrimination on the 
grounds of religion and belief, of age, disabil ity and sexual orientation; other 
directives ban discrimination in ref er ence to ‘race’ or ethnic origin (2000/43/ 
EC)13 and to sex/gender (2002/73/EC, 2004/113/EC, 2006/54/EC)14 in several 
areas of eco nomic and social life. These directives, based on Article 13 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, in effect since 1999, have been adopted since 2000, and pro­
hibit either direct or indirect discrimination. Since 2009 the Euro pean Commis­
sion has been preparing a new directive to ban discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief, age, disabil ity or sexual orientation in access to goods and ser­
vices such as banking, education, transport and health: the anti- discrimination 
directives of 2000 and 2002 have now been transposed into national legis la tion 
by the EU member states. However, experts and the Euro pean Commission have 
grave doubts about full com pliance of some of the newly adopted laws with the 
norm ative requirements of the directives. As this overview on headscarf pro­
hibitions shows, the national acts allow in some cases restrictions of religious 
freedom and exceptions from the rule of non- discrimination on the grounds of 
religion. Restrictions and exceptions to this gen eral rule are sometimes based on 
increased demands for secularity or neutrality for pub lic em ployees, and require­
ments by churches and other organ iza tions concerning the denominational af fili­
ation and ethos of their em ployees are widely permitted by the national 
legis la tion, for example in Ger many. Such restrictions to the gen eral pro vi sions 
are provided for in Article 4 Paragraph 1 and 2 of the directive 2000/78/EC. As 
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a con sequence, the ‘laic’ state of France in par ticu lar con tinues to pro hibit all 
religious symbols for civil ser vants, whilst newly restrictive approaches in coun­
tries, such as Ger many and Denmark, deny that banning religiously motiv ated 
clothes, symbols and beha vi our for teachers or judges could be a violation of 
non- discrimination on the labour market. In the case of specific conflicts, 
national courts must ensure that national legal regulations comply with the 
meaning and spirit of the EU directives. In cases of un cer tainty, national courts 
may refer the question of com pliance to the ECJ;15 national supreme courts are 
even obliged to ask for ‘preliminary rulings’ in such cases. 
Besides the aspect of religion, sex/gender is also an im port ant con sidera tion 
(as a potential source of ‘mul tiple discrimination’) in this intersectional con text 
(Sauer 2009), as the par ticu lar covering duty only applies to women. Bans on 
such clothing might be a sort of indirect discrimination, as these women who are 
excluded from school or employment are much more dis advant aged than Muslim 
men, who do not feel obliged by religious rules to cover their heads. A sim ilar 
logic could apply in the light of the ban on discrimination on the grounds of 
‘race’ or ethnic origin. As a number of female Muslim im mig rants wear a head-
scarf, any rejection in a job applica tion pro cess might be indirect discrimination 
on the grounds of them belonging to the often des pised group of Muslim im mig­
rants from a certain region and with a foreign ethnic background. 
As the labour market is the domain where all these dis advant ages and rejec­
tions gen erally have a pronounced impact, directive 2000/78/EC becomes rather 
im port ant. Member states shall ensure 
that a dif fer ence of treatment which is based on a charac ter istic related to 
any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 shall not constitute discrimination 
where, by reason of the nature of the par ticu lar occupational ac tiv ities con­
cerned or of the con text in which they are carried out, such a charac ter istic 
constitutes a genu ine and determining occupational requirement, provided 
that the ob ject ive is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. 
(Article 4, Paragraph 1 of directive 2000/78/EC) 
In other words, Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the directive 2000/78/EC calls for equal 
treatment of em ployees and pro hibits dis advant ages introduced vis- à-vis the 
non- discrimination cri teria in Article 1 of the EC directives 2000/43/EC, 
2000/78/EC and 2002/73/EC (in ref er ence to race/ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disabil ity, age or sexual orientation and sex) on the labour market. If 
em ployees or job applicants are not all treated in the same fashion, this must be 
justified by compelling occupational requirements of the specific job. As the 
anti- discrimination directives have been transposed into binding laws in the 
member states, a Muslim woman should be allowed to cover her head as long as 
the headscarf does not prevent her from doing her job prop erly – and in the civil 
ser vice this means neutrally and impartially. However the legis la tion allows, as 
we have seen by re gard ing the regulations in some coun tries, a gen eral ban on 
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The ECJ has not yet handed down a ruling on a headscarf or covering case; 
there have been no cases submitted to the court in Luxembourg by a national 
court via a request for a ‘preliminary ruling’ (Article 234 TEC/Amsterdam 
Treaty, Article 267 TEC/Lisbon Treaty). Concerning other issues, the ECJ has 
affirmed in several judgements that discrimination tied to the charac ter istics of 
‘race’/ethnic origin, sex/gender, religion and belief, age, disabil ity or sexual ori­
entation cannot be toler ated. One example is the judgement in the ‘Feryn’ case 
(C- 54/07 of 19 July 2008)16 versus a Belgian com pany. The com pany had stated 
pub licly that it would not recruit em ployees of a certain ethnic origin; the ECJ 
declared this as grounds for presumption of direct discrimination even though 
nobody was affected. Plaintiffs and experts maintain that the pro hibition on 
wearing a headscarf is not com pat ible with EC directive 2000/78 (e.g. Walter 
and von Ungern- Sternberg 2008). However, even though in Ger many, for 
example, about 20 to 30 courts of all levels up to the Federal Labour Court and 
the Federal Administrative Court have been engaged in lawsuits, none of these 
courts has so far appealed to the ECJ in headscarf cases. Instead of asking for 
‘preliminary rulings’ these courts dismissed cases brought by several covered 
Muslim teachers and a social worker, and declared the pro hibitive Education 
Bills com pat ible with Euro pean anti- discrimination norms. Nevertheless, this 
pro hibitive practice might easily be challenged if one single court were to dare 
to deviate from the common line in court de cisions and request a ruling from the 
ECJ. On the one hand, the ECJ then could apply its strict anti- discriminatory 
rules and prin ciples consistently in order to affirm the idea of a Euro pean space 
of eco nomic liberties and equal treatment on the labour market. On the other 
hand, the ECJ would have to find a way to deal with case law from the ECtHR, 
which tends to hand down rulings based on rather different cri teria. The ECtHR, 
an institution of the Council of Europe, decides on the basis of the ECHR of 
1950, which is binding on all 47 Council of Europe members, including the 27 
EU member states. 
While there are no ECJ rulings on the headscarf issue, there are several ECtHR
judgements on headscarf cases involving Switzerland, Turkey and France, sup­
porting headscarf bans in these coun tries. The rulings might be in ter preted in
favour of the notion that a gen eral ban on headscarves is com pat ible with inter na­
tional human rights, par ticu larly those of the ECHR.17 The crucial point, how ever,
is that contrary to the EC anti- discrimination directives, the ref er ence norm within
the ECHR limits the indi vidual scope of religious freedom to the specific notions
within each state concerning the manner in which the right of freedom of ‘thought,
conscience and religion’ should be protected. Article 9 ECHR states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in com mun ity with others and in pub lic or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such lim ita tions as are pre scribed by law and are neces sary in a demo cratic 
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soci ety in the inter ests of pub lic safety, for the protection of pub lic order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
According to the second paragraph of the art icle, the right ‘to manifest one’s 
religion’ may be restricted by lim ita tions that are ‘pre scribed by law’ and pertain 
to what is neces sary in a ‘demo cratic soci ety’. Further reasons for restrictions 
include the requirements of maintaining pub lic order, demands of health or 
morals or the rights of other persons. Paragraph 2 thus weakens the imperative 
of Paragraph 1. While ‘holding’ a religious belief is protected abso lutely, the 
right to ‘manifest’ one’s belief – outside a religious con text (worship, teaching, 
practice and ob serv ance) – is only protected with certain caveats. This makes 
clear that restrictions may impinge on the right to exercise ‘thought, conscience 
and religion’ in the pub lic sphere. 
By admitting broad dis cre tionary scope to Council of Europe members, the 
ECtHR has assessed the ban on headscarves as being com pat ible with Article 9 
and other freedom and equality rights of the Euro pean Human Rights Conven­
tion. One spectacular de cision concerned a Swiss teacher in the canton of 
Geneva,18 another concerned a Turkish scholar19 and in one case the Grand 
Chamber of the Court ruled on the claim of a Turkish medical student.20 In addi­
tion, the Court has ruled on several French and Turkish cases of pupils,21 in each 
case in favour of the states involved and their restrictive meas ures against the 
women and girls wearing headscarves. 
The most controversial debate among inter na tional and Euro pean legal 
experts flared up in response to the de cision in the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey. 
The Grand Chamber ruled in 2005 by 16 votes to one that the exclusion of Leyla 
Şahin from the Faculty of Medicine of Istanbul University did not constitute a 
violation of Article 9 ECHR. Violations of Articles 2, 8, 10 and 14 were also 
denied. One main argument by the court referred to the ‘margin of appreciation’ 
of the contracting states. According to the prin ciples of self- determination of 
states, rather broad dis cre tionary scope was granted to the contracting states. 
States may appreciate their ‘own’ rules, values and prin ciples related to the 
necessities of maintaining order and demo cracy in the par ticu lar coun try and the 
ECtHR would not intervene, unless the interference of the state was not ‘justi­
fied in prin ciple and proportionate to the aims pursued’.22 In the Turkish and 
French headscarf cases, it is obvious that the ECtHR accepted the overriding 
im port ance that both the Turkish and French consti tu tion and polit ical sys tem 
attribute to secularism or laïcité. The court seemed to admit that the pro hibition 
of the headscarf is gen erally ‘neces sary in a demo cratic soci ety’ without asking 
for evid ence and compelling con textual arguments. In the case of Leyla Şahin v. 
Turkey the court as sumed the restrictions to have been fore see able, practised 
equitably and to have been com pat ible with the prin ciple of proportionality. 
However, all these judgements are vehemently criticized. Appended to the Şahin 
de cision we find the very crit ical dissenting vote by Françoise Tulkens, the 
Belgian judge who set out the cri teria which the court should have examined but 
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Owing to its nature, the Court’s review must be conducted in concreto, in 
prin ciple by ref er ence to three cri teria: first whether the interference, which 
must be capable of protecting the legitimate inter est that has been put at 
risk, was appropriate; second, whether the meas ure that has been chosen is 
the meas ure that is the least restrictive of the right or freedom concerned; 
and lastly, whether the meas ure was proportionate, a question which entails 
a balancing of the competing interests. 
(Leyla Şahin v. Turkey Judgement.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens: 42)23 
Tulkens ultimately concludes the exact oppos ite: she assesses the ban on head-
scarves for students in Turkey as a violation of Article 9 ECHR. In other words, 
she expresses the argument that the aim of the court’s case law is to protect the 
rights and freedoms of cit izens and not in the first place to affirm broad dis cre­
tionary ‘room for maneuver’ of states, which gen erally restrict these rights to the 
detriment of individuals. 
Tulkens opposed the assertion of the court concerning the ‘gender argument’ 
too: this line of reasoning claims that a student wearing a headscarf under mines 
the equality of women and men, of girls and boys in the perception of others. 
Indeed the ECtHR had stated in the headscarf judgement concerning the Turkish 
student Leyla Şahin (10 Novem ber 2005) as well as in the earl ier case of a 
teacher (Lucia Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 Febru ary 2001)24 that a Muslim woman 
wearing a headscarf displays a ‘power ful’, ‘external’ and ‘manifest religious 
attribute’25 that might have ‘some kind of proselytizing effect’ and ‘is hard to 
square with the prin ciple of gender equality’.26 In her dissenting vote in the case 
of Leyla Şahin, Judge Tulkens countered the court’s argument, arguing that it is 
not the role of the ECtHR to make an ‘appraisal of this type – in this instance a 
unilateral and negat ive one – of a religion or religious practice’ and that she 
could not see ‘how the prin ciple of sexual equality can jus tify pro hibiting a 
woman from fol low ing a practice which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, 
she must be taken to have freely adopted’.27 
Here we can observe the two funda mentally contradicting approaches at 
work: on the one hand, maintaining a balance between the necessities of pub lic 
order and the essence of indi vidual rights and, on the other hand, drawing a rigid 
line between the ‘antagonistic’ spheres, thus avoiding indi vidual societal con­
flicts by glorifying homo gen eity but stigmatizing private plurality and dif fer ence 
in the pub lic realm. The latter approach might have been an appropriate meas ure 
after the religious wars in Europe; now adays it seems to be too rigid and not sen­
sitive enough to provide equality for be lievers of different faiths and/or non- 
believers in a proportionate and pluralistic fashion. 
Nevertheless, the case law of the ECtHR seems to be covered by the norm ative
ref er ence to the wording of Article 9 of the 1950 ECHR and to its distinction 
between the pub lic and the private realm. However, this simple distinction 
between spheres is challenged now adays (Loenen 2006; Cohen 2002: 52–6). The
Euro pean Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ‘consti tu tional’ docu ment of the
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Euro pean Union, contains in Article 10 a guarantee of the ‘freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion’ without such lim ita tion for religious manifestations in 
the pub lic sphere as is still part of Article 9 of the ECHR.28 This can be in ter­
preted as an improvement, which facilitates religious plur al ism. Although the
Euro pean Charter does not change the actual legal situ ation in the EU member 
states but only defines the basic rights of the cit izens of the Union vis- à-vis Euro­
pean institutions and legis la tion, it can be taken as an in dica tion of the dir ec tion 
the EU intends to steer and as evid ence of a trend towards more indi vidualistic 
and diverse approaches to granting religious freedom rights in the future. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the legal regulations towards veiling make up the 
norm ative setting that steers polit ical and every day practice, whilst mirroring 
col lect ive attitudes and their apparent or hidden polit ical mo tiva tions. The legal 
tradition, par ticu larly the consti tu tional frame of each coun try that has been 
shaped in his tor ical pro cesses, influences headscarf restrictions or accommoda­
tion. The legis lat ive bodies and the courts of most states used to regulate in a 
path- dependent way. Only in parts of Ger many is the situ ation paradoxical, as 
the ban against teachers wearing headscarves contradicts the German legal tradi­
tion of an ‘open’ understanding of state neutrality and of a wide legitimate scope 
of religious manifestations of indi viduals. Within the legal tradition of each 
coun try, the relationship between state and church/religion plays a major role: 
the laic states (France and Turkey) tend to pro hibit all signs and symbols worn 
in the pub lic sphere. At the same time these meas ures create a prob lematic ten­
sion between the distinction between the pub lic and the private realm on the one 
hand and the inter na tional and Euro pean requirements of basic and human rights 
for indi viduals on the other. In the non- laic states more conciliatory and prag­
matic pol icies prevail. Some meas ures, how ever, have been taken in this group 
of ‘tolerant’ coun tries that express pro hibitive tendencies. They can be quali fied 
as contradicting the lib eral and pluralistic legal traditions of these coun tries. In 
Ger many, the ban on teachers’ headscarves actu ally affects the professional 
chances of a number of good qualified female Muslims, whereas in Denmark 
and the Neth er lands the legal restrictions have less actual impact and serve 
mainly symbolic purposes. Nevertheless, all these restrictions tend to infringe on 
indi vidual freedom and equality rights of headscarf wearing women who want to 
parti cip ate in the labour market and in the polit ical sphere. 
Hence we can conclude that pro hibitive regulations against Muslim women 
wearing headscarves often suffer from a lack of proportionality and fairness 
against im mig rants. Not all the coun tries of our ana lysis manage to find the ade­
quate balance between col lect ive attitudes that express the wish to demarcate 
against Muslim im mig rants and to jus tify this by ‘modern’, ‘national’ or ‘Euro­
pean values’ on the one hand, and the legis lat ive tolerance and uni versal ism 
required by the same ideas shaped in the form of ‘prin ciples’ on the other. While 
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cor res ponding ‘prin ciples’ – freedom of religion and faith, gender equality and 
self determination – are more precise and enshrined in consti tu tional rights, 
Euro pean anti- discrimination laws and human rights declarations. Therefore, 
regulations have to respect these guaranteed uni versal istic rights. Otherwise 
states run the risk of practising a legal double standard. 
Notes 
1 I would like to thank Helen Ferguson for her patient reading of the text and correcting 
my language. 
2 State of regulation as of 10 July 2010. 
3 Turkish Constitutional Court, 7 March 1989, 1989/1, 1989/12. 
4 BVerfG (FCC), 24 Septem ber 2003, Az. 2 BvR 1436/02, BVerfGE 108, pp. 282. 
5 It refers to the right not to be bothered by religious manifestations of others in institu­
tional situ ations when the person is compelled to visit the pub lic institution. This 
‘negat ive freedom’ is part of the basic right to religious freedom in Ger many, Article 
4 of the Basic Law. 
6 See § 57 sec. 4 sen. 3 Schulgesetz- NRW (Education Law of North Rhine- Westphalia) 
and § 38 sec. 2 sen. 3 Schulgesetz- BW (Education Law of Baden- Württemberg).
 7 The first court was the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), 
BVerwGE 121, pp. 140 (24 June 2004, 2C 45.03).
 
8 Law 2683/1999, updated and replaced by Law 3528/2007.
 
9 ‘Leidraad Kleding op Scholen’, 2 June 2003, WJZ/2003/23379.
 
10 ‘Constitutional Rights in a pluriform soci ety’/‘Grondrechten in een pluriforme samen­
leving’, TK 29614, nr. 2 (2003–2004). 
11 See pol icy re com mendation for the judiciary by JSB/ETAC 2007, Chapter 3.3. Reli­
gious dress: Judicial Studies Board/Equal Treatment Advisory Committee (JSB/ 
ETAC) (2007): Equal Treatment Bench Book, online, avail able at: www.jsboard.co. 
uk/downloads/ettb_veil.pdf (accessed 24 March 2009); concerning school uniform, 
see pol icy re com mendation: DCSF (Department for Children, Schools and Families) 
(2007): guidance to schools on school uniform and related pol icies, last update: 4 
Octo ber 2007, online, avail able at: www.teachernet.gov.uk/management/atoz/u/ 
uniform/ (accessed 24 March 2009). 
12 Council Directive estab lishing a gen eral framework for equal treatment in employ­
ment and occupation. 
13 Council Directive implementing the prin ciple of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
14 2002/73/EC, Directive of the Euro pean Parliament and the Council amending Council 
Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the prin ciple of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and pro mo tion, 
and working con ditions; 2004/113/EC, Council Directive implementing the prin ciple 
of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and 
ser vices; 2006/54/EC, Directive of the Euro pean Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation of the prin ciple of equal oppor tun ities and equal treatment of men and 
women in mat ters of employment and occupation (recast). 
15 Based on Article 234 TEC Amsterdam Treaty, Article 267 EC Lisbon Treaty, named 
Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro pean Union. 
16 ECJ, C- 54/07, ‘Feryn’, 10 July 2008, online, avail able at: http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/ 
cgi- bin/form.pl?lang=en (accessed 22 July 2010). 
17 For example: BAG (Federal Labour Court) 20 Au gust 2009, Az. 2 AZR 499/08 (case 
of the school social worker wearing a pink beret); BVerwG (Federal Administrative 
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18 ECtHR, Lucia Dahlab v. Switzerland, No. 42393/98, online, avail able at: http:// 
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight= 
Dahlab%20|%2042393/98&sessionid=73177788&skin=hudoc- en (accessed 6 July 
2011); all EctHR de cisions online, avail able at: http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp (accessed 6 July 2011). 
19 ECtHR, Kurtulmuş v. Turkey, No. 65500/01. 
20 ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, 10 Novem ber 2005, Grand Chamber. 
Online, avail able at: www.menschenrechte.ac.at/orig/05_6/Sahin.pdf (accessed 23 
March 2010). 
21 ECtHR, Kevanci v. France, No. 31645/04; Dogru v. France, No. 27058/05; Köse et 
al. v. Turkey, No. 26625/02. 
22 ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, see endnote 20. 
23 ECtHR, Şahin v. Turkey, Françoise Tulkens, dissenting vote in the case, pp. 42–52, 
see endnote 20. 
24 ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, No. 42393/98. 
25 ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, No. 42393/98, p. 11. 
26 ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, No. 42393/98, p. 12. 
27 ECtHR, Şahin v. Turkey, Françoise Tulkens, dissenting vote in the case, pp. 42–52, 
47; cf. endnote 20. 
28 Article 10 Euro pean Charter of Fundamental Rights: Freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion 
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right 
includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in com­
mun ity with others and in pub lic or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2 The right to conscientious objection is recog nised, in accordance with the national 
laws governing the exercise of this right. 
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6 Regulating religious symbols in 
public schools 





One of the key questions under lying the various headscarf debates in Europe is
whether or not women freely choose to wear the headscarf or whether they are
forced to do so by their fam il ies and/or com munit ies. Perhaps more inter estingly,
in cases where there is no overt social pressure to be covered, what influences
women who decide to cover themselves anyway? In other words, what are the
intrinsic and extrinsic factors that shape de cision making about the headscarf?
Some would argue that it is faith alone; others claim that it is pol itics and still
others would argue that the headscarf could be viewed as a fashion statement. The
various meanings of the headscarf signific antly differ depending on the local con­
text within which it is worn and the par ticu lar constellation of social, cultural and
his tor ical factors at play. This chapter specifically examines the case of con tempor­
ary Bulgaria and argues that the de cision to cover one’s head in the Bulgarian con­
text is often influenced by the pres ence of inter na tional Islamic char it ies and the
discourses they produce about what is ‘proper’ beha vi our for a Muslim woman. 
Indeed, much attention has been paid to the headscarf debates in Western 
Europe, but few scholars are aware that this issue has also had its own iteration 
in Eastern Europe. As one of the Euro pean Union’s two newest member states, 
Bulgaria is actu ally the EU coun try with the largest Muslim minor ity, estim ated 
between 13 and 15 per cent in a coun try of 7.9 million as of 2001 (National Sta­
tistical Institute 2001). Perhaps more signific ant is the fact that Bulgaria has a 
very low overall birthrate; how ever, the birthrate among the Muslim popu la tion 
is higher than that of the Orthodox Chris tian popu la tion (ibid.), thus fuelling 
local nationalist anxi eties about the ‘Islamicization’ of the coun try (Kalkandjieva 
2008). These fears were fuelled in 2006 when several complaints re gard ing the 
abil ity of girls to wear their headscarves to pub lic schools were filed with the 
Bulgarian Commission for Protection from Discrimination (Комисия защита от
дискриминация or KZD), the national body in charge of adjudicating human 
rights violations.2 This chapter discusses the two key cases that came before the 
Commission in 2006 and 2007, the circumstances leading up to these cases and 
the arguments made both for and against religious symbols in schools. 
The aim of this chapter is to briefly ex plore the local pol itics informing the 
headscarf cases in Bulgaria, a coun try which names Eastern Orthodox Chris­
tianity as its traditional religion but simul tan eously claims that pub lic education 
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should be secular (Repub lic of Bulgaria Grand National Assembly 1991). Meth­
odologically, I conduct a detailed discourse ana lysis of the texts of new Muslim 
maga zines targeted towards young Slavic Muslims. These maga zines are excel­
lent examples of the kinds of discourses used to convince young women to wear 
the headscarf, even when these women come from fam il ies where their mothers 
and older female rel at ives are completely uncovered. The two maga zines that I 
focus on were first published in the Smolyan region just one year before the first 
headscarf case in 2006, and it was the editors of one of the maga zines that actu­
ally filed the complaint on the aggrieved girls’ behalf. I then turn to a close 
reading of the written texts of the two key de cisions on the wearing of head-
scarves in pub lic schools. I show that the language of these de cisions expli citly 
relies on language and rationales from the Euro pean Court of Human Rights 
(EctHR) in order to unofficially ban the headscarf in Bulgaria, while still leaving 
plenty of ambiguity for indi vidual headmasters to circumvent the ban if they 
wish. This reflects Bulgaria’s uneasy position vis- à-vis its Muslim minor ity 
popu la tion, as well as intra- Muslim rivalries between the ethnic Turkish popu la­
tion and the Bulgarian- speaking Muslims. 
The next section of this chapter ex plores the demographics of the Muslim 
com mun ity in Bulgaria and the shifting contours of Muslim belief and practice. 
In par ticu lar, I focus on two new Islamic maga zines, Ikra and Myusyulmansko 
Obshtestvo, which contain art icles arguing that it is mandatory for Muslim 
women to wear the headscarf in pub lic. I also ex plore the growing influence of 
recently estab lished Islamic organ iza tions with ties to inter na tional Islamic 
organ iza tions in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In the third section, I look at the first 
headscarf case in 2006 and the polit ical con text of Decision #37 of the Anti- 
Discrimination Commission, a de cision which effect ively banned the headscarf 
in pub lic schools. I then examine the second headscarf case in 2007, which 
seemingly reversed this de cision but in effect gave indi vidual headmasters the 
power to discriminate against the headscarf without any fear of repercussions 
from the state. In the final section, I briefly discuss the legis la tion that was for­
mally proposed in 2009 that would have officially banned all religious symbols 
in pub lic schools and offer some specu la tion as to how the issue may play out in 
the future. Interethnic rivalries among the Muslim minor ity, and a local percep­
tion that wearing the headscarf is evid ence of an imported ‘Arab’ (rather than 
Turkish) Islam, have under mined the gov ern ment’s abil ity to have a clear pol icy 
on these religious symbols in pub lic schools. 
This chapter is based on over 11 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Bul­
garia between 2005 and 2008, the period when the two major headscarf cases 
were being adju dic ated by the KZD. During this time, I collected rel ev ant art­
icles and commentaries that appeared both in local and in national news papers 
(24 Chasa, Trud, Ataka, Sega, Otzvuk and Rodopi Vesti) and conducted informal 
inter views with religious leaders (the Deputy Chief Mufti, the regional Mufti of 
Smolyan, local imams in the Madan and Rudozem oblasts, etc.) and human 
rights activists in the coun try. Furthermore, I sought out and collected a wide 
variety of mater ials published by Bulgarian Muslims re gard ing the headscarf and 
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whether Muslim women were required to wear it, in par ticu lar copies of the 
Muslim maga zines Ikra and Myusyulmansko Obshtestvo (published in Smoylan). 
Through a special peti tion, I was also able to obtain transcripts of the KZD’s 
deliberations as well as copies of their written de cisions (Commission for Pro­
tection against Discrimination 2006, 2007). This chapter is prim arily based on 
an ana lysis of these pri mary Bulgarian sources.3 This chapter is mainly a descrip­
tion of the events in Bulgaria leading up to the two headscarf cases, with the 
purpose of understanding the local polit ical con text and how it differs from the 
headscarf debates in the other Euro pean coun tries discussed in this volume. 
The Bulgarian Muslim community 
Although the majority of ethnic Bulgarians are nom inally Eastern Orthodox 
Chris tians, they share their coun try with several smaller ethnic groups. Bulgar­
ia’s Muslim popu la tion consists of ethnic Turks, Roma and some ethnic Bulgar­
ian Muslims (sometimes called ‘Pomaks’) (Eminov 1997). More im port antly, 
these Muslims are not recent im mig rants but descendants of Muslim popu la tions 
that lived in the lands that are now Bulgaria during the 500 years of Ottoman 
imperial pres ence in the Balkans (Ghodsee 2010). Between 1946 and 1989, the 
communist gov ern ment in Bulgaria heavily persecuted all religions (Hopkins 
2009), but it was Muslim women who were singled out as being par ticu larly in 
need of socialist emancipation (Neuburger 2004). Over the four- and-a- half 
decades of communist rule, Muslim women were actively encouraged to leave 
the home and to work in the formal eco nomy. Girls’ education in secular schools 
was mandatory, and Muslim women (like all Bulgarian women) were expected 
to con trib ute their labour to the building of com mun ism. Although there was 
always gender segregation in employment (with men working in the most lucra­
tive sectors), Muslim women earned their own wages and were fully in teg rated 
into Bulgarian soci ety as both workers and mothers. As part of their ongoing 
efforts to modernize Bulgaria’s Muslim popu la tions, the communists had 
imposed certain sartorial restrictions on traditional Muslim dress including the 
headscarf, which was con sidered a symbol of women’s oppression (Ghodsee 
2010; Neuburger 2004; Neuburger 1997). 
After the collapse of com mun ism in 1989, religious freedoms were restored 
and some Muslim women began to demand the right to wear headscarves once 
again (Ghodsee 2007). Throughout the 1990s, how ever, few Muslim women in 
Bulgaria felt that it was a neces sary religious requirement to wear the hijab. 
Most ethnic Turkish and Romani women left their heads uncovered. The women 
and girls who decided to cover themselves prim arily lived in regions where new 
and widely circulated Islamic pub lications promoted the supposedly correct 
in ter pretations of Muslim belief and practice. Most Bulgarian Muslims are 
Hanafi Sunni Muslims and practice a rel at ively lib eral form of ‘Turkish Islam’, 
which does not insist on various practices con sidered mandatory to other Muslim 
com munit ies around the world. Bulgarian Muslims have also tradi tion ally read 
the Qur’an in the Bulgarian or Turkish language and have a variety of heterodox 
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practices often con sidered forbidden by those who regard themselves as being 
more ‘or tho dox’ Muslims, such as the Islamic reformers in Duomato’s (2000) 
excellent study of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. The official Muslim pub lications 
of the Chief Mufti’s office in Sofia (the highest national spiritual authority of the 
Muslim com mun ity in Bulgaria), for instance, were all written in both Bulgarian 
and Turkish, since ethnic Turks make up the majority of the Muslim popu la tion. 
These official pub lications, such as the maga zine Myusyulmani, promoted a form 
of ‘Bulgarian Islam’, one that reflected the diversity of Muslim practice in the 
coun try (which includes small Shi’a and Sufi popu la tions) (Eminov 1997). 
These new maga zines, such as Ikra and par ticu larly Myusyulmansko Obsht­
estvo (Muslim Society), began pub lication in 2005 and were written entirely in 
Bulgarian and specifically targeted the Pomaks. They were not officially vetted 
through or sanc tioned by the Chief Mufti’s office, and, as such, they represent a 
different view of what is ‘proper’ Islam from that promoted by the Chief Mufti’s 
office. Because these maga zines were written by and for Muslims living in the 
same region where the two headscarf complaints origin ated, it is essential to 
examine these texts in detail. The art icles in these maga zines aimed to convince 
Bulgarian be lievers that their practice of Islam was incorrect and that they must 
follow a stricter in ter pretation of their religion if they are really to be con sidered 
‘true’ Muslims (see, for instance, Ali 2006 and Hodzhova 2005). These pro­
hibitions include not drinking alcohol, not eating pork, as well as injunctions to 
attend Friday prayers and to aban don heterodox practices such as fortune telling, 
making amulets or visiting the shrines of local Muslim saints. Many of the art­
icles in these new maga zines also stressed the moral duty of women to obey God 
and not provoke the attention of men. They emphas ized the sinful nature of 
remaining uncovered and warned that there would be divine sanc tions against 
women who did not wear the headscarf. They also juxta pose the modesty of the 
prop erly covered Muslim with the shameless immodesty of both Chris tian and 
Muslim women who ‘expose their beauties’ (Hodzhova 2005: 21). 
The fol low ing extended quota tion is from an art icle in Myusyulmansko Obsht­
estvo, a maga zine published by an Islamic nongov ern mental organ iza tion (NGO) 
called the Union for Islamic Development and Culture (UIDC). This organ iza­
tion was founded in the southcentral city of Smolyan in 2005, and brought the 
first headscarf complaint to the KZD in 2006. The quote dem on strates well the 
rhet oric deployed to convince Pomak women that it is their moral and religious 
duty to wear the hijab if they are to be ‘true’ Muslims: 
Today, when young women can be seen in the streets dressed in clothes that 
barely cover their underwear (and this is taken as normal), when the life­
style lures women to appear as sexually attractive as pos sible, when girls 
and women are disappointed if no one turns their head to look at them, 
women who do not want to behave in this manner are looked down upon as 
ab nor mal. This is an offending case of discrimination. Indeed, a great 
number of girls and women are modest by nature, do not want to expose 
themselves and do not feel mis er able if leering eyes are not fixed upon them. 
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Strange as it may seem, wearing the hijab is one of the prob lems that soci ety 
has thrust upon girls and women who profess Islam and who want to change 
the ‘dress code’ and use the headscarf. Ironically, these modest and shy 
women have to feel uncomfortable for having changed their previous habits 
of attracting excessive attention. [. . .] 
The clothes that a Muslim woman wears are not pun ishment nor ordeal; 
they give her the chance to look noble and lady- like without any arousal of 
carnal desires. . . . The hijab is not an attribute of fake modesty. It delivers a 
certain message to people. First, the message is that the woman has decided 
to submit all aspects of her life to the will of God; and second, that she 
wants to be judged on the basis of her virtues and deeds and not her beauty, 
elegance and sex appeal. 
(Raad 2006: 28f.) 
Similar types of arguments appeared in the maga zine Ikra, a pub lication 
launched in 2005 in the city of Madan, just 12 kilo metres to the east of Smolyan, 
and home to the largest mosque built in Bulgaria since 1989. Ikra also circulated 
widely in the region where young girls lived, and was produced by men with 
business connections to the UIDC in Smolyan. The maga zine published a series 
of art icles extolling the virtues of Islam for women while at the same time threat­
ening that they will face divine pun ishment if they do not obey. An art icle enti­
tled ‘The veil: A categorical imperative’ lays out a strict Islamic dress code for 
Muslim women: 
Guarding their virtue is one of the major tasks for both men and women. A 
veiled woman will not attract the eyes and hearts of the men around, as they 
[the men] are forbidden to look. [. . .] What parts of the body shall be 
covered? The whole body, except for the hands and the face. The hair must 
be covered completely. The over- garment is ankle- length and its sleeves 
leave only the hands exposed. It is a two- piece garment: the one covers the 
hair, neck, shoulders and bosom and the other covers the whole body. [. . .] 
The over- garment averts bad rumor and con sequence in this world and will 
protect against the Fire in the World Beyond. It should be known that when 
the Almighty asks the question, ‘Why didn’t you cover your body in your 
earthly exist ence?’ it will be very difficult for a woman to give an answer. 
(Ali 2006: 31ff.) 
Yet another art icle in a different issue of Ikra, ‘The code of conduct for the 
Muslim woman’, repeats the same imperatives about women’s clothing, empha­
sizing that women who dress appropriately are more precious and valu able than 
those who do not, and warning that there will be con sequences for those who do 
not comply: 
A Muslim woman must cover her body. [. . .] When a woman goes out in the 
street dressed in a garment of which Islam approves, she will not provoke 
 
The Islamic headscarf in Bulgaria  121 
lechery because the Islamic dress code re com mends loose garments that do 
not suggest the shape of the female body. [. . .] In order to protect the 
Muslim woman, Allah commanded that she should stay at home earnestly 
and with dignity and that she should not go out uncovered like the women 
in the pre- Islamic time of ignorance and that she should not expose her 
beauties. [. . .] Hopefully you understand the situ ation that a woman would 
face if she shuts her eyes and ears to these words. Let both men and women 
know that there is a path to follow and those who go astray shall be pun­
ished accordingly. 
(Hodzhova 2005: 21f.) 
These art icles were supplemented by a series of lectures and seminars held by 
Islamic NGOs like the UIDC, which also promoted the idea that the headscarf 
was mandatory for Muslim women. A new cohort of young imams (con grega­
tional leaders) speaking in newly built mosques throughout the region also 
impressed upon Muslim men the necessity of having their wives and daughters 
wear the hijab. Not surprisingly then, a growing number of women, and par ticu­
larly young women, began to cover their heads in pub lic. In 2006, two young 
women who had been attending the Islamic lectures held by the UIDC decided 
that they must wear their headscarves to their pub lic secondary school (Cholak­
ova 2006: 6). 
The first headscarf affair 
In early 2006, a teen ager attending the Karl Marx Professional High School for 
Economics in the city of Smolyan (the home of the UIDC) decided that in order 
to be a true Muslim she should cover her head in pub lic at all times, including in 
school. This 15-year- old befriended another student, a like- minded young 
woman who had also em braced a more ‘or tho dox’ version of her family’s faith. 
Although Fatme and Mihaela were raised as Muslims, their mothers did not wear 
the headscarf because their fam il ies practised the rather traditional form of Bul­
garian Islam that in ter preted the Qur’an lib erally.4 Despite this, the two girls 
added headscarves to their mandatory red and black school uniforms. The head­
master of the school, a secular Chris tian woman, told the girls that they were in 
violation of the school’s uniform pol icy and that they must remove the head-
scarves. Fatme and Mihaela insisted that it was their religious duty to remain 
covered, and refused. The dir ector of the school then told them that they were 
not allowed to attend school unless they removed their headscarves. The girls 
were sent home. 
The two girls then filed a complaint against the headmaster of the school with 
the local authorities in Smolyan, claiming that the headmaster had violated their 
religious rights. The Regional Inspectorate of the Ministry of Education (RIE), 
which is the local representative of the national Ministry of Education in 
the Smolyan oblast, upheld the de cision of the school, and told the girls that 
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secondary school (Kanev 2008). Soon there after, the UIDC interceded on behalf 
of the two students and brought an official complaint directly against the national 
Ministry of Education. Invoking Article 13 of the 1991 Bulgarian consti tu tion, 
which states that ‘religious institutions shall be separate from the state’,5 the 
Minister of Education, Daniel Vulchev, responded by arguing that Bulgarian 
education was secular and, adopting the terminology of the recently passed ban 
on headscarves in France, claimed that conspicuous religious symbols had no 
place in pub lic schools. The Minister of Education further argued that the Bul­
garian consti tu tion guaranteed religious freedoms and that there were three 
accredited Islamic high schools in Bulgaria where the girls could both receive a 
pub lic secondary school education while wearing their headscarves. (It is im port-
ant to note here that secondary school is not mandatory in Bulgaria and that 
acceptance into secondary schools is through a com petit ive pro cess.) Vulchev 
claimed that it was not a violation of their religious rights if the girls insisted on 
wearing their headscarves to a non- religious school to which they had voluntar­
ily applied. Once accepted, they had decided to attend, knowing that the school 
had a mandatory uniform that did not include the headscarf (Nova Televizia 
2008; Kanev 2008). 
The leaders of the UIDC, Arif Abdullah and Selvi Shakirov, then proceeded 
to file a grievance with the newly estab lished national KZD.6 The Islamic NGO 
filed this complaint on behalf of the girls, for the sake of protecting the rights of 
all Muslims in Bulgaria. The UIDC argued that the girls should be allowed to 
attend any school they wished while wearing the headscarf. The girls had a 
consti tu tionally protected right to freedom of religion that had been violated; 
Bulgaria had a respons ib ility to uphold the demo cratic prin ciples it had em braced 
after the collapse of com mun ism in 1989.
 The anti- discrimination commission announced that it would con sider the
headscarf case. This ignited a heated national debate in Bulgaria. As more details 
emerged about the case, the Bulgarian media7 was filled with pas sion ate editorials 
on both sides of the issue (see, for instance, Cholakova 2006: 6; Marinov 2006: 8;
Hadzhiev 2006a: 5; 2006b: 10; Petrova 2006: 15; Tonchev 2006: 10; Buchakova
2006: 1; Borisov 2006: 20). Key in these media debates was the fact that the two 
teenage girls, and the members of the UIDC that repres ented them, were Pomaks.8 
It was believed that their ethnic and religious ambiguity, together with their less 
than har moni ous relationship with the Bulgarian Turkish polit ical estab lishment
(Ghodsee 2010), led them to forge closer ties with religious com munit ies in 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In trying to distinguish themselves from the Turkish-
dominated Muslim com mun ity, some groups of Pomaks were embracing what
they con sidered a ‘purer’ form of Islam, one that the mainstream Bulgarian press 
referred to as ‘rad ical’ or ‘funda mentalist’. Indeed, due to this perception that the
UIDC repres ented a foreign type of Islam, the Chief Mufti’s office did not lend 
its sup port to the UIDC’s case against the Ministry of Education. 
It is also im port ant to note that the chair of the Anti- Discrimination Commis­
sion was an ethnic Turk and a member of the Turkish polit ical party, the Move­
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culturally identi fy as Muslims, the leadership of the MRF was decidedly secular. 
Since there was already a headscarf ban in place in Turkey, many Bulgarian 
Turks were not sympathetic with the Pomaks’ cause. After intense deliberations, 
the designated KZD subcommittee hearing the case eventually ruled in favour of 
the Ministry of Education, upholding the school’s right to prevent the girls from 
attending class while wearing their headscarves. The Turkish head of the KZD, 
Kemal Eyun, upheld the de cision of the subcommittee, lending implicit MRF 
sup port for a ban on headscarves in pub lic schools. 
The written KZD de cision cited two paragraphs from a Parliamentary Assem­
bly of the Council of Europe 2005 Resolution (No. 1464), ‘Women and Religion 
in Europe’.9 The first of these paragraphs read: 
It is the duty of the member states of the Council of Europe to protect 
women against violations of their rights in the name of religion and to 
promote and fully implement gender equality. States must not accept any 
religious or cultural relativism of women’s human rights. They must not 
agree to jus tify discrimination and in equal ity affecting women on grounds 
such as phys ical or biological differ enti ation based on or attributed to reli­
gion. They must fight against religiously motiv ated stereo types of female 
and male roles from an early age, including in schools. 
By using this language, the Anti- Discrimination Commission was clearly pro­
tecting itself from any potential case at the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Since the 
ECtHR had already upheld the Turkish de cision to ban headscarves in pub lic 
schools (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008), the Bulgarian commission most 
likely couched its own de cision in the language of defending secularism and 
upholding a state com mit ment to women’s rights. 
But the de cision of the KZD did not put the mat ter to rest. The UIDC sought 
counsel from local human rights NGOs with the hopes of appealing the de cision 
to a higher court. The leaders of the Islamic NGO were told that they would 
have had a better case if the girls had filed the complaint on their own behalf.10 
The UIDC did not appeal. About a month later, there was another case at a 
medical university in Plovdiv where over 100 tuition- paying nursing students 
from Turkey said that they would attend school in Bulgaria only if they were 
allowed to wear their headscarves to classes. The students were trying to escape 
the Turkish headscarf ban, but the rector of the university decided to forgo the 
much- needed income and also banned headscarves on campus. While this was 
happening, the Minister of Education floated the idea of legis la tion that would 
ban all religious symbols in schools, including small crosses, in order to prevent 
a repeat of the French headscarf affair. The idea of banning all religious symbols 
in order to deal with the Muslim headscarf made many Bulgarians uncomfort­
able, and led one national daily news paper to host an internet forum entitled, 
‘Who would ban wearing a cross in a Chris tian coun try?’11 
No legis la tion was formally passed in 2006, but there was a consensus that 
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re gard ing religious symbols in schools. The Ministry of Education also issued a 
verbal order to the regional inspectorate of education in Smolyan advising all 
schools in the Smolyan oblast that headscarves should not be worn to classes. 
Any schools violating this pol icy would be subject to fin an cial sanc tions. The 
verbal order applied to all schools, even those without a formal uniform require­
ment. The ministry also proposed that any girls wishing to wear headscarves 
could con tinue their education by distance learning, where they studied at home 
and only came to school for the exams. This new pol icy had imme diate impact 
in the Rhodope Mountain cities of Smolyan, Madan and Rudozem, where there 
was already a high concentration of girls wearing the headscarf.12 
As a result of the new verbal pol icy, another complaint was filed with the 
Anti- Discrimination Commission, this time by the girls and their fam il ies, alleg­
edly at the urging of the UIDC. The second major complaint to be filed with the 
Commission for Protection Against Discrimination on 23 Febru ary 2007 came 
from three tenth- graders from the village of Gyovren attending the Professional 
Еlectrotech no logy Secondary School in Devin, a city just east of Smolyan. Like 
Fatme and Mihaela in Smoylan, these girls had just recently begun wearing their 
headscarves; they were keen to con tinue their secular education while remaining 
modest and covered. Ramzie Kemal Shaib, Fatme Kazimova Chanta and Ulia 
Alieva Shaibova filed these complaints against the advice of the Chief Mufti’s 
office and the regional Muftiship in Smolyan. The official Muslim religious 
estab lishment feared that the new cases would also be struck down, hastening 
the need for formal legis la tion banning the headscarf al to gether.13 
In the Devin case, it seems that the headmaster of the Professional 
Еlectrotech no logy Secondary School, Vasil Simeonov Vasilev, called the three 
girls into his office and warned them that there was a verbal order from the Min­
istry of Education and that they were technically not allowed to wear their head-
scarves in school. Although he did not make them take their headscarves off, he 
did warn that in the event of an official written order, they would have to comply 
and remove their head coverings or they would not be allowed to attend the 
school. The girls con tinued to attend school wearing their headscarves, and did 
not miss any classes or exams after this meeting with the headmaster, but they 
filed a discrimination complaint against him preemptively, assuming that the rel­
ev ant authorities would eventually issue the written order.14 
During the hearings about whether or not the KZD would officially hear 
the case, Radka Jeleva, a representative of the RIE, explained that fol low ing 
the KZD’s first de cision in 2006, all of the schools in the Smolyan oblast
had been closely monitored for girls wearing headscarves. They found that 
there were five schools in the region where girls were wearing them. The head­
masters of the schools in the Smolyan oblast col lect ively agreed that headscarves 
would not be worn in schools, but that students were free to wear anything 
they liked outside of school. The head of the regional inspectorate of the Minis­
try of Education, Todor Petkov, also confirmed that it was his office’s position 
that the girls should not be allowed to wear religious symbols to secular 
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although he had told the girls that he would have to if an official order came 
down from the RIЕ. 
What is fascinating about the Commission’s ultimate de cision in this case is 
that the key issue hinged on the fact that the Devin secondary school did not 
have a uniform requirement. Because it did not have a uniform requirement, the 
commission claimed that the school was not under obli ga tion to implement the 
verbal order of the RIE about the pro hibition of headscarves in pub lic schools.15 
The formal text of the de cision is quoted at length below: 
After evaluating all avail able evid ence, the AD HOC committee of the KZD 
ac know ledges the following: 
The handbook of the Professional Electro- technology High School ‘A.S. 
Popov’ [in] Devin does not require that students wear uniforms. The plain­
tiffs regu larly attended classes and were not pro hibited from doing so by 
their headmaster, Vasil Vasilev, or by the head of [Regional Inspectorate of 
Education in] Smolyan. . . . The three girls have been wearing headscarves 
in school for a year. . . . [The Commission] finds in dis put able the statement 
that the plaintiffs’ right to education was not violated in any way. It also 
con siders the girls’ claim that eventually they might have been forced to 
take off their headscarves . . . as insubstantial because it is not backed up by 
any evid ence.16 
Further on in the de cision, the KZD argued that Vasilev, the headmaster of the 
girls’ school, did not discriminate against the girls because he had the oppor tun­
ity to institute a mandatory school uniform, but chose not to. It was for this 
reason that the Commission argued that neither the school nor the RIE were in 
violation of any anti- discrimination law, and therefore ruled there were no 
grounds for the complaint.17 The complaint was officially dismissed. 
By refusing to hear the complaint, the commission seemed to be advocating 
an odd set of pol icies re gard ing the headscarf. Based on the text of their written 
opinion, it seems that in schools with uniform requirements, the headmaster had 
a duty to uphold the ban on religious symbols. If the school had no uniform 
requirement, then the students were free to wear what they liked. However, the 
de cision about whether a school has a mandatory uniform requirement is decided 
exclusively by the headmaster. This means that any indi vidual headmaster could 
institute a mandatory uniform pol icy at his/her school specifically for the purpose 
of pro hibiting girls from wearing headscarves. If a headmaster did this, the Com­
mission for Protection Against Discrimination would not recog nize the pro­
hibition of headscarves as a violation of religious rights based on the precedent 
set by their own 2006 de cision re gard ing the two girls in Smolyan. 
Ultimately, then, the Commission created a situ ation in which there were dif­
ferent pol icies at different schools, and no clear guidelines for students as to 
whether or not they could wear headscarves to class. Students applying 
to schools with uniform requirements could expect that they would not be 
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requirements would be able to attend their classes with their heads covered. If, 
how ever, some young woman applied to a school without a uniform requirement 
and then the headmaster instituted such a requirement to prevent her from 
wearing her headscarf once she had been admitted, she would have no grounds 
upon which to claim discrimination. 
Recognizing this ambiguity and the specific targeting of Muslim girls, a dis­
senting opinion was issued by one of the members of the ad hoc committee of 
the KZD. Once again, I quote the official legal text again at length, to present the 
counter argument in its ori ginal form: 
The ana lysis of the testimony of the two sides shows that when RIE 
inspected schools in the Smolyan district fol low ing de cision 37 [in 2006], it 
did not look for religious symbols in gen eral but was solely inter ested in the 
headscarves worn by Muslim girls. Undoubtedly, the RIE believes that the 
norm ative order concerning the secular character of education pertains only 
to headscarves. . . . It is confirmed that after RIE’s inspection, the headmas­
ters of the five schools in the district of Smolyan (including [the school] 
‘A.S. Popov’) were told to observe the norm ative order as in ter preted by 
RIE. As a result [the headmaster of the school] ‘St. Kliment and Metodii’ 
agreed to pro hibit headscarves, while the headmaster of [the school] ‘A.S. 
Popov’ was not convinced that the norm ative order actu ally pro hibited the 
wearing of scarves in school. Even though he risked getting reprimanded, he 
did not forbid the three girls from wearing headscarves, but only warned 
them that if there was an official order by RIE, they might have to stop 
wearing headscarves to school.18 
In this opinion, the dissenting KZD representative argues that since the Regional 
Inspectorate sent representatives to the schools in Smolyan only to look for evid­
ence of headscarves (and not religious symbols in gen eral), this constituted clear 
discrimination against Muslims. Also, the Regional Inspectorate did not deny 
that there was a verbal ‘norm ative’ order issued to the headmasters that they 
should not allow girls to wear headscarves to school. The headmaster in Devin 
made it clear that he was aware of this order, but chose not to enforce it unless it 
was an official written order. In other words, the Regional Inspectorate specifi­
cally singled out headscarves, but because one par ticu lar headmaster chose not 
to enforce the verbal pro hibition, there was no discrimination.19 
The dissenting opinion con tinues by pointing out that all par ties in the dispute 
also agreed that the girls were Muslims and were raised in a religious tradition 
that con siders the headscarf a mandatory outward expression of their faith. The 
opinion states that: 
Headscarves are worn in the name of Islamic faith and the Qur’an-inspired 
tradition that women should cover themselves in order to preserve their 
chastity. . . . [R]eligious rules demand that women cover their hair and 
bodies when they are outside their close family.20 
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After citing a wide variety of laws protecting religious freedoms, rel ev ant art­
icles from the Bulgarian consti tu tion and the mandate that estab lished the Anti- 
Discrimination Commission, the opinion concludes: 
Education [in Bulgaria] is secular . . . according to which schools are not 
allowed to force ideo logical and religious doctrines on students, although 
religious classes can be taken if they are approved as part of the curriculum. 
I do not believe that the wearing of headscarves can be compared to the 
forcing of ideo logical/religious doctrines on students because there is no 
evid ence that this expli cit expression of faith hurts other students’ rights. 
Also, this conduct in no way threatens national secur ity, social order, or 
national health and morals. . . . [Therefore] the warning addressed toward the 
plaintiffs displays an equivocal and unequal approach toward the outward 
expression of faith and therefore violates the prin ciples of non-
discrimination.21 
Although the KZD accepted the ‘special opinion’ as part of its in ternal records 
(which I obtained through the Bulgarian Freedom of Information Act), they did 
not overturn their 2006 de cision and created a situ ation of great legal ambiguity 
re gard ing religious symbols. 
Conclusion 
Despite the legal ambiguity and the pos sib il ity of expulsion from their schools, 
the number of young girls wearing the headscarf to school began to increase 
after 2007, par ticu larly after these cases had garnered such national attention. In 
the 2006 case, the two girls, Fatme and Mihaela, were almost instantaneous 
celeb rities, being inter viewed by the national news papers as well as on the radio 
and on television (Cholakova 2006: 6.) The girls were articulate and framed the 
headscarf issue as one of personal choice and religious freedom. Both Fatme and 
Mihaela pro claimed that they were doing something which hurt no one and 
which reflected their inner com mit ment to Islam. With these girls in the local 
news papers and on the national news, there was bound to be a ripple effect 
among other young Muslim teen agers in the region. 
Perhaps as a con sequence of this, the local authorities may have realized that 
pro hibiting headscarves might actu ally be giving girls more incentive to wear 
them. Few headmasters instituted mandatory school uniforms in order to ban the 
headscarf, even though many of the headmasters in the Smolyan region were 
atheists or nom inally Bulgarian Orthodox Chris tians.22 Furthermore, there was a 
major demographic cata strophe taking place throughout the Rhodope Mountain 
region, part of a larger demographic collapse happening in Bulgaria. The coun­
try already had one of the lowest total fertility rates in all of Europe, but 
Rhodope cities, towns and villages were par ticu larly affected by emigration of 
young people of childbearing age to the bigger cities in Bulgaria and abroad. As 
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secondary schools throughout the region had been closed down for lack of stu­
dents, putting both local teachers and headmasters out of work. It is widely 
known that the birth rate among Bulgaria’s Muslim popu la tion is con sider ably 
higher than among the Orthodox Chris tians (National Statistical Institute 2001); 
headmasters know that attracting and accommodating Muslim students remains 
an im port ant strat egy to keep rural secondary schools open. 
These ongoing accommodations at the local level, how ever, did nothing to 
under mine the polit ical will of Daniel Vulchev, the Minister of Education, who 
still wanted national legis la tion banning all religious symbols in schools. In the 
fol low ing years, Vulchev spearheaded a comprehensive overhaul of the law 
re gard ing Bulgaria’s pub lic education sys tem. The details of the bill were 
worked out in a parlia ment ary committee, and the Bulgarian gov ern ment, under 
Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev, approved the draft bill in March 2009. The lan­
guage of the bill officially referred to ‘religious symbols’, but it was clear that its 
main target was the Muslim headscarf.23 The education bill, how ever, still had to 
be approved by the par lia ment. In July 2009, Bulgaria held parlia ment ary elec­
tions that brought a new gov ern ment to power. The bill had never been voted on, 
and was tabled indefinitely. 
As of 2010, there is still no official pro hibition of headscarves in pub lic 
schools, although indi vidual headmasters can still ban them by instituting new 
school uniform pol icies at will. The language used to jus tify this informal ban on 
headscarves is that of secularism and gender equality, but polit ically it is at least 
partly the result of the ethnic Turkish–Pomak split and the local perception that 
wearing the headscarf is a symbol of a foreign type of Islam not traditional to the 
coun try. As long as the Muslim com munit ies in Bulgaria remain divided on the 
issue of the headscarf, the legal ambiguity will remain, even as indi vidual head­
masters choose not to enforce it. As Western Euro pean coun tries become more 
heavy- handed in regulating forms of Islamic women’s dress, it will be im port ant 
to keep abreast of the situ ation in Bulgaria, the EU coun try where the Muslim 
popu la tion makes up the largest proportion of the popu la tion. For now, the situ­
ation remains in legal limbo, but with a new gov ern ment with nationalist allies 
in place, the proposal to ban religious symbols in schools may find itself on the 
parlia ment ary agenda once again. 
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tor ians. See, for instance, Kabakchieva 2006 and Todorova 1997. 
9 Commission for Protection against Discrimination, Reshenie (Decision) No. 37, Sofia, 
July 27, 2006 (an in ternal docu ment obtained by the author in hard copy from the 
Commission). 
10 Interview with Krassimir Kanev, President of the Bulgarian Helsinki Commitee in 
March 2007. 
11 ‘Koi zabranyava noseneto na krast v hristiyanska darzhava?’ Internet Izdanie, 31 
Au gust 2006. Online, avail able at: www.segabg.com (accessed 19 Septem ber 2006). 
12 Interview with Krassimir Kanev, President of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee in 
March 2007. 
13 Interview with Hairaddin Hatim, Region Mufti of the Smolyan oblast in March 2007. 
14 Commission for Protection against Discrimination, Reshenie (Decision) No. 38, Sofia, 
2007 (an in ternal docu ment obtained by the author in hard copy from the 
Commission). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.: 1. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.: 3. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.: 6. 
21 Ibid.: 7. 
22 The Bulgarian Communist Party was quite fervent in its quest to eradicate religion 
between 1945 and 1989. Since schools were seen as essential vehicles for communist 
indoctrination, the position of headmaster was usually reserved for ‘polit ically clean’ 
members of the communist party, which often entailed a pub lic com mit ment to 
atheism. After 1989, many headmasters con tinued in their positions and therefore are 
likely to be a subset of the popu la tion most committed to upholding the secular nature 
of the pub lic school. 
23 ‘Bulgaria to Ban religious symbols in Schools’, Balkan Insight. Online, avail able at: 
www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/17752/ (accessed 12 May 2010). 
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7 The limits of populism 
Accommodative headscarf policies in 
Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands 
Leila Hadj- Abdou, Sieglinde Rosenberger, 
Sawitri Saharso and Birte Siim 
Introduction 
While ‘multiculturalism’ was once pos it ively associated with a polit ical ideal of 
a diverse soci ety, Europe has in the past years witnessed a backlash of multicul­
turalist discourses and the rise of polit ical actors that call for a reduction of or 
even a stop to immigration. In pub lic debates the idea that im mig rants have a 
right to maintain their culture is replaced by the idea that some cultures contra­
dict with lib eral uni ver sal values, and many coun tries have therefore introduced 
stricter immigration rules and obligatory civic integration tests for im mig rants. 
Cultural diversity is no longer regarded as an asset, but as a prob lem for social 
cohesion and col lect ive identity. In par ticu lar, Islam and im mig rants from 
Islamic coun tries are often perceived as posing a threat to Western Euro pean 
soci eties defined by lib eral values such as indi vidualism, secularism, and gender 
equality (Parekh 2006; Joppke 2007; Zúquete 2008; Betz and Meret 2009). The 
Neth er lands shifted from a multicultural approach to assimilation (Entzinger 
2005). Likewise, Denmark moved towards one of the most restrictive Euro pean 
immigration and integration laws (Mouriten 2006), while Austria has never con­
sidered itself as an immigration coun try and already had an exclusive approach 
towards the rights of im mig rants, which has even been strengthened in the last 
years (Mourão Permoser and Rosenberger 2009). In par ticu lar, right- wing popu­
list par ties have been engaged in politicizing Islam and Muslim im mig rants, stig­
matizing them as the alien and backward ‘other’ (Zúquete 2008). Most notably, 
veiling has been portrayed as a sign of the oppression of im mig rant women and, 
eventually, restrictions on the wearing of the Muslim headgear have been 
claimed by both the rad ical right and fem in ists alike (see Chapter 1). In some 
coun tries, this change in attitudes and pol icy positioning went together with a 
change towards more restrictive meas ures re gard ing veiling (see Chapter 8), but 
it did not in others. Decision makers in Austria, Denmark and the Neth er lands, 
three coun tries with elect orally strong rad ical populist par ties, took a different 
path. Despite increasing politicization of immigration and Islam, these coun tries 
con tinue to pursue an accommodating veiling pol icy.1 
This chapter ex plores the structural and discursive factors which influence the 
con tinu ity of accommodating veiling pol icies despite heavy populist challenge 
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for restrictions. Focusing on specific pol icy de cisions in Austria, Denmark and 
the Neth er lands, we identi fy and discuss both institutional ar range ments and 
frames of ref er ences within these three coun tries which are sim ilar in regard to 
the major inde pend ent vari able, the strength of populist par ties proposing an 
anti- veiling agenda. The puzz ling question examined in this chapter is how it 
can be understood that despite the increasing polit ical con tention over immigra­
tion and Islamic issues, pol icy makers in these three coun tries stand out among 
our eight cases of the VEIL pro ject as having kept to their accommodating pol­
icies re gard ing the wearing of headscarves in the pub lic realm (within the time 
frame from the 1990s to 2004). For clarification, we define accommodating pol­
icies as pol icies that expli citly allow wearing the headscarf in pub lic institutions 
(schools, universities, health care institutions).2 
In our search for an explanation we will investigate the under lying mech an-
ism of the polit ical debate on veiling that preceded pol icy formation: we as sume 
that pol icy outcomes depend on configurations of polit ical power (e.g. the gov­
ern mental status of polit ical par ties) and to a large extent on long- standing insti­
tutional ar range ments (in our case the relationship of religion and pol itics). It is 
expected that polit ical de cisions follow a path dependency in this respect, which 
leads to the argument that the demands for pol icy change launched by populist 
par ties are confronted with institutional limits to challenging and mobilizing 
against rights of im mig rants and their religion (Fetzer and Soper 2005). More­
over, our research is led by the idea that in order to explain pol icy outcomes we 
must reflect upon the discursive construction of social prob lems in the polit ical 
sphere by polit ical actors, whether as constituting pol icy or as communicating 
(or even legitimizing) (future) pol icy. Translated to the subject at hand, this 
means that we expect the im port ant factors to explain the con tinua tion of accom­
modating regulation of headscarves in Austria, Denmark and the Neth er lands to 
be: the estab lished state–church relationship, the status of the given populist party 
within par lia ment and gov ern ment, pre val ent polit ical prin ciples with respect to 
anti- discrimination and equality, and whether debating the headscarf issue is 
aimed at communicating and legitimizing restrictive immigration pol icies or pro­
ducing pol icy change within the area of religion and pol itics. By comparing three 
coun tries with sim ilar pol icy outcomes, we identi fy which factors are most rel ev­
ant for explaining the accommodating pol icy in these countries. 
The chapter is structured as follows: the fol low ing section de scribes the 
accommodating pol icies and ex plores how these pol icies became contested by 
populist par ties; the next and central section comparatively ana lyses how and 
why accommodating pol icies stayed in place, that is what the institutional 
and discursive limits of populist par ties are; and the final section summar izes 
and concludes the analysis. 
Accommodation despite populist contention 
The year 2004 was a remark able year in the his tory of policing the headscarf. It 
was the year the French law banning any ostens ible religious symbols in pub lic 
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schools was passed. Yet, in the very same year Austria, Denmark and the Neth­
er lands (in different ways) all confirmed pro- veiling pol icies. The Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Education and Culture issued an administrative decree con­
firming that the wearing of the headscarf by Muslim pupils is a religious clothing 
instruction and is, therefore, protected by the freedom of religion as enshrined in 
the Basic State Law and by Article 9 of the Euro pean Convention of Human 
Rights (A40). In addition, it stated that school bodies are not entitled to interfere 
into subjects which belong solely to the sphere of governance of religious organ­
iza tions, as the headscarf is con sidered to belong to that sphere. Also, in spring 
of 2004, the populist anti- immigration Danish People’s Party presented its first 
motion to ‘pro hibit culturally determined head coverings’ of pub lic em ployees in 
Parliament.3 This proposal was, how ever, rejected by all other polit ical par ties as 
it would violate the right to religious freedom protected by Article 67 of the 
Danish consti tu tion as well as Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention. 
Finally, in the same year, the Dutch gov ern ment issued a pol icy report in which 
it institutionalized the right of women to express their faith by covering their hair 
in regu lar pub lic ser vice functions and in pub lic schools. It thereby confirmed 
the standing practice that pub lic officers may wear a headscarf provided that the 
clothing does not form a safety risk, as might be the case with certain gym exer­
cises, or blatantly harm the officer in fulfilling her function. The only pub lic 
functions for which the gov ern ment did con sider it legitimate to restrict this right 
were the police force and the judiciary because, according to the gov ern ment, 
these jobs required that they avoid all ap pear ance of partiality.4 All accommodat­
ing pol icy statements were made in a period during which veiling was already a 
contested issue in all three coun tries. They were a reassertion of accommodation 
in the face of contention. 
The polit ical landscape of Austria, Denmark and the Neth er lands is character­
ized by strong populist rad ical right- wing par ties with a rel at ively large elect oral 
base. In 1999, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ, Freedom Party of 
Austria) attracted 26.9 per cent of the vote in gen eral elections, coming second 
behind the Social Democrats; in early elections in 2002, the party gained 10 per 
cent of the vote (Luther 2005). In Denmark the Dansk Folkeparti (DFP, Danish 
People’s Party) won 12 per cent of the vote in the gen eral elections in 2001 and 
became the third largest party, providing the parlia ment arian sup port for the new 
lib eral–con ser vat ive gov ern ment co ali tion. In the Neth er lands the Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn (LPF, List Pim Fortuyn), named after its founder who was killed by an 
animal rights activist nine days before the elections, gained a vote share of 17 
per cent in the parlia ment ary elections of 2002, thereby becoming the second 
largest party in the coun try. What these par ties, often labelled as rad ical populist 
par ties with regard to their exclusive communication style and ideo logical posi­
tioning (Mudde 2007; D’Amato and Skenderovic 2007) have in common, among 
others, is their opposi tion to immigration in gen eral and to Muslim im mig rants 
in particular. 
Having highlighted the strength of the radical populist par ties in the three
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which populist par ties started to contest the right to wear a headscarf. In
Austria, the administrative decree, emphasizing that wearing a headscarf in
schools is a religious right, was initially triggered by a contro versy in a junior
high school about a veiled pupil in 2004. The headmaster of the school had
instituted a gen eral pro hibition of head coverings to which the father of the
Muslim schoolgirl objected. When the regional school council declared that a
pro hibition was unlawful because of the right to express religious freedom, the
conflict was solved very quickly as the pupil was permitted to attend school
wearing a headscarf. Despite this quick settlement of the dispute, in order ‘to
prevent discrimination for Muslim girls’ and ‘to make aware of the legal situ­
ation’,5 the officially recog nized representative body of Muslims, the Islamic
Religious Community in Austria (IRCA), pushed the Federal Minister of Edu­
cation and Culture to clarify that the headscarf is identified as an expression of
religious freedom by launching a decree. In the beginning, the min is ter was
hesitant to issue a decree, arguing that the prin ciple of religious freedom is
already enshrined in the Austrian consti tu tion. Finally, the min is ter agreed
with the pres id ent of the IRCA on a respective action (Gresch et al. 2008).
Both the min is ter and the representatives of the IRCA con tinu ously framed
veiling as related to religion; no ref er ence was made to migration or integra­
tion. Most notably, this de cision was taken during a period in which the Aus­
trian Freedom Party was an influ en tial polit ical actor both in gov ern ment and
par lia ment. After its elect oral gain in 1999, it moved into a co ali tion gov ern­
ment with the Chris tian con ser vat ive Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP, Aus­
trian People’s Party), which lasted from 2000 to 2005. The FPÖ had begun its
cam paign against Islamic issues in 1999 and took up the debate against the
headscarf in 2003 in the con text of the French and German debates (A24). Yet,
what is most remark able, the FPÖ refrained from protesting against the head-
scarf decree issued by a ministry held by its co ali tion partner, the ÖVP. In
2004, the party introduced an anti- Muslim mobil iza tion strat egy on regional
levels but not on the federal level. At this time the topic was taken up by the
then Viennese FPÖ leader, Heinz- Christian Strache, who called for a compre­
hensive ban on veiling by civil ser vants in all pub lic buildings, espe cially
schools and universities. The headscarf was marked as conflicting with reli­
gious neutrality and viewed as being a polit ical rather than a religious symbol,
contradicting with gender equality (A23, cf. also A20, A21, A22). It was only
in the wake of the split in 2005 of the FPÖ into two par ties, the Bündnis
Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ, Alliance for the Future of Austria) and the FPÖ, that
Islamic issues were put centre stage to a substantial degree at the national
level, too. Since then, the rad ical populist right par ties have been con tinu ously
addressing the issue of veiling in the pol icy area of migration and deficient
integration on the side of migrants. In sum, it was the FPÖ and later also the
BZÖ (A25) that actively took up the issue, while other polit ical par ties referred
to veiling as a religious or a women’s right only as direct or indirect reaction
to populist claims to ban the headscarf (A16, A26, A30) (cf. Rosenberger and
Hadj- Abdou 2012). 
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In Denmark, politicization of the headscarf issue was part of an overall immi­
gration debate, which intensified during the 1990s. The opposi tion par ties on the 
right (the Liberal and Conservative Parties) demanded a more restrictive legis la­
tion and the Social- Liberal leftist gov ern ment defended the rel at ively lib eral 
Danish approach to immigration. The immigration issue was central in the 2001 
elections where the right won and the Liberal and Conservative co ali tion gov­
ern ment with the sup port of the Danish People’s Party replaced the previous 
gov ern ment of Social- Democrats and Social- Liberals. From 2004, veiling 
became a hot issue in pub lic and polit ical debates (Siim and Skjeie 2008).6 In 
April 2004, the Danish People’s Party presented a parlia ment ary proposal to ban 
the headscarf in the pub lic sector (DK1). This was rejected by all the other polit­
ical par ties (DK2, DK3, DK6, DK7, DK9). In March 2006, there was an intense 
media debate when Asmaa Abdol- Hamid, who wears the hijab, was hired to host 
a talk show on the national Danish pub lic ser vice channel, DR, sparked by the 
recent cartoon con tro versy. This was strongly opposed in a press release by the 
Women for Freedom organ iza tion stating: ‘Women for Freedom takes distance 
from the hostile use of the religious headscarf ’ (DK19). In spite of many pro­
tests, the editor of DR2 news, Anne Knudsen, declared that the hiring was not to 
be reversed (Andreassen and Siim 2007). In the spring of 2008, a new debate 
about the right of elected politicians to wear the hijab when speaking in par lia­
ment erupted. The issue was raised because this same Asmaa Abdol- Hamid was 
elected as a sub sti tute candidate for the Red– Green Alliance, and therefore 
would be likely to appear and speak in the national par lia ment. The par lia ment 
had to take a de cision on this issue, because the Danish People’s Party demanded 
a ban against veiled politicians speaking in Parliament. This case ended with an 
accommodating regulation, when the Danish Parliamentary Presidium issued a 
res olu tion stating that there was nothing to prevent parlia ment arians from 
wearing a veil when speaking from the podium as long as the face is vis ible and 
the person can be identified. The rationale behind the res olu tion was to protect 
the right of a veiled parlia ment arian to speak from the podium no mat ter what 
religious affili ation as well as the cit izens’ demo cratic right to be repres ented. 
Finally, a controversial debate concerning rules for religious and polit ical gar­
ments for legal judges erupted in April 2008. It was inspired by a pub lic 
announcement by the inde pend ent Board of Governors of the Danish Court 
Administration (Domstolsstyrelsen) stating that there was no legal basis for a 
ban against Muslim judges wearing the hijab in Danish courts. This case ended 
with a gov ern ment de cision to propose a bill aimed at securing the neutrality and 
impartiality of the court by pro hibiting religious and polit ical attire for legal 
judges. The bill was adopted by a large majority in May 2009, despite massive 
criticism by the majority of the legal and aca demic com mun ity.7 The bill 
expressed a more restrictive Danish approach to veiling in the pub lic arena, 
although it was expli citly limited to legal judges in the courtroom. DFP’s 
demand to extend the ban to jury and lay judges was rejected by a large major­
ity, arguing that these groups should be representative of the civilian popu la tion 
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In the Neth er lands it was the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF ) which in 2004
requested a parlia ment ary debate on headscarves in the pub lic ser vice that
eventually led to the gov ern ment issuing the above- mentioned pol icy report.
Fortuyn had expli citly reacted against Islam – according to him Islam was ‘a
backward culture’ – as well as against the pol itics of toleration by the ‘left­
wing Church’ and against the continual influx of im mig rants and asylum
seekers (Poorthuis and Wansink 2002). From 2004 onward veiling became a
highly politicized issue within the con text of a wider polit ical debate in which
Islam became framed as hampering integration and also Muslim women’s
emancipation (Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007; Prins and Saharso 2008).
Relevant polit ical actors at that time were Rita Verdonk, the Minister of Inte­
gration, who later estab lished her polit ical movement ‘Proud of the Neth er­
lands’ (Trots op Nederland) and Geert Wilders, leader of the Freedom Party
(Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV). Moreover, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, at that time a
member of the Liberal Party, aimed to combat what she considered to be
instances of gender oppression in Islam (Hirsi Ali 2007, NL6). Together with
Theo van Gogh she produced the film Submission, which led to a rad ical
Islamist murdering van Gogh in 2004. However, it was not so much head-
scarves (hijab) but face veils (niqab and burqa) that were the object of discus­
sion (NL11, NL24). 
So, in Austria, Denmark and the Neth er lands – with the exception of Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali, who saw her struggle in global terms – it was the populist right- wing 
par ties that politicized the headscarf issue within a broader framework of a 
nationalist anti- immigrant and anti- Islam polit ical platform. Despite con tention, 
the three coun tries have kept to a largely accommodating pol icy re gard ing the 
headscarf. In legal terms, Austria places no limits at all, in Denmark legal judges 
are not allowed to wear a headscarf in court and in the Neth er lands the headscarf 
is forbidden in certain functions in the judiciary and the police force. 
The limits of populist challenge 
This section of the chapter discusses several mech an isms which can con trib ute 
to the understanding of why the populist challenge to restrict veiling did not lead 
to the implementation of restrictive pub lic pol icies. One of the rel ev ant findings 
is that anti- veiling claims were formulated as a part of symbolic pol itics in the 
Table 7.1 Regulation of the hijab 
Austria Denmark Netherlands 
Arena	 Schools, public health Public arena, parliament Schools, police, courts, 
sector ministries 
Instrument Decree	 Parliament presidium Directive (governmental 
decision policy document) 
Limits	 No Courts Courts, police 
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broader framework of opposi tion to migration, rather than being used instrumen­
tally in terms of pol icy making. Other explan at ory factors are the party configu­
rations within the par lia ment and specific polit ical prin ciples that are pre val ent 
in the par ticu lar versions of lib eral demo cra cies. Last, but not least, the institu­
tionalized state–church relationship that impacted on the framing employed by 
mainstream polit ical par ties and pro- veiling ad voc ates has been decisive for the 
pol icy outcome. 
Veiling as symbolic politics 
In all three cases observed, claims to restrict veiling can be characterized as a 
discursive tool of symbolic pol itics rather than a pol icy goal itself. According to 
Edelmann (1964), symbolic pol itics can be understood as part of the expressive 
dimension of polit ical action, which signifies the pre senta tion of polit ical action 
to the public. 
One striking commonality in the three national cases investigated in this 
chapter is that it was the populist right- wing par ties who after 2004 were agenda 
setters in the polit ical debates on veiling. When these par ties gained elect oral 
sup port and became strong polit ical actors in the parlia ment arian arena, veiling 
was not framed as an isolated religious issue but was used more broadly as a 
symbol to present and legitimize concerns about immigration, national belong­
ing and, in the case of Austria, Turkey’s mem ber ship to the EU (A19, A21, 
Rosenberger and Hadj- Abdou 2012). Most im port antly, the populist right- wing 
par ties evoked images of ‘parallel soci eties’ with Islamic im mig rants unwilling 
to integrate and respect the basic values of the national com munit ies (A19, DK4, 
NL14, NL15). In other words, veiling was actu ally more of a side issue, a com­
municative strat egy used instrumentally to push through other polit ical agendas 
in adjacent pol icy areas such as immigration control and civic integration, rather 
than being an issue that in itself needed to be tackled.
In Austria, the FPÖ presented itself as a defender of the national identity 
coined as ‘Leitkultur’ (dominant culture), which consisted of Chris tian values 
and modernity and protected women from ‘archaic tribe structures’ (A20). Illus­
trations of the headscarf were used as the vis ible proof of the incompatibility of 
Muslim im mig rants in gen eral and of Turkey with Europe in par ticu lar with its 
presumed value order. In election cam paigns the party ran on anti- Islamic senti­
ments by using placard slogans such as ‘Free women instead of forced head-
scarf ’ (‘Freie Frauen statt Kopftuchzwang’). The pop ular initiative launched by 
the FPÖ against the accession of Turkey to the EU in 2006 employed the head-
scarf as a cam paign motive: a woman veiled with an EU flag was meant to sym­
bolize future de velopments opposed by the initiative. Already these few 
ac tiv ities illus trate that the ref er ences to veiling were in the first place intended 
to create a hostile pub lic opinion both against Muslims residing in the coun try 
and Turkey’s accession to the EU rather than to legally restrict veiling as 
such (Bunzl 2007). Although veiling has become a hot issue in the mass media, 
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Neth er lands, the FPÖ never proposed or drafted a bill to ban or restrict wearing 
the headscarf. Restrictions on veiling were only mentioned in interpellations to 
the gov ern ment, and it was referred to in the con text of a variety of other issues 
such as the danger of terrorism and secur ity issues, failed integration, not com­
plying with Austrian values and cultures, and gender in equal ity in migrant fam­
il ies. The actions taken by the FPÖ were mainly addressed to the media during 
election cam paigns (Hadj- Abdou and Rosenberger 2009). In sum, in Austria 
there was no par lia mentarization of the veil debate, it remained outside the par­
lia ment. This also holds true for the lib eral de cision itself, which was a gov ern­
ment pol icy beyond the parlia ment arian arena. 
In the 2004 Danish parlia ment ary debate on the Danish People’s Party’s pro­
posal to ban ‘culturally determined headgears’ (‘kulturbestemt hovedbeklædn­
ing’) in the pub lic sector, Louise Frevert, the then DFP spokesperson, said: 
Muslim women’s headscarves are expressions of a gender coercion which 
does not at all belong in a modern soci ety like the Danish soci ety. Head 
coverings, espe cially a hijab [represents] precisely a person who is against 
the Danish norms and against the values in Denmark and in our culture.8 
(DK4) 
In the 2004 debate most par ties regarded the headscarf as a symbol of female 
oppression but perceived it to be an indi vidual religious choice and thus rejected 
banning as the solution (DK3, DK5, DK7, Andreassen and Siim 2007: 39–42). 
In the 2008 debates about veiled politicians’ right to speak in par lia ment and 
legal judges’ right to wear a headscarf, the DFP filled the cityscape with a poster 
depicting a burqa-wearing judge entitled ‘Submission’. In this way the party 
presented Muslim judges, and with them Islam, as being equi val ent to Sharia, 
and Muslim judges and Islam were claimed to be a threat to Danish legis la tion 
(Andreassen et al. 2008; Betz and Meret 2009). 
The Dutch LPF and its populist successors framed accommodation of the 
headscarf as a threat to Dutch demo cracy and its prin ciples of secularism by 
referring to a funda mentalist Islam that under mined Western liberties. In a dis­
cussion about pub lic morality, MP Mat Herben of the LPF argued: 
We have been liberated ages ago from inquisitors and Ayatollahs, and we 
would like to keep it like that. Even the pope respects the separation 
between religious and civil law. That’s why I would like to ask our Prime 
Minister to consti tu tionally lay down the formal separation between church 
and state.9 
The burqa and niqab – the debate had come to focus more on these garments – 
were seen as symbols of this increasing polarization and segregation. This 
concern could not be ignored by the other polit ical par ties and hence they began 
responding to these claims. Similar to Austria and Denmark, controversies over 
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and goals. The ‘prob lem of veiling’ was framed stra tegically in highly emotional 
terms. The under lying issue seemed to be raising fears about immigration and 
about Islam tearing apart the fabric of society. 
Thus in all three coun tries veiling debates raised by populist par ties were 
symbolic pol itics aimed at triggering exclusive notions of national belonging or 
at pushing through stricter regulations in the pol icy fields of integration and 
immigration control; or, as in the case of Austria, at mobilizing pub lic opinion 
against Turkey’s future accession to the EU. 
The political power structure and prevalent political principles 
The populist right was apparently not strong enough to win a parlia ment ary 
majority for their attempts to restrict the right to veiling. Moreover, it could not 
prevent pro- veiling de cisions. Against this background, we look at the polit ical 
actors advocating accommodating de cision making. Surprisingly, stakeholders 
outside the parlia ment arian arena, religious com munit ies and experts played a 
decisive role in the pro- veiling decision- making pro cess in 2004. 
When looking at the actors involved in the launch of the Austrian accommo­
dating regulation, we see that the IRCA in coopera tion with respons ible state 
authorities was indeed the decisive player for de cision making in the field of reli­
gious clothing. With regard to schools, the actors who were involved in the 
de cision of 2004 included the Federal Ministry of Education and Culture and the 
IRCA. At the time, the launch of the executive decree attracted neither media 
attention nor polit ical con tention. The min is ter was not confronted with signi fic­
ant opposi tion expressed by rival polit ical par ties. As for intra- coalition 
dy namics, the FPÖ was part of the federal gov ern ment and was expected to be 
loyal to its partner, the Christian- conservative Austrian People’s Party, which 
has been in favour of a strong position for the Cath olic Church within Austrian 
soci ety. Former pres id ent of the Austrian National Council and mandatary of the 
Austrian People’s Party, Andreas Khol, aptly expressed this position when he 
circumscribed ad voc ates of pro hibition as ‘enemies of any religion, who are also 
hostile against the ring of church bells and steeples’10 (cf. also A16). Given this
gov ern mental constellation, only regional FPÖ branches let their voice be heard 
in the mass media and framed the headscarf as a symbol of an alien culture and 
the oppression of women within im mig rant com munit ies (A24). All other polit­
ical par ties repres ented in par lia ment remained silent. They neither protested 
pub licly nor expressed consent to the pol icy (Gresch et al. 2008). 
Moreover, the chosen pol icy tool indicates that the pol icy makers aimed at 
preventing polit ical protest: an administrative decree was to be characterized as 
a binding gov ern mental instrument implemented without the involvement of the 
par lia ment. In fact, the main purpose was to meet the religious claim made by 
the IRCA to settle the case and regulate in an expli cit manner, albeit without any 
signific ant pub lic consultation and dispute. 
In the Danish case the par lia ment played a key role in pol icies on veiling in 
the pub lic sector. The current centre- right gov ern ment co ali tion of the Liberal 
 
The limits of populism  141 
Party (Venstre, V) and the Conservative Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti, 
KF ), confirmed by the most recent election in 2007, represent a minor ity gov ern­
ment sup ported by the populist Danish People’s Party. The gov ern ment used this 
majority to adopt a highly restrictive anti- immigration legis la tion including the 
infamous 24-year rule, cit izen ship tests and an integration agenda close to assim­
ilation (Emerek and Bak Jørgensen 2009). From this per spect ive, it is a puzzle 
that the Danish approach to veiling has been rel at ively accommodating. A look 
at the arguments with which the other par ties rejected the 2004 DFP proposal to 
ban all forms of veiling in pub lic institutions gives an in dica tion why a pro­
hibition was prevented. The then con ser vat ive Minister of Employment, Henri­
ette Kjær, legitimized the dismissal of the proposal as follows. First, it was 
targeted at one specific religion, second, it would violate the Law against Dis­
criminatory Behaviour in the Labour Market (Lov om forbud mod forskels­
behand ling på arbejdsmarkedet) and the Law on Ethnic Equal Treatment (Lov 
om etnisk ligebehand ling). Finally, the proposal would be against the law 
because it differentiated between cit izens.11 The min is ter further explained that a 
realization of the proposal would go against § 67 and § 70 of the Danish consti­
tu tion (i.e. freedom of religion and pro hibition of religious discrimination), and 
would be in violation of the Convention of Human Rights’ Article 9 (i.e. 
freedom of religion) and Article 14 (i.e. pro hibition against discrimination). In 
Danish demo cracy and polit ical culture indi vidual rights stand in high esteem, 
and despite the exist ence of the state church, religion is con sidered to be a 
private mat ter. Thus, the most power ful arguments in favour of non- regulation 
referred to prin ciples of ‘equal rights’, ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘freedom of reli­
gious expression’ (Andreassen et al. 2008). These arguments refer to polit ical 
prin ciples sup ported by the lib eral con ser vat ive gov ern ment, which on this issue 
chose to side with the opposi tion and not with its parlia ment ary sup port party, 
the Danish People’s Party. 
The Dutch polit ical sys tem has been dominated for over a century by the 
Chris tian par ties. In 2010, the gov ern ment was a co ali tion of the Social Demo­
crats, Chris tian Democrats and the Chris tian Union, a small strict Chris tian 
party. The Chris tian par ties tradi tion ally favour an active role of religion in soci­
ety. Curtailing the right to wear a headscarf would amount to curtailing religious 
freedom and would thus eventually backfire on the par ties’ own rationale of 
exist ence. Other polit ical par ties, like the left- wing Greens, were and still are 
against a ban on headscarves, because their ideal of a multicultural soci ety 
includes the right to express one’s religion through dress. The Social Democrats 
were against a ban because they believed that would hamper Muslim women’s 
parti cipa tion in soci ety (Lettinga and Saharso 2009). Yet, it is not only polit ical 
par ties that are pivotal for the Dutch regulation, but also the judgements of legal 
expert commissions. The Commission on Equal Treatment is an auto nom ous 
body of nine experts that tests whether cases do not contravene equal treatment 
legis la tion. The Commission con siders veiling as protected by the freedom of 
religion. The Commission’s basic position is that religious freedom is a funda­
mental right that can only be outweighed by a second party’s funda mental rights. 
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Although the judgements of the Commission are not legally binding, it has great 
authority and par ties usually voluntarily accept them. The pol icy report of 2004 
in which the gov ern ment institutionalized the right of women to wear a head-
scarf was also derived from the Commission’s judgements. Legal experts also 
played a key role when it came to the burqa. When par lia ment in 2005 had 
decided on a ban on burqas, the then respons ible Minister, Rita Verdonk, 
installed a legal commission to investigate the legal grounds for such a ban. This 
commission (Vermeulen 2006) advised against a ban, because it would infringe 
on several consti tu tional prin ciples, notably the prin ciple of religious freedom 
and of equal treatment. The gov ern ment then refrained from further action. 
We see that in Austria and the Neth er lands the influence of the Chris tian par­
ties was im port ant to retain or even strengthen lib eral pol icies, while this was not 
the case in Denmark. Another major dif fer ence is the role of demo cratic institu­
tions in the three coun tries. In the majoritarian Danish demo cracy (Kelstrup et 
al. 2008), the par lia ment played a key role in pol icy making compared to the 
executive and judiciary powers, while in Austria and the Neth er lands legal com­
missions and representative bodies were im port ant actors. Still, many questions 
remain unanswered. What explains the deafening silence over headscarves in 
Austria? Why did the majority in the Danish par lia ment believe that equal rights 
demanded that veiling be accepted? Why was the tolerant ruling of the Commis­
sion on Equal Treatment in the Neth er lands so widely accepted and even taken 
over by the gov ern ment? To answer these questions we turn to the national insti­
tutions, par ticu larly to his tor ically estab lished church–state relationships and lib­
eral rights. 
National state–church relations and liberal rights 
As Islam is a religion that is introduced in Western Europe through immigration 
and veiling is a gender- specific religious prescription, three types of institutional 
ar range ments may thus con trib ute to explain headscarf pol icies: regimes for 
hand ling immigration and integration, gender equality pol icies and state–church 
relations. As explained in the introduction of this chapter, in the past years all 
three coun tries have shifted towards a more restrictive immigration and integra­
tion pol icy, and in the Danish and Dutch cases emancipation pol icies for im mig­
rant women play a central role. This makes it highly unlikely that these three 
coun tries’ accommodating pol icies re gard ing headscarves can be explained by 
their immigration and integration regimes or by their gender equality pol icies. 
The main explan at ory factor is the coun tries’ state–church relations. 
Austria’s state–church relations are based on the prin ciple of ‘religious plur­
al ism’ and the re cog ni tion of Islam as one out of 14 recog nized religious faiths. 
The Austrian model guarantees equal treatment to all recog nized religious com­
munit ies as well as church auto nomy, i.e. specific auto nom ous domains in which 
the state may not interfere. The range of domains of in ternal affairs of churches 
and religious com munit ies into which state inter ven tion is not allowed is exten­
sive (Robbers 1996). One example is religious confessional education in pub lic 
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schools, which is mandatory for all pupils within each confession. Islam has 
been recog nized as an official religion since 1912, when after the annexation of 
Bosnia- Herzegovina in 1908 Muslims formed part of the cit izenry of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire and were given a parallel legal status with members of other 
religious minor it ies. In 1979, the IRCA was recog nized by Austrian state author­
ities as a legal corporate body serving as official repres enta tion for all Muslims 
residing in Austria. The IRCA is – alongside other such institutions – included 
in polit ical decision- making pro cesses in mat ters of concern to religious com­
munit ies and has due to this status an influ en tial pub lic voice. As religious com­
munit ies are granted rel at ive extensive auto nomy in religious affairs and because 
the headscarf is a religiously demanded dress code, the state has determined that 
the hand ling of the headscarf is a mat ter for the IRCA and does not belong to the 
realm of other state institutions. The institutionally enshrined religious plur al ism 
explains why Austria can hold restrictive cit izen ship and integration pol icies 
which mar ginalize parts of the (Muslim) im mig rant popu la tion with regards to 
eco nomic, social and polit ical parti cipa tion (Fassmann 2007), while at the same 
time entitling Muslim im mig rant minor it ies to comprehensive religious rights. 
This his tor ical tradition more over con trib utes to explain why veiling was politi­
cized so little and so late in Austria (Mourão Permoser and Rosenberger 2009). 
As the status of the religious com munit ies and their far- reaching auto nomy in 
religious affairs is regarded as a polit ical taboo, religious mat ters are usually 
kept outside pol itics. In addition, veiling has been constantly con sidered as a 
mat ter of religion by the majority of politicians. Only the populist par ties 
attempted to signify the headscarf as a mat ter of unwanted immigration and a 
symbol of failed integration. 
Religion plays a more ambiguous role in Danish demo cracy. On the one hand, 
the coun try has an estab lished state church, but on the other hand the church 
plays a limited role in pol itics, and religion is gen erally perceived to be an indi­
vidual or personal mat ter. The polit ical institutions and polit ical culture are 
based upon the belief that there is a close relation between Lutheranism and 
national Danish belonging (Østergård 2003; Christoffersen 2010). The 
Evangelical- Lutheran state church called the Danish People’s Church (Den 
Danske Folkekirke) is inscribed in the Danish consti tu tion, and the Danish 
version of religious plur al ism12 dates back to the first demo cratic consti tu tion in 
1849. This model formally guarantees freedom of religion and protects religious 
minor it ies (§ 67), but there is no equality between religions (Christoffersen 
1998). The consti tu tion states that the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran 
Church has special privileges, but Denmark has signed several inter na tional laws 
that guarantee equal rights for religious minor it ies. The coun try is rel at ively 
homo gen eous in relation to religion and about 80 per cent of the popu la tion are 
members of the People’s Church. Despite this, the coun try has a strong semi- 
secular tradition and the majority of members of the Danish Prot est ant Lutheran 
Church are what can be labelled ‘cultural Chris tians’ who may not even define 
themselves as religious.13 Islam, which recently has become the second largest 
religion, has formally, although not in practice, an equal position with other 
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denominations. To sum up: although the critique of veiling in the pub lic arena 
does resonate with the secular Danish polit ical culture, the major par ties have 
preferred dialogue, as the pro hibition of the headscarf goes against the indi vidual 
right to freedom of religion, which is a strongly adhered to prin ciple in Danish 
democracy. 
The Neth er lands has a long his tory of religious tolerance that can be traced 
back to the final decades of the sixteenth and seven teenth centuries, the Dutch 
Golden Age. Tolerance was guaranteed in the Union of Utrecht (1579). Minority 
religions were toler ated provided that their religious practices stayed private, and 
many persecuted religious minor it ies from other coun tries found shelter in the 
Neth er lands (van der Burg 1998). Religious plur al ism is a strong Dutch tradition 
that was further revived in the late nine teenth century by efforts to protect the 
freedom of religious minor it ies against the lib eral state. Cath olic and Calvinist 
minor it ies had estab lished local and regional polit ically or gan ized religious sub­
cultures to oppose the lib erals’ secular nation building pro ject, later joined by 
the Social Democrats that likewise had begun to or gan ize par ties, professional 
and leisure- time asso ci ations (Kersbergen and Manow 2008). Secular (leftist) 
lib erals in the Neth er lands were forced to make a compromise about social and 
polit ical life. This resulted in the segmentation of Dutch soci ety along confes­
sional lines, known as pillarization. Under the sys tem of pillarization religious 
com munit ies (and the socialists and lib erals) had, and to a large extent still have, 
the right to set up their own institutions, such as schools, hos pitals and broad­
casting com panies. The Dutch cor porat ist pillarized model of secularism also 
means that the state finances schools, social wel fare ac tiv ities or broadcasting 
agencies of religious com munit ies, without interfering with the religious life of 
the adherents (Bijsterveld 2005). The religious com munit ies more over were 
included in the polit ical decision- making pro cess on specific pol icy issues 
through consultative bodies. The institutions of pillarization were extended to 
the new religious and cultural minor it ies. The Neth er lands therefore has an elab­
orate sys tem of repres enta tion of delegates of ethnic and religious organ iza tions. 
In sum, the Dutch pluralist tradition grants a large space to live according to (and 
to be recog nized on the grounds of ) par ticu lar identities and traditions of groups 
in the pub lic sphere. Given the Dutch tradition in which religion is highly vis ible 
in pub lic life, it would go against the estab lished custom to ban headscarves. 
And thus the Equal Treatment Commission’s judgements that offered head-
scarves strong protection by making the right to religious freedom almost para­
mount could for a long time count on broad consensus. 
So we conclude that in both Austria and the Neth er lands, the state–church 
regime is one of religious plur al ism, giving Islam the same rights as other 
(recog nized) religions with an ‘open’ and ‘cooperative’ understanding of neu­
trality. Neutrality is achieved through even- handed treatment of all (recog nized) 
religions. The state sup ports and encourages the ac tiv ities of the religious com­
munit ies to a certain (albeit different) extent. In Austria, the state cooperates 
even more strongly with churches than in the Neth er lands, but religion is allowed 
to play a vis ible pub lic role in both coun tries. Denmark also has a long 
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Table 7.2 Factors in favour of accommodation 
Austria Denmark Netherlands 
Decisive Recognition of Political pluralism Pillarization 
institutional factor Islam 
Political principles Religious pluralism Recognition of religion 
as private matter 
Religious tolerance 
Pivotal party Conservative Liberal, Conservative Christian 
estab lished religious plur al ism, but here the state does not act in a neutral way 
towards religions. The model secures freedom of religion but not equality of reli­
gion. The Danish/Lutheran state church has a strong tradition of semi- secularism. 
Visible religious symbols are perceived to be a challenge to the secular polit ical 
culture, but dialogue is gen erally presented as the preferred solution. The pro­
hibition of the headscarf would go against the strong adherence to indi vidual 
rights in Danish demo cracy, which includes the right to freedom of religion. In 
light of this it seems reigning state–church relations combined with specific 
in ter pretations of lib eral prin ciples are the key factors in explaining the three 
coun tries’ accommodating headscarf decisions. 
Conclusion 
The chapter started off by questioning why, despite the increasing polit ical con­
tention over immigration and Islam in par ticu lar, Austria, Denmark and the 
Neth er lands kept to their accommodating pol icies re gard ing the wearing of head-
scarves in pub lic institutions.
 We suggested, first, that the polit ical con tention around veiling is to a con­
sider able extent symbolic pol itics, used instrumentally by the populist right to 
make and legitimate claims about restricting immigration, or has been used by 
other polit ical actors challenged by the populist right to position themselves on 
the issue of national identity and migration, rather than being an object of pol icy 
making in itself. 
Second, we noted that in Austria and the Neth er lands the Chris tian par ties 
played a pivotal role in pol itics. The beha vi our of the par ties in that mat ter indi­
cated that they have no inter est in limiting the role of religion in pub lic life. 
While in theory they could have claimed a pub lic role for Chris tianity, but not 
for Islam, they did not do so. For his tor ical reasons – in Austria, Islam has been 
inherited by the Habsburg Empire, and the Neth er lands has a tradition of reli­
gious tolerance – they chose to include Islam into their understanding of reli­
gious plur al ism. In Denmark, by contrast a secular coun try with no im port ant 
religious polit ical par ties, other concerns inspired the Danish polit ical par ties to 
vote against restrictions on the right to wear religious headgear. They were influ­
enced, we suggest, by a strong notion of indi vidual rights, which is deeply 
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the coun try’s version of Lutheranism con siders religion to be an indi vidual, per­
sonal mat ter into which the gov ern ment should not interfere. 
Last, we emphas ized the institutionalization of state–church relations. Austria 
and the Neth er lands have a regime of open neutrality that includes coopera tion 
with religious com munit ies and a tradition of religious plur al ism that demands 
that Islam is treated on a par with other religions. This explains why in both 
coun tries Islam gained the same rights as other religions and why in Austria the 
IRCA could successfully exert influence on pol icy making. Their his tor ical tra­
dition of open neutrality and the pres ence of religion and its symbols in the 
pub lic sphere is not con sidered as contravening pub lic neutrality. Therefore, in 
both coun tries religious symbols are accepted in pub lic life, and their under­
standing of equality between religions demands that also Islamic religious 
symbols are accepted. Moreover, in the Neth er lands the legal expert commis­
sions, which have no formal power but great authority, were crucial. In 
Denmark, in turn, the strong adherence to people’s indi vidual religious rights 
and the prin ciple of non- discrimination between all worldviews linked to an 
understanding of religion as a private mat ter even when expressed in the pub lic 
sphere, played a pivotal role. 
While polit ical power relations and discursive use of veiling as constituting or 
legitimizing pol icy change are im port ant factors, we have argued that they only 
gain meaning within the con text of polit ical institutions and state–church rela­
tions. In the Austrian and Dutch cases, his tor ically estab lished institutions sup­
port an inclusive state–church sys tem. Powerful polit ical actors in ter pret lib eral 
prin ciples like state neutrality in accordance with their institutional traditions. 
Therefore, when weighing religious freedom against other prin ciples and inter­
ests, the balance tipped off to religious freedom. Headscarves were not con­
sidered as conflicting with pub lic neutrality or not enough to jus tify major 
restrictions of religious freedom and the right to wear a headscarf. In the Danish 
case, religious freedom was not combined with religious equality and state neu­
trality but is perceived as an indi vidual right that the gov ern ment has no right to 
interfere in, even when exercised in the pub lic sphere. As underlined, this reso­
nates with the Danish demo cratic institutions and polit ical culture in which, next 
to equality, indi vidual freedom and rights are highly valued. This is why, despite 
heavy polit ical pressure from the rad ical populist right to curtail the right to 
veiling, polit ical par ties across the polit ical spectrum paid respect to these 
national traditions and kept to the his tor ical ways of regulating expressions of 
religion. 
These observations illus trate that there are limits to what is polit ically pos­
sible, that is limits to populism. In the polit ical struggle across Western Europe 
the rhet oric ‘defence of lib eral values’ is used as a strat egy against Islam. 
However, this chapter dem on strates that lib eral demo cratic values may also con­
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Notes 
1 By the end of 2009, in the Neth er lands a law was being prepared which, if accepted 
by the second and first Chamber, will forbid all types of face covers in education; the 
gov ern ment sent a directive that face veils are forbidden for pub lic ser vants (TK 
Kamerstuk 2007–2008, 31200 VII, no. 48, 19 Febru ary 2008). All pol icy docu ments 
discussed in the Dutch Tweede Kamer (TK, Second Chamber) can be accessed 
through the electronic search engine Parlando http://parlando.sdu.nl by referring to 
the parlia ment ary year, date and docu ment number. 
2 The focus is on pub lic institutions; as for private institutions, Euro pean anti- 
discrimination legis la tion applies for all EU countries.
 3 Proposal entitled: ‘B201 Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om forbud mod at bære kul­
turbestemt hovedbeklædning’ (‘B201 proposal to par lia ment bill about the pro hibition 
of wearing culturally determined headdress’). See the Danish frame ana lysis of docu­
ment DK1. The proposal spoke of ‘culturally determined head cover age’, that is ‘any 
kind of veil or head cover age which is not included in the Christian- Judean culture’. 
Chris tian symbols or Jewish kippas were not to be banned. It argued ‘that headscarves 
have become a growing prob lem, which has become offensive to ordinary people’ 
(‘hovedbeklædning, specielt tørklæder, er blevet et stigende prob lem, der virker 
stødende på mange almindelige mennesker’). 
4 TK Kamerstuk 2003–2004, 29614, no. 2, 7 June 2004.
 5 Online, avail able at: www.derislam.at/haber.php?sid=39andmode=flatandorder=1 
(accessed 18 April 2006). 
6 Danish debates on veiling included employment debates, about the right of private 
employers to pro hibit a headscarf for their em ployees, media debates and parlia ment­
ary debates. Denmark is exceptional in terms of regulation of religious dress of 
em ployees in the private labour market. According to Supreme Court de cisions from 
1999 and 2005, pro hibition of headscarves is legal when it is in accordance with a 
com pany dress code and does not violate the anti- discrimination act. 
7 The legal experts argued that the veil is not a prob lem in Danish courts (in Berlingske 
Tidende, 16 Decem ber 2008). Other experts argued that the bill may be in conflict 
with the Danish consti tu tion, Human Rights Convention and EU law. Finally, the bill 
was perceived as an attack on the separation of powers and Danish demo cracy. The 
Minister of Integration and Church, Birthe Rønn Hornbech, pub licly warned that a 
ban on religious dress for legal judges would be against the Danish version of 
Lutheran Prot est antism characterized by a separation between religion and law. In 
addition, a ban would interfere with the basic tenet of (Danish) lib eralism; ‘Frihed for 
Loke såvel som for Thor’, ‘Dommertørklædet og de to regimenter’, Politiken, 14 May 
2008.
 8 Original text: 
tørklæder er et udtryk for kønslig tvang, som overhovedet ikke hører hjemme i et 
moderne samfund som det danske [. . .] et tørklæde, det er lige præcis en person, 
som er imod de danske normbegreber, værdibegreberne I Denmark og I vores 
kultur. 
Parliament debate re. B210. Online, avail able at: www.ft.dk/?/samling/20031/bes­
lutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B201.htm (accessed 1 Au gust 2009). 
9 MP Herben, LPF, TK Handelingen 2004–2005, no. 73, 14 April 2005, p. 4471. 
10 Die Presse, 21 Septem ber 2007. 
11 Parliament debate re. B210. 
12 The Danish version of religious plur al ism is divided between the old recog nized 
groups – Chris tian and Jewish denominations who receive special treatments – and 
the more recent Muslim and Eastern denominations who are accepted but not recog­
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13 The in forma tion is from the Ministry of Church’s website, online, avail able at: www. 
km.dk/kirkestatistik.html (accessed 1 Au gust 2009). See also Christoffersen (1998). 
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Introduction 
In this chapter we will focus on the debates related to the pro hibitive regulations 
adopted in France, Ger many and Turkey. We will elaborate the various factors 
explaining a specific pro hibitive regulation (e.g. federal legis la tion in Ger many, 
state–churches regime in France and the consti tu tion in Turkey). Methodologi­
cally, we will compare the three coun tries to (re)in ter pret the situ ation of each 
coun try in light of the ana lysis of the two others. The results of the comparison 
of the pro hibitive regulations of France, some German federal states and Turkey 
will ‘unveil’ the ways in which the impartiality of the state is ad voc ated not only 
for determining the bound ar ies of state–religion/church relations, but for accom­
modating a dominant discourse on religion and at the same time reproducing 
gendered fantasies of co lo nialism, nationalism and ‘modernity’ (Varikas 2007).
 In the first section of this chapter, we briefly de scribe the main features of the 
pro hibitive regulation in the three coun tries. In the second section, we will focus 
on factors which might explain national, regional and local pro hibitions, and 
court de cisions. The chapter con siders the state–religion regimes, the polit ical 
oppor tun ity structures such as the cit izen ship and migration regime, aspects of 
the polit ical culture and anti- discrimination ma chineries including social move­
ments (espe cially fem in ist ones). Our approach focuses on (a) the mul tiple in ter­
pretations of state neutrality within each coun try, (b) the instrumentalizations of 
the gender equality issue in pub lic and polit ical debates and (c) the conflicting 
in ter pretations of cit izen ship, nat uralization and assimilation both across and 
within France, Turkey and Ger many (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Scott 2007). 
Prohibitive regulations in France, Germany and Turkey: 
setting the stage 
Brief sketch of prohibitive regulations 
In France, the prin ciple of laïcité applies to all pub lic institutions and ser vices 
(including teachers) as well as to courts. It appeals to the first art icle of the 
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French consti tu tion (4 Octo ber 1958) affirming the secularity of the Repub lic, 
and it was formally stated in the Law of 9 Decem ber 1905 separating churches 
and state. The Law of 1905 imposes several rules: no religion may be sup ported 
by the state, either fin an cially or polit ically; every one has the right to practise 
a religion, but no one has the obli ga tion to do so; religious education at school 
is strictly forbidden. The Law of 1905 forbids teachers’ proselytism, either 
by speech or by wearing religious and polit ical signs. Advocating the Law of 
1905 for enforcing laïcité in school, the Act of 2004 pro hibits the display of 
any religious and polit ical signs in both pri mary and secondary schools but 
not for universities (Article 141-5-1, Law of 15 March 2004). Therefore, 
wearing the headscarf is forbidden for pupils but it is allowed for university 
students. 
Before 2004, a ‘soft’ implementation of the prin ciple of laïcité was promoted. 
The then Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin (Socialist Party), referred to a 
more ‘open’ in ter pretation of the prin ciple of state neutrality, and in 1989 the 
Council of State (Conseil d’État, CE) decided in favour of a ‘differentiated 
approach’ to the headscarf of pupils: they were allowed to wear it as long as they 
did not use it in an aggressive and proselytizing way (CE, report no. 346,893, 27 
Novem ber 1989). François Bayrou, member of the con ser vat ive UDF (Union 
pour la Démocratie Française, Union for French Democracy) broke with his 
predecessor’s pol icy and introduced a circular for fostering a ‘hard’ version of 
laïcité. After some new headscarf controversies1 and after 11 Septem ber 2001, 
President Jacques Chirac (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, Union for a 
Popular Movement, UMP) set up an experts’ group under the heading of Bernard 
Stasi.2 The result of the Stasi Commission’s discussions was the Law ‘on 
laïcité’3 banning pupils’ veils. 
In Ger many, pupils and students are free to wear the Islamic headscarf. The 
pro hibition concerns teachers – and partly other pub lic ser vants – in eight federal 
states (Bundesländer). The oppor tun ity to ban religious signs and clothes in 
school was opened by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). Until its judge­
ment on 24 Septem ber 2003, the requirements of neutral beha vi our concerning 
teachers and civil ser vants in gen eral had been uniformly in ter preted in Ger many 
at large: civil ser vants had to behave impartially and to abstain from proselytism 
according to the consti tu tional prin ciple of neutrality in ter preted as the ‘non- 
identification’ of the state with a religion or denomination. In contrast to the 
French and Turkish situ ation, state em ployees did not have to keep their reli­
gious or philosophical convictions out of the pub lic sphere since the German 
neutrality of the state is con sidered to be an open and comprehensive one. The 
situ ation changed when in 2003 the FCC stated in the case of Fereshta Ludin 
that if a federal state (Bundesland) wanted to pro hibit teachers from wearing 
headscarves, this must be pre scribed by a law of the Bundesland which restricts 
the wearing of religious signs and clothes. Thus, the FCC itself opened up the 
pos sib il ity of in ter preting the required personal attitude of teachers in different 
ways: either in an ‘open’ and pluralistic way, or, more restrictively, sim ilar to 
a laic approach. The only con dition provided by the FCC was: all religions 
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and denominations have to be treated equally.4 As a result, the competence to 
regulate the headscarf shifted from the national to the federal level. Thus, in Ger­
many rather different patterns of regulating the wearing of a headscarf are in 
effect. Eight out of 16 German Bundesländer introduced pro hibitive regulations. 
Five of them (Baden- Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine- Westphalia and 
Saarland) introduced bans with exception clauses in favour of the display of 
Christian- occidental values and traditions. Three of these eight Bundesländer
(Berlin, Bremen and Lower Saxony) pro hibit the wearing of any religious signs 
in schools. 
The most severe pro hibition of the headscarf in pub lic institutions is in effect 
in Turkey. At the beginning of 2008, almost a state crisis was caused by the 
attempt to lift the headscarf ban concerning university students. On 9 Febru ary 
2008, Turkey’s ruling AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Develop­
ment Party) tried to amend the Turkish consti tu tion in an attempt to create the 
legal framework for lifting the ban that prevents veiled women from entering 
universities. The amend ments were passed by the par lia ment with 411 to 103 
votes. Two art icles of the consti tu tion were changed: Article 10, which guaran­
tees equality before the law irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, polit ical 
opinion, philosophical belief, religion or sect, was amended to include a com mit­
ment to ensure that all cit izens have equal access to all pub lic ser vices; and 
Article 42 on the right to education was changed to include a phrase preventing 
anyone from being denied the access to education except for a reason openly 
stated in law. It is im port ant to note that no written laws preventing veiled stu­
dents from entering the university exist, except for an implicit regulation of the 
Council of Higher Education. Although in 1989 the Constitutional Court decided 
that ‘headscarves in universities are against the prin ciple of secularism that is the 
most im port ant pillar of the Turkish state and consti tu tion’,5 no pro hibition law 
came into force. Thus, it is only in the name of the consti tu tion that headscarves 
are banned from universities. After the pres id ent, Abdullah Gül, had signed the 
amend ments of Article 10 and 42, the main opposi tion CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, Repub lican People’s Party) applied to the Constitutional Court for their 
annulment. On 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court consisting of 11 members 
annulled the amend ments to the consti tu tion with nine to two votes. In this 
de cision, the court stated that the two amend ments were invalid as they violate 
the prin ciple of secularism enshrined in the consti tu tion as one of the unchange­
able charac ter istics of the Turkish Repub lic (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008). 
As a con sequence, in Turkey pro hibitive regulations for pupils, students and 
civil ser vants are still in effect. 
Similarities among the three prohibitive country cases 
In Turkey, although the majority of cit izens are Muslim, the headscarf was 
banned because modern Turkey followed the his tor ical model of France pro­
claiming a strict form of secularism. Religion and its formerly power ful institu­
tions should be excluded from the pub lic sphere. The main dif fer ence is that the 
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target of neutralization in Turkey was and is Islam as opposed to Cath olicism in 
France. As a con sequence, the idea of curtailing the influence of religion also 
greatly affects the pro hibition of the headscarf in Turkey and France. 
Even though the EU member states France and Ger many represent com­
pletely different state–church regimes and ideo lo gies concerning ‘state’ and 
‘repub lic’, at first glance we find some simil ar ities in dealing with the headscarf 
in the pub lic sphere or parts of it. One common feature in France and Ger many 
is that the institutional traditions of combating discrimination are rather weak in 
both coun tries. In both soci eties, Muslims are a growing minor ity and are mainly 
im mig rants. The sociological structure of the Muslim popu la tion differs: while 
the majority of Muslims in France belong to French ex- colonies, prin cipally 
from Maghreb, and own French cit izen ship, Muslims living in Ger many have 
mainly im mig rated from Turkey and most still do not hold a German passport 
(Open Society Institute 2007: 15). It is no surprise that there are a lot of dif fer­
ences concerning religious customs and ob serv ance, covering practices and 
styles, polit ical and ideo logical im plica tions of female Muslim attire, etc. (Sin­
tomer 2009: 139). Differentiations derive from the specific co lo nial his tory, from 
different legal traditions of access to cit izen ship (France, ius soli; Ger many, ius 
sanguinis), and from a distinctive societal ex peri ence of being accustomed or not 
to a multicultural soci ety and to fellow cit izens of Islamic faith. Despite racism, 
xenophobia and the polit ical stigmatization of the female Muslim covering prac­
tice, French soci ety seems to be less dismissive of Muslims than German soci­
ety. The Pew Research Center revealed in its survey of 2008 that in Ger many a 
signific antly larger group has a negat ive attitude towards Muslims in Europe (50 
per cent) than in France (38 per cent) (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008). Sinus 
Sociovision found in Ger many a high percentage of consent to very crit ical asso­
ci ation chains that identi fy religion imme diately with Islam and ‘its ubiquitous 
negat ive image’ (2008: 137), with backwardness, funda mentalism, a threat to 
‘our’ (the German) culture and other sentiments of disasso ci ation. While the 
widespread image of Islam is qualified as backward and Muslims are identified 
as being funda mentalists (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007: 232), Germans ‘of all 
social milieus, not just the educated ones’, are ‘proud of the “occidental” 
achievements of the secular state which grants people to pursue their own beliefs 
while ensuring that pub lic life and societal institutions remain unaffected by reli­
gion’ (Sinus Sociovision 2008: 135). Here a convergence of German and French 
constellations on a laic level can be detected: although in Ger many religion is 
not banned from the pub lic sphere, there is a trend to declare religion to be a 
‘private mat ter’ and to define religiously affiliated persons ‘to be the problem’. 
Considering the wide spread aversion to Muslims and Islam in Ger many and 
France, vis ible personal attributes of this religion are often stigmatized even in 
the private eco nomy. Hence it is no surprise that despite anti- discrimination laws 
Muslims face many dis advant ages in the labour market. Though no legal pro­
hibition of the headscarf is in effect outside the pub lic sector, the prin ciple of not 
being allowed to show one’s religion is tacitly ad voc ated to ban the headscarf 
even in private employment in France (cf. Dumas 2002) and also in Ger many 
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(Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit und Soziales Berlin und Landesstelle 
für Gleichbehandlung – gegen Diskriminierung 2008). Formally, in France as 
well as in Ger many, private employers may not pro hibit the wearing of head-
scarves, but they can impose prescriptions about the suit able outfit for doing a 
job, since dress codes are part of the employer’s rights. The dress codes, how­
ever, must not violate em ployees’ human rights. 
In Turkey, veiled women are not members of a religious or national minor ity 
but never the less are not protected by human rights or anti- discrimination institu­
tions, on the contrary: a court de cision (Council of State, 26/10/2005, 2004/4051, 
2005/3366) sup ports penalties for civil ser vants who wear the headscarf even 
beyond their work place. In the private eco nomy there is no regulation pro­
hibiting any kind of veil in private businesses, but many private employers prefer 
to employ unveiled women, espe cially for high- profile jobs; this can also be said 
for ‘Green Capital’ com panies (owned by Islamists). Even they prefer unveiled 
women in high- profile positions. In this sense, very religious people and espe­
cially veiled women constitute a Muslim minor ity within the Muslim majority 
popu la tion, and are excluded or dis advant aged in state professions and private 
mainstream eco nomy (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008). 
Explaining prohibitive regulations: political opportunity 
structures and political culture 
This chapter ex plores the most salient explan at ory factors for pro hibitive regula­
tions: first, the role of anti- discrimination institutions, state–church relations, cit­
izen ship regulation and migration pol icies which might be labelled as polit ical 
oppor tun ity structures (Fetzer and Soper 2005) and, second, the dimension of 
polit ical culture, that is images and traditions, which shapes polit ical institutions 
and policies. 
Anti- discrimination institutions 
To begin with the perhaps least salient but functionally closest factor: as the last 
passage indicates, strong and effect ive anti- discrimination institutions could pos­
sibly exercise a correcting influence on legis la tion if they exist and if they are 
power ful enough. In EU member coun tries, anti- discrimination institutions have 
to be estab lished according to EC directives. In 2004, France changed its exist­
ing legis la tion according to the Euro pean Council’s anti- discrimination direc­
tives6 estab lishing the High Authority for the Struggle Against Discrimination 
and for Equality (HALDE; cf. FR16). In Ger many, the adaptive act, the General 
Equal Treatment Act (AGG), was passed only in 2006, and the national anti-
discrimination body, the Federal Anti- Discrimination Agency (ADS), was set up 
with even more delay. In contrast, Turkey only has legal norms pro hibiting dis­
crimination based on religion, sex or ethnic origin (Article 10 of the consti tu­
tion); but no anti- discrimination institutions exist that are in charge of mediating 
conflicts or assisting vic tims of discrimination. 
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 In France and Ger many, the anti- discrimination ma chineries have only short 
histories of exist ence and have not – until now – estab lished any prin ciple crit­
ical objections against the legal headscarf pro hibitions. In France, the dominant 
pro hibitive in ter pretation of laïcité and religious symbols in pub lic spaces, espe­
cially schools, can be as sumed as a pro mo tion of such a reserved and cau tious 
approach by HALDE; in Ger many, the widespread anti- Islamic atmo sphere in 
polit ical debates and among large parts of the popu la tion seems as well to foster 
the in ac tiv ity of the ADS, which is situated in Berlin and only has very few 
human resources to act on across the national level against all kinds of discrimi­
nation. In both coun tries, this lack of crit ical and advocatory performance by 
these institutions might be sup ported by the fact that also courts have not 
opposed the dominant (col lect ive) in ter pretation of laïcité and neutrality of the 
state in relation to the headscarf mat ter and to the indi vidual basic rights of 
teachers and applicants. Therefore, the anti- discrimination institutions in both 
coun tries have not yet touched the issue of head covering because of religious 
duties, either for the pub lic education and employment sector or for the private 
labour market. Specifically for the headscarf affair, how ever, the French HALDE 
intervened fol low ing allegations of discrimination coming from veiled mothers 
who were not allowed to accom pany their chil dren to a school outing upon the 
teacher’s request for parents’ help (FR16). HALDE’s medi ation and ‘re com­
mendations’7 represent a rather low level of inter ven tion in favour of non- 
discrimination on religious grounds and are a telling example of the modest 
binding power and ambition of this authority. 
State–church relations, citizenship and migration policies 
Of course even for France and Turkey the state–religion regime alone cannot 
explain the adoption of such pro hibitive laws, but it does explain a great deal. In 
France, the Law of 2004 must be con sidered instead as an overall configuration 
of state–church relations, of the cit izen ship and migration regimes, and of polit­
ical culture. The regulating actors seek refuge in the his tor ically handed- down 
rem edy against conflicts emerging from religious groups and denominations. 
The Law of 2004 seems to be a converging strat egy to renew the unifying power 
of the ‘Repub lic’ and the ‘Nation’ which asks for a specific com mit ment by cit­
izens, even im mig rated cit izens. They should have obtained cit izen ship by a 
complex pro cess of nat uralization, meaning the assimilation to the French 
national culture self- defined as being a secular and egal it arian civilization (cf. 
Balibar 2004). Since the Sarkozy presidency in 2007, religion, eth ni city and 
‘race’ are introduced as underhanded cri teria to prevent access to French cit izen­
ship (Herald Tribune 2008). Regardless of its unconsti tu tionality, the current 
strengthening of racism in immigration and nat uralization pol icies (Delphy 
2008a; Keaton 2006) goes back to the second Chirac presidency in 2001. It is 
related to the growing racism de veloping from the mid- 1980s and to the normal­
ization of extreme- right par ties and ideo lo gies (Eribon 2009: 127–60), which are 
reactivating the imaginary and as sump tion of a co lo nial legacy never confronted 
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(Dorlin 2006; Varikas 1998). ‘The Muslim veiled woman’ has become ‘the 
other’ par excellence, who is called upon to neutralize herself and her gendered 
and racialized par ticu larity (or forced to do so by law) in the pub lic space 
(Delphy 2008b; FR25) as a con dition for participating in the French secular soci­
ety (cf. Bracke 2009), and even more when she applies for cit izen ship. Here the 
state–church regime comes into play. During the pol icy making of the Law of 
1905, the pres ence of Islam in the metropolitan territory was totally erased, 
tacitly setting the state–church regime as a relationship between the state and 
mainly Chris tian faith (although Judaism was formally included) (cf. Bauberot 
2000). From the Law of 1905 to the ban of 2004, the legacy of the Empire has 
shaped the failure of French authorities to appeal to the prin ciple of laïcité in 
order both to institutionalize and to improve a real equality among French cit­
izens re gard less of their origins or religious beliefs. In this con text, repub lican 
neutrality does not only mean state impartiality vis- à-vis religion in the name of 
freedom of thought; it also represents the will of the state to reaffirm ‘the unity’ 
and ‘the indivisibility’ of the French nation through the ‘neutralization’ of any 
expression of the origins of French cit izens, residents and im mig rants (Balibar 
2004). The ban on the headscarf suggests that the status of the Muslim com mun­
ity in France has been and still is the main target: Muslims are seen as the main 
if not the only transgressors of both laïcité and gender equality (FR28). Indeed, 
the argumentation according to which the prin ciple of laïcité is able to protect 
veiled women from Islamic funda mentalism and pat ri archy was largely used by 
pol icy makers. Left- wing and right- wing par ties in power during the policy- 
making pro cess shared the gender equality objection. They instrumentalized the 
mainstream fem in ist rhet oric of Western women’s emancipation (FR3) for defin­
ing a meas ure of the degree of modernity and demo cracy of the state on the one 
side, and on the other, for the purpose of a self- serving image of the Repub lic as 
the modern, rational pro tector of gender equality threatened by the irrational, 
archaic use of the headscarf (FR22).
 Concerning Turkey, the state–religion regime and institutionalized configura­
tions of the polit ical sys tem – the party sys tem and the balance of powers – 
embedded into the his tor ical de velopment of the modern Turkish nation in the 
twentieth century are of crucial relev ance to the pro hibitive regulation. It is 
im port ant to underline that with Islam being the religion of the majority and 
Turkey not being an immigration coun try, the headscarf is a question of ‘the 
majority’ and not of minor it ies. Although Article 10 of the consti tu tion guaran­
tees equality before the law to all cit izens, Article 2 underlines that secularism is 
the most im port ant pillar of the state and that it has to prevail. The ban of the 
headscarf is thus justified by this Article. Secularism is in ter preted here as the 
most im port ant consti tu tional prin ciple, and it is ad voc ated to institutionalize 
the separation between the state and religion in an over whelm ingly Muslim 
coun try. But after the emergence of a new generation of religiously motiv ated 
leaders challenging the dominance of secularized pol itics after the milit ary take­
over in 1980, Islam has become vis ible in all spheres of life. Due to this fact, the 
headscarf has been mainly perceived by a large, secular section of the popu la tion 
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as a polit ical symbol representing the revival of Islam (Saktanber 2006). Finally, 
in 2008 the Constitutional Court decided that lifting the ban and accepting veiled 
students at universities was against secularism as a major prin ciple of state.
 Concerning Ger many, the regional and local regulations in eight federal states 
– among them are city states such as Berlin and Bremen – are the result of a very 
specific judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court and therefore a product of 
the strong position of the Court within the German polit ical sys tem. As the FCC 
had to decide in the case of Fereshta Ludin in 2003, the majority of judges chose 
a surprising compromise that changed the consti tu tional landscape of Ger many 
re gard ing the national competences regulating the right to freedom of religious 
expression of civil ser vants of the Bundesländer. The court emphas ized on the 
one hand the right of a teacher to wear a headscarf as long as there is no restrict­
ing law; on the other hand, it strengthened the anti- headscarf approach by 
opening up the pos sib il ity of pro hibition by federal state law. Until this moment 
of de cision, all the experts had expected a clear de cision for all of Ger many. 
Hence the respons ib ility for new regulations and solutions of the headscarf prob­
lem was handed over from a power ful but dis agreeing court to the politicians 
and par lia ments of the federal states. Due to Ger many’s fed eral ism, its party 
sys tem and its ponderous decision- making mech an isms, the competing polit ical 
par ties try to enforce their controversial in ter pretations of state neutrality and of 
Ger many’s future as a soci ety of immigration (cf. Rostock and Berghahn 2008). 
The different regulations in the 16 German states can be explained mainly 
through these competing in ter pretations, which are not only divided along party 
lines but also along regional ones. The Christian- occidental camp, consisting of 
politicians mainly of the Chris tian Democratic Union (CDU) and Chris tian 
Social Union (CSU) in the southern, Catholic- oriented German Länder, wants to 
hold on to the old German ‘ethno- cultural’ model of cit izen ship while rhet­
orically it accepts Ger many as a multicultural soci ety. Therefore, reforms on cit­
izen ship status and immigration8 work hand in hand with pol icies of demarcation 
against Muslim im mig rants. In contrast, Social Democrats and other mainly 
secular- oriented polit ical forces try to push forward a more consequent separa­
tion between state and churches or religious com munit ies. The fact that Ger many 
has become a coun try of immigration was finally accepted at the turn of the 
twenty-first century when the red- green gov ern ment of SPD and Bündnis 90/ 
Grüne (Social Democrats and Greens) initiated funda mental reforms of the cit­
izen ship and immigration laws. But while the religious and cultural feature of 
Ger many is becoming more manifold, large parts of the German popu la tion still 
perceive this diversity rather scep tically (Rostock and Berghahn 2008; Pew 
Global Attitudes Project 2008; Sinus Sociovision 2008). For many politicians 
this means a strong incentive to compete in pol icies of restricting actual immi­
gration and making clear that their own party is most successful in getting an 
assimilation strat egy through. Since the headscarf is in ter preted as a symbol of 
Muslims showing ‘too much’ dif fer ence and self- confidence, this symbol is also 
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One can say that, in addition to the power of the FCC on the one hand and 
fed eral ism concerning educational and cultural affairs on the other hand, the two 
other factors having an impact on Ger many’s pro hibitive regulations are its 
ambivalent migration regime and – in a paradoxical way – its state–church 
regime. As far as migration issues are affected, the question is how assim il ated 
im mig rants have to be. Concerning religion, the dispute (initiated by the crucifix 
de cision in 1995)9 is about how much the German soci ety – the Chris tian major­
ity in gen eral and the Muslim minor ity in par ticu lar – should be allowed to be a 
religious one and in which sense. Is it a Western Chris tian soci ety or a multi- 
religious one? Will it copy the French example where all religious signs and 
symbols have to be banned from the pub lic sphere? Does the frequent ref er ence 
to an ‘occidental’ culture, to ‘Christian- occidental’ values and consti tu tional 
prin ciples mean, as Nikola Tietze suggests, that it is a strat egy to avoid the topic 
of ‘national’ unity but confirm it indirectly – in opposi tion to the ‘foreign’ 
Muslims and their faith (1998: 191). Shirin Amir- Moazami draws the conclusion 
that these ‘consti tu tional’ questions of Ger many’s religious and cultural identity 
are questions of the norms, values and symbols of the nation and are therefore 
questions of the very founda tions of the German Repub lic – in ref er ence to the 
moral burdens of the past (2007: 155). In this situ ation of a burdened past and 
doubts about the definition of the ‘very own’ charac ter istics of the nation, it 
seems to be easier to achieve certainty about oneself by demarcation from others. 
Besides the religious dif fer ence between Chris tianity and Islam, the dif fer ence 
between ‘modern’ gender relations and pat ri archal and backward ones presents 
itself as an easy pattern of justification for the widespread anger and indignation 
towards accepting Muslim im mig rants as fellow citizens. 
While gender relations may play an im port ant role for the self- definition of 
soci eties, and equality arguments were indeed used in the pub lic and polit ical 
debates, social movements – and espe cially women’s movements – played a 
subordinate role in pol icy making. Although the headscarf debate has given a bit 
more voice to Muslims (Spielhaus 2009: 414; G9, G24, G25), these few voices 
of Muslim women in defence of the right to wear a headscarf could not 
exert power to influence decision- making pro cesses (Rostock and Berghahn 
2009: 10). 
So far we have examined factors of the national polit ical oppor tun ity struc­
ture or polit ical culture of the three coun tries that work in favour of pro hibitive 
meas ures against the headscarf. Now we shall take a closer look at the structure 
of the main argument, namely that the headscarf as a symbol of religious affili­
ation of pupils, students, teachers and other pub lic ser vants would infringe the 
major prin ciples of laïcité, secularism or neutrality and thus under mine the very 
founda tions of state and soci ety in France, Turkey and Ger many. In France and 
Turkey, a laic configuration of state–religion relations can be identified as a 
salient factor explaining the headscarf bans. Contrary to this, German federal 
pro hibitions cannot be explained by the state–religion regime which is embed­
ded into the open and pluralistic neutrality of the national consti tu tion. Starting 
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but not sharing the same model of state–religion relations, the cross- comparison 
of different state–religion regimes could provide further insights into factors that 
mat ter within the sys tem of funda mental values and beliefs that constitute the 
polit ical culture of coun tries and therefore influence the pol icy making of 
national and local regulations.
 In Turkey, religion does not regulate pub lic life nor does it play a role in juris­
diction. Nevertheless, although regulated by the state, Islam is culturally estab­
lished (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008: 10). There is no official state religion 
in Turkey and secularism is referred to as both the funda mental and founda tional 
prin ciple of the Turkish Repub lic, as much as the prin ciple of laïcité is referred 
to as a funda mental French Repub lican prin ciple. Secularism is thus ad voc ated 
as the state ideo logy sup porting the national effort of de velopment and moderni­
zation. In this con text, the headscarf is construed as the very symbol of the 
Ottoman past and of religious funda mentalism, a threat to the Turkish moderni­
zation pro ject defended by Turkish nationalism (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 
2008). 
Focusing on the relations between state and religion for explaining the adop­
tion of restrictive regulations in Ger many, we are able to enlighten that the pro­
hibitive pol icies of some Bundesländer contradict the national legal tradition.10 
This holds espe cially true for those five states where a ‘Christian- occidental 
clause’ was passed saying that the exhibition of ‘Christian- occidental educa­
tional and cultural values or traditions’ (cf. § 38 sec. 2 sen. 3 school act of 
Baden- Württemberg and § 57 sec. 4 sen. 3 school act of North Rhine- 
Westphalia)11 does not contravene the duty of teachers to maintain neutrality. 
Here ‘Christian- occidental’ traditions and customs were equated with ‘state neu­
trality’. The contra dic tion in itself is obvious: the prin ciples of equal treatment, 
plur al ism and fairness towards minor it ies were neglected. 
The differ enti ation of regulations from Land to Land in Ger many leads to an 
unequal guarantee of religious freedom rights within the territory of Ger many, 
and this is reflected in the conflicts not only about the headscarf but also con­
cerning the crucifix and Islamic religious education in schools (Rostock and 
Berghahn 2008). Although in Ger many state and religion/churches are officially 
separated, a special relation – going back to the German Empire which lasted 
until 1918 – has existed and still exists between the state and religious com­
munit ies, in par ticu lar Chris tian churches. The Chris tian churches have had, and 
still have, the status of pub licly recog nized corporations; while today Jewish 
com munit ies hold this status too (Rostock and Berghahn 2008), no Muslim com­
mun ity has obtained this status. After the end of the Second World War, the 
dominant in ter pretation of state neutrality as open and inclusive prevailed in 
Ger many. This in ter pretation enabled the Cath olic and Prot est ant pol icy makers 
to coexist with secular agencies. It was also a guarantee of national unity despite 
fed eral ism. This compromise held until the FCC judgement of 2003 in the Ludin 
case. But even the legal ban itself – the pro hibition to show one’s own religious 
affili ation as a teacher – infringes the indi vidual guarantee of basic rights in 
those federal states which have not passed a Christian- occidental exception 
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clause, as the ban in all eight pro hibitive Bundesländer does not ask for reasons 
given by the person, not for mis be ha viour or actual dangers to anyone, but it 
stigmatizes the Islamic clothing as such. This is indicated by the fact that the 
amend ments to the school acts were intentionally made for no other reason but 
to ban the headscarf.12 The common ground of federal states that pro hibit all reli­
gious signs (three) and those that privilege Chris tian and pos sibly Jewish signs 
(five) is the ban of the headscarf because this is the major and almost only reli­
gious sign actu ally worn by teachers or other ped ago gical staff.
 In France, in spite of the formally strict separation between state and 
churches, the implementation of the Law of 1905 reconstituted an im port ant 
state source of funding different worships, in par ticu lar Cath olicism, Prot est­
antism and, to a lesser extent, Judaism (Bauberot 2000). In contrast, Muslims do 
not dispose of state- owned buildings, mosques and other prop erty funded by the 
pub lic authority. In order to construct or maintain mosques, Muslims are obliged 
to appeal to sponsors (including the sponsorship of Muslim coun tries like 
Algeria or Morocco – the former French colonies – and even Saudi Arabia) 
(Bowen 2007). Thus we can say that the legacy of co lo nial relations emerges as 
one of the major factors respons ible for targeting the headscarf as the very threat 
to the cultural unity and indivisibility of the French Repub lic (FR27; Bouyahia 
and Ramdani 2011; Kian 2011; Sanna 2011). It should be noted that laïcité is 
not currently construed as the separation of churches and state; on the contrary, 
the very notion of laïcité is his tor ically and theologically related to the Chris tian 
idea of a private religion nurtured in ‘the heart of hearts’ (Balibar 2004; Nancy 
2004). With this in mind, we should realize once more that religion was never 
banned from school totally. The Cath olic faith’s privileges are vis ible at least in 
the de part ments of Alsace and Moselle. In these de part ments, Chris tian tradi­
tions and practices are con sidered to be local customs that are perfectly com pat­
ible with the national, modern and secular culture. The exist ence and acceptance 
of these his tor ical privileges reveals the Chris tian fundament of the repub lican 
laïcité (Beumier 2006: 13). The exception proves the rule banning the headscarf 
as a religious sign ostentatious of Islam. In metropolitan France as well as in 
Ger many, the exception may only be a Chris tian one. The ever present as sump­
tion that ‘minor ity’ religions and cultures (Islam in par ticu lar) are the prob lem, 
that they are threatening indi vidual liberties and more par ticu larly the liberties of 
women, therefore reveals an aporetic conception of ‘toleration’ (cf. Bayle 1992; 
Mairet 1991) according to which it is the dominant religion’s privilege to toler­
ate (or not) the others. 
But why do we find this lack of plur al ism and uni versal ism in the three coun­
tries to this extent? Only a comparison with more ‘tolerant’ states in our sample 
would help explain the latter. But again we may as sume that the laic basis of 
state–religion relations influences the lack of lib eral plur al ism. In favour of a 
peaceful ‘repub lican’ realm and a clear- cut separation between the private and 
the pub lic sphere, indi vidual freedoms and liberties have to be cut back. 
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Instrumentalizations of gender equality issues 
Another charac ter istic of the situ ation in the three pro hibitive coun tries is the 
in tens ity of pro claiming the ‘gender equality’ objection. In the Turkish moderni­
zation pro cess, the topic of women’s emancipation has been adopted as a cri­
terion for evaluating the realization of the pro cess itself, and the idea of equality 
between men and women has been ad voc ated to legitimate nationalism encour­
aging the de velopment of the Repub lic. From the founda tion of modern Turkey 
in 1923, the image of a secular and emancipated woman has been depicted in a 
bin ary opposi tion to the veiled woman; the latter has been con sidered as being 
the symbol of religious funda mentalism and thus representing the legacy of the 
Ottoman past, while the former has been idealized as the emblem of ‘the Turkish 
woman’. In this con text, women have been usually referred to as a ‘comrade- in-
arms’ for achieving secularization and modernization (Kandiyoti 1988). From 
the 1980s onwards, the headscarf began to symbolize the pro gressive return of 
religiosity within Turkish soci ety. This re- emergence is paradoxically embodied 
today by modern, highly educated veiled women fighting for free access to uni­
versity, polit ical activity and the labour market (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 
2008). 
This ana lysis, in turn, calls our attention to the image of ‘a modern and eman­
cipated woman’ evoked in the French pub lic and polit ical debates in order to 
legitimate French Repub licanism while mar ginalizing fem in ist movements and 
Muslim women’s groups. Women’s emancipation has been referred to as a ‘uni­
ver sal shared value’ in the discourses of a large spectrum of politicians and 
mainstream fem in ists (FR3). Moreover, women’s equality has been as sumed as 
an ‘already existing reality in Euro pean soci eties’ by these same actors (e.g. the 
authors of the fem in ist peti tion to pres id ent Chirac; FR3). This instrumental use 
of the idea of gender equality is underscored by the utter invisibility of the fem­
in ist and Muslim actors themselves (FR7). Muslim women are referred to as 
‘oppressed vic tims’ of funda mentalism who have to be saved by the secular 
Repub lic, or as the embodiment of ‘their’ culture who have to be toler ated within 
the French multicultural soci ety. Focusing on this instrumental ex ploita tion of 
the value and im port ance of women’s emancipation provides us with a further 
insight into the factors explaining the French pro hibitive regulation. During the 
polit ical debate and despite ideo logical dif fer ences, there has been an overall 
consensus between the party in power and the opposi tion (Sintomer 2009). Both 
basically seemed to agree on the necessity ‘to save’ oppressed veiled women 
from (Islamic) domination and, more precisely, from their male kin (FR9, 
FR14). Gender equality, referred to as a ‘modern norm’, has become a one- sided 
polit ical instrument able to split the modern (Chris tian) nation from backward 
(Muslim) migrants, and thus refuse migrants’ claims to equal treatment as cit­
izens and subjects of the demo cratic process. 
The French instrumental advocation of gender equality sheds light on the 
German con text. While fem in ist movements are split over the headscarf question 
(G2, G4, G12, G15, G28) and anti- racist fem in ist positions are rarely mirrored in 
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the mainstream media, it is remark able how often and intensely the gender 
equality objection is used by German politicians, judges and persons in adminis­
trative functions – almost irrespective of the polit ical party they belong to or 
sympathize with. Many actors – reaching from representatives of the Cath olic 
Church to judges of the FCC who gave a dissenting vote in the Ludin case – 
argue that the headscarf expresses the subordination and oppression of women in 
Islam. Among the three dissenting judges of the FCC who assessed the headscarf 
worn by a teacher as a clearly unconsti tu tional symbol was Udo di Fabio, who 
opposed the idea of affirmative- action meas ures in favour of women and its 
com pliance with the German consti tu tion for a long time. As a famous con ser­
vat ive intellectual he still de scribes the role of women and men in soci ety as 
very essentially oppos ite (Di Fabio 2005: 144), but within the dissenting vote in 
the Ludin case of 2003 he and his two colleagues attributed a high pri or ity to the 
achievement of gender equality, whereas these judges condemned the headscarf 
as a symbol of Islamic oppression and funda mentalism. By this we may as sume 
that those German con ser vat ives mainly inspired by Cath olicism, whose ideas 
about ideal gender relations re semble those of con ser vat ive Muslims, want to 
dissociate themselves strongly from the socially deprived group of Muslim 
im mig rants. And of course, an efficient way to keep mental and social distance 
is to promote a legal pro hibition for the very symbol that connects Islam and 
‘backward’ gender relations. 
Migration and integration questions 
Comparing the Turkish case with France and Ger many sheds light on the fact 
that, in these latter states, the governance of migration and integration issues is 
crucial to the adoption of pro hibitive regulations. In Ger many, those who are 
seen as ‘cultural aliens’ do not have easy access to cit izen ship. Here cultural 
assimilation is a precon dition for nat uralization, and the headscarf ban is sup­
ported as a polit ical instrument of demarcation against Muslim ‘foreigners’. This 
is indicated by the fact that the headscarf de cision of the FCC in the Ludin case 
was followed by vehement debates and a restrictive law- making pro cess in half 
of the German Länder and coincided with heated polit ical debates preparing a 
completely new immigration law during the years after 2001. This reform 
became neces sary because the red- green gov ern ment had pro claimed in 2000 
that Ger many had become – now and finally – an immigration coun try. Thus the 
debates about the headscarf ban for teachers perfectly fit into the discourses on 
the terms immigration and integration. The con ser vat ives demanded assimilative 
beha vi our of im mig rants as a precon dition for nat uralization and rights of resi­
dence (for examples see Rostock and Berghahn 2008: 350; Schiffauer 2008: 11; 
Lanz 2007). 
The ana lysis of the German situ ation reminds us that in France cultural assim­
ilation is also at stake in current immigration and nat uralization pol icies. The last 
Council of State’s ruling of 27 June 2008 upheld immigration officials’ refusal 
to grant cit izen ship to a woman in full body veil by stating that ‘she was not 
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assim il ated’ (Herald Tribune 2008).13 This could be in ter preted as a telling 
example of the current French administration’s intention to strengthen and 
frankly introduce the up to now tacit and, after all, unconsti tu tional cri teria of 
religion, ‘eth ni city’, ‘cultural belonging’ and ‘race’ in the enforcement of cit­
izen ship pol icies. Meanwhile, the pro hibition of full body and face coverings in 
the streets, called the burqa ban, has been discussed in France and is about to be 
passed by par lia ment in the course of 2010 – fol low ing the example of 
Belgium.14 These de cisions and pro posi tions seem to illus trate the inveterate fear 
of and intolerance towards Islam in French soci ety. Spreading mass anti- 
immigration attitudes date back to the 1980s (Eribon 2009: 127–60). During this 
period, the rhet oric that made the im mig rant – mainly from the Maghreb – the 
scapegoat for unemployment and every other social evil became a common or at 
least a legitimate polit ical language (Etcherelli 1977). Policies of the late 1970s 
and 1980s con trib uted to how the gov ern ment dealt with the ‘question of immi­
gration’, but ‘the question’ was meant as ‘the prob lem’ and was treated as if it 
was a separate issue totally inde pend ent from the polit ical con text and the atti­
tudes of the French soci ety towards the im mig rants (Sternhell 2000). Ultimately, 
im mig rants are always the troublemakers. This way of coping with immigration 
promoted a segregationist rhet oric and neo- colonial stereo types of the French 
empire and co lo nial wars (Sintomer 2009: 136; Tribalat 1995). 
Conclusions 
The pro hibitive regulations in France, Turkey and in German Bundesländer can 
not be explained by a single feature but by a combination of factors rooted in 
path de pend ent consti tu tional determinations and in actual de cisions of the rel­
ev ant politicians of legis lat ive or judicial institutions. Many aspects of the 
national de velopments therefore can be explained by the contingency of the 
polit ical oppor tun ity structures; others are caused by the dy namics of the polit­
ical culture, they are rooted in traditions of a common value sys tem and of 
national identity perceptions which are then on occasion picked up by politicians 
competing for voters in elections. In the case of France and Turkey, the most 
salient influence is of course the consti tu tionally determined relation between 
state and religion/church (see Chapter 5). Secularism as the most im port ant pillar 
of the Kemalist conception of state has prevailed in Turkey over the careful 
attempt of the governing AKP to open the pub lic sphere for religious manifesta­
tions. While in Turkey the polit ical oppor tun ity structure offered in 2008 a 
chance for the governing party to take this step re gard ing headscarves, the 
counter strike came from the consti tu tional court, which is tradi tion ally a guard­
ian of the secular forces. Within the polit ical culture of the coun try, the values of 
national unity, repub licanism and espe cially of the para digmatic role of women 
as an indic ator of modernity and pro gress have so far been victorious; more tol­
erance towards religious plurality and diversity would have obviously been too 
big a venture. In France, the pragmatic approach of the Conseil d’État of 1989 
has been pushed back and the legis la tion of 2004 finally took over the role of 
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sharpening the profile of laïcité in a pro hibitive way. In both coun tries, the 
de cisions maintain and strengthen the laic logic and therefore stay within the 
con ser vat ive value sys tem of being ig nor ant to requirements of inclusiveness 
and anti- discrimination. The pattern of de velopment in Ger many is different 
insofar as half of the federal states are now on the way to a new, less tolerant and 
less pluralistic relationship between state and religion. In light of the unclear and 
awkward de cision of the consti tu tional court, some of the competing polit ical 
par ties and politicians have tried to use this chance to (re)define a populist pol icy 
of demarcation towards multiculturalism in the era of Islamic terrorism and the 
war against it. Instead of a lib eral notion of integration and diversity, the require­
ments of assimilation to the majority religion and culture are presented as solu­
tions for the immigration soci ety. Despite the simil ar ities concerning the 
resentments of the mainstream popu la tion between France and Ger many, the 
consti tu tional prin ciples and the state ideo lo gies are rather different. Ger many 
has chosen the far more devi at ing way of dealing with the headscarf mat ter, 
devi at ing from its own traditions and consti tu tional norms. If we compare France 
with Turkey, both laic coun tries, from a legal and lib eral pluralistic point of 
view the case of France is more ser ious, since the French legis la tion should have 
taken into account the anti- discrimination laws of the EU and could have opted 
for a regulated con tinu ity of the ‘soft form’ of laïcité but decided in favour of a 
confronting approach; whereas in Turkey the consti tu tional court only restored 
the status quo ante, that means the stage before Islamic inspired polit ical leaders 
of the AKP dared to touch the dogma of strict secularism in the headscarf 
question. 
Both in France and Turkey the debate about the headscarf has led to such a 
dis agreeable and confronting solution due to the lack of integration of religiously 
affiliated persons and milieus by state institutions. Laïcité and secularism have 
been used as a shield to protect from being forced to deal pragmatically with the 
demands and claims of religion in pub lic institutions and to take into account the 
rights of the indi vidual. This ideo logical shield, which only can pretend to 
protect the ‘unity and indivisibility’ of the French and Turkish nations, tends to 
fail now adays as it becomes apparent that in equal ity, unequal treatment, social 
and eco nomic dis advant ages, and conflicts about metaphys ical questions do not 
vanish by keeping religious issues out of the cit izens’ pub lic encounter. Instead 
of de- dramatizing such religious expressions of persons in the name of plurality 
and indi vidual human rights, they were instrumentalized to demarcate the col­
lect ive ‘us’ from the devi at ing ‘them’. This effect is part of a polit ical argumen­
tation about the con ditions of living together, but it is not a demo cratic and 
inclusive way of argumentation among cit izens and polit ical elites. 
While in Turkey female Muslim covering is not a marker of im mig rants, it is 
in France and Ger many; and while in France the polit ical need seems to be 
dealing with religious diversity in the pub lic sphere and not that much with 
getting accustomed to immigration and nat uralization, it is a new ex peri ence for 
the German pub lic to be asked to accept Muslim ‘foreigners’ as (equal) German 
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impression that the socio- psychological need of the majority soci ety for demar­
cation is sometimes stronger than the sys tematic and norm ative determination by 
consti tu tional and other norm ative prin ciples (Berghahn 2010). Although there 
is no doctrine of laïcité in Ger many and no need to keep religious af fili ations 
and symbols strictly out of pub lic institutions, some German Länder par lia ments 
have ‘invented’ such a new doctrine of differentiating the pub lic from the private 
sphere, but have at the same time created a double stand ard to combat exclu­
sively the Muslim headscarf. Although courts did not accept this infringement of 
equal treatment of religions, they never the less approved of the ban against reli­
gious signs as a new way of in ter preting neutrality (Berghahn 2009: 46). Hence 
the model of laïcité or secularism might be copied by a coun try with a totally 
different tradition of relations between state and religion – not in spite of the 
prob lematic polit ical effect and of the anti- Islamic double stand ard but prob ably 
just because of it. Thus the utter explanation for the headscarf ban in Ger many 
where laïcité and strict secularism actu ally fail to jus tify the pro hibitive regula­
tions then seems to be the stubborn assertion of unwillingness to accept long 
approved ‘foreigners’ as equal co- citizens. 
Notes 
1 Espe cially after the Levy sisters’ case (cf. Giraud and Sintomer 2004). 
2 In 2003, President Jacques Chirac commissioned an experts’ group whose role was to 
reflect on religious signs in schools. Officially, the Inde pend ent Commission of 
Reflection on the Application of the Principle of laïcité in the Repub lic began to work 
on mul tiple issues and re com mendations, such as fighting discrimination at work or 
recognizing state holidays for Jews and Muslims. In fact, only the headscarf issue was 
taken for imme diate legis la tion. It finally ad voc ated for a pro hibitionist act on ‘con­
spicuous religious signs at school and in pub lic administration’.
 3 	Loi n° 2004–228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en applica tion du principe de laïcité, le 
port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, 
collèges et lycées pub lics (Law no. 2004–228 of 15 March 2004 concerning, as an 
applica tion of the prin ciple of the separation of church and state, the wearing of 
symbols or garments which show religious affili ation in pub lic pri mary and secondary 
schools). 
4 The de cision of the FCC can be found online, avail able at: www.bverfg.de/entschei­
dungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602.html (accessed 28 Janu ary 2010). 
5 Turkish Constitutional Court, 7.3.1989, 1989/1, 1989/12. 
6 Cf. EU directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC. 
7 Concerning this complaint, the HALDE stated that, because veiled mothers are not 
pupils or civil ser vants, they are not concerned by the applica tion of the Law of 2004 
nor by the applica tion of the Law of 1905. 
8 In 2000, the access to cit izen ship was newly defined by a change from the ethnic defi­
nition of cit izen ship to a mixture of ‘ius sanguinis’ and ‘ius soli’; in 2005 the immi­
gration law changed from a pro hibitive pol icy concerning immigration to a controlled 
and officially accepted admission. 
9 Cf. Rostock and Berghahn (2008). The FCC declared a Bavarian act about the Chris­
tian crucifix in all classrooms in pri mary schools as being unconsti tu tional (1995). 
The de cision nearly caused a rebellion against the FCC among Christian- conservative 
politicians and clergy officials in the southern parts of Germany. 
10 § 38 sec. 2 of the school act of Baden- Württemberg states that teachers are not 
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allowed to ‘to exercise polit ical, religious, ideo logical or sim ilar manifestations that 
may endanger or disturb the neutrality of the Land [= federal state; the authors] 
towards pupils or parents or the polit ical, religious or ideo logical peace of the school’. 
As ‘par ticu larly illegitimate’ the act con siders ‘a beha vi our that can appear to pupils 
or parents to be a teacher’s demonstration against human dignity, non- discrimination, 
the rights of freedom or the free and demo cratic order of the consti tu tion’. In § 57 sec. 
4 of the school act of North Rhine- Westphalia almost the same wording is used. 
11 Sentence 3 of § 38 sec. 2 of the school act of Baden- Württemberg and also of § 57 
sec. 4 of the school act of North Rhine- Westphalia states: ‘The exhibition of Chris tian 
and occidental educational and cultural values or traditions’ how ever does not contra­
dict the duty of neutral behaviour. 
12 This intention was declared by the explanations within the drafts of the bills saying 
that the ban shall not be applic able to Christian- occidental signs and clothes (for the 
state of Hesse, see Sacksofsky 2009: 279). As in reality the only banned religious 
clothes are Muslim headscarves, we can conclude that the headscarf is almost the only 
target of regulation. See the par lia ment docu ment of North Rhine- Westphalia LT- Drs 
14/569, p. 9, LT- Drs 13/4564, p. 8 and par lia ment of Baden- Württemberg, LT- Drs 
13/2793, p. 7. 
13 According to the Council of State: 
X adopted a rad ical practice of her religion incom pat ible with the essential values 
of the French com mun ity, notably with the prin ciple of the equality of the sexes 
and therefore she does not fulfill the con ditions of assimilation listed in the Civil 
Code as a requirement for gaining French citizenship. 
(Herald Tribune, 17 July 2008) 
14 The Belgian par lia ment passed a so- called burqa ban on 29 April 2010; before the 
law comes into effect the Senate has to agree to it as well. 
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9 Non- regulation 
Opportunity for freedom of religion or 
sedimentation of existing power 
structures? 
Rikke Andreassen, Eirini Avramopoulou, 
Nora Gresch, Sevgi Kılıç and Birgit Sauer 
Why ‘non- regulation’? Introduction 
Recent polit ical science liter at ure de veloped coun try typologies in order to high­
light and explain dif fer ences and simil ar ities between coun tries in regulating 
Muslim women’s head and body coverings in Euro pean coun tries (Skjeie 2007; 
Joppke 2009; Sauer 2009). An increasing number of Euro pean coun tries, as for 
instance France, Turkey and some German federal states, have introduced 
restrictive regulations for specific forms of Islamic apparel. Other coun tries such 
as Austria, the Neth er lands and the UK have adopted tolerant or permissive 
approaches, which expli citly allow head covering despite the fierce debates over 
the headscarf. While there are quite a few indic ators which sup port this twofold 
typology (see Chapter 5), it is difficult to distinguish a clear- cut restrictive 
approach in one coun try, which forbids the wearing of religious attire, from tol­
erant ar range ments in other coun tries, which allow body covering (Skjeie 2007: 
138). Rather, there is also evid ence of ‘mixed’ or ‘select ive’ regulation (ibid.). 
However, even this three fold typology of headscarf pol icies in Europe might not 
ana lyt ically grasp the complexity of headscarf regulations. The VEIL pro ject 
rather suggests that regulations differ, espe cially within so- called tolerant coun­
tries, depending on specific sites such as schools, courts, pub lic ser vice and 
private business. Also, regulations do not only depend on different styles of reli­
gious clothing (e.g. hijab, burqa or niqab), but also on the diversity of covered 
women (such as teachers or pupils). 
The research puzzle of this chapter refers to the complexity of ‘mixed regula­
tions’ within so called tolerant coun tries. In four tolerant coun tries of the VEIL 
sample, Austria, Denmark, Greece and UK, we find islands of – what the VEIL 
pro ject suggests labelling – ‘non- regulation’ of headscarf conflicts. Non-
regulation does not de scribe the gen eral absence of regulation but points to the 
fact that sometimes conflicts over head and body covering are solved rather 
select ively. Non- regulation reflects the observation that despite a more or less 
tolerant climate and despite some tolerant regulations for specific cases, only few 
pol icy debates in these coun tries resulted in comprehensive pol icy de cisions and 
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it is note worthy that despite huge mobil iza tion against Muslim im mig rants and a 
growing hostility towards Muslim head and body covering in these coun tries of 
tolerant or mixed headscarf approaches, not many pro hibitive regulations are in 
place. It seems that non- regulation is an appropriate way to react to conflicts 
over Muslim headscarves – and it seems to be a ‘rational’ way of dealing with 
these conflicts by not putting these conflicts on the agenda for a gen eral decision. 
A non- regulation approach is characterized by the absence of an expli cit gen­
eral rule, i.e. legally binding norms such as laws and decrees, for dealing with 
veiling practices at a specific site or with ref er ence to specific body covering. 
Non- regulation is an informal way of governing religious dif fer ence and diver­
sity where conflicts over head and body covering are regulated from case to case. 
A non- regulatory approach towards head and body covering stresses that a spe­
cific regulation only relates to a par ticu lar case of a specific person at a par ticu lar 
time and place, while other situ ations are not regulated. The judgements and 
de cisions (for instance by courts) made in one case are decisive only for that par­
ticu lar situ ation, but are not binding for future de cisions on veiling practices and 
do not estab lish a direct obli ga tion on actors involved in future cases. However, 
in specific conflict situ ations about veiling practices the non- regulation approach 
might come under contestation and has to be argued for, reconfirmed or changed. 
As the chapter will show, this is not only the case in legal sys tems with a 
common law tradition based on case law created by courts like in the UK, but 
also for legal sys tems in the civil law tradition, where binding rules are created 
by par lia ments or issued by the min is ter ial administration, such as Austria, 
Denmark and Greece. 
Although the four coun tries under scrutiny can be characterized as applying 
non- regulation approaches, some gen eral laws and regulations for religious prac­
tices, which directly or indirectly impact on the regulation of the wearing of 
headscarves, are in place, such as the right to religious freedom. These gen eral 
regulations include, first, the Euro pean Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 
which provides the ‘right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, 
including the right of freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs (Article 9). 
Second, some coun tries codified this re cog ni tion of religions in their consti tu­
tions, which also guarantee the freedom of religion. Third, Euro pean coun tries 
have de veloped specific forms of state–church relations, which impact on the 
inter action of a dominant church with state institutions as well as on the relation 
of state institutions with minor ity religions. Fourth, some Euro pean states have 
de veloped institutional settings to sup port majority as well as minor ity churches. 
Fifth, gen eral regulations of anti- discrimination pol icies, e.g. EU anti- 
discrimination directives,1 as well as national anti- discrimination laws and insti­
tutions build a framework for dealing with conflicts over Muslim headgear. 
This chapter ex plores the pos sible rationale of this non- regulation approach. 
Although the chapter cannot explain why the four tolerant coun tries of the VEIL 
sample refrain from gen erally regulating the headscarf issue in specific situ ations 
of conflict and follow a pol icy of non- regulation, we want to give some appro­
priate explanation why the four coun tries share this sim ilar ity – for different sites 
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of soci ety and for different forms of body covering. The chapter argues that non- 
regulation occurs due to the fact that in some conflicts, which are not gen erally 
decided on, actors try to avoid the mobil iza tion of bias around the headscarf. 
Hence, we as sume that non- regulation is a prob lem solution, which aims at not 
openly offending the freedom of religion and non- discrimination laws. The 
chapter wants to give examples by which governance mech an isms and frames 
specific actors are invested with power. Also, we want to show how specific 
frames and, hence, prob lem or conflict solutions become crucial in this form of 
governance of religious dif fer ence in order to explain the different con sequences 
of non- regulation pol icies in the four countries.
 More specifically, the aim of the chapter is, first, to show that non- regulation 
in so- called tolerant coun tries does not automatically sup port tolerant regulation 
practices, i.e. that non- regulation does not (always) foster the freedom of reli­
gion and the free choice of women to wear the veil. On the contrary, non-
regulation of specific conflicts in coun tries labelled as ‘tolerant’ might also lead 
to – informal – pro hibitive regulations as in the cases of Denmark and UK. Non- 
regulation might also maintain the status quo of a conflict without tolerant or 
pro hibitive de cisions as in the cases of Austria and Greece. It may also lead to a 
pro hibitive climate and practices towards Muslim head covering as in the two 
latter coun tries. Hence, non- regulation is a form of muddling through, which 
how ever, might lead to case- by-case pro hibition and involves power ful de cisions 
that infringe upon the rights of the individual. 
Second, non- regulation runs the danger of reproducing existing power set­
tings and re- establishing either the power of state institutions, dominant churches 
or private business to decide against veiling without mobilizing too much bias. 
Third, non- regulation effects indi vidualization of the prob lem of religious 
freedom, because the avoidance of mobil iza tion of bias around headscarf con­
flicts also pro hibits col lect ive mobil iza tion against the infringement of the right 
to religious freedom and forces indi vidualistic solutions of the conflict. 
In the next section we will set out our research approach. We then de scribe 
examples of a pol icy of non- regulation in the four coun tries. Third we ana lyse 
the governance setting, that is the estab lished state–church relations in the coun­
try sample which impact on the framing of headscarf issues in the con text of 
religious freedom. This ‘governance setting’ – i.e. the institutions and the frames 
– helps to understand the rationale of non- regulation pol itics in the four 
countries. 
Non- regulation as governance: nondecision, discourse, and 
power 
The theor et ical background to explain non- regulation pol itics is informed by 
four strands: first, the concept of governance, second, the framework of nonde­
cision and power, third, a discursive- institutionalist per spect ive and, fourth, the 
impact of new forms of conduct and subjectivation in Michel Foucault’s (2008) 
notion of ‘gov ern mentality’. The chapter suggests, first, that non- regulation is a 
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specific form of governance (Pierre and Peters 2000), namely a regulative form 
of governing religious dif fer ence and diversity. In contrast to hierarchical, state- 
centric methods of governance which employ codifications such as laws or 
binding court de cisions as their steering tech no logy, regulative forms of govern­
ance are characterized by informal mech an isms of de cision making on social and 
polit ical issues. These informal pro cesses of governance espe cially vest non- 
state actors with power who then are enabled to enforce specific claims in such 
nego ti ation pro cesses (Koenig 2007: 915). Governing through nonde cision is a 
way to deal with highly contested issues in order to include the whole diversity 
of actors, but also to exclude actors, and to keep conflict solutions open for 
future de cisions. Hence, non- regulation may not be a (power) neutral pro cess of 
self- governance of people and – in our case – of religious freedom and choice, 
but to the contrary, a power ful setting, located in well estab lished power ful insti­
tutional structures and discursive constellations. Non- regulation as governance 
of religious diversity is embedded in institutional settings of long estab lished 
state–church relations (Fetzer and Soper 2005) as well as country- specific forms 
of regulating anti- discrimination pol icies for instance on the labour market. 
Second, a non- regulation approach can be understood according to Bachrach 
and Baratz’s concept of the two ‘faces of power’. While the first face of power 
refers to the power (of polit ical institutions and actors) to make de cisions on 
issues, the second face of power is a ‘covert power’ through ‘nonde cision’. This 
covert power is exercised by confining the scope of de cision making to rel at ively 
‘safe’ issues and excluding other issues from discourse and de cision (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1962: 948). Nonde cision strat egies aim at ex ploiting ‘some kinds of 
conflicts’ and suppressing others in order to mobilize or demobilize bias 
(Schattschneider 1960: 71). This ‘organ izing out’ of some issues in the realm of 
pol itics and de cision making – such as not deciding on headscarf issues – is, fol­
low ing Bachrach and Baratz, a power ful pro cess. Limiting de cision making to 
‘rel at ively non- controversial mat ters, by influ en cing com mun ity values and 
polit ical pro ced ures and rituals’ is an ‘extremely im port ant’ face of power 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 949), because it prevents ‘a latent issue from 
becoming a question for de cision’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 641). Nonde­
cision is a ‘de cision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or mani­
fest challenge to the values or inter ests of the de cision maker’ (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1970: 9). The power of nonde cision is exercised by ‘shaping or reinforc­
ing predominant norms, precedents, myths, institutions, and pro ced ures that 
undergird and characterize the polit ical pro cess’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1975: 
900f.). Power in nonde cision pro cesses is exercised ‘by manipulating the domi­
nant com mun ity values, myths and polit ical institutions and pro ced ures’ 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1963: 632). With ref er ence to this approach, the chapter 
intends to explain the non- regulation approaches in the four coun tries less as a 
sign of tolerance towards minor ity religion but more as a ‘face of power’ in the 
new forms of governance of religious diversity and difference. 
Third, in accordance with Bachrach and Baratz, new dir ec tions in pol icy 
studies emphas ize that the construction of meaning through ideas and hence the 
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formation of a pol icy prob lem and solution (Bacchi 1999) in governance pro­
cesses are im port ant features in pol icy making (Schmidt 2010). The chapter sug­
gests that non- regulation might be accompanied by specific meanings and 
in ter pretations of the headscarf cor res ponding with specific institutional settings 
of state–church relations. Put differently: state–church relations and the framing 
of religious freedom in headscarf debates might explain simil ar ities and dif fer­
ences of non- regulation in the four coun tries. Therefore, this chapter will detect 
the ‘norms’ and ‘myths’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1975: 900) in selected headscarf 
conflicts.
 Fourth, and finally, non- regulation of headscarf issues can be conceptualized 
as a new form of self- government of Muslim women. Non- regulation puts the 
burden of dealing with the ‘unsecured’, i.e. non- regulated situ ations and with 
pos sible infringements of the right to religious freedom and to cover on the indi­
vidual. It is the woman who has to choose to uncover in an unclear situ ation of 
non- regulation. Hence, non- regulation might be understood as gov ern mentality 
in the Foucauldian sense – that is as a way of regulation by indirectly pushing 
the indi vidual to behave in specific ways (Foucault 2008). 
The next section will de scribe non- regulatory settings in Austria and Greece 
and focus on substantial legal cases in Denmark and the UK concerning appeals 
of veiled Muslim women for defending their choices to wear the veil. While 
non- regulation did not lead to pro hibitive de cisions in Greece and no formal pro­
hibitive de cision was made in Austria at all, in Denmark and the UK, the women 
lost their court appeals, forcing them to uncover while the non- regulatory 
approach was expli citly confirmed. 
How does non- regulation work? The case- by-case approach 
as characteristic for governing through non- regulation 
Until 2009, there have been very few pub licly discussed cases of headscarf con­
flicts in Austria, as for instance in schools at the turn of the century, which at 
that time were solved at the school level. However, a conflict at a school in Linz 
resulted in a decree of the Minister of Education in 2004 expli citly allowing 
teachers and pupils to wear a headscarf. Also, the city of Vienna follows a toler­
ant approach, allowing the hijab for pub lic ser vants in Vienna. Not least due to 
the involvement of the Islamic Religious Community of Austria (IRCA) in these 
decision- making pro cesses, Austria is still rather accommodative towards head-
scarves despite the right- wing mobil iza tion against Islam (see Chapter 7). 
However, the coun try also applies a non- regulatory approach with respect to 
other social sites and to other styles of clothing (Gresch and Hadj- Abdou 2008). 
One pro hibitive Austrian case occurred which ended in non- regulation: during 
the proceedings of the so- called Viennese- Terror pro cess in April 2008, the 
senate pro hibited the attendance of the defendant Mona S., unless she removed 
her niqab. Mona S. refused to unveil and was thus expelled from the courtroom. 
The case did not result in a gen eral pro hibition of body covering in the court­
room, but in non- regulation there seems to be a consensus that body covering 
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should not be allowed in courtrooms. Also, no specific gen eral norm exists for 
other domains, and a gen eral practice of tolerating the headscarf and full body 
covering still characterizes the Austrian situ ation. One could conclude that non- 
regulation is a way of silencing the issue and avoiding the mobil iza tion of bias 
by the par ties in gov ern ment and by religious com munit ies as part of the consen­
sus demo cracy. Despite a tolerant self- understanding and despite summoning a 
tolerant his tory, the coun try refrains from actively sup porting veiled women, for 
instance on the labour market (Rosenberger and Sauer 2011). Hence, the status 
quo of discriminating practices in a chilly climate towards migrants and Muslims 
is maintained through a pol icy of non- regulation. 
Greece has no gen eral law or decree regulating the wearing of headscarves. 
In Western Thrace, the Greek region with an autochthonous Turkish Muslim 
minor ity, the headscarf is allowed in all pub lic and private institutions. School 
dir ectors are authorized to decide on pupils’ dress code – including headscarves. 
No headscarf cases have been brought to the courts to date; how ever, some pub­
licly debated conflicts have occurred. Headscarf issues emerge; the Muslim 
minor ity popu la tion of Western Thrace, as well as the position of Muslim 
migrant women in Greece, are being discussed. In Western Thrace, these con­
flicts are conflicts between the Orthodox popu la tion and the Muslim minor ity. 
For instance, in 2006 the owner of a cafeteria banished a veiled woman. After a 
pub lic debate, the owner of the cafeteria changed his pol icy towards veiled 
women, allowing them to visit the place (Avramopoulou 2008: 14f.). This con­
flict did not attract much pub lic debate (ibid.: 25). Another headscarf conflict 
occurred in the Muslim minor ity secondary school of Komotini in 2004 where 
veiled pupils provoked the rejection of parents and teachers (ibid.: 14f.). As there 
is no pro hibitive legis la tion, the school’s headmaster, who issued re com­
mendations against veiling, decided on this conflict. Nevertheless, some students 
con tinued to wear the veil. Outside the area of Western Thrace no issue has been 
raised con sidering the employment of veiled migrant women in the pub lic sector, 
where only Greek cit izens are eli gible to be employed.
 The UK’s tradition of tolerance towards Muslim body covering in the last 
years is accompanied by a non- regulatory approach in conflict situ ations, mainly 
over the niqab and jilbab. The effect has been to create a climate which has 
accommodated the wearing of various forms of Islamic dress without feeling any 
need to legislate against them. Positively, this has allowed for much freedom of 
expression and religious freedom for Muslim women, and room to manoeuvre 
for schools and other local institutions in drawing up dress codes appropriate to 
their members and em ployees. Disputes tend to be handled case by case and in a 
pragmatic way. However, the situ ation changed. In 2002, Shabina Begum sued 
Denbigh High School in Luton/London. The school administration had rejected 
her request to wear the jilbab and insisted that she wear the approved school 
uniform for Muslim female pupils. In the two years that followed, Begum did 
not attend school and in Septem ber 2004, she was admitted to a different school 
which permitted her to wear the jilbab. The Judicial Committee of the House of 
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jilbab, after it had formulated its uniform pol icy so as to include options of 
Muslim dress code, was not a breach of the pupil’s human rights under Article 9 
of the ECHR. Again, in 2007, a 12-year- old pupil in Buckinghamshire girls’ 
grammar school legally challenged the school’s uniform pol icy, which did not 
allow the niqab. The girl, again, finally went to an al tern ative school where the 
niqab was allowed. Again the High Court ruled that her rights under ECHR 
Article 9 were not violated. The schools’ ‘infringement’ of the right to wear a 
jilbab or niqab were justified, under the pro vi sion of the ECHR, because of their 
need to protect the rights and freedoms of others, that is, non- covered pupils. In 
his judgement, Justice Silber stressed that he was dealing with one par ticu lar 
case – not the broader issue of whether the niqab should be worn in schools or 
anywhere else (Kılıç 2008). 
What is im port ant to draw from these two cases is that while school uniform 
pol icy provides a guide to schools it does not in any way inhibit a pupil from 
challenging it in a court of law. The judgements in these two cases are not a 
‘blanket rule’ on the jilbab or the niqab but rather they only concern the cases 
that were before the bench and did not bind future de cisions on the jilbab or the 
niqab. However, the judgements do create a precedent for how other schools and 
pupils might deal with sim ilar cases, i.e. the results of the judgements might 
result in fewer pupils trying to challenge their school’s uniform codes. In both 
cases the claimants failed to convince the judiciary that the school breached their 
right to manifest their religion because there was a place avail able at an equi val­
ent school that would let the girls wear the jilbab or niqab. It seems like this 
British case- by-case approach might lead to pro hibitions of veils and head-
scarves in decentralized situ ations, thereby allowing for pro hibitions in areas 
where gen eral national pro hibitions could not have passed. 
Denmark still has expli cit tolerant regulations, allowing the hijab in schools 
and in par lia ment; no national pro hibitions exist. However, the coun try has 
moved towards restrictive regulation in the pub lic sphere in the last years, as for 
instance a law from 2009 which pro hibits the wearing of a headscarf for judges 
in the courtroom. Also, some high schools have passed a code of conduct pro­
hibiting female students from wearing niqabs and burqas. Most likely, it would 
never be pos sible to pass a gen eral national ban for students as it would be con­
sidered religious discrimination (Andreassen 2007: 156ff.). However, in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, women’s right to wear headscarves while working in 
retail was heavily debated (Andreassen 2005). Back then, several actors argued 
that headscarves were not accept able in Danish retail, while at the same time the 
coun try applies a non- regulatory approach on the labour market. 
In 1999, Denmark had its first pub licly disputed headscarf case. Amin 
Baktyar, a 14-year- old female intern in the retail store Magasin was fired because 
she did not want to unveil. She made her case pub lic and it was taken to court by 
the Documentation and Counselling Center for Racial Discrimination (DRC) 
(Dokumentations og rådgivningscenter om racediskrimination) and in 2000 
Magasin was convicted of indirect discrimination and sentenced to pay 10,000 
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com panies to change their previous practice of not hiring veiled women and to 
give up previous requirements pro hibiting headscarves and veils.3 
A sim ilar case occurred in the de part ment store chain Føtex, part of Dansk 
Supermarked, which was brought to court twice by the labour union HK (Handel 
og kontor, i.e. commercial and clerical em ployees). The first case was held at the 
High Court, which acquitted Føtex of charges in 2003. This sentence was 
appealed and the case was taken to the Supreme Court, which in 2005 also 
acquitted Føtex. The judges ruled that Føtex’s headscarf pro hibition was not a 
question of discrimination but rather a question of uniform clothing. According 
to the fired employee’s contract with Føtex from March 2001, the claimant had 
agreed that her employment was based on ‘the rules and duties de scribed in the 
staff regulations’, including clothing regulations, which pro hibited wearing the 
veil for em ployees who are in contact with costumers. 
Today, a decade after these disputes, the debate has died and hijab covered 
women are vis ible in several stores and sectors of the labour market. Most likely, 
it would never have been pos sible to pass a gen eral national ban on headscarves 
on the labour market in Denmark (Andreassen 2007: 156ff.), but the legal 
outcome of the Føtex case makes it pos sible to con tinue discrimination against 
women with headscarves and veils. The Danish approach of deciding case by 
case, instead of a gen eral national de cision, can therefore be in ter preted as a 
means to maintaining the status quo – and this is maintaining the discriminatory 
attitude towards headscarves. Moreover, the Danish court cases show that 
freedom rights are expli citly conceptualized as indi vidual rights by the employ­
ers who argue against centralized legis la tion and for their right to determine the 
dress codes in their com panies (Andreassen et al. 2008). Moreover, these cases 
show that the right of Muslim women to wear the veil depends on where they 
are employed. The Føtex case proved that employers’ rights to decide their 
em ployees’ dress code and codes of conduct outweighed the women’s right to 
express their religion. 
We can summar ize that tolerant coun tries apply non- regulation in situ ations 
where the right to religious freedom runs danger of being infringed through pro­
hibitive de cisions. Not breaching this right openly but never the less limiting the 
right to cover, the coun tries refrain from gen eral de cisions but go towards non- 
regulation. The section also showed that the four coun tries apply two different 
forms of non- regulation: Austria and Greece go towards non- regulation in con­
flict situ ations without gen erally moving towards pro hibitive solutions of these 
conflicts. However, the two coun tries show pro hibitive tendencies in a gen eral 
tolerant sur round ing. The UK and Denmark decided for gen eral non- regulation 
but for a pro hibitive approach in specific cases of conflict. 
Having ex plored the ways that the four coun tries deal with conflicts over 
veiled Muslim women fol low ing the non- regulatory approach, we will de scribe 
the institutional and discursive setting by focusing on state–church relations, 
which influence the framing of the right to religious freedom, and on the 
dominant framing strat egies in the veiling debates of the four coun tries in the 
next section of the chapter. We will identi fy framing strat egies that foster 
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non- regulation and this form of power and legitimize the denial of the indi vidual 
right to religious expression. 
The governance of non- regulation: church–state relations 
and the framing of religious freedom 
The tolerant but non- regulatory coun tries share one common feature which is 
decisive for the regulation of the accommodation of religions and the govern­
ance setting of non- regulation, namely a close relation between the state and the 
churches and/or the dominance of a par ticu lar church. Nevertheless, the four 
coun tries differ in the framing of the right to religious freedom. The aim of this 
section is to depict the multifaceted and ambivalent ways by which a non-
regulative approach is reaffirmed without neces sar ily implying a tolerant head-
scarf regime. For this reason, we ex plore how a ‘rights language’ is used so as to 
mediate values, perceptions, power structures and institutional ar range ments. We 
would like to ex plore how this language of rights is charac ter istically incorp or­
ated in certain con texts so as to demarcate the limits of tolerance and inclusion 
towards the threatening spectre of a female Muslim- religious subject. 
The basic prin ciple re gard ing Austrian state–church relations, which is often 
categorized as ‘cooperative’ (Brocker et al. 2003: 14), can rather be character­
ized as a ‘pluralistic inclusion’ of religion into the pub lic realm (Kalb et al. 
1996: 50; 2003: 42ff.; Gresch et al. 2008: 418). Islam was given the status of a 
‘pub lic coopera tion’ in 1979 and recog nized on grounds of the Recognition Law 
and the so- called Islam Law of 1912 that entitled people practising Islam to 
certain rights during the time of the Austrian- Hungarian Empire (Heine and 
Kroissenbrunner 2001: 22). The Islamic Religious Community of Austria 
(IRCA) has thus the same rights as the other recog nized religious com munit ies 
like Buddhism or the Cath olic Church and it is included in the Austrian consen­
sus demo cratic ways of polit ical parti cipa tion, consultation and nego ti ation pro­
cesses. This way of governing religious plur al ism is framed as the Austrian way 
of neutrality and lib eralism (Gresch and Hadj- Abdou 2009). However, the domi­
nant position of the Cath olic Church is maintained by the concordat. 
In Austrian headscarf debates, the right to religious expression is closely 
related to the coun try’s institutionalized model of pluralistic inclusion of reli­
gions in the pub lic realm by stressing the re cog ni tion and equal treatment of 
Islam. In 2003, Andreas Khol of the ÖVP, the pres id ent of par lia ment at the 
time, emphas ized that the equal treatment of religions should be ensured (A15). 
Jürgen Wallner, a jurist from the University of Vienna, stressed that the prin ciple 
of neutrality is stronger than the separation of state and church (A33). Further­
more, the privileged position of the Cath olic Church would come under scrutiny 
and be affected if religious rights of other religious com munit ies were to be 
infringed upon, as stated by the social- democratic youth organ iza tion SJÖ (A31). 
Also, Carla Amina Baghajati, the pub lic relations officer of the IRCA stresses 
that wearing the headscarf is ‘a very personal de cision’ which symbolizes a 
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Religious Community specifically refer to the fact that Islam has been recog­
nized as a religion in Austria since 1912, and hence has freedom of religious 
expression and auto nomy (A4). 
In a sim ilar vein, representatives of the Cath olic Church refer to the right of 
religious expression by arguing that wearing the headscarf is protected by the 
ECHR, and thus a pro hibition has to been seen as unlawful (A2). Thus, the argu­
ment of legal re cog ni tion as well as the in ter pretation of veiling as religious 
expression and personal religious obli ga tion – as stated by the ÖVP Minister for 
Education Elisabeth Gehrer for instance (A37) – and, hence, a per spect ive that 
pro hibition would breach human rights, is carried in this framing. 
This framing is also embedded in the gender related arguments that a pro­
hibition would not prevent oppression or discrimination of women. The im port­
ance of the self- determination of Muslim women is espe cially emphas ized by 
Muslim groups (A5, A12, A13, A14). Representatives of the women’s move­
ment criticize the argument that veiled women di min ish the achievements of 
majority women and stress that Muslim women are self- determined, but can only 
be emancipated if they work or have the oppor tun ity to work, while they are still 
discriminated against on the Austrian labour market (A39). 
In Austria, veiling is perceived by most of the actors as a religiously com­
manded clothing instruction and protected in the name of uni ver sal human rights. 
In Austrian headscarf debates, the framing of the indi vidual right of freedom of 
religious expression is linked to the institutionalization of church–state relations 
and embedded in the legal re cog ni tion of religious com munit ies. State neutrality 
is understood as a way to accommodate equal treatment of all religious com­
munit ies. Austrian actors stress the right to religious freedom and the coun try’s 
tolerant approach to religious diversity. Hence, this framing makes it discur­
sively im pos sible to regulate headscarf conflicts in a pro hibitive way. However, 
the tend ency towards curtailing the right to veil pro hibits accommodative prac­
tices and regulation in pub lic conflicts and leads to non- regulation in order not to 
mobilize too much bias, which might then provoke further restrictive claims by 
right- wing politicians for instance (see Chapter 7). 
Greece is a coun try in which Orthodox Chris tianity is the official state reli­
gion, deeply en tangled with the pro cess of nation building since the period of the 
War of Independence of 1821. A series of administrative, institutional and fiscal 
practices sup port this tight relation between the state and the church and the 
privileges of the Greek Orthodox Church despite a slow pro cess of seculariza­
tion since the 1980s (Avramopoulou 2008: 43f.). In par ticu lar, the Ministry of 
Education and Religion pays for the sal ar ies and the religious training of the 
Greek Orthodox clergy (a regulation that was implemented by law in 1952) and 
also finances the restoration and maintenance of churches (ibid.: 44). A national 
law guarantees the freedom of expression of civil ser vants and forbids discrimi­
nation on grounds of religious belief (ibid.: 51). 
The Muslim minor ity of Western Thrace has been officially recog nized as a 
minor ity since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Muslims of Western Thrace are 
therefore entitled to religious rights with ref er ence to their status as Greek 
 
 
Non-regulation  179 
cit izens (ibid.: 7). Different from that, the rights of religious minor it ies are mar­
ginal. For instance, only in 2006 was the authority to estab lish ‘Houses of 
Prayer’ (mosques) trans ferred from the local or tho dox bishop to the Ministry of 
Education and Religion through the law 3467/2006 Article 27. Thus, even if 
during the last years a slow pro cess of separation between the state and the 
church has begun, it has still not resulted in any prac tical measures. 
Greek discussions over veiling practices are mainly dominated by debates 
concerning other Euro pean coun tries, namely France and Turkey. One im port ant 
framing is anti- secularism. These voices positioning themselves expli citly 
against Euro pean secularism stem either from the Chris tian Orthodox Church as 
expressed by its former Archbishop Christodoulos (GR10) or from intellectuals 
of Chris tian af fili ations (GR16). According to them, even if modernity and 
Enlightenment have played an im port ant role for the de velopment of humanity, 
the need for humans to belong to a group is crucial and thus the headscarf should 
be perceived as a resistance symbol against indi vidualism like it is lived or 
enacted within the Euro pean cultural model (GR16). By arguing for the right of 
freedom of religious expression and hence for the pos sib il ity to veil, Orthodox 
Chris tian voices, such as the Chris tian con ser vat ive intellectual Christos Gian­
naras (GR18), try to safeguard the author itat ive primacy of Chris tianity as 
national religion. This is due to the fact that in such arguments Muslim ‘other­
ness’ does not yet seem to appear as threatening ‘at home’; hence, expressing 
solid arity towards other religions and sup porting the manifestation of religious 
symbols in other coun tries (like in France) secures a safe position for religious 
pres ence within Europe and in Greece. On the other hand, Muslim voices such 
as the theo lo gian Cahide Haseki (GR19), member of the Western Thrace Uni­
versity Graduates Association, and the Mufti of Komotini Metso Cemali (GR9), 
also deploy the rhet oric of rights and the discourse of freedom of religious 
expression, while they depict a need to reconceptualize state–church relations, 
both in Europe and in Greece. They argue for state neutrality. Hence, a paradox 
occurs: the Muslim representatives ad voc ate for secular neutrality, whereas the 
Orthodox Chris tian representatives are positioned against any pro cess of secu­
larization in Greek soci ety and therefore argue against restrictions of veiling. In 
Greece, freedom of religious expression is used by actors affiliated with Ortho­
dox Chris tian identification so as to stra tegically protect a homo gen eous national 
religious image against secularist claims. On the other side, it appears that the 
same demand is voiced by Muslim representatives who argue that in order to 
protect the accommodation of non- Christian religious practices, a form of state 
neutrality should be implemented. 
Denmark is defined as a Prot est ant Lutheran coun try. The Danish National 
Evangelical Lutheran Church is a state church and enjoys special privileges 
according to the Constitution. While the Constitution grants freedom of religion, 
the hier archy of religions is not ques tion able. The Danish National Evangelical 
Lutheran Church is therefore quite power ful and is in teg rated into several insti­
tutions in Denmark. In the Danish headscarf debates, the right to freedom of reli­
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freedom frame sup ports a uni versal istic understanding of rights, but at the same 
time this right is connected to values stemming from the par ticu larity of adher­
ing to a national identity. This par ticu lar Danish identity is constructed as inter­
related to Chris tianity. As in the Danish People’s Party’s argument, the freedom 
rights are nationalized; they are ‘Danish freedom rights’ (DK4). Furthermore, it 
carries pre- constructed images of who can be positioned as a demo cratic and 
emancipated subject. In a parlia ment ary debate about headscarves, the Con­
servative Party’s spokesperson, Else Theill Sørensen (DK5) as well as the popu­
list right- wing Danish People’s Party’s spokesperson, Louise Frevert (DK4) 
argued that headscarves are a sign of female oppression which is therefore 
‘against Danish norms, Danish values and our culture’ (DK4). 
This might be explained by ref er ence to the Danish state–church relations. 
Since Chris tianity is an in teg rated part of the Danish consti tu tion and Danish 
soci ety, ‘Danish’ freedom rights and freedom of religion become limited to 
Chris tian expressions of religion. This creates a paradox in the Danish headscarf 
debates, where most actors are not arguing for a gen eral national pro hibition of 
headscarves but rather frame headscarves as oppressive, as for instance authors 
in the leftist lib eral daily Politiken (DK14, DK15, DK16). Freedom rights are 
reduced to rights of par ticu lar subjects with clear connotations of national and 
religious charac ter istics. Because the wish to veil is in ter preted as an indi vidual 
pref er ence and not as a right or religious obli ga tion, the right of freedom of reli­
gious expression does not appear as being violated: not least of all because a 
violation would negate the self- portrayed image of Danishness as lib eral and all- 
inclusive, and it would controvert laws sup porting anti- discrimination and 
human rights declarations. As a result of this stra tegic framing, it is pos sible to 
argue simul tan eously that indi vidual rights should be protected while restricting 
the indi vidual right of religious freedom and excluding women who want to 
follow veiling practices.
 In the UK, both England and Scotland have estab lished Chris tian ‘state 
churches’, whilst Wales and Northern Ireland do not, but have histories of estab­
lishment. The privileges accorded to the state churches, namely the Church of 
England and the Church of Scotland are residual and include: the mon arch is the 
supreme governor of the Church of England, some church legis la tion has to go 
through par lia ment, politicians have some say in election of senior clergy, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and the Moderator of the Church of Scotland have 
prominent cultural positions, and a number of seats in the House of Lords are 
reserved for bishops. 
Also, religious plur al ism and freedom has been an essential part of British 
soci ety due to the coun try’s his tory of immigration. It is based on a strong lib eral 
focus on indi vidual rights. Moreover, the coun try has a long and active tradition 
of equal treatment and anti- discrimination institutions. The Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB), for instance, receives gov ern ment funding. State funding of 
Islamic schools is also avail able. The pro mo tion of British cit izen ship lessons 
for Muslim chil dren while they are attending mosque schools is also part of the 
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The norm ative values stressed in the British headscarf debate are the religious 
rights argument, the im port ance of religious plur al ism as well as the British 
values of lib eralism, fairness and politeness. The ref er ence to lib eralism is dis­
cussed in terms of indi vidual rights and choices as well as being tolerant as key 
com pon ents for the definition of British self- understanding within the veil 
debate. Here, the estab lished church of state that enjoys signi fic ant privileges in 
comparison to all other religious com munit ies, serves as the stand ard against 
which equal treatment can be claimed on the basis of fairness (Kılıç 2008). The 
right of religious expression is thus understood as a human right of the indi vidual 
that can claim equal treatment in regard to its indi vidual choices and as a part of 
a group, which is framed as a prin ciple of lib eralism and British values. 
The value of tolerance is also referred to by Muslim actors in the sense that 
the intolerance they ex peri ence in British soci ety represents an infringement on 
their human rights (ibid). These values, on the other hand, are the crucial ref er­
ence points to argue for regulations of the full veil, because communicating with 
women in a full veil contradicts politeness and is in ter preted as concealing beha­
vi our from the com mun ity and is contrary to the demo cratic prin ciple of open­
ness (UK20). Thus, in the British debate it is the identification of the British 
self- definition as a lib eral, fair and tolerant soci ety as well as the emphasis of not 
identi fying as a secular state that is linked to the framing of the right to freedom 
of religious expression. Religious representatives and Muslim groups (UK14) 
argue for their right to religious expression without the interference of the state. 
In par ticu lar, the Muslim com mun ity argues that veiling is a prere quis ite of reli­
gious faith and that it is a woman’s right to follow Islamic ruling (UK14). In 
Britain, Muslim women stress that the veil empowers them and that veiling 
stands for freedom of religious expression (UK15). In a sim ilar vein, Rowan 
Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury and leader of the world’s Anglicans, 
argues that the UK is not a secular coun try and that religion is a core facet of 
British institutions (UK18). Intellectuals also defend the right of women to reli­
gious expression and trace correlations between nuns and Muslim women rather 
than between terrorists, funda mentalists and veiled Muslims (UK11). However, 
equal treatment of all indi viduals meets its limits when faced with a woman 
wearing a niqab. This is actu ally the only iconic status that could easily jeopard­
ize the entrenched borderlines of demo cracy, national cit izen ship and gender 
pol itics in the UK as it appears to negate, in practice, the well cherished values 
inherent in the self- perception of ‘Britishness’. 
To sum up: the frame ana lysis of pol icy docu ments from the four coun tries 
(see introduction to the book) shows that ‘religious freedom’ appeared to be one 
of the most frequent frames used by actors of different ideo logical and polit ical 
affili ations in the non- regulation countries. 
Understanding politics of non- regulation: conclusions 
In this chapter we have argued that in coun tries with a non- regulatory approach 
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settings are invested with power through governing by nonde cision. A non- 
regulatory approach as a form of governing religious dif fer ences is oscillating 
between the poles of taking the indi vidual rights ser iously on one side, but on 
the other side simul tan eously using the framing and granting of these rights to 
solidify the respective dominant power relations in the field of state and church 
relations in Austria, Greece and the UK, namely the dominant Churches, and in 
the field of state and market relations in Denmark, namely the employers. By 
non- regulation, Austria tries to balance growing mobil iza tion against the Muslim 
veil by right- wing par ties with the claim for national traditions of tolerance 
towards Islam. The coun try avoids tolerant regulations in order not to mobilize 
bias on the issue of veiling. In Greece, the non- regulatory approach legitimizes 
refraining from introducing restrictive meas ures because this would have secu­
larizing con sequences for the dominant Orthodox Church. 
Court de cisions, as in the conflicts de scribed in Denmark and UK, stall the 
polit ical pro cess. In Denmark, governing through non- regulation is a way not to 
grant religious freedom rights and to prevent the enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws on the labour market. Here, non- regulation legitimizes the 
existing mode of regulation between the state and the market, en ab ling employ­
ers to discriminate against em ployees due to their religious practice. UK authori­
ties in the school conflicts over the Muslim veil give privilege to the dominance 
of Chris tian norms as well as of school authorities to decide on the access to 
schools. It seems as if the four coun tries do not want to run the risk of being 
accused of practising double stand ards by privileging the majority church or not 
complying with EU anti- discrimination directives. 
While institutional ar range ments of close state–church relations explain the 
claim- making leverage of actors advocating for the protection of the right to 
freedom of religious expression in the four coun tries, these ref er ences to freedom 
of religious expression are con textualized and related to the very par ticu lar 
national context and respectively national governance settings. The ana lyses of 
the headscarf debates in Austria, Greece, Denmark and UK dem on strate that the 
arguments about ‘rights’ and the legitimizing strat egies of religious freedom are 
interconnected to par ticu lar his tor ical, cultural, religious and national con texts 
and institutional settings and, again, cannot be easily detached from the author­
itat ive powers that these interrelations carry. 
Freedom of religious expression appears to be debated in terms of granting 
rights to par ticu lar religious groups, as is the case in Austria and Greece. The two 
non- secular and dominantly Chris tian coun tries grant religious minor ity com­
munit ies certain rights and em brace religious alterity. However, looking at the
headscarf debates as an example of how close church–state relations are condu­
cive to the enjoyment of indi vidual participatory and re cog ni tion rights, the full
parti cipa tion of the religious ‘others’ as national cit izens is an issue of con tention 
in these two coun tries as well. In Austria, it is less the right to religious freedom
rather than claims of neutrality and the ref er ence to the historic tradition of toler­
ance that illus trate a pluralistic model of religious governance. In Greece, anti- 
secularism actu ally indicates a strong reaffirmation of national homo gen eity. 
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Nevertheless, Muslim women both in Greece and in Austria face prob lems of 
integration and have to struggle to gain their right to be fully included in soci ety 
as equal cit izens (Gresch and Hadj- Abdou 2009). Austria avoids curtailing indi­
viduals’ rights to religious freedom and to cover or to break with the his tory of 
religious plurality by introducing restrictive legis la tion or a gen eral pro hibitive 
ruling and hence reacts with non- regulation. 
In Denmark and the UK, freedom of religious expression is debated as the 
right of the indi vidual, who can claim equal treatment in regard to her/his indi­
vidual choices. However, to grant rights in Denmark in the name of indi vidual 
protection might lead to exclusion by claiming ‘Danishness’ as a prere quis ite of 
rights on the one hand or by in ter preting veiling not as a right but as an indi­
vidual choice on the other hand. Non- regulation sup ports this framing and hence 
the exclusion of veiled women from the right to religious freedom. Similarly in 
Britain, indi vidual rights have to comply with so- called ‘British values’. Hence, 
in both latter coun tries, non- regulation is exclusive in framing the right to reli­
gious freedom as a ‘national’ right. 
We can conclude that due to these mech an isms the mode of non- regulation of 
veiling issues does not initiate and foster anti- discrimination legis la tion that 
would sup port the choices of Muslim women. Non- regulation runs the danger of 
pro hibiting veiled women from claiming their right to cover in order to 
strengthen the dominant church as in Austria, Greece and UK, or the ‘free’ 
market as in Denmark. Moreover, the examples show that non- regulation 
becomes a practice of gov ern mentality, which indi vidualizes women. Non-
regulation seems to be a tech no logy of the self through which covered women 
have to find their own indi vidual solutions, for instance to find new schools or 
new job oppor tun ities. These women have to decide how to clothe and to behave 
in order to fit to the ‘we’ without having the right to claim rights. Moreover, 
non- regulation is a practice that makes it difficult to or gan ize against the 
infringement of the right to religious freedom through col lect ive action because 
account abil ity in non- regulation cases is absent. 
Notes 
1 Directive 2000/78/EC: Council Directive estab lishing a gen eral framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation; this directive forbids discrimination on the 
grounds of religion. 
2 Foreningen Nydanskers news letter, Septem ber 2000, online, avail able at: www. 
foreningen- nydansker.dk/brevet/2000/sep/septema.html (accessed 28 Febru ary 2011).
 
3 Månedsbrevet (Foreningen Nydansker, Janu ary 2001), online, avail able at: www.
 
foreningen- nydansker.dk/brevet/2001/jan/janart1.html (accessed 28 Febru ary 2011).
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10 	 Muslim women’s participation in 
the veil controversy 
Austria and the UK compared 
Leila Hadj- Abdou and Linda Woodhead 
As this book ex plores, female Muslim dress in Europe has become a symbol of
much wider issues, including gender relations, migration pol icies, national identi­
ties, secularism and multiculturalism. The veiled Muslim woman has become
something to see through rather than to see. As Birgit Sauer (2008) stated, ‘The
bodies of Muslim women became a battlefield of conflicts over values and identity
pol itics.’ The veil is good to think with – or at least to argue and contend with. 
An unintended con sequence is that Muslim women themselves are frequently 
ignored: positioned as passive vic tims of more im port ant intra- Western debates, 
the effect is to discount their agency or influence. This reinforces the widespread 
as sump tion that the veil is something imposed by pat ri archal Islam on passive, 
defenceless and oppressed women – and that it should con sequently be banned 
for the sake of female emancipation. However, the growing politicization of 
Islam in Europe (Brown 2006) does not exclude women (Silvestri 2008). They 
work within local, national and trans national asso ci ations, not least in trying to 
counter dominant anti- Muslim discourses about themselves and Islam in gen eral 
(Hadj- Abdou 2011). 
In relation to veiling, Muslim women are active parti cip ants in ongoing 
Qur’anic and intra- Islamic debates about veiling and the nature and extent of the 
obli ga tion. In addition, many have become active parti cip ants in the wider pub lic 
controversies over veiling, as well as in polit ical action in sup port of the right to 
veil. These forms of parti cipa tion are the focus of this chapter. Since there is 
little research on such parti cipa tion (or indeed on the pub lic and polit ical engage­
ment of migrant women in gen eral; Martiniello 2005; Maussen 2007), we 
attempt to render Muslim women more vis ible in aca demic ana lysis by examin­
ing the forms such parti cipa tion takes, and ex plor ing how they can be explained 
in terms of wider oppor tun ity structures, resources, alli ances and constraints. 
Our inter est is not in intra- Muslim debates, but in women’s parti cipa tion in 
pub lic square debates conducted in Euro pean languages. We are inter ested in the 
degree to which, and the ways in which, Muslim women have entered the pub lic 
sphere in relation to the issue of veiling. How vis ible are they in such disputes? 
What inter ven tions and demands are being made? What strat egies are used to 
push through their demands? What resources are drawn upon, and what obs­
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These questions are pursued within a comparative per spect ive. We have 
chosen to look at Muslim women’s parti cipa tion in pub lic debates and polit ical 
action in relation to veiling controversies in Austria and the UK. These coun tries 
were selected because they are both rel at ively tolerant of veiling: neither has ser­
iously debated a ban on veiling in pub lic places or for par ticu lar cat egor ies of 
state officials. Nevertheless, pub lic debates on the rights and wrongs of veiling – 
in these coun tries and in the rest of Europe – are lively and are not di min ishing. 
We are of the opinion that this combination of circumstances might be favour-
able to Muslim women’s parti cipa tion. Furthermore, we are also aware of inter­
esting prima facie dif fer ences in women’s parti cipa tion between the two 
coun tries, with indi vidual female Muslim actors being more vocal and vis ible in 
the debates in the UK than in Austria. Our aim is to investigate, docu ment and 
explain the apparent similarity- in-dif fer ence, and in doing so lay the grounds for 
further, much needed study of the neg lected topic of Muslim women’s parti cipa­
tion in state pol itics and civil soci ety in Europe. 
The research on which this chapter is based stems from the VEIL pro ject, 
espe cially its quantitative media and frame ana lysis of the pub lic voices of 
female Muslim actors. We drew on internet items and pub lications, press art­
icles, published position papers by Muslim actors and some major radio and TV 
broadcasts by Muslim women. We paid par ticu lar attention to the voices of 
Muslim women who were advocating the freedom to veil (and who were often 
veiled themselves). We also carried out inter views with representatives of key 
Muslim organ iza tions in each coun try, par ticu larly those that had taken a stand 
on the veil issue (details given in the text below). 
We proceed by outlining the salient con texts in which Muslim women in each 
coun try operate, and go on to con sider the nature of Muslim women’s parti cipa­
tion in headscarf controversies in Austria and the UK. Finally, we try to explain 
different forms of parti cipa tion in each coun try, and draw some conclusions. We 
con sider four main explan at ory approaches to try to make sense of our findings: 
a polit ical oppor tun ities approach (as de veloped by Kriesi et al. (1995) and 
extended by Koopmans et al. (2005), and in the expanded form which Bengtsson 
(2008) proposes for studying the polit ical integration of im mig rants); a resource 
mobil iza tion approach, which con siders what resources, including fin an cial and 
organ iza tional ones, are avail able to Muslim women (Zald and McCarthy 1987); 
a values/ideo logy approach, which con siders the ideo logical resources avail able 
to women and how their ideo logical framing of the issue of veiling relates to 
values and beliefs of non- Muslim majorities; and an expanded state–church 
approach, which con siders how existing religious majorities and minor it ies and 
their incorporation by the state help or hinder parti cipa tion and accommodation 
(Fetzer and Soper 2005).
 Three clarifications are neces sary before we proceed. First, we are inter ested 
in Muslim women’s parti cipa tion both in state pol itics and in civil soci ety, 
including media debates. We concentrate on national- level debates (whilst rec­
ognizing the need for more research on women’s parti cipa tion at the local level). 
Second, our inter est in the most pub lic and prominent forms of Muslim women’s 
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inter ven tion in the veiling debates may reinforce a false pic ture of Muslim 
women as a homo gen eous group. In reality, of course, Muslim women display a 
variety of polit ical attitudes, different attitudes to veiling (some being opposed to 
it) (Dwyer 1999), different degrees and types of religiosity and secularity, and 
come from diverse socio- economic, cultural and ethnic backgrounds. However, 
given that we are looking at inter ven tions in national pub lic and polit ical debates, 
educated, middle class women are most prominent and tend to play a representa­
tive role, and those who take the step of intervening on the veiling issue are 
largely those who sup port and defend the practice and follow it themselves 
(though, as we will see, most understand it as a free choice rather than an obli ga­
tion). Third, although we use the terms ‘veiling’ and ‘covering’ in this chapter, 
the latter word is more ac cur ate insofar as it en com passes the fact that not only a 
headscarf but also a face veil and/or some additional form of body covering may 
be at issue. Generally speaking, the debates in Austria concern the headscarf, 
and in the UK concern any form of covering, though in recent years the focus of 
con tro versy in the UK has shifted from headscarf (hijab) to face covering 
(niqab), and occasionally to certain forms of en com passing body covering like 
jilbab. 
Contexts 
It is estim ated that there are currently around two million Muslims living in the 
UK – around 3 per cent of the popu la tion.1 A total of 48 per cent of British 
Muslims are women. Islam is the second largest religion in the UK. The vast 
majority of British Muslims – between 80 and 90 per cent – have formal cit izen­
ship status (Koenig 2005: 232). Many im mig rants were entitled to cit izen ship 
rights because of their coun try of origin’s co lo nial asso ci ation with Britain. Chil­
dren born of a parent settled in Britain attain cit izen ship status automatically. 
Naturalization can also be applied for after living in Britain for five years or, in 
the case of the spouse of a British cit izen, three years. 
Despite rel at ively easy access to full cit izen ship, Muslims in the UK lag 
behind other minor ity groups in terms of educational attainment and employ­
ment. A total of 66 per cent of Muslim women are eco nomic ally in act ive, com­
pared with 26 per cent of women in the UK as a whole, and almost one- third of 
Muslims of working age in Great Britain have no qualifications, the highest 
proportion for any religious group (Botcherby 2006). Young Paki stani, Bangla­
deshi and Black- Caribbean women are apparently almost three to four 
times more likely than white women to take a job at a lower level than the one 
they are qualified for (Botcherby 2006), and recent research has shown that 
the intersections of religious, ethnic, national identities and discrimination in the 
UK are complex and signific ant (Khattab 2009). Nevertheless, growing numbers 
of young Muslims, including women, are entering higher education and 
professions. 
In Austria, according to the 2001 census, 4.2 per cent of the resident popu la­
tion is Muslim, and 44 per cent of this proportion is female (Statistik Austria 
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2006: 55). Immigrants of Muslim faith mainly settled in Austria within the 
framework of labour migration starting in the 1960s, or, as in the case of Bos­
nians, as war refu gees in the 1990s.2 Initially, their stay was conceived as tempo­
rary: integration was not intended by the gov ern ment. Today, 72 per cent of 
Muslims living in Austria still do not possess Austrian cit izen ship (Schakfeh 
2005: 155). Non- citizens are excluded from formal polit ical cit izen ship rights, 
and the socio- economic parti cipa tion of people with an im mig rant background is 
limited rel at ive to that of the Austrian majority (Fassmann and Reeger 2007). 
Women with headscarves face par ticu lar prob lems of discrimination in the 
labour market. They have difficult ies finding and maintaining work because of 
being veiled (Heine 2005: 105; Potz and Schinkele 2005: 632). If they are 
employed, they often hold rather non- prestigious and/or in vis ible positions. This 
holds true even for second generation veiled im mig rants (Heckl 2007: 33). 
Turning to veiling pol icies, in the UK there is no nationwide regulation or 
legis la tion dealing with Muslim covering, and the presumption is, therefore, that 
women are free to cover in all spheres of private and pub lic life. As mentioned 
above, it is the jilbab and niqab that have become the focus of con tro versy and 
pub lic and legal debate rather than the hijab in the UK, par ticu larly since 2001. 
The Shabina Begum legal case, involving a pupil who sought to defend her right 
to wear the jilbab in her state school (McGoldrick 2006; Malik 2008), and the 
pub lic comments made by Labour politician Jack Straw against the face cover­
ing of Muslim women in Octo ber 2006, are the two par ticu larly salient and well- 
publicized controversies (Kılıç 2008). Yet despite these very pub lic disputes and 
hostility to the niqab in the pop ular right- wing press, there has been no ser ious 
move to regulate face covering. Recent guidelines for schools and courts about 
the wearing of the niqab by teachers and legal officials in the courtroom have 
indicated that toleration should be the rule (on the grounds of multicultural inclu­
sion), except where the fulfil ment of duty is inhibited or secur ity is infringed.3 
Like the UK, Austria has one of the most lib eral regulation regimes in Europe 
concerning the expression of religious beliefs and practices in the pub lic realm. 
Muslim girls and women are entitled to wear the headscarf in educational insti­
tutions and pub lic offices as well as in photos for pub lic docu ments if the face is 
clearly identifiable.4 The headscarf is framed as a religious practice and pre­
sented as a non- issue by the majority of politicians. However, the media and the 
far right party Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria; FPÖ) 
have taken a leading role in generating headscarf disputes by raising the topic in 
the pub lic sphere, despite a limited number of cases of actual conflict (Rosen­
berger and Hadj- Abdou 2011). 
Muslim women’s participation in the veiling controversy in 
the UK 
Muslim women have been active in the veiling debate in the UK, par ticu larly in 
three areas: in social mobil iza tion and polit ical lobbying around the issue, in 
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We do not review the latter area in detail, since it is treated by Kılıç (2008), 
Malik (2008), and McGoldrick (2006, 2009a, 2009b). The locus of most of the 
legal cases in the UK has been schools and places of employment. Regarding the 
former, the Begum case in 2006 concerned the wearing of the jilbab in a school 
which already had a uniform pol icy that allowed the wearing of the shalwar 
kameez. The case was fought under human rights law, and it was finally settled 
by the House of Lords, which ruled that neither freedom of religion nor of edu­
cation were violated in this case, for various local reasons concerning uniform 
pol icy and al tern ative schools. In this case and another brought under human 
rights law, a margin of dis cre tion is allowed for schools to make their own 
de cisions (McGoldrick 2009b). More recent claims by veiled Muslim women 
have been brought under the new legis la tion on religious discrimination 
(Employment Equality (Religion or Belief ) Regulations 2003 and the Equality 
Act 2006), and several cases have been brought by women claiming discrimina­
tion in the workplace, including Bushra Noah, a hijab wearer who was not 
employed by a hairdresser because she would not display her hair (successful); a 
hijab wearing Muslim barrister, Saleca Faisal Parkar, who was harassed by a 
senior colleague (successful); a niqab wearing schoolroom assistant who claimed 
unfair dismissal when she was asked to remove the niqab in order to be effect ive 
in teaching (unsuccessful).5 
As for mobil iza tion, polit ical protest and lobbying, only one major organ iza­
tion has arisen in the UK which is ded ic ated to the issue of covering: the Assem­
bly for the Protection of Hijab (origin ally Protect Hijab). Organized by Muslim 
women, it was founded in 2003 as a response to the French moves to ban veiling. 
It was led by an Arab British Muslim woman, Abeer Pharaon, and mobilized 
inter na tionally through personal contacts and snowballing. In an inter view held 
with Pharaon in the course of research for this chapter, she reported emailing 
contacts throughout the world with a call to sup port the ‘French sisters’, and 
quickly received a huge response.6 As a result of this initiative, in Janu ary 2004 
protests of various sizes were held in 35 coun tries around the world against the 
French ban, most taking place outside French embassies. In London, around 
5,000 people picketed the French embassy, whilst an estim ated 30,000 marched 
in France. 
Pharaon and her sup porters also lobbied British politicians. They gained the 
sup port of the London Mayor, Ken Livingston, and or gan ized a press conference 
on the day of the French vote, gaining extensive media cover age, much of it 
favour able to the cause of veiling and with an anti- French emphasis. The sup port 
of some British MPs and other organ iza tions was also secured.7 A large confer­
ence was held in London in July 2004. The next step taken was to lobby 
members of the Euro pean Parliament. All 732 members were contacted and 70 
signed a declaration ‘on religious rights and freedoms in France and throughout 
the EU’. This called on member states to allow outward expression of faith in 
educational and other state estab lishments, to urge France to re think its ban, to 
hold a debate in the Euro pean Parliament and to forward the declaration to the 
Commission, Council and member gov ern ments. The largest proportion of the 
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70 signatures was from British MEPs, but the 300 signatures needed to present 
the declaration to the par lia ment were not achieved.8 
Despite this signific ant activity between 2003 and 2005 and a good deal of 
polit ical sup port from inside and outside the Muslim com mun ity in Britain, 
Protect Hijab was unable to attract sufficient resources to con tinue to cam paign 
actively. Pharaon explained that all its work was carried out by volunteers, 
mostly women working from home. Attempts to secure an office or funding 
from Muslim organ iza tions, trade unions or the gov ern ment failed, and there was 
no fixed structure – as opposed to charismatic leadership – to con tinue the move­
ment. Protect Hijab is no longer active, and its ori ginal website was removed 
before this chapter went to press. Pharaon finds it re gret table that the cam paign 
failed to estab lish a ded ic ated cam paigning group for Muslim women. She had 
hoped that the ‘Muslim Women’s Society’ in which she was involved would 
become representative, but thus far it is largely for the Arab com mun ity. She 
also suggested that the exist ence of Protect Hijab may have actu ally inhibited the 
larger, male- dominated Muslim organ iza tions’ willingness to take women’s 
issues ser iously, as they saw Protect Hijab as carrying out that work success­
fully. No other organ iza tions ded ic ated solely to this issue have de veloped in the 
UK, and no representative national Muslim women’s organ iza tion has emerged. 
Muslim women’s organ iza tions are usually metropolitan or local rather than 
national, often represent par ticu lar ethnic and religious com munit ies, and are fre­
quently affiliated branches of a wider, male- dominated organization. 
Despite this limited amount of legal and polit ical action, the single most 
signific ant way in which Muslim actors have been active and vis ible in the UK 
in relation to the covering issue is by having a pres ence and a voice in national 
media. Such actors fall into two cat egor ies. First, those ‘symbolic’ indi viduals 
who are selected by the media to represent the covering issue – often because 
they have chosen to wear the niqab; and, second, Muslim actors who themselves 
speak out on the issue and obtain media exposure. To give an example of the 
first cat egory, when Jack Straw’s comments criticizing the niqab were made 
pub lic, BBC Radio 4 carried a half- hour docu mentary on 12 Octo ber 2006 which 
included a brief inter view with a niqab wearing cit izen of Mr Straw’s Blackburn 
constituency. The inter viewee remarked that Jack Straw’s comment was unhelp­
ful because ‘people who don’t have an opinion will form one and no doubt it 
will be a biased opinion’.9 It is mainly educated, middle class, highly articulate 
women who make up the second cat egory of Muslim actors. Their claims are 
varied, but gen erally amount to a plea for greater understanding and tolerance of 
covering. The number of such voices heard in the mass media has grown as the 
con tro versy on covering has con tinued, first in relation to the French ban, then 
the Begum case, then the Straw con tro versy, then cases, debates and bans else­
where in Europe (including the debated ‘total ban’ in France in early 2010). 
Public inter ven tions by Muslim actors have gen erally been re act ive rather than 
proactive – or at least the limited oppor tun ity to appear in national media seems 
to have brought this about as a con sequence. In other words, it appears that 
Muslim spokeswomen are more often invited to take part in news features, 
 
 
192 L. Hadj-Abdou and L. Woodhead 
debates and so on, rather than actively engineering a media pres ence, an impres­
sion confirmed by our questions to key radio and TV producers in the UK.10 
The amount of media ap pear ances by Muslim women speaking on the veiling 
con tro versy allowed for an ana lysis of the debates and how they were framed. In 
order to do so, we sampled internet items and pub lications, press art icles, pub­
lished position papers by Muslim actors and some major radio and TV broad­
casts. In order to limit the amount of mater ial, we looked at inter ven tions 
defending not only veiling in gen eral but also its most controversial forms, par­
ticu larly the niqab.
 The major finding was that in terms of the way the debate is framed by 
Muslim women, the most frequent values invoked were ‘freedom’ and ‘rights’, 
par ticu larly freedom of expression and of religion. For example, Protect Hijab’s 
slogan was: ‘Our Choice, Our Freedom, Our Right’. Interestingly, other Muslim 
organ iza tions which have spoken out on the issue also adopt the language of 
indi vidual rights and freedom of choice. To give just two examples, in response 
to Jack Straw’s comments the Muslim Association of Britain (a mainly Arab 
asso ci ation) issued a statement saying, ‘There may be a dif fer ence of opinion on 
niqab, but we have to respect a woman’s right to choose to adopt it’,11 and the 
joint statement issued by a number of different Muslim asso ci ations, including 
the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Islamic Human Rights Commis­
sion, which ‘urged people to be sup portive for a woman’s right to wear the veil 
as this complies with the values upon which western civilization was founded – 
the protection of human and religious rights’.12 
This stress on freedom was also evid ent in an im port ant pub lic ap pear ance in 
the UK by a niqab wearing British Muslim woman, who broadcast the ‘al tern­
ative Christmas message’ on Channel 4 TV in 2006 (al tern ative to the traditional 
Queen’s Speech, which is broadcast at the same time on BBC). Her real name 
was withheld and she was called only ‘Khadija’. She began by saying that 
Britain was the best coun try in which to live for people who wish to practise 
their religion freely, and went on to mention that her great- grandmother had 
been a suffragette – thus making an implicit link to an earl ier struggle for 
women’s rights. ‘We are seen as oppressed’, she said, but ‘since I’ve started cov­
ering I feel much more liberated, which I know a lot of people prob ably won’t 
be able to understand’.13 Thus, the argument that women have a right to cover 
because it is their free choice to do so links closely to the argument that covering 
is itself liberating. This linking counters accusations that women are forced to 
cover against their will and that it is a form of pat ri archal oppression. Freedom is 
sometimes extended beyond that of the indi vidual, as when one Muslim woman 
says ‘the niqab is not about oppression, it means freedom, of faith, of self, of 
state’.14 After freedom, our ana lysis found that the values most frequently 
invoked by Muslim women in defence of covering, espe cially the niqab, were 
gender equality (covering was repres ented, for example, as a way of protecting 
against the male gaze), social and civic integration (covering was defended as 
being com pat ible with being a loyal British Muslim) and religious reasons 




Muslim women in the veil controversy  193 
Muslim women’s participation in the veiling controversy in 
Austria 
In the veiling con tro versy in Austria, according to the quantitative media ana­
lysis conducted for the VEIL pro ject, 27.5 per cent of the voices repres ented are 
Muslim. Whilst men dominate in the pub lic debate on covering in gen eral, 
within the group of Muslim actors female voices dominate. On the basis of this 
ana lysis, two main types of actors can be distinguished in the debate. The first 
and dominant type is the official national representative of Muslims, the Islamic 
Religious Community in Austria (IRCA). The IRCA includes ‘Recognized Reli­
gious Communities’ in the polit ical pro cess in a cor porat ist manner (Schakfeh 
2005; Abid 2006; Mourão-Permoser and Rosenberger 2009). The second type 
consists of ‘symbolic’ indi viduals who are selected by the media to represent the 
covering issue – often because they wear headscarves themselves.16 This type of 
actor, how ever, is rather mar ginal compared to the first, and is positioned as a 
subject rather than an active agent, confirming a criticism levelled against the 
Western media repres enta tion of Muslim women in gen eral (Macdonald 2006). 
Women’s sections within Islamic asso ci ations are growing in Austria 
(Kroissenbrunner 2003). Although the IRCA is the officially recog nized body 
for all Muslims in Austria, a distinct asso ci ation for Muslim women was initially 
in form ally founded in the wake of a headscarf conflict in Vienna. A Muslim 
woman wearing the hijab was discriminated against at work and turned to the 
Wiener Integrationsfonds (Vienna Integration Fund) for advice. This incident 
galvanized local Muslim women into coming together and creating Islamic Aus­
trians for Mutual Tolerance in order to combat stereo types against Muslims and 
de velop counter strat egies. The women most active in this initiative, Andrea 
Saleh and Amina Baghajati, then became involved in the IRCA, and, in a further 
step in 2004, the Forum of Muslim Women was created as a branch of the 
IRCA.17 The Forum aims to foster the integration of Muslim women, increase 
visibility and promote the parti cipa tion of Muslim women.18 It has approxi­
mately 30 active members. Meetings are held monthly, and include seminars, 
lectures and workshops. Excursions and other ac tiv ities are also arranged. The 
majority of women active in the Forum of Muslim Women have Austrian cit­
izen ship. Although their social backgrounds are mixed, according to Saleh (head 
of the Forum), they gen erally come from the higher social strata. So far coopera­
tion with other women’s groups is not very signific ant, and takes place only at 
the margins of those groups. There is some exchange with the Cath olic Women’s 
Movement Anima. Greater exchange takes place with women who are active 
within the various mosque asso ci ations.19 
Interestingly, there are hardly any alli ances between fem in ist organ iza tions 
and Muslim women’s organ iza tions in Austria, with one exception: the Forum of 
Muslim Women did invite the Vienna- based fem in ist asso ci ation Frauenhetz to 
meet. However, no other exchange has taken place yet. In fact, occasional ideo­
logical conflicts dividing fem in ist asso ci ations and Muslim women’s organ iza­
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In statements on the headscarf question by the IRCA, Andrea Saleh, together 
with the current press officer for the IRCA, Amina Baghajati, has actively and 
repeatedly taken a position against a pro hibition of the headscarf.21 
In gen eral, the majority of actors of a Muslim background who speak out on 
the issue of covering come from within the IRCA. Other col lect ive actors who 
have produced pub lic declarations on the issue belong to the Initiative of Aus­
trian Muslims. There is, how ever, a lot of overlap between the leadership of the 
Initiative and the IRCA. With the exception of the Muslim Youth of Austria,22 
which comprises mainly second generation Muslims and which has published 
two docu ments on the headscarf issue, no other Muslim asso ci ation has pub licly 
raised its voice on the mat ter of headscarf conflicts. Two (male) representatives 
from Muslim organ iza tions inter viewed23 stated that they con sider this the job of 
the IRCA, as the legally recog nized representative body for Muslims in Austria. 
Thus the way in which the veiling ‘con tro versy’ is pursued in Austria illus­
trates how Muslim action is most often carried out through institutionalized 
exchange with authorities and polit ical de cision makers as a result of the legal 
and polit ical re cog ni tion of the IRCA. The IRCA has been a leading actor in 
negotiating and strengthening the right to wear the headscarf in pub lic institu­
tions. It lobbied for an official statement on school education, delivered in 2004, 
clarifying that the headscarf is part of religious freedom.24 The IRCA likewise 
intervened effect ively when a member of the Austrian gov ern ment, the Minister 
of Interior Liese Prokop, spoke pub licly against the right to wear the headscarf. 
She sub sequently withdrew her statements.25 This ‘informal’ channel of 
exchange with polit ical elites was also employed when the fem in ist Austrian 
journ al ist, Elfriede Hammerl, wrote in pub lic against the Muslim headscarf. 
Representatives of the IRCA complained to the second pres id ent of the National 
Council, who in turn addressed the journ al ist and asked for a dialogue between 
her and the IRCA (Fischer 2003). 
So far vis ible Muslim actors, in par ticu lar female actors, in headscarf debates 
have gen erally been representatives of the IRCA, and belong to a higher social 
and educational stratum. They are also likely to have Austrian cit izen ship. 
Growing polit ical parti cipa tion from the younger generation is likely to be tied 
into a growing sense of national belonging. Nevertheless, those who currently 
take a prominent role in the Austrian pub lic sphere are de facto first generation 
Muslim im mig rants. But one in dica tion that change is underway is that more 
women are becoming aware of their rights and are beginning to invoke anti-
discrimination legis la tion. Official complaints due to discrimination in employ­
ment are increasing and several proceedings are in pro gress.26 
When we con sider the framing of the issue by those actors who do take part 
in pub lic debates in Austria, we find that, as in the UK, statements produced by 
Muslims tend to be in reaction to opposi tion to the right to cover. Looking spe­
cifically at discursive strat egies employed by female Muslim actors in Austria, 
veiling is frequently framed as a religious practice or obli ga tion. Associated with 
this, a ‘col lect ive rights’ frame is the one predominantly drawn upon by Muslim 
women, but also by male Muslim representatives, in headscarf controversies. 
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Accordingly, pro hibitions on covering are argued to act against the basic right of 
religious freedom. Furthermore, through the repeated emphasis on the re cog ni­
tion of Islam in Austria, a strong ref er ence to col lect ive rights has been used to 
defend and praise the status quo, which enables covering in pub lic (A4, A5, 
A13).27 
Explaining the different participation patterns 
How can we explain the sim ilar and different patterns in polit ical action and 
framing of veiling debates in these two coun tries, which are characterized by 
gen eral toleration of covering? 
Political opportunity approach: institutional structures 
A polit ical oppor tun ity approach highlights the way in which existing institu­
tions structure the openness of a state towards specific (col lect ive) actors, and 
shape oppor tun ities for voices to be heard and claims to be made. The most 
salient dif fer ence here is that whereas Austria has a recog nized corporate body 
for the repres enta tion of Muslims, in the UK Muslims do not have a single offi­
cially recog nized representative body.28 In Austria, the fact that debates on 
veiling have been muted and tolerance has been maintained can be explained, in 
part, by the dominant role of the IRCA in mediating between Muslims and the 
state. In the UK, by contrast, the absence of such an authorized body may help 
explain why debates take place in a wider variety of arenas, including the media, 
and why indi vidual Muslim women are more likely to raise their voices in pub lic 
on the issue, rather than being repres ented by an official body. The lack of an 
officially recog nized body may also partly explain why the variety of female 
Muslim protest is stronger and louder in the UK than in Austria. Thus cor porat­
ism (Koenig 2005) and the exist ence of legal Muslim repres enta tion on the one 
hand assist dialogue and effect ive inter est repres enta tion in Austria. On the other 
hand, they seem to limit the quantity and diversity of Muslim women’s polit ical 
engagement. This confirms Nancy Fraser’s observation (2003) that re cog ni tion 
may in fact di min ish the chances for minor it ies within minor it ies to speak and be 
heard.
 The different cit izen ship regimes in Austria and the UK may also play some 
role in shaping Muslim women’s parti cipa tion in the veil debate. The fact that 
Muslims in the UK tend to have full cit izen ship because of the imperial and 
post- imperial con text of high migration, lib eral nat uralization pro ced ures and a 
multicultural pol icy orientation, may be part of the explanation for why Muslim 
women are more vis ible and more vocal, and why many younger Muslim women 
wear more controversial and ‘extreme’ forms of religious dress, par ticu larly the 
niqab. Their cit izen ship may give them not only the right, but also the feeling of 
secur ity to do so. In Austria, a much more restrictive, exclusionary nationality 
act prevails, where an im mig rant is legally only entitled to nationality after 30 
years of residence in the coun try (Çinar and Waldrauch 2007). This par ticu larly 
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places women at a dis advant age by rendering female im mig rants more de pend­
ent upon male breadwinners and the state. This insecure status, limited national 
belonging and lack of mater ial inde pend ence may partly explain the rel at ive lack 
of protest compared with the UK, despite the persistence of discrimination 
against Muslim women, espe cially in the labour market. Thus both the UK and 
Austria sup port the con tention that the degree to which actors are able to exer­
cise ‘active cit izen ship’ (Lister et al. 2007) or ‘civil cit izen ship’ (Cesari 2009) is 
related to cit izen ship status and existing rights. 
Resource mobilization 
The polit ical oppor tun ities approach shades into a resource mobil iza tion 
approach insofar as the latter con siders organ iza tional oppor tun ities as a major 
resource for the empowerment of minor it ies. The overlap is even more apparent 
in relation to the availabil ity of cit izen ship status and accom panying mater ial 
resources, including full access to a state’s wel fare pro vi sion, and educational 
oppor tun ity. But a resource mobil iza tion approach also invites us to take account 
of the significance of actor alli ances and configurations in helping to explain the 
different patterns of female parti cipa tion in Austria and the UK. 
In Austria, the IRCA’s representative status, along with the way in which 
male representatives dominate the organ iza tion in practice, means that mat ters of 
in equal ity within the Muslim com mun ity, and in par ticu lar issues to do with the 
status and wel fare of women, may be regu larly ignored in pub lic discourse and 
rendered less prominent in the framing strat egies of Muslim women themselves 
in headscarf controversies. This may be one reason why the headscarf debate in 
the West tends to ob scure genu ine socio- economic dis advant age (Macdonald 
2006). The exist ence of the IRCA makes it much less likely that Muslim women 
will be able to or gan ize their own polit ical repres enta tion or mobilize polit ically 
on issues of concern to them. Moreover, strong alli ances between the Austrian 
Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the IRCA, along with the aggressive and 
successful politicization of the headscarf mat ter by the far right, reduces the pos­
sib il ity of Muslim women with a crit ical stance towards veiling from forming an 
alli ance with the polit ical left and thereby gaining constructive polit ical support. 
In the UK, the absence of a single, official body for the repres enta tion of 
Muslims may, by contrast, mean that there is both more need and more oppor­
tun ity for Muslim women to give voice to their par ticu lar indi vidual and col lect­
ive concerns and claims, to or gan ize in order to do so (as in the formation of 
Protect Hijab) and to form alli ances with other polit ical organ iza tions. However, 
it is notice able that British Muslim women who wish to defend covering have 
not been able to estab lish strong and sup portive alli ances with other organ iza­
tions, whether Muslim, trade unionist or fem in ist.29 We noted the failure of 
Protect Hijab as a direct result of its failure to secure sufficient fin an cial 
resources to con tinue, and its failure to secure office space or other mater ial sup­
port from organ iza tions like the MCB. As one Muslim woman commented, 
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There is a clear contrast here between the success of Sikh and Jewish (mainly) 
men in winning legal protection for their religious dress, often in alli ance with 
other organ iza tions, including religious- political ones and trade unions, and the 
failure of Muslim women to gain the same protection for covering. A notable 
example would be the success of Jewish and Muslim men in securing protection 
for wearing the kippa and tur ban, respectively, under The Race Relations Act 
1976 (a struggle in which an alli ance with other organ iza tions, including trade 
unions in the case of the Sikhs, was an im port ant feature (Singh and Singh Tatla 
2006)). The new protection of religion under equality and discrimination law 
(Employment Equality (Religion or Belief ) Regulations 2003 and the Equality 
Act 2006) opens an oppor tun ity for Muslim women to take indi vidual cases 
forward for legal protection and to build up case law on the issue. But it does not 
afford the same level of gen eral protection to covering as Sikh and Jewish men 
enjoy. Human rights law at both national and Euro pean level has also failed to 
protect the rights of veiled women to veil, as in the Begum case in the UK and 
the Sahin case in the ECHR (McGoldrick 2006, 2009a, 2009b). 
Thus it seems that the ‘freedom’ of Muslim women in the UK from incorpo­
ration into official organ iza tions, and their failure to forge power ful alli ances, 
may enable them to speak ‘with their own voice’, including in the media and 
polit ical rallies and in the legal arena, whilst at the same time militating against 
this voice having lasting or extensive polit ical influence. There are some recent 
examples of active attempts by the Labour gov ern ment to listen to Muslim 
women’s voices, leading most notably to the formation of a National Muslim 
Women’s Advisory Group.31 The latter has a merely consultative status, and we 
are not aware that it has intervened in relation to the veiling issue. 
Values and ideologies 
In terms of prevailing pol icies, an exclusive, ethno- cultural understanding of 
nationality in Austria, contrasted with a more multicultural approach in the UK, 
may play a role in determining which voices are viewed as legitimate in pub lic 
debate, and in influ en cing Muslim women’s abil ity to speak out. In the UK it is 
common for Muslim actors to stress that they are ‘British Muslims’, loyal to 
their coun try but with a clear identity of their own. In Austria, Muslim women 
also sometimes make ref er ence to a co alescence of being Austrian and Muslim 
as a strat egy in defence of veiling,32 but this is a less common framing than in 
the UK. A widespread ‘civil’ ethos of tolerance and lib eralism in the UK may 
also play a role, and here a long tradition of lib eralism which privileges indi­
vidual freedom of speech and religious expression may be signific ant, even if it 
is prob lematic to characterize the UK as lib eral in relation to the veil debate as 
Koenig (2005) does, without making im port ant qualifications about the limits to 
such lib eralism, espe cially as compared with the USA (for example, the exist­
ence of a state church). 
Widespread value com mit ments and polit ical ideo lo gies also help explain the 
ways in which Muslim women frame the covering debate in their pub lic and 
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polit ical inter ven tions in the UK and Austria. As we have noted, in the UK dis­
cursive strat egies invoking indi vidual freedom prevail, whereas in Austria argu­
ments invoke corporate rights rather than indi vidual rights. Moreover, in the UK 
Muslim women go so far as to argue that the right to cover the face and body 
and to reject any ban exemplifies ‘British prin ciples of freedom and lib erty’.33 
The nature and strength of opposi tion to veiling in each coun try also seems 
salient, not least the nature and extent of secularist opposi tion, par ticu larly for 
the way in which Muslim women frame their defences of veiling (for example, 
insisting that it is not a pat ri archal imposition, nor a form of religious ‘oppres­
sion’ of women). 
State–church relations 
The im port ance of historic church–state relations and their con tempor ary forms 
in shaping different forms of accommodation of Islam and Muslims in different 
Euro pean coun tries has been dem on strated by Fetzer and Soper (2005). Church– 
state relations also help explain different forms of national regulation of veiling. 
They do not, how ever, appear to be as salient in explaining the different ways in 
which Muslim women parti cip ate in the veiling con tro versy in Austria and the 
UK. They may have some indirect significance: for example, the widespread 
exist ence of state- funded church schools in the UK allowed Muslims to claim 
the same privilege and has led to the opening of some Muslim schools; many 
church schools are tolerant of all religious beliefs and dress, and may be a signi­
fic ant resource for Muslim women and their empowerment to speak out in 
defence of veiling. More im port ant than state–church relations, how ever, seem 
to be church–religion relations and the official ways in which religion is ‘gov­
erned’ and related to the state. Thus we have repeatedly noted the significance of 
the historic incorporation of Islam in Austria by way of the IRCA, and the cor­
res ponding significance of the fact that the UK does not officially re gis ter reli­
gions or have estab lished forms of incorporation for any religious bodies except 
the estab lished churches. 
Conclusions 
This study of parti cipa tion in veil controversies in Austria and the UK has found 
that Muslim women in both coun tries are vis ible in the veil controversies. 
Female Muslim actors tend to be of high socio- economic and educational status 
and hold the respective coun try’s cit izen ship. The visibility of both indi vidual 
and col lect ive female actors is greatest in the UK, whilst in Austria official rep­
resentatives of the IRCA are most vis ible. Only in the UK has a cam paigning 
organ iza tion ded ic ated to the issue been formed (Protect Hijab), and it was 
founded, run and resourced by Muslim women. Its failure to attract wider sup­
port, including from male- led Muslim organ iza tions, was a factor in its in abil ity 
to sustain its ac tiv ities for more than a short period. In the UK indi vidual action 




Muslim women in the veil controversy  199 
arenas in which Muslim women who defend veiling make their voices and 
claims heard. Their counterparts in Austria rely more heavily upon exchange and 
alli ances with polit ical de cision makers. 
The claims made by Muslim women in the debates tend to be rather modest. 
We have not come across many actors in the UK calling for legal protection of 
Muslim dress, despite the fact that such protection is accorded in the UK for 
some other forms of religious dress (par ticu larly Sikh and Jewish). Not all 
Muslim women agree that veiling is required or even desir able, and there is a 
lively debate over this issue in Muslim circles. This is one factor which may 
inhibit claim- making and which may make it harder to mobilize within the 
Muslim com mun ity. Rather than calling for protection, indi vidual, non- organized 
actors in the UK tend to explain the practice of covering, defend it and make 
gen eral claims for toleration, understanding, respect and freedom of expression, 
rather than making specific polit ical demands. In both coun tries framing strat­
egies mirror and appeal to the dominant frames in wider pub lic discourses on 
covering. As a result, framing strat egies differ: in the UK indi vidual rights and 
free expression are the values which are invoked most in defence of covering, 
whereas in Austria debates are more often framed in terms of the col lect ive 
rights of religion and religious participation. 
We have suggested that these national dif fer ences can be explained by a 
number of co ordinating factors. In the UK, dissonance between Muslim 
women’s full cit izen ship and a perceived lack of respect for them and their 
choices, a church–state settlement in which religious (or at least Chris tian) actors 
have an accepted voice in pub lic life, a lack of ‘official’ repres enta tion of Islam 
to the state, and a lib eral ethos and multicultural pol icy strat egy all emerge as 
salient factors leading to higher levels of protest and a greater number of female 
Muslim voices being heard – par ticu larly in civil soci ety – and to more ‘extreme’ 
forms of covering, most notably the niqab, being worn and defended, including 
by younger Muslim women. In Austria, limited access to cit izen ship combined 
with a cor porat ist approach which channels Muslim voices and claims through a 
single official ‘representative’ organ iza tion serve to dampen indi vidual voices 
and mute protest, but also serve to diffuse controversies and win some direct 
access to the polit ical pro cess. In both coun tries Muslim women have the poten­
tial to launch polit ical cam paigns for the defence or protection of covering (in 
their own coun tries and more widely in Europe) by virtue of having a clearly 
defined ‘single issue’ which is of deep concern to many. However, mobil iza tion 
is inhibited by a lack of unity amongst the Muslim com mun ity and amongst 
Muslim women (including between different ethnic com munit ies, different 
understandings of the value of veiling and different polit ical pri or ities), and by a 
failure to attract sup port and resources from potential allies, including fem in ist 
organ iza tions, male Muslim organ iza tions, trade unions, other religious bodies 
or civil liberties organizations. 
This chapter represents a first step in gath er ing more know ledge and gaining 
a greater understanding of the factors that influence the polit ical action of 
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research the gendered dimension of polit ical oppor tun ity structures and avail able 
resources more fully, since oppor tun ities for Muslim women’s parti cipa tion may 
be greater at the local level. The effect of recent de velopments, including the 
introduction of EU equality and anti- discrimination legis la tion rendering religion 
a protected ground, also needs to be con sidered. More research on this topic can 
help counter a stereo type of Muslim women as passive vic tims rather than active 
members of Euro pean soci eties, and correct gender- blindness in the study of 
immigration and polit ical mobil iza tion. This chapter suggests that when it comes 
to a con tro versy like that over the veil, which has a direct bearing on Muslim 
women’s lives and wellbeing, the dir ec tion of influence is not simply top- down. 
Muslim women’s oppor tun ities for polit ical engagement are shaped and limited 
by wider oppor tun ity structures, resources and historic settlements, but they are 
never the less exercising agency in im port ant ways within these constraining and 
enabling frameworks. 
Notes 
1 The UK census of 2001 included a question on religious af fili ation for the first time, 
and 1,591,000 people re corded themselves as ‘Muslim’, which is 2.7 per cent of the 
popu la tion (72 per cent self- identified as Christian). 
2 Though, as will be seen below, a sizeable Muslim group had already been incorp or­
ated into the Austro- Hungarian Empire in the late nine teenth century.
 3 See Judicial Communications Office: New Guidance Issued on the Wearing of Veils 
in Court (24 April 2007), online, avail able at: www.judiciary.gov.uk/pub lications_ 
media/media_releases/2007/1607.htm and DfES Guidance to Schools on School 
Uniform Related Policies (2007), online, avail able at: www.dcsf.gov.uk/consultations/ 
conResults.cfm?consultationId=1468 (both accessed 1 June 2008). 
4 Parliamentary response by the Interior Ministry 4104/AB XXI GP, 2002. 
5 For details see McGoldrick (2009a, b) and the legal case database online, avail able at: 
www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/networks/lrsncd.html (accessed 1 March 2010). 
6 Information in this paragraph is derived from a telephone inter view between Linda 
Woodhead and Abeer Pharaon on 10 Octo ber 2008. 
7 Caroline Lucas MEP, Fiona McTaggart MP, George Galloway MP, Muslim Associ­
ation of Britain, National Assembly against Racism, Federation of Islamic Organisa­
tions in Europe and the human rights group Liberty, all gave support. 
8 Information from Protect Hijab website, accessed 1 June 2008, no longer available.
 9 For a cita tion see, for example, Hilary Keenan, ‘Veiled smbitions’, 21st Century 
Socialism, online, avail able at: http://21stcenturysocialism.com/art icle/veiled_ambi­
tions_01263.html (accessed 1 July 2009). 
10 E- mail and face- to-face conversations by Woodhead with Robert Piggott (BBC Reli­
gion Correspondent) and Aaqil Ahmed (Channel 4, then BBC Commissioning Editor). 
11 Muslim Association of Britain, 6 Octo ber 2006, online, avail able at: www.islamon-
line.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone- English-News/ 
NWELayout&cid=1160816912631 (accessed 1 March 2010). 
12 Joint statement about the veil from Muslim groups, scholars and leaders, 17 Octo ber 
2006, online, avail able at: www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/in- the-com mun ity/working- together/ 
joint- statement-about- the-veil- from-muslim- groups-scholars- and-leaders.html 
(accessed 1 March 2010). 
13 The broadcast is avail able on YouTube, online, avail able at: www.youtube.com/watc 
h?v=Wlz9Dc6wMKo&feature=related (accessed 1 March 2010). 
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14 	Arts London News, ‘Veiled issues’, 10 Octo ber 2006, online, avail able at: www.art­
slondonnews.co.uk/index.php?opt=art icle&siid=1464 (accessed 1 July 2009). 
15 For more details, see Woodhead (2009). 
16 	Der Standard, 9 Febru ary 2007. 
17 Information from an inter view with Andrea Saleh, 8 Au gust 2008. 
18 See online, avail able at: www.derislam.at/islam.php?name=Themen&pa=showpage& 
pid=145 (accessed 1 July 2009). Further goals are to foster coopera tion among 
Muslim women and with non- Muslim women organ iza tions, to docu ment discrimina­
tions against Muslim women, to expose discriminatory structures and mech an isms for 
Muslim women and to enhance counter- strategies, to work against stereo types of 
women in Islam, to claim for Muslim women rights and a gender- equal in ter pretation 
of Islamic law, to de velop strat egies against women hostile traditions, to offer educa­
tional training for social groups which deal with Muslim women such as hos pitals, to 
provide advice for Muslim women who ex peri ence viol ence or suffer other indi vidual 
or societal prob lems, to offer an intercultural platform for leisure ac tiv ities for women 
and girls, to foster inter- religious and inter- feminist dialogue and, finally, to sup port 
the IRCA. 
19 Information based on inter view with Andrea Saleh, 8 Au gust 2008. 
20 In a discussion on ‘arranged marriages’ between non- Muslim fem in ists and Muslim 
women, moderated by Hadj- Abdou in the framework of a seminar called ‘Islam in 
Sicht’ on ‘Muslim Women’ on 10 Janu ary 2009, hosted by the Danube University 
Krems, this ideo logical conflict and lack of coopera tion became quite apparent. 
21 For example, IRCA 2003; Die Bunte Zeitung, Novem ber 2003. 
22 In addition to the Forum, the women’s section of the Young Muslims in Austria is an 
active women’s group. Their current head is Amani Abuzahra. According to their 
self- definition they follow the goal of gender equality and they aim to equip Muslim 
women for a self- determined life. They define themselves as Islamic fem in ists and 
stand for a European- Islamic identity. There are also other Muslim religious asso ci­
ations, which host women sections and are active in educational, religious concerns. 
The Islamic Union, the Islamic Centre, the League of Culture and espe cially Millî 
Görüş Austria have large women’s sections, for example. However, according to 
Andrea Saleh, the women’s representative in the IRCA, the women within these asso­
ci ations rarely take action in a broader, polit ical sense. They are more over or gan ized 
along ethnic lines (inter view with Andrea Saleh, 8 Au gust 2008). Finally, there are 
some indi vidual im mig rant women who are active in the Women’s Movement and 
who spoke out in the headscarf debate, such as Leila Kececi Arzu, a journ al ist for the 
im mig rant journal Bunte Zeitung. 
23 Interviews on 2 and 4 April 2008. 
24 Die Presse, 17 May 2004. 
25 ‘Kein Kopftuchverbot für muslimische Lehrerinnen! Aussprache mit Bundesmin is­
terin Liese Prokop’, online, avail able at: www.derislam.at/islam.php?name=Themen 
&pa=showpage&pid=198 (accessed 1 Janu ary 2008). 
26 Die Presse, 23 Septem ber 2008. 
27 For example, IRCA, 24 Novem ber 2003. 
28 Most successful to date is the Muslim Council of Britain. There are also national 
organ iza tions representing federations of mosques, polit ical and religious cam­
paigning organ iza tions, and a Muslim par lia ment. However, there is no official part­
ner ship of any with the state. 
29 The fem in ist Fawcett Society did stage a debate on the issue; see Fawcett Society 
(2006). 
30 Muslim Women’s Network (2006) ‘She who disputes: Muslim women shape the 
debate’, Novem ber 2006, London, 19. 
31 For the official description of the group see online, available at: www.com munit ies.gov. 
uk/com munit ies/prevent/com mun ityengagement/nmwag/ (accessed 1 March 2010). 
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32 For example, Der Standard, 9 Febru ary 2007. 
33 Debate on BBC2 Newsnight, with Myriam Francois, 21 Janu ary 2010, commented on 
by Dominic Lawson in the Sunday Times, 24 Janu ary 2010, online, avail able at: www. 
timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/dominic_lawson/art icle6999908.ece 
(accessed 1 March 2010). 
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Conclusion 




We have seen in various chapters of this book that in national debates on the 
Islamic headscarf, or veiling in gen eral, ref er ence is made to Euro pean values 
(see Chapter 4). Immigrants, Muslims in par ticu lar, should realize that these 
values form the core of ‘our’ identity and are non- negotiable, so is said in these 
debates. A docu ment on the integration of im mig rants by the Euro pean Council 
states the following: 
Integration implies respect for the basic values of the Euro pean Union. Eve­
rybody resident in the EU must adapt and adhere closely to the basic values 
of the Euro pean Union as well as to member State laws. . . . They include 
respect for the prin ciples of lib erty, demo cracy, respect for human rights and 
funda mental freedoms, and the rule of law. Furthermore they include respect 
for the pro vi sions of the charter of funda mental rights of the union, which 
enshrine the concepts of dignity, freedom, equality and non- discrimination, 
solid arity, cit izen’s rights and justice. Member States are respons ible for 
actively assuring that all residents, including im mig rants, understand, 
respect, benefit from, and are protected on an equal basis by the full scope 
of values, rights, respons ibil ities and privileges estab lished by the EU 
Member State laws. 
(Council of the European Union 2004: 8) 
Immigrants are asked to integrate into Europe and adapt to Euro pean values. In 
the above statement, Euro pean values are ex cathedra pro claimed. Yet, what are 
these Euro pean values? Already a cursory glance at the above quote reveals that 
what are referred to as Euro pean values are in fact the values of lib eral demo­
cracy. There is, how ever, nothing par ticu larly Euro pean about lib eral demo cracy. 
When lib eral morality is claimed as Euro pean, it is because in all Euro pean 
coun tries the legitimacy of the state is derived from it, and pub lic institutions 
must be or gan ized in accordance with lib eral prin ciples.1 Euro pean coun tries and 
also the EU feel bound by lib eral prin ciples – and Muslims should learn to feel 
bound to them, too. That is the message of much of current polit ical talk on the 
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While the other chapters in this book discuss the ref er ence to values as they 
are used in polit ical strife around veiling, in this chapter I want to offer a more 
philosophically inspired reflection on lib eralism and value diversity. This will, 
first, serve as helpful background in forma tion when in other chapters it is dis­
cussed how values are figured in national debates, or institutionalized in legal 
regulations, so that we are better able to see how these values are used in the 
debates or instantiated in regulations is in fact a specific in ter pretation of the lib­
eral tradition or a specific way of solving a case of conflicting cultural values.2 
Secondl I found the legal regulations on veiling to contain a ten sion. On the one 
hand, as coun tries in the Euro pean Union express their allegiance to shared 
Euro pean values, held to be uni versal istic and constitutive of lib eral demo cra­
cies, they therefore expect im mig rants to obey the norms based on these values. 
On the other hand, differing legis la tion on the headscarf reveals that coun tries 
across Europe have a different understanding of this common tradition. In this 
chapter, I want to look back and discuss how selected coun tries, namely France, 
the Neth er lands, the UK and Norway, have understood core lib eral values, in 
order to suggest how we can understand that it is pos sible that coun tries can all 
claim to be bound by the same values and yet institutionalize these in radic ally 
different, if not oppos ite, legis la tion. Last, I also want to look forward by dis­
cussing the im plica tions this may have for a Europe that aspires to become 
united in a cultural sense as well. How ‘united in diversity’ is Europe?3 
Liberalism and value diversity 
The classical lib eral solution to guarantee the peaceful co- existence of people 
with different worldviews in one polity is by protecting each indi vidual’s 
freedom to live according to his or her own views of what is ‘good’ to the extent 
that his/her freedom is com pat ible with a like freedom for all. Liberal demo­
cracy, as Bellamy aptly summar ized it, is characterized as follows: ‘Equal rights 
to lib erty are secured through uni ver sal, gen eral laws produced by a consti tu­
tional framework, demo cratic institutions and an eco nomic market embodying 
the re quis ite balance between freedom and equality’ (1999: 1). 
The his tor ical roots of this institutional solution (of indi vidual religious toler­
ance) lay in the Euro pean Wars of Religion in the sixteenth and seven teenth 
century, when both Cath olics and Prot est ants realized that in order to guarantee 
peace within the nation, instead of the cuius regio, eius religio prin ciple (the reli­
gion of the ruler is the religion of the people) it might be better to coexist and to 
con sider religion as a mat ter of indi vidual conscience. In Michael Walzer’s 
words: ‘People kill one another for years and years and then, mercifully, exhaus­
tion sets in, and we call this toleration’ (1983: 10). One might infer from this 
that tolerance is about pragmatic compromise (people let the other be because 
they realized they could not win) or moral indif fer ence (they let the other be 
because after so many deaths they no longer cared what the other believes). 
We speak of tolerance when we find other people’s beliefs or ways of life 
deeply unaccept able, yet feel that we should put up with them on good moral
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grounds (cf. Heyd 1996: 4). This is what differentiates tolerance from either 
pragmatic compromise (we respond with restraint to another’s belief or action, 
because we fear the con sequences) or indif fer ence (we do not care enough to 
react) (ibid.). Why should we tolerate what we find morally wrong? The classi­
cal moral ground for tolerance is respect for personal auto nomy, which refers 
back to the Lockean argument that beliefs are in ternal attitudes and must there­
fore be acquired in freedom, as coercion cannot lead to sincere convictions, and 
to the Millian argument that indi viduals themselves determine what is in their 
best inter est without being interfered with by others. Tolerance is then con­
sidered as a precon dition for this self- rule. Both lines of arguments thus lead to 
the idea that we may find certain beliefs or lifestyles wrong, yet think it undesir­
able to deploy the power of the state to suppress them (cf. van der Burg 1998). 
Out of the respect for personal auto nomy evolved the lib eral conception of a 
pluralist, supposedly impartial and neutral state, which affirms the rights of all 
cit izens to equal con sidera tion, including an equal right to form and express their 
personal beliefs (Williams 1996: 22). From this follows the separation between 
state and church and the neutrality prin ciple. The first means that be lievers 
should be free to practise their belief without state interference, but also that the 
church does not interfere in state pol itics. Public authorities should base their 
actions on values and prin ciples – that is a common polit ical conception of 
justice – which people can identi fy with irrespective of their par ticu lar world-
views. So, neutrality does not imply that the state should abstain from any ref er­
ence to values, but that it abstains from identification with one specific 
worldview. Otherwise it could not fulfil its function of ordering a pluralistic 
soci ety, for it would then not treat all worldviews as equals (Musschenga 1991). 
Public pol icy should not have the aim to promote a specific conception of the 
good, nor should it in its effect favour one worldview over the others, and pub lic 
authorities should not in their justification of their actions refer to the values of 
one specific worldview. We can differentiate, hence, between neutrality of aim, 
neutrality of effect and neutrality of justification (Galston 1991). The aim of a 
lib eral state is thus to create the circumstances that give cit izens the freedom to 
live according to their own beliefs, provided that their way of life does not 
restrict the freedom of others. This freedom to devise one’s own life is what the 
right of auto nomy refers to. In a lib eral soci ety there is, therefore, also a place 
for non- liberal indi viduals and non- liberal groups. The only restriction is that in 
a lib eral polity cit izens have to abide by lib eral norms in their pub lic life. In their 
private life, how ever, they are free to choose other belief sys tems, provided that 
they do not harm the freedom of others, including other group members. This 
short his tor ical digression shows that lib eralism of old aspires to provide a moral 
framework that is able to deal with value diversity. It is its raison d’être. 
Liberalism: a toolbox, not a recipe book 
I observed that in the coun tries studied, the pres ence of Muslim im mig rants led 
to a recon sidera tion of existing rules and ar range ments and gave rise to new 
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legis la tion. I will come back to this shortly, but the question I want to address, 
first, is how it is pos sible that coun tries have different, sometimes even oppos ite 
justifications of rules and regulations? How can the wearing of a headscarf in 
one coun try be con sidered as a human freedom right and count on state protec­
tion, and in the other be con sidered as an attack on freedom and therefore be 
banned? And both are done in the name of lib eralism? The explanation is that 
lib eral theory is not a recipe book that tells us what to do. Liberal prin ciples are 
generic and hence there is a range within which they can be in ter preted. The 
Canadian philo sopher Joseph Carens explains it thus: ‘Every lib eral demo cratic 
polit ical com mun ity must recog nize certain prin ciples . . . but there are many dif­
ferent ways of in ter preting these prin ciples and many different forms of practice 
among lib eral demo cratic states’ (2000: 7). This observation leads Carens to 
suppose ‘that there is a range of reason able dis agree ment about what the prin­
ciples of demo cratic justice require, and that within that range different polit ical 
com munit ies are morally free to adopt different institutional ar range ments and 
pol icies’ (ibid.). Therefore, according to Carens, national con texts can and some­
times should be morally decisive, so that what may be a de fens ible solution in 
one national con text is, given the dif fer ences in his tory and polit ical culture 
between lib eral states, not neces sar ily a de fens ible solution in the con text of 
other lib eral demo cratic regimes (ibid.). 
Second, gen eral prin ciples are too indeterminate to reach a judgement in spe­
cific cases (cf. Parekh 2000). Moreover, as Melissa Williams (2005) argues, 
justice arguments provide strong founda tions for tolerating and accommodating 
cultural minor it ies, but they also provide strong reasons for drawing limits to 
toleration. When we look at par ticu lar cases, lib eral prin ciples often pull against 
each other and there are often freedom and equality arguments on both sides of 
the issues (ibid.). We saw in the ana lysis of national headscarf debates in the 
chapters of this book that in the name of equality (between the sexes) a ban on 
headscarves was issued in France, while in the Neth er lands the Commission on 
Equal Treatment ruled that equality (between religions) required that pub lic 
school teachers should be allowed to wear a headscarf. Liberal prin ciples must 
be applied in a specific con text. The weighing of different prin ciples may differ 
between nation states and thus lead to different pol icy outcomes. 
Universal rules, national regulation 
In Chapter 5, the various ways the headscarf is regulated in the eight coun tries 
under study were examined. Let us now return to ex plor ing the question of how 
different national ways exist to regulate the headscarf despite the fact that they 
all pay tribute to the lib eral tradition. The main argument of this ana lysis is that 
as lib eral values are generic and hence underdetermined, they leave room for 
in ter pretation. In this in ter pretation there are dif fer ences in national his tory and 
culture. In other words, there are national dif fer ences in regulation, because there 
is no one right way to instantiate lib eral prin ciples into concrete institutions and 
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11). The examples of France and the Neth er lands are used to illus trate this argu­
ment.4 These two coun tries were chosen because Dutch regulations represent a 
tolerant model and French regulations a pro hibitive model re gard ing the wearing 
of headscarves. 
On 15 March 2004, in France the law banning conspicuous signs of religious 
affili ation was passed. How did this come to pass? In 2003, French Socialists 
submitted a law- proposal to ban all religious, polit ical and philosophic symbols 
from schools (Law proposal no. 2096; quoted in Lettinga and Saharso 2009: 
257). Donning the headscarf was framed as a ‘contestation of French values and 
culture’ (referring to gender equality and the freedom of indi vidual conscience), 
and ‘a rejection, often imposed on young girls, of the Repub lican and laic model 
of integration’ (ibid.). The prob lem ana lysis was that a growing com munalism in 
the suburbs would con trib ute to this funda mentalism that fragmented the nation 
in separatist and pos sibly violent com munit ies where the rights of women were 
being under mined. While the ‘right’ and other par ties on the ‘left’ had already 
made this dia gnosis before, now the socialists also believed that both teachers 
and secular parents who wanted their chil dren to be free from religious manipu­
lation in pub lic schools needed to be sup ported. Strict com pliance with laïcité
was neces sary to safeguard gender equality to protect the unity of the nation and 
to uphold the equality and lib erty of all cit izens (ibid.). 
At about the same time (2004) in the Neth er lands, a parlia ment ary research 
committee that had been estab lished to study the integration of migrants in 
Dutch soci ety (the Commission Blok) (TK 28 689, no. 8, March 2004) advised 
against a ban on headscarves. The chair of this Commission, the lib eral Stef 
Blok, explained why the Commission did not favour a gen eral ban on head-
scarves for the civil ser vice at large, but only for certain pub lic functions that 
require a uniform, such as the police force, or for functional reasons of commu­
nication or safety: the Dutch approach 
is different from, e.g., the French approach. We find it the respons ib ility of 
the woman in question and hence not of her husband or of imams. Also the 
con sequence [of covering] is her own respons ib ility. . . . On my view, it is 
very irrespons ible to be dog matic in this regard, because each case should 
be judged on its own. The main point is that it is someone’s own choice. If 
you want to restrict it, you need to show good reasons for it. 
(TK 28 689, no. 14, 16 March 2004, pp. 4245, 4255,
quoted in Lettinga and Saharso 2009: 247) 
Obviously, pub lic neutrality was not a good enough reason. This is because the 
Dutch, in contrast to the French, saw no im min ent conflict between the headscarf 
and pub lic neutrality. In specific cases a ban might be warranted. We see that for 
the Dutch the auto nomy of the woman was made paramount without further 
questioning her freedom to decide for herself. The French, on the other hand, 
saw the headscarf as conflicting with pub lic neutrality and wanted to protect the 
auto nomy of girls (to choose not to wear a headscarf ) against their com munit ies 
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(on the presumption that the latter were pressuring them into wearing a head-
scarf ). The key to understanding these different applica tions of lib eral values is 
both coun tries’ national histories. Both in France and the Neth er lands the con­
flict over who would shape the loyalties and values of the cit izenry is par ticu­
larly centred on education and wel fare. French Repub lican nation building was 
an anti- clerical pro ject. French secularism de veloped not only as a mech an ism to 
free the state from religious influence, it also became a tool to emancipate indi­
vidual cit izens from (religious) com munit ies seeking control over their members 
(Scott 2007). The French concept of secularism, therefore, strictly sep ar ates a 
polit ical religious free sphere from a private sphere (laïcité). The pub lic school 
in French repub licanism is con sidered as an anti- social institution, whose aim is 
to free chil dren from their com munal ties and to instal in them an idea of uni ver­
sal cit izen ship that does not differentiate according to gender or religion. Muslim 
girls who wanted to cover, thus marking their body as gendered, funda mentally 
contradicted the Repub lican ideo logy in both ways. In contrast to France, Dutch 
secularism sought to protect the freedom of religious minor it ies from the lib eral 
state. In the Neth er lands’ school struggle the or tho dox Prot est ants’ credo of 
‘sover eignty within one’s sphere of life’ and the Roman Cath olic subsidiarity 
prin ciple demanded that it was the right of intermediary groups, like the family 
and church, and not the state, to socialize chil dren. The Dutch pillarized school 
sys tem therefore is a dual sys tem of pub lic and, mainly religious, private schools 
that are both fully state funded (Monsma and Soper 1997). Moreover, in pluralist 
Neth er lands with its his tory of pillarization, the task of the school is not to teach 
pupils a common morality, but to teach them to respect the different moral 
values that exist in Dutch soci ety (Dutch Law on Primary Education, section 8.3, 
The Hague, 2 July 1981). In the Neth er lands, schoolgirls wearing a headscarf are 
not perceived as a prob lem, since school education was and is supposed to link 
up with the first socialization milieu. So, we see that both coun tries’ different 
reaction to the veil is at least in part explained by their different understanding of 
the prin ciple of the separation of state and church. As explained above, the sepa­
ration of state and church contains a double meaning: the state should not inter­
fere in the religious life of its cit izens and the church should not interfere in state 
affairs. Historically, the French placed the emphasis on the latter meaning, the 
Dutch on the first: the state is not to interfere in cit izens’ private (religious) life. 
The dif fer ences in regulating the veil between France and the Neth er lands can 
then be traced back to their different his tor ical institutionalization of state– 
church relations, to Repub licanism and pillarization, respectively. 
The aim of this short comparison was to illus trate the point that national tradi­
tions determine the institutionalization of lib eral prin ciples (for a more extensive 
discussion see Chapter 7).5 This leads to the next issue, namely, what does this 
mean for the Euro pean level? Harmonization clearly requires a recon sidera tion 
of current national in ter pretations of lib eral values. I believe there is such a need, 
but not neces sar ily only for reasons of harmon iza tion. This will be explained 
first, followed by an examination of the Euro pean level. 
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Reconsidering current interpretations 
Given its his tor ical background it would seem that lib eral morality is perfectly 
suited to deal with value diversity. Yet, obviously it is not or other wise there 
would not be so much contestation over the Islamic veil or multiculturalism in 
gen eral (Kılıç et al. 2008; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). There are two 
reasons why lib eral morality might to be readjusted. One reason, frequently put 
forward in the debate on gender and multiculturalism, is that im mig rant groups 
have brought with them traditions that are harmful to their members, while not 
being adequately addressed by current law (see Phillips and Saharso 2008). Pro­
totypical examples are female genital cutting and forced marriage; this argument 
is also made with regard to the headscarf (as it is suspected that young girls are 
forced by their com munit ies to wear a headscarf ). Those who believe that exist­
ing laws fail to offer minor ity group members adequate protection against their 
group culture, argue that these laws need to be changed. Liberal prin ciples 
should be institutionalized in a more restrictive way so as to prevent oppression 
of vulner able minor ity group members. A second reason to recon sider lib eralism 
is argued by defenders of multiculturalism (e.g. Parekh 2000). They argue that 
when the rules were made, these im mig rant groups were not present, and there­
fore their point of view and their needs could not be taken into con sidera tion. 
Now that lib eral states have become more diverse due to migration, it can no 
longer be taken for granted that the values and prin ciples on which state legis la­
tion is based are shared by all. Current rules may betray an identification with 
the worldview of the majority popu la tion that no longer befits the multicultural 
soci ety. Legal rules may nolens volens promote or favour the dominant world-
view or rest on justifications that refer to values that are no longer shared by all. 
This also points to the need to recon sider pub lic values and prin ciples. How 
should they be in ter preted in a diverse soci ety so that they also do justice to the 
cultures of the newly im mig rated groups? This is also neces sary, because when 
minor ity groups have the feeling that the gen eral opera tional values of a soci ety 
(ibid.) discriminate against their (religious) culture, they will not identi fy with 
soci ety and feel excluded and/or exclude themselves. An example is the Rushdie 
affair in the UK. Many Muslims at that time took offence to Salman Rushdie’s 
novel, The Satanic Verses (1988).6 Muslim leaders in the UK felt that their reli­
gion deserved equal protection against libel as offered to the Anglican Church. 
The existing anti- blasphemy law applied only to the Church of England and they 
now demanded that this law should also extend to their religion. This gave rise 
to a pub lic debate. Some argued that the anti- blasphemy law should not be 
extended to other religions than the Church of England, because Chris tianity is 
constitutive for Britain’s identity. Chris tianity therefore rightly enjoyed a special 
polit ical status. Others, how ever, believed that the prin ciple of equality required 
either disestab lishment of the Anglican Church (and with it the abol ish ment of 
special protection like the anti- blasphemy law) or exten sion of the anti- 
blasphemy law to other religions (see Parekh 2000: 258–60 and Parekh chapter 
10 for a reconstruction of the Rushdie affair). The arrival of im mig rants with 
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different religions required the British to re think their institutionalized state– 
church relationship and anti- blasphemy law. Immigration may require Euro pean 
coun tries gen erally to re think their legal institutionalization of lib eral values and 
prin ciples, be it as some believe because current laws offer too little protection 
against newly imported illib eral traditions or because the current legal institu­
tions are biased towards the way of life of the dominant population. 
A common European standard? 
Immigrants are asked to adapt to Euro pean values, which are in fact, as argued 
in this chapter, lib eral demo cratic values. Liberal polit ical morality de veloped to 
provide a moral framework that is able to deal with value diversity. Yet, why 
then does the Islamic headscarf form a prob lem? The headscarf is heavily 
debated because some believe it compromises central lib eral values. Liberal 
theory, I argued, is not a recipe book that tells us what to do, as lib eral prin ciples 
are generic and therefore offer room for in ter pretation. This chapter also covered 
that differing legis la tion on the headscarf reveals that coun tries across Europe 
have a different understanding of the lib eral tradition. Let us now look forward 
by discussing the im plica tions this has for a Europe that aspires to become united 
in a cultural sense. If different member states have in ter preted the lib eral tradi­
tion differently, what does this make of the ambition already formulated in the 
1996 Euro pean Commission First Report on the Consideration of Cultural 
Aspects in Euro pean Community Action to de velop a ‘Euro pean model of soci­
ety built on a set of values common to all Euro pean soci eties’ (CEC 1996: 102, 
quoted in Shore 2000: 40). Both the Euro pean Court of Human Rights in the 
Council of Europe con text and the EU have afforded a wide ‘margin of apprecia­
tion’ to coun tries for detailed adjustment of their national regulations, leading to 
the adoption of many different approaches in striking a balance between the 
values, prin ciples and inter ests at stake (see Chapter 5). Politicians on the Euro­
pean level thus seem to want to leave the dis cre tion over cultural and religious 
mat ters to the indi vidual member states. This may be under stand able, as the 
issue touches upon the question of how cit izens should be united in the nation. 
Countries have de veloped in this their own national traditions and com mit ment 
to their own traditions runs deep, as they are a mat ter of national identity. They 
may therefore not be inclined to give up these traditions. Nevertheless, if one 
wants to de velop a common stand ard, addressing the issue on a Euro pean level 
is un avoid able, and the issue has entered the Euro pean agenda anyway through 
the back door of the Euro pean anti- discrimination directives and case law from 
the Euro pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). EC Directive 2000/78 forbids 
discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief. So far no national headscarf 
cases have been submitted to the Euro pean Court of Justice (ECJ), but as 
Berghahn (in this book) already explained, the EJC would most likely judge that 
laws restricting em ployees’ right to wear a headscarf constitute discrimination. 
As national legal regulations must comply with EU directives, coun tries with 
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lead to harmon iza tion, were it not for the fact that the ECtHR on the other hand 
has ruled in several headscarf cases that the coun tries concerned had rightly 
restricted the right to wear a headscarf. The ECtHR rulings, how ever, are based 
on the understanding that member states are free to in ter pret the neutrality prin­
ciple and institutionalize state–church relations according to their own national 
traditions (the wide ‘margin of appreciation’). As long as member states are 
allowed to keep this wide dis cre tionary scope, this will work against the 
de velopment of a common Euro pean standard. 
Still, a Euro pean stand ard seems to be in the making. Head covering requires 
Euro pean coun tries to re think how they want to understand the values of lib­
eralism. This is in fact what is already happening because that is what the pub lic 
debates are about. When we look at the con tent of the debates and the changes in 
legal regulation we can observe that in tolerant coun tries there is a strong pres­
sure to tighten regulation and insofar as regulation has changed it has become 
stricter. While in the Euro pean con text the French and Turkish strict understand­
ing of neutrality is rather the exception than the rule, in the national debates in 
the other coun tries this strict in ter pretation is now often promoted as a regulative 
ideal. The judgements in the headscarf cases that were brought before the 
ECtHR (see Chapters 4 and 5) are often (mis)in ter preted in a way that the strictly 
secular regulation could be taken for the dominant ideal on a Euro pean level. 
The recon sidera tion of lib eral values that is now taking place is not so much 
inspired then by a multicultural concern that current legal institutions are biased 
towards the way of life of the majority popu la tion, but rather by the fear that the 
current institutionalization of lib eral values offers too little protection against 
illib eral cultures. Thereby the gender card is frequently drawn: across Europe the 
dominant frame is that the headscarf is violating gender equality (see Chapter 1). 
National debates evolve around the question of what place a gendered Islamic 
religious practice should have in a lib eral soci ety. The answer is de pend ent on 
how one wants to in ter pret and balance lib eral values. This makes the headscarf 
issue prim arily an intra- liberal conflict, not a conflict of religious values against 
Euro pean lib eral values. Against the idea that gender equality self- evidently 
requires the right to wear the hijab to be restricted, there are many counter argu­
ments. First, it can and has been argued (by the Norwegian Ombud, see Siim and 
Skjeie 2008: 332) that as only women wear a headscarf, a ban on headscarves is 
a burden on women only and therefore an instance of indirect gender discrimina­
tion. One might of course object that here it concerns a self- chosen religious 
obli ga tion (choice), the con sequences of which the person should bear herself, 
and not a religious obli ga tion per se (circumstance) in which case an exemption 
pol icy might be justified (cf. Dworkin 1989). The Norwegian Ombud, but also 
the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission has understood it as a religious obli ga­
tion, arguing that it is not an indi vidual idiosyncrasy but a large group of 
be lievers who in ter prets it as such. Second, it has been questioned whether 
the headscarf can be un equi voc ally understood as an expression of gender 
in equal ity and whether judges (or other outsiders) have the authority to decide 
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Seyla Benhabib (2002) has pointed out. And there are many statements from 
Islamic women who claim that for them the headscarf is not a symbol of gender 
equality (ibid.). In Austria, the hijab is con sidered as an in ternal religious affair 
that therefore falls under the authority of the religious organ iza tion only (Gresch
et al. 2008: 421). Third, even if we accept for the sake of the argument that the 
hijab is an expression of gender in equal ity, what if women voluntarily choose to 
wear the symbol of their sexual submission? Prins and Saharso (2001) have 
argued that it is not at all evid ent why the value of gender equality should take 
pre ced ence over the right of auto nomy. Liberal values, therefore, allow far more 
room for al tern ative in ter pretation than is reflected in current pub lic debates on 
the issue. While the narrowness of the debate risks running into a rather illib eral 
lib eralism, the arrival of new cultures in Europe could also be an oppor tun ity to 
self- critically interrogate current Euro pean in ter pretations of the lib eral tradition 
and combine them with the desire to de velop common Euro pean values. Instead 
of returning to a secular cuius regio, eius religio, let’s not miss that opportunity. 
Notes 
1 A note of clarification. Values refer to what should be strived for from the idea that the 
good should be done, e.g. justice, freedom, equality. Principles are ‘gen eral moral and 
polit ical pro posi tions [that are derived from these values], like Do not inflict un neces­
sary suffering or Citizens must be treated equally’ (Benhabib 2002: 107). Norms are 
concrete guidelines for beha vi our. Norms connect values and prin ciples (gen eral) and 
beha vi our (concrete) as they tell us how we should behave in concrete situ ations. Ben­
habib (2002: 107) again: ‘Principles permit a plurality of norm ative concretizations; 
the same prin ciple may be instantiated through different norms and institutions.’ 
2 Liberalism is but one moral doctrine. When groups that adhere to a non- liberal doctrine 
settle in lib eral states this may give rise to conflicts of value diversity. These conflicts 
require a solution, e.g. gov ern ments adopt new legislation. 
3 ‘United in Diversity’ was adopted as the Euro pean Union’s motto in 2000. The motto 
means that, via the EU, Euro peans are united in working together for peace and pros­
perity, and that the many different cultures, traditions and languages in Europe are a 
pos it ive asset for the continent, online, avail able at: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/ 
motto/index_en.htm (accessed 8 Septem ber 2010). 
4 The fol low ing sections are based on Lettinga and Saharso (2009), translation by the 
authors. 
5 There is also reasonably extensive research liter at ure sup porting the thesis that nation- 
bound traditions of cit izen ship are respons ible for the fact that Euro pean coun tries have 
responded differently to the pres ence of migrants (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Entz­
inger 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005). 
6 	The Satanic Verses is a fantasy about two actors from India travelling on an airplane.
After a terrorist bomb blows up the airplane, they fall to Earth and survive. The contro­
versial parts of the book centre on just two chapters. One of the Indian actors apparently
is losing his mind. He dreams about God revealing his will to the Prophet Muhammad,
who passes on the sacred words to humanity through the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam.
But the novel refers to Muhammad by an insulting name used by Chris tians in the Middle
Ages. As part of the dream sequence, a scribe called ‘Salman’ writes down God’s com­
mands that are coming from the lips of Muhammad. The scribe, how ever, decides to play
a trick by changing some of the divine words. Since Muslims hold the Qur’an as the
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to an old legend retold by Rushdie. According to the legend, some of the Qur’an’s ori­
ginal verses origin ated with Satan, and Muhammad later deleted them. By repeating this
legend, Rushdie offended Muslims by associating the holy Qur’an with the work of
Satan. One part of the novel prob ably outraged Muslims the most. It de scribes people
mocking and imitating Muhammad’s 12 wives. Muslims revere Muhammad’s wives as
the ‘mothers of all be lievers’. See online, avail able at: www.crf- usa.org/america­
responds-to- terrorism/blasphemy- salman-rushdie.html (accessed 25 Au gust 2010). 
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VEIL project’s frame analysis 
























These major frames are composed of subframes. The VEIL pro ject identified 32 
subframes, as shown in Table A.1. 
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